Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0634
11-26-2019
GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. HARLAND LARSON, Defendant/Appellant.
COUNSEL Schern Richardson Finter, PLC, Mesa By Michael Andrew Schern, Yusra Batool Bokhari Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Harland Larson, Salt Lake City, UT Defendant/Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2017-096234
The Honorable Janice K. Crawford, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Schern Richardson Finter, PLC, Mesa
By Michael Andrew Schern, Yusra Batool Bokhari
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Harland Larson, Salt Lake City, UT
Defendant/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Harland Larson appeals from the superior court's denial of his motion to vacate a prior stipulated judgment and to dismiss the case for alleged lack of jurisdiction. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In 2012, Larson, a Utah resident, enrolled in an online doctoral program at Grand Canyon University ("GCU"). Eventually, GCU declined to award him a Ph.D., and Larson, contending that he had met all requirements to earn the degree, began expressing his frustrations directly to GCU faculty and staff as well as in online forums. GCU then filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief in Maricopa County Superior Court alleging that Larson was falsely disparaging GCU on public platforms and was improperly harassing and threatening GCU employees.
¶3 Larson answered with a general denial and specifically raised several defenses, but he did not challenge the court's jurisdiction. He then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on several bases, again without challenging jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion.
¶4 Soon thereafter, GCU and Larson entered into a written, signed settlement agreement—including election of Maricopa County Superior Court as the exclusive forum—under which GCU dropped its claims for damages and Larson agreed to cease contacting GCU, disparaging GCU, and claiming to have received a degree from GCU. The parties agreed to entry of a stipulated judgment to that effect, including a permanent injunction and an agreement that the superior court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. The superior court entered the stipulated judgment as a final judgment.
¶5 Several weeks later, GCU filed a motion to enforce judgment, citing Larson's refusal to remove defamatory material from certain websites. Larson initially opposed on the merits, asserting that he had attempted to comply. He then filed a motion to vacate the judgment and
dismiss the case based on a purported lack of personal jurisdiction over him.
¶6 The superior court denied the motion to vacate and dismiss, reasoning that Larson had waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by failing to timely assert it and, in any event, had expressly agreed to jurisdiction in the settlement and stipulated judgment. After a hearing a few days later, the superior court found that Larson had violated the injunction, held him in contempt, and awarded GCU its reasonable attorney's fees expended in enforcing the judgment.
¶7 Larson filed a notice of appeal challenging the superior court's order denying his jurisdiction-based motion. Over the next several months, Larson continued to file documents in superior court re-urging his jurisdictional arguments and alleging misconduct on the part of GCU's counsel and the judges who denied his requests. The superior court later entered an order finalizing the ruling from which Larson appeals, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Larson argues that the superior court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and asserts that, because jurisdiction was lacking, the court thus erred by declining to vacate the stipulated judgment. To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff must present "facts establishing a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." Arizona Tile, L.L.C. v. Berger, 223 Ariz. 491, 493, ¶ 8 (App. 2010) (as amended). The burden then "shifts to the defendant to rebut the showing." Id. We review de novo the superior court's conclusion that exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. See Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 232 Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 10 (App. 2013), aff'd as modified, 234 Ariz. 1 (2014).
¶9 Arizona's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the greatest extent permitted under the United States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Planning Group of Scottsdale, L.L.C. v. Lake Mathews Min. Props., Ltd., 226 Ariz. 262, 265, ¶ 12 (2011). A state may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant "who has sufficient contacts with the state to make the exercise of jurisdiction 'reasonable and just' with respect to that claim." Planning Group, 226 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 13 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)).
¶10 Personal jurisdiction is an individual right and, as such, any objection to exercise of personal jurisdiction is subject to waiver, including
by the defendant's express or implied consent. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). Parties may agree in advance to submit to a court's jurisdiction by including a forum-selection clause in a contract, provided such an agreement is not "unreasonable and unjust." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Dunn v. FastMed Urgent Care PC, 245 Ariz. 35, 41, ¶ 22 (App. 2018) (noting the burden on the party opposing enforcement of a forum-selection clause to show enforcement to be unreasonable or to "deprive a litigant of his or her day in court"). Similarly, a party may stipulate to a court's exercise of jurisdiction at the time of litigation. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704 (citing Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Co., 350 U.S. 495, 496 (1956)).
¶11 Here, Larson expressly consented to Arizona courts' exercise of jurisdiction both before the litigation in his 2012 enrollment agreement with GCU and during the litigation in the settlement agreement and stipulated judgment. First, the enrollment agreement between Larson and GCU included a forum-selection clause specifying that any judicial proceeding "may only be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in the state of Arizona" and that "each party accepts, generally and unconditionally, the exclusive jurisdiction of the aforesaid courts." Larson points out that the agreement also included an arbitration clause, which he argues undermined the forum-selection provision. But the two clauses address different issues. The arbitration clause simply gave Larson (and GCU) a right to insist on private arbitration rather than judicial proceedings (unless waived, see City of Phoenix v. Fields, 219 Ariz. 568, 575, ¶ 30 n.4 (2009)), whereas the forum-selection clause denominated an Arizona judicial forum for any judicial proceedings.
¶12 Moreover, Larson again expressly consented to personal jurisdiction in Arizona courts—specifically, the Maricopa County Superior Court—in the settlement agreement and in the stipulated judgment. Under the settlement agreement, GCU and Larson specified that the Maricopa County Superior Court would have "exclusive jurisdiction," and they expressly "consent[ed] to this jurisdiction and venue, and [t]hereby waive[d] any arguments relating to jurisdiction and venue." The stipulated judgment, also approved and signed by Larson "as to form and content," similarly agreed that the Maricopa County Superior Court would "retain jurisdiction"—an implicit acknowledgement that the court already had jurisdiction over the dispute itself—for purposes of enforcing the judgment. Although Larson now asserts that he signed the settlement agreement under duress, he did not raise that argument in superior court until months after settlement and entry of judgment, and even then he offered no factual
basis that could support a claim of duress. See Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 228 (1982); Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 13 (App. 2000); see also Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 355-56 (1967) (noting that a "duress" claim is limited to wrongful acts that engendered "such fear as to preclude the exercise . . . of free will and judgment").
¶13 Accordingly, even assuming that Larson initially objected to personal jurisdiction by answering the complaint with a general denial, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(3)—despite his failure to check the box next to personal jurisdiction as a defense on his answer and despite his failure to raise jurisdiction in his motion to dismiss—his prior and subsequent consent to jurisdiction override his objection. Given Larson's repeated, express consent to exercise of jurisdiction by Arizona courts, we affirm the superior court's conclusion that jurisdiction was proper.
CONCLUSION
¶14 We affirm. GCU requests an award of attorney's fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. In an exercise of our discretion, we deny GCU's request. As the prevailing party, however, GCU is entitled to its costs on appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21.