Opinion
4:00-CV-0694-E.
December 20, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Lear Corporation in the above-numbered and styled case. Plaintiff Roylene Graham has responded in opposition, and Lear has submitted reply briefing. After considering the motions and arguments of the parties, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following determinations.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Roylene Graham began working at Lear's manufacturing plant in Arlington, Texas, on or about November 24, 1997. Graham worked on the second shift (afternoons and evenings), helping to build car seats for installation in sport utility vehicles produced by General Motors Corporation. At the beginning of her employment, Graham's duties included bonding adhesive material to the foam cushions that were placed in the car seats. In June 1998, however, Graham was assigned to work on the "riser line," a part of the assembly process where car seat frames, cushions, and electrical power switches were assembled.
On March 11, 1999, Graham and two of her co-workers, Lisa Fairchild and Art Rodriguez, approached Plant Manager Todd Henry to complain about offensive comments allegedly made by other employees on the riser line. Despite Henry's request that they provide specifics of what was said and by whom so that he could remedy the situation, the three workers refused to give details or identify the individuals involved. Fairchild would only say that an undisclosed co-worker had made a sexually-graphic comment about Graham's breasts, while Rodriguez mentioned that there had been some comments about his Hispanic origin. Graham refused to disclose anything.
After meeting with the three workers, Henry gathered together all of the employees on the riser line. He informed the group that he had received complaints about comments being made that were racial and sexual in nature, admonished them to refrain from making such comments, and warned that any employees who violated company policy on this issue would face severe discipline, including possible termination. Henry also arranged for the workers to watch a training video on sexual harassment.
One week later, on March 18, 1999, Lear Human Resources Manager Lisa Zubriski interviewed all of the employees on the riser line in an effort to identify the possible problems on the line and determine what corrective action should be taken. During her interview with Zubriski, Graham would not identify who had made offensive remarks towards her. She stated only that co-workers "Terry" [Lang] and "Wayne" [Adair] were "wrong in the way they treated me." (Zubriski Aff., attached as Ex. 6 to App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at ¶ 6.) Graham also claimed that Lang had told her that "you can run but you can't hide," and that she overheard Adair mention that he had a gun in his car, both of which made her feel threatened. (Id.) None of the other riser line employees interviewed by Zubriski — including Fairchild and Rodriguez — corroborated Graham's allegations or identified those individuals allegedly responsible for making offensive racial or sexual comments.
On March 26, 1999, Graham filed a charge of discrimination with the Fort Worth Human Relations Commission and the EEOC. In her filing, Graham claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race, age, and sex, and she specifically referenced discriminatory comments allegedly made by Wayne Adair and Terry Lang. Graham claimed that Lear had not acted on her complaints, with human resources personnel telling her to have patience with her co-workers and to give them another chance.
Graham took a health-related leave of absence from Lear in April 1999. When the leave period expired on September 16, 2000, without Graham notifying Lear that she intended to return to work, her employment was terminated pursuant to company policy. Graham asserts that she did not return to work because she "just didn't want to be subjected to the same stress and maybe even more stress." (Graham Aff., attached as Ex. 1 to App. to Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., at ¶ 2.)
On June 30, 2000, Graham filed her original Complaint in this action, alleging that offensive remarks about her sex, race, and age by her co-workers at Lear contributed to a hostile work environment. She seeks recovery of damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
In her briefing on this Motion, Graham notified the Court that she wished to withdraw claims she previously had asserted in her Complaint pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and Texas state law regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant Lear's Motion for Summary Judgment as to these two claims without further discussion of their merits.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986); Hill v. London, Stetelman, Kirkwood, Inc., 906 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1990). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. Once the moving party has made an initial showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. In order to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving party "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514.In making its determination on the motion, the Court must look at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits. See Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Although all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
III. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation by proving that discrimination based upon race, age, or sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986). There are five elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a hostile work environment claim: (1) the employee belonged to a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on membership in the protected group; (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Tex., 168 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1999); Lacher, 147 F. Supp.2d at 543.
Although "hostile work environment" as a category of employment discrimination originally arose in the context of sexual harassment claims under Title VII, see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that such a claim also can be made for discrimination on the basis of race. See Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed whether a hostile work environment claim can be brought pursuant to the ADEA, but there is little doubt that this is permissible. See Lacher v. West, 147 F. Supp.2d 538, 542-43 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (Lindsay, J.) (concluding that hostile work environment claims are available under the ADEA as well as under Title VII); see also Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (same holding);Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (same holding).
In Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth Circuit held that when an employee brings a Title VII harassment claim against a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over her, the employee need only satisfy the first four elements of the test. Where the alleged harasser is a co-worker, the employee must satisfy all five elements. See id. at 509, n. 3. Here, Graham's Complaint alleges that she was harassed by both co-workers and supervisors (see Compl. at ¶ 6), but her later deposition testimony establishes that only co-workers were responsible for the alleged harassment. (See App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 35 ("Q: Do you recall any of those comments that you found to be crude and offensive having been made by anybody in supervision or management? A: No, sir.").) Thus, Graham must satisfy all five elements.
In the instant case, Graham has set forth sufficient evidence adequately raising a fact issue with respect to the first three elements of the test. Therefore, the Court need only consider two questions: (1) whether Graham has raised a genuine issue of material fact that the alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to alter a "term, condition, or privilege" of her employment; and (2) whether Graham has raised a genuine issue of material fact that Lear failed to take prompt remedial action.
1. Did the alleged harassment affect a "term, condition, or privilege of Graham's employment?
For harassment on basis of age, race, or sex to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2403 (citation omitted);Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, 2001 WL 1491001, at *3 (5th Cir. 2001). Whether a reasonable person would find the environment hostile or abusive is determined by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance.See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371 (1993); Woods, 2001 WL 1491001, at *3.
In her deposition testimony, Graham alleges that co-workers Terry Lang and Wayne Adair harassed her with several off-color comments. Lang, for example, stated that she "needed to be locked up in a nursing home and not ever let out in public," told her that "[a] person your age ought to be at home," and asked if she "still had sex and still had orgasms." (App. to Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8, 11; App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 038.) According to Graham, Adair allegedly asked her if "he could f*ck me in my t*tties and did my husband f*ck me in my t*tties," and remarked that she "needed a black d*ck stuck up [her] a**." (App. to Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.) Graham also claims that she felt threatened when Lang told her that "you can run but you can't hide," and when she overheard Adair mention to a co-worker that he kept a gun in his car. (App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 027, 029A.)
The Court does not believe that the comments attributed to Lang and Adair could reasonably be perceived as severely offensive, pervasive, or abusive — even if Graham was subjectively offended by them — for three reasons. First, the comments were relatively few in number, and occurred during only two of the 17 months that Graham was employed at Lear. Second, the alleged statements made by Lang and Adair, while boorish, were not of such severity that they created a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that supervisor's egregious comments about employee's sexual proclivity, made two or three times a week, created hostile environment). Third, none of the alleged comments were physically threatening, despite Graham's subjective belief — unsupported by any reasonable summary judgment evidence — that her life had been threatened and "could possibly be in danger." (App. to Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) Finally, Graham has failed to adequately address how or if her work performance was affected by her co-workers' comments. See Woods, 2001 WL 1491001, at *3.
Graham contends that she felt threatened by two particular comments: Adair's alleged remark that he kept a gun in his car, and Lang's alleged statement to her that "[y]ou can run, but you can't hide." (App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 027, 029A.) After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court concludes that a reasonable person in Graham's position would not feel threatened by either comment. First, Lear's investigation of Adair's remark about possessing a gun revealed only that "there apparently had been a conversation between [Adair and a coworker] related to an upcoming gun show. It did not appear that any direct or implied threat [towards Graham] had been made or was intended." (Id. at 104.) Second, Lang's alleged statement is too ambiguous, standing alone, to constitute a reasonable threat to Graham's physical safety. Without any other evidence to bolster Graham's subjective belief, the Court cannot conclude that a reasonable person would interpret Lang's comment as a threat.
In an affidavit submitted with her response to Lear's Motion for Summary Judgment, Graham appears to imply that her work performance was negatively affected by the "stress" from the situation with Lang and Adair and Lear's ineffective response to her allegations. (App. to Pl.'s Br. in Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) Not only are these vague assertions insufficient to demonstrate that the alleged conduct of her co-workers unreasonably interfered with her work performance, but they are flatly contradicted by Graham's deposition testimony, in which she confirms that the harassment ended after successful intervention by Lear management. (App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 032.).
The comments attributed to Lang and Adair are certainly crude, insensitive, and in bad taste. As one federal court has noted, however, "Title VII is not a guardian of taste." Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 706, 716 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Therefore, because Graham cannot point to any evidence in the record indicating that the alleged harassment was anything more than "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents,"Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874, she cannot demonstrate that a term, condition, or privilege of her employment was affected as a result of the alleged conduct of her co-workers. Failing this one element, Graham will be unable to prevail on her hostile environment claim.
2. Did Lear take prompt remedial action after learning of Graham's claims?
The Court alternatively concludes that Graham cannot prove that Lear failed to take prompt remedial action once it knew of her complaints of harassment, and thus she has not met the fifth prong of her prima facie case. If an employer takes prompt action upon learning of alleged harassment by a non-supervisory employee, the employer is not liable under Title VII. See Carmon v. Lubrizol Corp., 17 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1994). Generally, an employer satisfies the prompt remedial action requirement if it took the allegation seriously, conducted a prompt and thorough investigation, and immediately implemented remedial and disciplinary measures based on the results of the investigation. See Waymire v. Harris County, 86 F.3d 424, 428 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Carmon, 17 F.3d at 795)).
In this case, Lear responded seriously and promptly once Graham brought her allegations of harassment to the attention of Plant Manager Todd Henry on March 11, 1999. Even though Graham refused to provide him with details of the harassment or identify those responsible, Henry immediately called a team meeting and informed the group that he had received complaints about comments being made that were racial and sexual in nature, and sternly warned them to refrain from making such comments. After reminding the employees that violation of company policy on this issue would lead to severe discipline, including possible termination, Henry arranged for the workers to watch a training video on sexual harassment. In addition to Henry's efforts, Lear Human Resources Manager Lisa Zubriski interviewed Graham and all of her co-workers to find out what problems existed at the plant and determine what corrective action should be taken. Although Zubriski's investigation did not produce any corroboration of Graham's allegations, Lear sought to reinforce its employees' knowledge of the company's anti-harassment policies through the showing of training videos and team meetings on the subject.
In her deposition, Graham admitted that Lear management made an effort to stop the harassment, and that the company's remedial actions succeeded in ending the offending conduct. (App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 044, 032.) Under the circumstances, the Court finds that Lear acted promptly to address Graham's complaint of harassment, and thus cannot be liable for a hostile environment claim under Title VII. See Goff v. Soundolier Div. of Am. Trading and Prod. Corp., 2000 WL 707810, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (Solis, J.) (holding employer not liable for hostile work environment claim where employer interviewed employees within two days of report of harassment).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having considered defendant Lear Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, the record before the Court, and the applicable law, the Court determines that Lear is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff Graham's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, and Texas state law regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It is therefore ORDERED that Lear's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED as set forth previously herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.