Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-0354-JMC-JDA
03-17-2022
Randie Lee Grainger, Plaintiff, v. Agent Thomas E. Buckhannon, IV, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Randie Lee Grainger (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (“SCDNR”) Agent Thomas Buckhannon (“Defendant”) violated his constitutional rights. [Docs. 1; 1-2.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was sailing his sailboat from Maryland through the Intracoastal Waterway. [Doc. 1 at 2.] On November 26, 2021, near Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, a SCDNR patrol boat pulled up next to Plaintiff's boat. [ Id. at 2-3.] Defendant boarded Plaintiff's boat and began searching above the deck. [Id.] Plaintiff asked for a search warrant. [Id.] Defendant then commandeered Plaintiff's sailboat and directed him to continue sailing south. [Id.] Defendant then went below deck into Plaintiff's living quarters and conducted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of Plaintiff's 4th Amendment rights. [Id.] Defendant claimed he found items that were stolen and detained Plaintiff. [Id.] Defendant instructed Plaintiff to dock his boat at a landing and then placed him under arrest. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff's boat was impounded, and he was taken to the Horry County Detention Center. [Id.]
Then, on December 5, 2021, Defendant met with Plaintiff to discuss the sale or disposal of his boat. [Id.] Defendant informed Plaintiff that his boat had been taken to a private marina rather than the SCDNR impound area and that Plaintiff was being charged a daily fee which, as of January 28, 2022, totaled over $5,700. [ Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff asked why the boat had been taken to the private marina and again asked for a copy of the search warrant, but Defendant could not answer those questions. [Id. at 5.]
On January 15, 2022, Defendant called Plaintiff to again discuss the sale or disposal of his boat. [Id. at 6.] Defendant explained he obtained a new South Carolina title for the boat, which previously had been registered and titled in Maryland. [Id. at 7.] Defendant also informed Plaintiff that “Tow Boat Us” was also on the call and that it would be handling the sale and disposal of Plaintiff's boat. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that his boat was his home and contained all of his earthly possessions. [Id.] Plaintiff protested, asked to see the search warrant, and argued his rights had been violated. [Id. at 8.] Plaintiff contends that his detention is unlawful and a violation of his rights. [Id. at 8-9.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following claims. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unlawful search and seizure, resulting in the loss of his freedom, his boat, his home, and his possessions. [Id. at 10.] Second, Plaintiff contends he suffered a “breach of protection” related to Plaintiff's health being placed in danger because he contracted Covid-19 while at the detention center. [Id. at 11.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests money damages in the amount of $300,000. [Id. at 12.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, ” is “frivolous or malicious, ” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully searched and seized his boat, arrested him, and detained him. Thus, Plaintiff appears to assert claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution. Despite Plaintiff's contentions, however, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff was charged in the Horry County Court of General Sessions with (1) receiving stolen goods at case number 2021A2610202639; (2) identity fraud at case number 2021A2610202642; (3) unlawful possession of a weapon at case number 2021A2610202645, and (4) giving false information to law enforcement at case number 2021A2610202640, all arising from the incident described in the Complaint. See Horry County Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Horry/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2021A2610202639, 2021A2610202642, 2021A2610202645, 2021A2610202640) (last visited Mar. 16, 2022). The charges at case numbers 2021A2610202639, 2021A2610202642, and 2021A2610202645 all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time. However, on January 4, 2022, Plaintiff pled guilty to the charge at case number 2021A2610202640. Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff has other charges pending against him in the Horry County Court of General Sessions including two counts of second degree burglary at case numbers 2020A2610400440 and 2020A2610400465.
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Heck
The Complaint should be dismissed because it is legally frivolous. A finding of frivolousness can be made where the Complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989).
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's arrest in November 2021, and his subsequent incarceration in the Horry County Detention Center on the charges noted above. For his relief, Plaintiff purports to seek money damages for his allegedly unlawful arrest and incarceration.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on his allegedly unlawful arrest and incarceration and/or the prosecution of the criminal charges against him, his claim is barred because Plaintiff pled guilty to at least one charge and his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated. In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement, which Plaintiff has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendant acted improperly by unlawfully arresting and detaining him. And, although Plaintiff is being held at the Detention Center on charges that remain pending, he has already pled guilty to one charge arising from the incident described in the Complaint. Because Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, his claims in this case are barred by Heck. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 action would imply that the charges against him and resulting conviction are invalid.
Loss of Property
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a constitutional claim for the loss of his property, his claim fails because the Supreme Court has held that deprivations of personal property do not support an action for damages under § 1983. See Baker v. Stevenson, No. 8:13-cv-466-JFA-JDA, 2013 WL 4866337, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2013). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989). And, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that random and unauthorized deprivations of personal property by state officials do not rise to a federal due process violation where the state provides meaningful post-deprivation procedures to secure the return of the property or to compensate for the loss. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 230-31 (4th Cir. 2008); Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548, 561-63 (4th Cir. 2005); Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (4th Cir. 1986). Thus, Plaintiff's claim for the loss of his personal property fails because he has not alleged a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).