Opinion
No. 75862-COA
04-17-2020
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC, N/K/A DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, Appellant, v. PREMIER ONE HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
Green Tree Servicing, LLC, n/k/a Ditech Financial, LLC (Ditech), appeals from a final judgment following a bench trial in a quiet title action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; James Crockett, Judge.
The original owners of the six subject properties failed to make periodic payments to their respective homeowners' associations (HOA). The HOAs recorded notices of delinquent assessment liens and later notices of default and elections to sell to collect on the past due assessments and other fees pursuant to NRS Chapter 116. Respondent Premier One Holdings, Inc. (Premier One), purchased the properties at the resulting foreclosure sales and filed the underlying action seeking to quiet title against Ditech, the beneficiary of the first deeds of trust on all of the properties. The parties later filed competing motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied in a written order without explanation. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Premier One, finding that Ditech failed to prove that the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) owned the underlying loans such that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) (the Federal Foreclosure Bar) would have prevented the foreclosure sales from extinguishing Ditech's deeds of trust. This appeal followed.
Ditech challenges both the district court's verdict and its decision to deny Ditech's motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in Ditech's favor, we consider only that decision. See Univ. of Nev., Reno v. Stacey, 116 Nev. 428, 431, 997 P.2d 812, 814 (2000) (considering the district court's decision denying summary judgment in the context of an appeal from a final judgment following trial). This court reviews a district court's order regarding summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. When deciding a summary judgment motion, all evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. General allegations and conclusory statements do not create genuine issues of fact. Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1030-31.
A review of the record from the underlying proceeding reveals that, at the time Ditech moved for summary judgment, no genuine issue of material fact remained, and Ditech was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. The testimony and business records produced by Ditech were sufficient to prove Fannie Mae's ownership of the underlying notes and the agency relationship between it and Ditech (or Ditech's predecessor) in the absence of contrary evidence. See Daisy Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 135 Nev. 230, 234-36, 445 P.3d 846, 849-51 (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on similar evidence and concluding that neither the loan servicing agreement nor the original promissory note must be produced for the Federal Foreclosure Bar to apply). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Ditech such that the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented extinguishment of its deed of trust and that Premier One took the property subject to it. See Saticoy Bay LLC Series 9641 Christine View v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 134 Nev. 270, 273-74, 417 P.3d 363, 367-68 (2018) (holding that the Federal Foreclosure Bar preempts NRS 116.3116 such that it prevents extinguishment of the property interests of regulated entities under FHFA conservatorship without affirmative FHFA consent); see also Pink v. Busch, 100 Nev. 684, 691, 691 P.2d 456, 461 (1984) ("[U]pon reversal, where the material facts have been fully developed at trial and are undisputed such that the issues remaining are legal rather than factual, we will . . . remand the case to the lower court with directions to enter judgment in accordance with [our order].").
To the extent Premier One argues that assignments of the deeds of trust on some of the properties prior to the foreclosure sales indicate that Fannie Mae did not have an interest in the underlying loans, the supreme court recognized in Daisy Trust that Freddie Mac (or in this case Fannie Mae) obtains its interest in a loan by virtue of the promissory note being negotiated to it. 135 Nev. at 234 n.3, 445 P.3d at 849 n.3. Section A2-1-04 of the Fannie Mae Servicing Guide, of which we take judicial notice, NRS 47.130; NRS 47.170, stands for the same proposition. Consequently, because the promissory note had already been negotiated to Fannie Mae at the time of the relevant assignments of the deeds of trust, the assignors lacked authority to transfer the notes, and any language in the assignments purporting to do so had no effect. See 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 111 (2019) ("An assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and ordinarily obtains only the rights possessed by the assignor at the time of the assignment, and no more.").
Insofar as the parties raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.
/s/_________, C.J.
Gibbons
/s/_________, J.
Tao
/s/_________, J.
Bulla cc: Hon. James Crockett, District Judge
Wolfe & Wyman LLP
Morris Law Center
Fennemore Craig P.C./Reno
Eighth District Court Clerk