Opinion
G058728
05-27-2021
Estate of ELIZABETH V. WRIGHT, Deceased. WILLIAM GRAHAM, Petitioner and Respondent, v. WALTON WRIGHT, Contestant and Appellant.
Tredway, Lumsdaine & Doyle and Brandon L. Fieldsted, for Contestant and Appellant. Anderson LeBlanc, Jeff W. LeBlanc and Richard Anderson for Petitioner and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00852890) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David L. Belz, Judge. Affirmed. Tredway, Lumsdaine & Doyle and Brandon L. Fieldsted, for Contestant and Appellant. Anderson LeBlanc, Jeff W. LeBlanc and Richard Anderson for Petitioner and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Elizabeth V. Wright (Mother), died in 1992, survived by three adult children, including her eldest son, contestant and appellant W. Walton Wright (Walton). At the time of her death, she owned three real properties, including her home where Walton had lived with her for over 25 years.
Because most individuals discussed share either a surname or first name, we will refer to them by their first or middle names to avoid confusion; we intend no disrespect.
In 1981, Mother signed an attested typewritten will devising half of her real property interests to Walton and the other half to his two siblings, subject to a 15-year estate for years interest in Mother's home created for Walton. In 1989, Mother hand-altered the typewritten will through line outs and interlineations.
In this will contest case, Walton appeals from a judgment construing Mother's 1989 modified will. At a bench trial, the trial court heard evidence from Walton and his sister, Elizabeth, about their relationships with Mother. The court ruled Mother's handwritten modifications had not revoked the real property interests of Walton's siblings. It also construed the modified will as increasing Walton's estate for years interest to a life estate in Mother's home but not to her two other real properties, and apportioned the children's fee interests based on a typewritten provision Mother had lined out by hand.
Walton first claims the trial court should have found he carried his burden of proving revocation. He also claims the court should have construed the modified will so his life estate interest included all of Mother's real properties and not just her home. Under the substantial evidence standard of review, Walton has not shown the court erred in its revocation finding or in the court's construction of his life estate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
A. Mother's Three Children and Three Real Properties
When Mother died in 1992, her three adult children were Walton, Dr. Elizabeth A. Wright (Elizabeth), and E. Allen Wright (Allen). For decades, Mother had resided in her home in Brea, California. Walton lived with her there since 1967. He provided general assistance to Mother toward the end of her life. At the time of her death, Mother also owned two vacant lot properties: one adjacent to her home and another in Big Bear, California (the vacant and Big Bear lots, respectively). None of her real property was owned as a joint tenancy interest. B. The 1981 Typewritten Will That Superseded a 1971 Will
Mother created two typewritten wills during her life. In 1981, she signed a witnessed, typewritten will that superseded a 1971 will. The 1971 will had devised Mother's property to her children in equal shares. The 1981 will changed that apportionment for Mother's real property interests in the "Fifth" paragraph:
FIFTH: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of whatever kind and character, real or personal, and wherever situated, as follows:
A. I give and devise any and all real property of which I may die possessed to my children in the following proportions: one-half (1/2) to my son, WILLIAM WALTON WRIGHT, one-fourth (1/4) to my son, EDWIN ALLEN WRIGHT, and one-fourth (1/4) to my daughter, ELIZABETH ANN WRIGHT, with the provision that my son, WILLIAM WALTON WRIGHT, may use and occupy said real property for a period of up to fifteen years from the date of my death, provided that he pays for and undertakes to take care of the property, including, but not limited to the following: the care and maintenance of the property, the payment of all utilities of the property, all major or minor repairs needed, all
real property taxes and the preservation of the property. In the event my son, WILLIAM WALTON WRIGHT, should elect not to use the residence as his principal place of residence, then the property shall be sold and the proceeds divided as provided for above.
B. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate shall go to my three children, WILLIAM WALTON WRIGHT, ELIZABETH ANN WRIGHT and EDWIN ALLEN WRIGHT, to be shared by them in equal parts, share and share alike.
The primary focus in this case is the 1981 will's Fifth paragraph (Paragraph Five), and its subsection "A," which, as noted, changed the apportionment of Mother's real property interests from her earlier will. As depicted above in the 1981 version of Paragraph Five, Mother's real property interests other than Walton's estate for years were to be distributed as follows: 50 percent to Walton; 25 percent to Elizabeth; and 25 percent to Allen (the typewritten apportionment). C. Mother's 1989 Handwritten Modifications
In 1989, Mother added handwritten marks and interlineations to her 1981 typewritten will. For clarity, we partially reproduce the "Third" and "Fifth" paragraphs:
Image materials not available for display.
Mother died almost four years after making her handwritten modifications. According to Walton's trial testimony, two days after Mother's 1992 death, he retrieved the modified will from Mother's top dresser drawer based on her earlier advisement to him. He delivered the will the following month to the lawyer who had created Mother's 1981 will. Walton had not discussed any of the modified will provisions with Mother, but testified the lawyer told him the modified will "was legal." Walton believed Mother had given him all of her estate through the modified will and asked the lawyer to "take care of it," because Walton "could not deal with" his siblings. Apparently, the lawyer did not take any action.
For the next 23 years, Walton did not communicate any information about the modified will to his siblings or take any further action on it. The first time Elizabeth learned of the modified will was when Walton submitted it to the trial court as part of this will contest case that started in 2016. In the meantime, Walton had continued to live in the Brea home after Mother's death, paying for its property taxes, utilities, and repairs.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Based on Elizabeth's authorization, in 2016, respondent William Graham (Allen's son-in-law) filed a petition to probate Mother's estate. Although the initial petition claimed Mother had died intestate, Graham amended it to request the trial court to probate Mother's 1981 typewritten will. Two months later, Walton filed a competing petition, soon after amending it to submit a photocopy of the 1989 modified will, which Walton claimed he found after searching his home. Graham and Walton both objected to the other's submitted will.
At a bench trial, the parties stipulated Mother's 1989 handwritten marks on her 1981 typewritten will were authentic. The parties stipulated to admit as exhibits copies of Mother's superseded 1971 will, the 1981 typewritten will and the 1989 version with Mother's handwritten marks. Walton, Elizabeth, and Graham testified.
Walton argued Mother's 1989 modified will should be probated and construed as granting him a fee simple to all of Mother's real properties. Graham argued how the modified will came to light showed Mother had destroyed it before her death. Graham alternatively argued that even accepting the modifications at face value meant the modified will should be interpreted as creating for Walton a life estate in Mother's home only, and not a fee simple. Graham additionally argued Walton should not be appointed an executor of Mother's estate because he had acted negligently.
The Court's Findings and Judgment
The trial court made an oral statement of findings, distinguishing between the 1989 modified will's handwritten "line-outs" and "written provisions." The court explained "[t]he line-outs [we]re a little bit easier to understand or appreciate, but they [nonetheless] create some confusion, or some issues, also in reviewing and trying to understand what it is that [Mother] was wanting to do."
The trial court found Mother had intended Walton to continue living in the Brea home. The court relied on the maintenance obligations left over from the 1981 will to also find Mother intended to give Walton a life estate interest in the home. The court noted some of Walton's testimony "left the [court] with a question as to his credibility." Even accounting for the lawyer Walton claimed he communicated with, the court found Walton's explanation for not telling his siblings about their mother's 1989 modified will for decades gave the court "difficulties with Walton's credibility." The court also explained it "didn't find [Walton's] testimony to be credible" to persuade it that Mother's intent "in what she was doing in [the modified will's Paragraph Five] was anything more than giving [Walton] a life estate." It reasoned "the evidence[, Walton's] credibility, the circumstances behind [the will contest], the language [of the modified will] itself," did not show Mother had intended for Walton to "get all the property outright." On Mother's two other real properties—i.e., the vacant and Big Bear lots—the court ruled they were explicitly identified in Mother's 1989 modified will and should be distributed as "part of the residue of [Mother's] estate."
On the apportionment of real property interests between Walton and his siblings, the court implemented Mother's lined-out 1981 typewritten apportionment, finding Mother's "prior intent" had remained when she made her 1989 handwritten modifications. The court reasoned Mother "wasn't really sure what she was trying to do" and so given the choice between equal, one-third shares for Mother's children or the 1981 apportionment that favored Walton, the court concluded the latter better expressed Mother's intention.
The court entered judgment decreeing Mother had created for Walton a life estate interest in the Brea home "subject to [Walton's] obligation to maintain the property, including all major and minor repairs, all real property taxes and preservation of the property. (Which the Court finds he finds he has failed to do to this date)." The judgment further proclaimed the vacant lot and Big Bear properties were "assets of the Estate" to be proportionally distributed to all three children along with the life estate remainder interests in Mother's home, according to the typewritten apportionment: 50 percent to Walton; 25 percent to Elizabeth; and 25 percent to Allen. The court also appointed Graham executor of Mother's estate.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Admitted the 1989 Modified Will to Probate and
Considered the 1981 Will As Extrinsic Evidence;
Alternatively, the 1989 Will Was a Codicil to the 1981 Will
As a threshold issue, Walton asserts the trial court erroneously probated "both the 1981 [w]ill and the 1989 [w]ill." The judgment decrees both documents were "collectively admitted to [p]robate." The record can reasonably be read to show the court admitted the 1989 Will and considered the 1981 will as extrinsic evidence on the meaning of the 1989 Will.
Alternatively, because Mother's 1989 handwritten marks relied upon her 1981 typewritten provisions, the marks by themselves can amount to a holographic codicil that republished an altered version of Mother's typewritten 1981 will. (See Estate of Benson (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 866, 870-872 [discussing difference between wills and codicils].)
In both scenarios, the judgment must be affirmed because it is supported by substantial evidence. As with general contract interpretation, courts should first aim to determine intention in a will "from the writing alone, if possible." (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 (Founding Members); accord Prob. Code, § 21102, subd. (a) ["The intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument controls the legal effect of the dispositions made in the instrument"].) "Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove a meaning to which the [writing] is reasonably susceptible . . . '[T]he test of admissibility . . . is not whether [a written instrument] appears to the [trial] court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citation.]'" (Founding Members, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 955; accord Estate of Duke (2015) 61 Cal.4th 871, 879 ["California law allows the admission of extrinsic evidence to establish that a will is ambiguous and to clarify ambiguities in a will"].)
Given the ambiguity of Mother's 1989 handwritten marks, the undisputed fact they were made to alter parts of her 1981 typewritten will, and the parties' stipulation to the admission of both Mother's 1971 and 1981 typewritten wills as evidence, the trial court appropriately assessed Mother's typewritten 1981 will in determining her intent in 1989.
II. Standard of Review
The parties disagree on the governing standard of review for Walton's appellate claims. Walton contends we should review them de novo and Graham contends the substantial evidence standard of review controls.
"The ultimate construction placed on [an instrument such as a will] might call for different standards of review. When no extrinsic evidence is introduced, or when the competent extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the appellate court independently construes the contract. [Citations.] When the competent extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires resolution of credibility issues, any reasonable construction will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]" (Founding Members, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 955-956; accord Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254, fn. omitted.)
All of Walton's contentions for reversal rest on two independent arguments: (1) Mother's 1989 handwritten modifications to her 1981 will revoked all of Walton's siblings' interests in Mother's real properties; and (2) the court erred by construing Mother's 1989 modified will as devising to Walton a life estate in Mother's home but not her vacant lot properties. Because construction of Mother's intent in the modified will was informed by conflicting extrinsic evidence, we resolve both of Walton's arguments based on our conclusions that substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings underlying the court's reasonable construction of Mother's 1989 modified will. (Founding Members, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 955-956.)
Although Walton does not directly challenge the trial court's ruling that he received a life estate (and not a fee simple), we note he indirectly argues he should receive a fee simple based on the doctrine of merger, which rests on his contention the trial court erred in its revocation finding. That is, Walton contends if the trial court correctly found Mother had revoked all of the siblings' interests, we would then be compelled as a matter of law to conclude his sole remaining remainder interest coupled with his life estate interest would merge to create a fee simple. Given our affirmance of the trial court's revocation finding, we need not address Walton's merger argument.
III. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's
Finding Walton Did Not Prove Revocation of His Siblings' Interests
Walton asserts the trial court erred when it ruled Mother's 1989 modifications to her 1981 typewritten provisions did not revoke his siblings' fee interests in Mother's real properties, including life estate remainder interests in Mother's home. We disagree because substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding.
When a will is contested on a theory it has been wholly or partially revoked, Probate Code section 8252 places the burden of proof on the party asserting revocation (here Walton). (Id, subd. (a); see also Prob. Code, § 6120 [methods of revocation].) (All further undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.) "The rules of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the province of a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any other civil case." (Estate of Bristol (1943) 23 Cal.2d 221, 223.)
"'When a trial court's factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion." (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143, quoting Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)
As an explanation for Mother's 1989 will modifications, conflicting evidence on the nature of Elizabeth's relationship with Mother was presented at trial. Elizabeth testified that when Mother was alive, they had spoken on the phone since 1981, "once a month, or more, and on special occasions."
When Walton was asked at trial if he had an opinion about Elizabeth's relationship with Mother, Walton claimed Mother had "said, at times, that [Elizabeth] did not understand her." On his own relationship with Mother, Walton testified he thought they "understood each other." Walton was asked if he could think of any events that caused Mother to change her will in 1989. He responded that one year earlier, Mother had gone to stay with Elizabeth in North Carolina but called Walton and said she needed to be picked up because Elizabeth would "go to her [medical] practice" and Mother did not want to be a caregiver for Elizabeth's mother in law who had dementia. Walton explained he was not surprised when he found Mother's 1989 changes to her will (in his favor) based on "[l]ongstanding family relations and . . . [Mother's] desire for [Walton] to come and pick her up" from Elizabeth's home.
This testimony was competent extrinsic evidence about circumstances relevant to Mother's handwritten notations on her 1989 modified will. Given the written changes by themselves did not show a clear intent, discerning Mother's intention—the basic goal of the trial court's construction task—turned on the credibility of the trial evidence. It was the court's prerogative as trier of fact to believe testimony in whole or in part. In its oral statement of findings, the court explicitly noted it was not persuaded Mother's lining out of Elizabeth and Allen's names in Paragraph Five meant Mother had intended to "give [Walton] all of the real estate." The court explained it "didn't find [Walton's] testimony to be credible" to persuade it that Mother's intent "in what she was doing in [Paragraph Five] was anything more than giving [Walton] a life estate."
We give prevailing parties the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolves all evidentiary conflicts in their favor. (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 75-76) We also indulge "all intendments and presumptions . . . in favor of [the] correctness" of the trial court's judgment. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court's finding Mother did not revoke Walton's siblings' interests in her real properties.
Walton correctly notes the trial court's ruling gave expression to certain line outs of typewritten language but not others. For example, on a separate distribution point, the judgment decrees Mother "deleted" a 1981 typewritten devise to a university, based on Mother's handwritten line out of the university's name. At the same time, the court disregarded Mother's line out of her 1981 typewritten apportionment and relied on its percentages in its distribution of Mother's real property interests to her children.
Although Walton's observation is accurate, these points do not compel a conclusion the trial court's selective acceptance of Mother's handwritten line outs was error, much less prejudicial error. His other grounds for error do not overcome the substantial evidence standard of review.
Walton also relies on case law to point out "lines over or across words" may be sufficient to revoke earlier will provisions under a theory of cancellation. He also claims the evidence at trial gave rise to a presumption of revocation by cancellation. Neither point persuades us the trial court was compelled to find Mother had revoked Walton's siblings' interest in her real properties. Although we agree a lineout can sufficiently evidence a testator's intent to revoke a provision through cancellation, there is no rule requiring a court to conclude that revocation is shown as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Estate of Wikman (1906) 148 Cal. 642, 645-646 ["ink-lines were over and through" words, "sufficient to" support trial court finding of revocation through cancellation].)
Similarly, Walton's presumption argument does not show the trial court's finding was necessarily error. Given the evidentiary record, even allowing Mother's line outs to create a presumption they revoked typewritten provisions did not compel the court to conclude they did, given the substantial trial evidence and their inferences in favor of Graham's position in the will contest. (See, e.g., Estate of Uhl (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 138, 143 ["It was the exclusive function of the trial court to resolve the conflict in the evidence as to whether the cancellations and interlineations in the will were made by the testator with the intent to revoke or merely as guides for a new will that he planned to execute"].)
In sum, Walton has failed to show Mother had intended to revoke Elizabeth and Allen's real property interests. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding and, additionally, given Walton's burden at trial (§ 8252, subd. (a)), he has not met his high burden on appeal to show his interpretation of Mother's intent is the only one the court could have concluded was correct. (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570-571.)
Even if we agreed the trial court erred by disregarding Mother's line out of her typewritten apportionment, it would not necessarily follow the error was prejudicial to Walton. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) That is, the trial court could have found Mother's 1981 typewritten apportionment was revoked but still distributed Mother's real property interests as equal thirds. (See §§ 240 ["property shall be divided into as many equal shares as there are living members of the nearest generation of issue then living"] & 245 ["where a will, trust, or other instrument that expresses no contrary intention provides for issue or descendants to take without specifying the manner, the property to be distributed shall be distributed in the manner provided in Section 240"].)
Finally, Walton argues that because the 1981 will expressly revoked all prior wills and the provision remained in the 1989 will, the 1981 will was automatically revoked. Again, the trial court explained how and why it considered the 1981 will and substantial evidence supports its conclusions.
IV. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's
Construction That Walton's Life Estate Included Only Mother's Home
Walton asserts there was no valid ground for the trial court to simultaneously conclude Mother created for him a life estate in her home but not her vacant and Big Bear lots. We disagree and conclude extrinsic evidence was properly considered to resolve ambiguities about how to distribute Mother's interests in the lots and that substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings underlying the court's reasonable construction of Mother's 1989 modified will.
The devise of Mother's real property interests in the vacant and Big Bear lots implicates two separate paragraphs of Mother's 1989 modified will: its Third and Fifth paragraphs. Mother's intent for them both as individual paragraphs and in relationship to each other are not clear. (§ 6111.5 ["Extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine . . . the meaning of a will or a portion of a will if the meaning is unclear"].)
Mother's 1989 handwriting identified both the vacant and Big Bear lots in the Third paragraph, which also declares Mother "may" have owned "property in joint tenancy" at the time of her death (she did not). As typewritten in 1981, Mother instructed that any joint tenancy property interests were "not" to be claimed as part of Mother's estate for probate. This was consistent with the law's function of joint tenancy interests avoiding probate. (Grothe v. Cortlandt Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1317 [joint tenancy means "means that when one joint tenant dies, the entire estate belongs automatically to the surviving joint tenant(s)"].)
Notwithstanding, through her 1989 handwritten changes, Mother negated the typewritten "not," flipping the logic of the paragraph. That is, if negating the "not" is given expression, the Third paragraph inconsistently instructs joint tenancy interests to be included as part of Mother's probate estate. Further complicating the paragraph's meaning, Mother added Walton's name above the typewritten term "joint tenancy interests." In sum, it is unclear what Mother was intending to do by hand altering the Third paragraph, including its explicit identification of the vacant and Big Bear lots.
The vacant and Big Bear lots identified in the Third paragraph of the 1989 modified will are not explicitly identified in the Fifth paragraph, which created Walton's life estate. Although Paragraph Five starts broadly by claiming to devise "any and all real property of which [Mother] may die possessed" and identifies Walton's right to use and occupy property as "said real property," its life estate obligations for Walton include "pay[ing] for and . . . tak[ing] care of the property," including "payment of all utilities of the property." Especially given Walton only testified about paying for property taxes, utilities, and repairs for the Brea home, the paragraph's terms make the life estate provision reasonably susceptible to a conclusion it was meant to be limited to Mother's home. Indeed, Paragraph Five's subsection "A" concludes by specifying a home as the trigger to terminate the life estate: "In the event [Walton] should elect not to use the residence as his principal place of residence, then the property shall be sold and the proceeds divided as provided for above."
Given the trial court's rejection of Mother's line out of the typewritten apportionment for Walton's revocation argument, the trial court's construction of Paragraph Five, Subsection "A" was: "I give and devise any and all real property of which I may die possessed to my children in the following proportions": 50 percent to Walton; 25 percent to Elizabeth; and 25 percent to Allen. Evidence on the nature of Mother's relationship with Walton's siblings was relevant to construction of Walton's life estate. The court construed the 1989 will in a way to provide Walton a residence but also benefit his siblings by not eliminating their interests in Mother's nonresidence properties.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's reasonable construction. Walton lived at the Brea home and only testified about paying for its property taxes, utilities, and repairs. Elizabeth maintained a steady relationship with Mother between her 1981 typewritten will and the 1989 modified will. The court reasonably concluded Walton's reliance on Mother's interactions with Elizabeth did not operate to disinherit Elizabeth from her real property assets.
Although Walton did testify his grandmother initially gifted the Big Bear lot to him more than 50 years before the trial, it was undisputed he quitclaimed his interest to Mother in 1967. This history does not change our conclusion substantial evidence supports the trial court's reasonable construction of Mother's 1989 modified will on the question of whether the vacant and Big Bear lots were subject to Walton's life estate. In sum, Wright has not shown error to reverse the court's judgment.
We note Graham takes the position in his respondent's brief that the trial court's judgment can be interpreted as decreeing Walton's life estate for Mother's home has been terminated based on the court's finding that "he has failed to do" the actions he was obligated to perform under Mother's life estate devise. Given Graham has made no request for relief on the point, we express no opinion on it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Graham is entitled to costs in this appeal.
FYBEL, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. MOORE, J.