Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-1556 (NHP).
February 16, 1999.
Mr. Barry Grant, PN #289591, EAST JERSEY STATE PRISON, Lock Bag R, Rahway, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Kathy Stroh Mendoza, Deputy Attorney General, PETER VERNIERO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendants
William H. Fauver, State of New Jersey, Department of Corrections Stephen D. Holtzman, Esq., Vanessa P. Patrizi, Esq., LALLY, HOLTZMAN, GILLIGAN, DUFFIN QUASTI, P.C. Linwood, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
LETTER OPINION ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc., for summary judgment. This matter was resolved without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated herein, defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Furthermore, plaintiff Barry Grant's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ONLY AS TO DEFENDANT CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 29, 1998, plaintiff Barry Grant ("plaintiff"), an inmate of the New Jersey State Prison system currently incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint against defendants William H. Fauver, former Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Nurse [first name unknown] Spencer, V.R.U. c/o [first name unknown] Watkins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation in the amount of $250,000.00.Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 19, 1997, while incarcerated at V.R.U. prison in Trenton, New Jersey, he slipped and fell down a flight of stairs. See Exhibit A, copy of plaintiff's Complaint at ¶ 4. Plaintiff indicates that, as a result of that fall, he became unconscious, dislocated his back and was required to use a splint on his right arm. Id. In his Complaint, plaintiff essentially contends that Correctional Medical Services, Inc. ("CMS") failed to provide adequate care to his medical needs.
Thereafter, defendant CMS filed the present motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment
The standard governing a summary judgment motion is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which provides, in pertinent part, that:
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Procedurally, the movant has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of genuine issues of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). When the movant will bear the burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden can be discharged by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id. at 325. If the movant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-movant to do more than "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
In this matter, there are no genuine issues of material fact and therefore, summary judgment is appropriate in these circumstances.
II. § 1983 and Medical Conditions
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant has deprived him of a right secured under the constitution, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In this matter, plaintiff alleges that defendant CMS violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. More specifically, plaintiff contends that CMS provided inadequate care in connection with the slip and fall incident at V.R.U. prison.
To prove a violation of one's Eighth Amendment rights, the plaintiff "must satisfy both the objective and subjective elements of a cruel and unusual punishment allegation." Diaz v. Edgar, 831 F. Supp. 621, 623-24 (N.D.Ill. 1993). The objective prong of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the deprivation be "sufficiently serious." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Notably, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment analysis is "contextual and responsive to `contemporary standards of decency.'"Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). Accordingly, the courts have indicated that a condition will be deemed "sufficiently serious" if the "`conditions. . ., alone or in combination, deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'" Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981),cert. denied, sub. nom., Union County Jail Inmates v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1101, sub. nom., Di Buono v. Fauver, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984))).
The subjective element of an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis requires that the plaintiff show that the resulting injury was caused by the prison official's "deliberate indifference."Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 820 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd dub nom,Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). To establish that a state actor was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's conditions of confinement, it must be shown that the prison official acted with "subjective recklessness." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). In other words,
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837. Thus, an analysis of the prison official's state of mind is entirely mandatory in the determination of whether the complainant has suffered cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 838.
Notably, "[w]here a person is suffering injury as an incidental and unintended consequence of official actions, the abuse of power contemplated in the Due Process and Eighth Amendment cases does not arise." Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir. 1979). Accordingly, mere negligence on the part of a state official does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986). See also Office of Inmate Advocacy v. Fauver, 222 N.J. Super. 357, 360 (N.J.Super.Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 111 N.J. 637 (1988).
In the present matter, plaintiff contends that CMS failed to provide adequate medical care in connection with the slip and fall incident at V.R.U. prison.
A state clearly has the obligation to provide medical care for inmates at a penal institution since inmates at a prison are unable to provide medical care for themselves. In the Matter of the Commitment of F.H., 258 N.J. Super. 532, 536-537 (N.J.Super.Ct. A.D. 1992). A medical need meets the objective prong and is, therefore, "sufficiently serious" if the condition is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987),cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988) (citing Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a condition is "sufficiently serious" if "a failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury or death.").
In this matter, plaintiff has not alleged that the deprivation suffered is "sufficiently serious." Plaintiff merely proffers a blanket statement that CMS "fail[ed] to properly treat my injuries." Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has met the first prong of the inquiry, namely that the deprivation suffered was "sufficiently serious," plaintiff has not alleged that CMS was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
To establish deliberate indifference to the medical needs of an inmate, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the prison guards intentionally delayed or denied access to the inmate's treatment once such treatment was prescribed by a physician. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A showing of deliberate indifference requires "facts which indicate not only the conduct but also the attitude of prison authorities." Smith v. Fielder, 867 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D.Wis. 1994). Notably, not every "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care," however, can be deemed violative of the Eighth Amendment. It is only such "deliberate indifference" that can affront "evolving standards of decency" in direct contradiction to the Eighth Amendment.Id. at 106.
In the present matter, plaintiff merely contends that CMS failed to properly treat his injuries in connection with the slip and fall incident which took place on July 19, 1997. There are no allegations in plaintiff's Complaint to support the contention that CMS acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. In fact, the documentation attached to both plaintiff's Complaint and CMS' brief in support of motion for summary judgment reveals that plaintiff was examinedimmediately after the fall and was transferred to St, Francis Medical Center for a complete evaluation and diagnostic study. See Plaintiff's Complaint; Defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B. The medical records also indicate that plaintiff was, in fact, provided with follow- up care. Id. Finally, the Requests for Administrative Remedy Forms attached to plaintiff's Complaint do not provide a basis for arguing that CMS was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs. Instead, these forms indicate that plaintiff was continuously being seen and treated for his injuries by the medical department.
CONCLUSION
Fore the foregoing reasons, defendant Correctional Medical Services, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Furthermore, plaintiff Barry Grant's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE ONLY AS TO DEFENDANT CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.