Opinion
E052843 Super.Ct.No. CIVVS1002611
11-15-2011
DWIGHT TIMOTHY GRANDY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROBERT G. FOWLER, as Commissioner, etc. et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Dwight Timothy Grandy, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Sarah L. Overton for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steve Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
Dwight Timothy Grandy, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates and Sarah L. Overton for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and Appellant Dwight Grandy sued (1) the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV); (2) two employees of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department; (3) the Honorable Robert G. Fowler (Fowler), Commissioner of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County; (4) the Honorable Brigid M. McCann (McCann), Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County; and (5) the Honorable Lorenzo R. Balderrama (Balderrama), Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Grandy alleged causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) debts owed to Grandy; (3) fraud; (4) trespass; (5) deprivation of his civil rights (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983); (6) conversion; (7) searching his car without a warrant; (8) failure to train officers and employees; (9) supervisor liability; (10) threats of violence (Civ. Code, § 51.7); and (11) intentional interference with his right of travel.
Grandy's lawsuit emanated from a traffic case, in which Grandy was cited for driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and driving with an object or material applied to his window(s) (§ 26708, subd. (a)(1)). Balderrama, McCann, and Fowler (collectively referred to as "the Judges") allegedly played a part in the traffic case against Grandy. The trial court sustained the Judges' demurrers, without leave to amend. Grandy contends the trial court erred by sustaining the Judges' demurrers because (1) the Judges did not have judicial immunity; (2) Grandy set forth sufficient facts to support his causes of action; and (3) a government claim was properly presented. We affirm the judgments.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BACKGROUND: TRAFFIC CASE
On December 13, 2009, Grandy was cited for driving without a license (§ 12500, subd. (a)), and driving with an object or material applied to his window(s) (§ 26708, subd. (a)(1)). On March 23, 2010, Grandy failed to appear at his arraignment hearing, and Fowler issued a bench warrant for Grandy. On May 26, 2010, Grandy appeared for his arraignment before McCann. The court rejected Grandy's plea of "innocent," and entered a "not guilty" plea. On October 5, 2010, Balderrama denied Grandy's motion to strike the traffic complaint. Grandy's motion to strike was based on an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Grandy filed his complaint in the instant matter on April 19, 2010. Fowler was listed in the complaint. Grandy amended the complaint to add McCann on June 22, 2010, and amended the complaint to add Balderrama on October 27, 2010.
B. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1. FACTS AND PARTIES
In the general "Facts" portion of Grandy's First Amended Complaint, he alleged that public officers were attempting to convert his right to travel into a taxable privilege. Grandy asserted that he was not a driver or an operator of a motor vehicle, and therefore, was not subject to the DMV's jurisdiction. Grandy alleged that an employee of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department (Conway) worked in concert with Fowler to trespass upon Grandy's rights and property, which amounted to "a direct contempt of the court record, breach of agreement, without jurisdiction (jurisdictional vacuum) and under color of law." Also in the "Facts" section, Grandy alleged that a second San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department employee (Woolley) (who appears from the record to be a courtroom bailiff), McCann, Fowler, and Conway worked in concert "under color of law."
In the "Parties" section of the First Amended Complaint, Grandy alleged Fowler and McCann were acting as magistrates and were not involved in judicial functions. Further, Grandy asserted that Fowler and McCann "operated as prosecutors in violation of the separation of powers mandate." When Grandy amended the complaint to add Balderrama, he did so by way of a "Doe" substitution. As a result, there do not appear to be any factual allegations directly concerning Balderrama in the First Amended Complaint.
2. CAUSES OF ACTION
The first cause of action, for breach of contract, did not refer to the Judges. The second cause of action alleged that Fowler and McCann became indebted to Grandy within the last four years (1) because there was a written account between the parties, in which Fowler and McCann agreed to be indebted to Grandy; and (2) Fowler and McCann agreed to (a) pay Grandy for work, services, and materials rendered, (b) pay Grandy $5,000 per hour for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered to them, and (c) pay Grandy for money lent by Grandy to Fowler and McCann.
In the third cause of action for fraud, Grandy alleged that Fowler and McCann breached their agreements and oaths of office because they claimed Grandy was a driver and operator of a motor vehicle "when in fact the[y] knew he was exercising his right to travel." Grandy explained that he was driving in his capacity as a private individual, and therefore, "it was impossible for him to commit a public offense." Grandy further alleged that Fowler and McCann concealed facts by attempting to "claim that everyone is in a commercial activity and therefore a 'driver' and 'operator.'" Additionally, Grandy asserted that Fowler and McCann, in breach of their oaths of office, were attempting to convert Grandy's rights into commercial privileges for their personal profit. Grandy alleged that he was being "compelled under color of law and force of arms" to waive his unalienable rights and "compelling commercial privileges." Grandy complained he "suffered emotional, economic as well as threats of violence and the taking or destruction of his property." (Sic.)
The fourth cause of action concerned trespass. Grandy alleged that Fowler and McCann trespassed upon his rights and property "under color of law." The fifth cause of action alleged a deprivation of Grandy's civil rights (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), in that Fowler and McCann were violating Grandy's right to travel. The sixth cause of action asserted that Fowler and McCann were converting Grandy's "right to travel into a licensed privilege." The seventh cause of action, for searching Grandy's vehicle without a warrant, did not concern the Judges.
The eighth cause of action related to a failure to train DMV employees, and did not concern the Judges. The ninth cause of action was labeled "Supervisor Liability," and asserted that Fowler and McCann should have known about Conway's and Woolley's wrongful conduct. Grandy further alleged that Fowler's and McCann's responses to Conway's and Woolley's conduct were inadequate. In the tenth cause of action, for threats of violence, Grandy asserted that Fowler and McCann intentionally threatened violence against Grandy and/or his property, and they were motivated to make such threats due to Grandy's "religion and national origin." In the eleventh cause of action, for "Intentional interference of a Right," Grandy asserted that Fowler and Woolley interfered with his right to travel by threatening or committing violent acts against Grandy or his property.
C. DEMURRER OF FOWLER AND McCANN
On September 14, 2010, Fowler and McCann demurred to the First Amended Complaint. Fowler and McCann raised four arguments in their demurrer. First, Fowler and McCann asserted the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit, because the lawsuit was being brought as a substitute for an appeal. Fowler and McCann argued Grandy's actions should have been raised in an appeal from the traffic case, and not in a civil lawsuit. Second, Fowler and McCann asserted they were protected from all the causes of action by judicial immunity, in that all the causes of action related to their rulings in the traffic case.
The third demurrer argument raised by Fowler and McCann was that the First Amended Complaint failed to show any compliance with the Government Claims Act. Fourth, McCann and Fowler argued the First Amended Complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. As to the second cause of action for indebtedness, Fowler and McCann argued Grandy did not establish Fowler and McCann requested that Grandy perform services for them. In regard to the third cause of action for fraud, Fowler and McCann asserted Grandy never believed he was a driver and/or operator of a motor vehicle, so Grandy failed to establish the element of justifiable reliance.
As to the fourth cause of action for trespass, Fowler and McCann asserted Grandy failed to establish that they entered his land. Fowler and McCann argued the fifth, sixth, and ninth causes of action were framed as violations of Grandy's civil rights (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983). Fowler and McCann asserted Grandy did not plead detailed facts, and therefore failed to allege how McCann and Fowler were involved in the alleged wrongs. As to the tenth cause of action, for threats of violence, Fowler and McCann argued Grandy did not set forth any facts that would constitute a threat of violence by Fowler and McCann. In regard to the eleventh cause of action, for intentional interference, Fowler and McCann asserted the cause of action was vague and did not set forth facts informing them of the exact wrong(s) they allegedly committed.
D. OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF FOWLER AND McCANN
Grandy opposed Fowler's and McCann's Demurrer. Grandy argued that Fowler and McCann "were acting as magistrates over an inferior administrative hearing," and therefore they were without jurisdiction.
It appears Grandy was referring to the traffic case in this argument, as opposed to Fowler and McCann being without jurisdiction to demurrer to the complaint.
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E. HEARING ON DEMURRER OF FOWLER AND McCANN
On November 4, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the demurrer of Fowler and McCann. The trial court gave a tentative ruling in which it explained that it planned to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court found that (1) the complaint was "a substitution for an appeal"; (2) the causes of action against Fowler and McCann were barred by judicial immunity; (3) the causes of action failed to set forth sufficient facts; and (4) the complaint did not reflect compliance with the Government Claims Act.
In response to the trial court's tentative ruling, Grandy argued that Fowler and McCann had been acting as ministerial magistrates (presumably in the traffic case) and therefore they "violated jurisdiction." Grandy further asserted, "[I]f they can't show jurisdiction, their merits of their demurrer is [moot] and void." Grandy also asserted, "[T]he fact of the government claims, that's already in the record." The trial court ruled that its tentative decision would become the final ruling.
F. DEMURRER OF BALDERRAMA
On November 23, 2010, Balderrama demurred to Grandy's complaint. Balderrama's demurrer raised the same issues as the demurrers of Fowler and McCann. First, Balderrama argued the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case, because it was a substitute for an appeal or writ. Second, Balderrama asserted Grandy's causes of action were barred by judicial immunity. Third, Balderrama argued the complaint failed to show compliance with the Government Claims Act. Fourth, Balderrama asserted the complaint did not set forth any causes of action against him, and Grandy did not set forth any facts supporting a cause of action against Balderrama.
G. OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF BALDERRAMA
Grandy opposed Balderrama's demurrer. Grandy argued that hearings involving licensing and penalties are "'Administrative/Quasi-crim[inal]." Grandy asserted that licensing issues are generally governed by the Business and Professions Code. Grandy argued, "Balderrama and his council" continued to incorrectly claim that Grandy was a driver and operator of a motor vehicle, despite those terms having specific legal meanings. Grandy argued that Balderrama was "acting as a magistrate over an inferior administrative hearing," and therefore, Balderrama was without jurisdiction (presumably in the traffic case) until a verified complaint was filed by the district attorney.
In regard to the complaint having insufficient facts, Grandy argued that a portion of his complaint was prepared using judicial council forms, and those forms "meet all requirements] for the element necessary for the causes of action raised thereon." As for the causes of action that were not set forth on Judicial Council forms, Grandy asserted, "The remainder of the causes of action meet all causes of action as given in the California Civil Jury Instructions."
H. HEARING ON DEMURRER OF BALDERRAMA
On January 10, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on Balderrama's demurrer. The trial court stated that its tentative ruling was to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend because (1) the trial court was without "subject matter jurisdiction to intercede in the proceedings of another department of the superior court"; (2) the action was barred by judicial immunity; (3) Grandy failed to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and (4) Grandy failed to set forth facts reflecting that he complied with the Government Claims Act.
In response to the trial court's tentative ruling, Grandy said, "Well, at no time was he exercising a judicial function. Obviously, a licensing matter as an administrator. And this is a Civil Right[s] action. And if he's acting in an administrative capacity without jurisdiction, he's liable for torts." The trial court adopted its tentative ruling as its final ruling.
DISCUSSION
A. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Grandy contends the trial court erred in finding that the Judges were acting as judges, as opposed to magistrates, when they ruled in his traffic case. Grandy reasons that since the Judges were acting as magistrates, they are "liable for the[ir] torts" and are not protected by judicial immunity. We disagree.
Since this case concerns a demurrer, we apply the de novo standard of review. (Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 816, 819.) "A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed [citations]. The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action [citation]." (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)
"'It is well established judges are granted immunity from civil suit in the exercise of their judicial functions. [Citations.] This rule applies even where the judge's acts are alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. [Citation.]'" (Regan v. Price (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1495.) "'Judicial immunity from a civil action for monetary damages is absolute. [Citations.]' [Citation.] [¶] The privilege of judicial immunity applies not only to judges, but to all persons who act in a judicial capacity, such as court commissioners and court-appointed referees performing subordinate judicial duties. [Citations.]" (Ibid.) Administrative law hearing officers are also protected under the concept of quasi-judicial immunity. (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 853.)
"However, not all acts by judges are immune from civil liability. '"Immunity exists for 'judicial' actions; those relating to a function normally performed by a judge and where the parties understood they were dealing with the judge in his official capacity. [Citations.]" [Citation.] Thus, the line is drawn "between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges. . . . [I]mmunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Regan v. Price, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1495-1496.)
Grandy's complaint concerns the Judges' actions in his traffic case. Grandy was charged with driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and driving with an object or material applied to his window(s) (Veh. Code, § 26708, subd. (a)(1)). The offense of driving without a license is a misdemeanor. (Veh. Code, § 40000.11, subd. (b).) Driving with an obstructed window is an infraction. (Veh. Code, § 40000.1; People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278, 1291.) Court proceedings involving misdemeanors and infractions are classified as criminal proceedings. (Pen. Code, §§ 16 & 691, subd. (g); People v. Disandro (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 593, 600, fn. 3 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Thus, Grandy's traffic case is a criminal proceeding.
"Judicial functions" include the task of issuing rulings on controversies between parties. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1104-1105.) Since Grandy's complaint relates to the Judges' rulings in a criminal case, Grandy is attacking the Judges' exercise of their judicial functions. As set forth ante, the exercise ofjudicial functions is protected by judicial immunity. Thus, Grandy's causes of action are barred by judicial immunity, and therefore, the trial court did not err by granting the demurrers.
Grandy argues, "The Vehicle Code is enforced by the [DMV]." Grandy asserts that the DMV "is required to conduct adjudicative hearings for actions undertaken within the purview of its authority (contested cases) where a state statute or an inalienable right (to travel) is in question. [Citations.]" Thus, Grandy reasons the Judges were presiding over an administrative matter, and therefore, were not protected by judicial immunity.
There are at least two flaws in Grandy's argument. First, as set forth ante, administrative law hearing officers are protected under the concept of quasi-judicial immunity. (Howard v. Drapkin, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 853.) Thus, even if the Judges were issuing rulings in an administrative hearing, their rulings would likely be protected by judicial immunity. Second, as set forth ante, the traffic case is not an administrative proceeding; rather, it is a criminal proceeding.
We infer from Grandy's argument that he is confusing (1) the criminal proceedings, where the issue is whether he is guilty of committing the charged offenses, with (2) the administrative DMV hearing, where the issue is whether he should be denied a driver's license. (§§ 13951, 14100.) In sum, we find Grandy's argument to be unpersuasive.
B. REMAINING CONTENTIONS
Grandy contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers because the first amended complaint set forth sufficient facts to support the causes of actions against the Judges. Grandy also contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers because Grandy complied with the Government Claims Act. We have already concluded that there was a proper basis for sustaining the Judges' demurrers, i.e., the causes of action were barred by judicial immunity. Thus, any decision we make on these two remaining contentions will not affect the outcome of this opinion, because the trial court's ruling must be affirmed. Accordingly, we do not address Grandy's remaining contentions, because they are moot. (See Bay Area Cellular Telephone Co. v. City of Union City (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 686, 700 [not addressing a remaining contention that was rendered moot].)
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
HOLLENHORST
J.