Opinion
C/A No.: 6:20-2754-TMC-SVH
09-02-2020
David Green, Jr., #300923-0355, Plaintiff, v. Director S. Bodiford; State of South Carolina; 13th Circuit Judge Letitia Verdin; Greenville County; Sgt. Hall; Sgt. Gantt; Ofc. Burris; and Ofc. Neely, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
David Green ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed this complaint for alleged violations of his civil rights by Greenville County Detention Center ("GCDC") Director S. Bodiford, State of South Carolina, 13th Circuit Judge Letitia Verdin, Greenville County, Sergeant Hall, Sergeant Gantt, Officer Burris, and Officer Neely (collectively "Defendants"). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the amended complaint. I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that Judge Verdin violated his constitutional rights by "adding a extra $5,000.00 bond to a hold for the State of Maryland." [ECF No. 11 at 1-2]. Plaintiff further alleges Verdin changed "the number of already paid bond which had been paid over a year ago and was revoke[d] by said judge to no wrongful doing of the Plaintiff because the Plaintiff was never released from detention due to him not being eligible for a G.P.S. monitor." Id. at 2.
Plaintiff alleges Bodiford has violated his equal protection rights because detainees on the new side of GCDC have better mats for sleeping and more visitation hours. Id. at 6. Plaintiff further alleges Bodiford "let more whites go to the new side than blacks." Id.
Plaintiff also claims Bodiford has violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to COVID-19 because of officers and other detainees placed in his unit. Id. at 6. Although Plaintiff alleges that Bodiford had not tested him, he states that he may have already had COVID-19 because he was weak, sore, unable to eat meals, and had cold flashes for about a week. Id. at 6-7, 9. Plaintiff further alleges Greenville County and the State of South Carolina are responsible for failing to follow social distancing guidelines and protect inmates from the spread of COVID-19. Id. at 9.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 27, 2020. [ECF No. 1]. On July 31, 2020, the undersigned issued an order and notice cautioning Plaintiff that his case was subject to summary dismissal and permitting him until August 21, 2020, to attempt to correct defects in his complaint. [ECF Nos. 5, 6]. On August 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. [ECF No. 11]. II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. Judicial Immunity
It is well-settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and such immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. Id. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) ("A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'") (citation omitted). Although Plaintiff alleges Verdin acted without jurisdiction, he provides no basis for his statement and appears to acknowledge that Verdin is responsible for determining bonds. Plaintiff's allegations show, at most, that Verdin acted in excess of authority, which is insufficient to deprive Verdin of judicial immunity. Plaintiff's claims relate to Judge Verdin's judicial actions, and she is entitled to absolute immunity.
2. Greenville County and State of South Carolina
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff names the Greenville County and the State of South Carolina, neither of which are "persons" subject to suit under § 1983. A judicial circuit is not considered a legal entity subject to suit. See Harden v. Green, 27 F. App'x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not "person" under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Greenville County and the State of South Carolina are subject to summary dismissal.
Additionally, Greenville County and the State of South Carolina would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
3. Failure to State a Claim as to Bodiford
Plaintiff's claim concerning Bodiford's actions related to COVID-19 are insufficient to state a constitutional violation. Although Plaintiff claims "I myself may have had it but it ran right through me" [ECF No. 11 at 6], he has not provided any facts showing Bodiford was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of medical harm to Plaintiff.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his equal protection rights. Although he alleges more whites than blacks are housed on the newer side of GCDC, such allegations are too vague to state a cause of action. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
4. Failure of a HIP False Report
Plaintiff's allegations that an officer's filing of a false HIP report denied him due process are also insufficient to state a claim pursuant to § 1983. Plaintiff's allegations fail to show deliberate indifference generally needed to show a violation of constitutional rights. To the extent Plaintiff believes his constitutional rights have been violated in his state criminal proceedings, he should raise those issues in his state case.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Petitioner states he is currently detained pending disposition of state criminal charges, satisfying the first part of the test. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted that "the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Fourth Circuit has addressed the third criterion in noting "'that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Petitioner can pursue his claims that he failed to receive a fair hearing in state court during the disposition of his criminal charges. III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Although Plaintiff is now detained in Maryland to face charges there, there is no indication that his South Carolina charges were dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. September 2, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).