From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Grant v. DCA Food Industries, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Nov 20, 1986
124 A.D.2d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

Opinion

November 20, 1986

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Saratoga County (Ford, J.).


Plaintiff was first employed by defendant in 1966 in its credit department. He subsequently transferred to defendant's retail bakery sales division and in 1979 was promoted to field sales manager of this division. In August 1982, defendant's corporate headquarters were transferred from New York to Jessup, Maryland. At that time, plaintiff commenced reporting to defendant's management in Maryland instead of in New York. Plaintiff, however, did not move to Maryland at this time, as he continued to work from defendant's remaining office in New York. In April 1983, plaintiff moved his office to defendant's headquarters in Jessup, Maryland. In August 1983, plaintiff relocated his home to Maryland. Defendant paid plaintiff's moving expenses and reimbursed plaintiff for other relocation expenses, including closing costs and the real estate commission incurred in selling his old home. Subsequently, in 1984, pursuant to corporate reorganization plans, the retail sales division was transferred to another division of defendant and plaintiff's job was eliminated.

Plaintiff then commenced the instant action in which he alleges that defendant fraudulently induced him to relocate to Maryland. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that "defendant falsely and fraudulently stated to [him], that if [he] relocated to Jessup, Maryland * * * his job would not be terminated and that he would be assured of a steady and secure employment with the defendant company". In due course, defendant moved for summary judgment. This motion was granted and the instant appeal ensued. We affirm.

Initially, we note that there was no written contract of employment. Consequently, the alleged oral assurances of continued employment, even if established, are void and unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a] [1]; see, D N Boening v Kirsh Beverages, 63 N.Y.2d 449; Cunnison v Richardson Greenshields Sec., 107 A.D.2d 50). Moreover, the circumstances alleged here do not estop defendant from invoking the Statute of Frauds (see, Cunnison v Richardson Greenshields Sec., supra, pp 52-53). Since plaintiff cannot prove an enforceable employment contract, his was an employment at will (id., p 55) and, accordingly, defendant had an "unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time" (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304; see also, Cunnison v Richardson Greenshields Sec., supra, p 55). As noted above, plaintiff's allegation of fraud is based upon the assertion that defendant never intended to honor its oral promise to perform the future act of providing plaintiff with steady and secure employment. This allegation is without merit since "[a] failure to perform promises of future acts is merely a breach of contract to be enforced by an action on the contract. A cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract" (Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v Holborn Oil Co., 108 A.D.2d 607, appeal dismissed 65 N.Y.2d 637; see also, Chase v United Hosp., 60 A.D.2d 558, 559). Consequently, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action for fraud.

We have examined plaintiff's remaining contentions and find no issues of fact which would preclude the granting of summary judgment to defendant. The order should therefore be affirmed.

Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, Casey and Weiss, JJ., concur.


In my view, plaintiff's allegations that defendant made assurances of continued employment to induce him to move to Maryland and never intended to honor the promises are sufficient to support a cause of action for fraud (see, Brown v Lockwood, 76 A.D.2d 721, 731). The failure to set forth detailed circumstances constituting the alleged fraud should not result in dismissal of the complaint since fraudulent conduct is inherently secretive such that the facts are within the peculiar knowledge of defendant (see, Jered Contr. Corp. v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 N.Y.2d 187, 194; P.S. Auctions v Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 105 A.D.2d 473, 475).


Summaries of

Grant v. DCA Food Industries, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Nov 20, 1986
124 A.D.2d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
Case details for

Grant v. DCA Food Industries, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:BERT GRANT, Appellant, v. DCA FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Nov 20, 1986

Citations

124 A.D.2d 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)

Citing Cases

Sivel v. Readers Digest, Inc.

The inescapable inference is that plaintiff had rejected the Avon offer prior to the offer he accepted from…

Zinaman v. USTS New York, Inc.

A cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud relates to a breach of contract." Grant v. DCA…