Opinion
Civil Action CV-2021-0346
11-06-2023
MARK GRAHAM, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN JOYCE, JOHN COSTELLO, ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., and EDITH WOODWARD, Defendants.
ORDER
JOHN O.NEIL, JR. JUSTICE
Before the Court is Defendants Kevin Joyce and John Costello's motion for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, summary judgment against Plaintiff Mark Graham. M.R. Civ. P. 12(c), 56. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
On May 9,2022, the Court issued an Order limiting the allegations to be adjudicated to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims against all defendants. See Order, No. CV-21-346, at *3 (May 9, 2022). This constriction became the "law of the case/' see Stale v. Larrivee, 481 A.2d 782, 783 (Me. 1984), rendering Defendants5 present motion for judgment on the pleadings concerning Plaintiffs state tort and First Amendment claims moot. The result would be the same if the Court were to reach the merits of Defendants' motion. See Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988) (noting that a defendant's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is treated like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830 (elucidating the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions). Plaintiffs state tort claim fails because he neglected to plead that he had complied with the conditions precedent to bringing a claim against Defendants under the Maine Tort Claims Act. See 14 M.R.S. § 8107(1) (2023) (requiring tort claimants to file a written notice of claim within 365 days after the cause of action accrues); M.R. Civ. P. 9(c). Plaintiff also fails to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, see D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012), by submitting only the conclusory allegation that Defendants "retaliated against him in violation of the [First] Amendment" by drugging his food and water and placing him in segregated housing. (Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 7-9.).
I. BACKGROUND
a. Material Facts
Plaintiff failed to oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment in compliance with M.R. Civ. P. 56(e), (h). Therefore, the following recitation of facts is derived exclusively from Defendants' statement of material facts and the portions of the record cited therein.
Defendant Joyce is the Cumberland County Sheriff. (Defs.' S.M.F. ¶ 1.) At all relevant times, Defendant Costello was a Captain in the Cumberland County Sheriffs Office, responsible for overseeing the Cumberland County Jail's (the "CCJ") operations and security. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Plaintiff was first incarcerated at the CCJ in Portland, Maine on May 26, 2020. (Id. ¶ 4.). On January 29, 2021, Plaintiff was released on bail until it was revoked on April 12, 2021; he was then incarcerated at the CCJ until January 6, 2022, when he was transferred to the Maine State Prison Intensive Mental Health Unit. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee who had not been convicted of a crime or sentenced by a court during the events pertinent to this case. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff alleges that he is the victim of a "nationwide criminal conspiracy," involving the CCJ and the Los Angeles County Jail, to place drugs and chemicals into his food and water. (Id. ¶ 10.) Although Plaintiff never personally witnessed anyone place drugs or chemicals in his food or water while he was incarcerated at the CCJ, he believes he can smell that they have been tainted. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Defendants have never placed any substances into Plaintiffs food or water, nor do they have knowledge of anyone else doing so. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17.)
The only medical treatment Plaintiff sought while incarcerated at the CCJ was for head pain he claims was caused by the harsh drugs and chemicals in his food and water. (Id. ¶¶ 13,18.) Plaintiff was otherwise seen by and interacted with numerous nurses and mental health professionals during his period of incarceration at the CCJ. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff also "constantly" threatened suicide during his incarceration; as a result, officials at the CCJ placed him on suicide watch and assigned him to segregated housing. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)
b. Procedural History
On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging several claims against CCJ officials and medical personnel, including violations of his Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (extending Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment to the delivery of medical care to incarcerated individuals). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he was continuously subjected to the following inmate abuse and retaliation: CCJ officials and medical staff intentionally placed extremely harsh chemicals and drugs in his food and water, denied him adequate medical and mental health care for the brain injuries purportedly caused by those substances, and placed him in segregated housing as punishment for seeking such treatment.
On February 12, 2023, Defendants filed a motion seeking, in relevant part, summary judgment on Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim. On February 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed an "objection" to Defendants' motion, reemphasizing the seriousness of the alleged violations of his constitutional rights and insisting that the case must go to trial because the only way he can prove the merits of his claims is through witness testimony before a jury.
On May 17, 2023, the Court received a letter from Plaintiffs mother stating that he had requested she communicate that he was unavailable to proceed because he was incarcerated, deemed mentally incompetent, and awaiting placement at a mental health hospital. On June 6, 2023, the Court requested Defendants' position on the letter from Plaintiffs mother. On June 21, 2023, Defendants responded, requesting that the Court either (1) act on the pending motion, considering there was no indication Plaintiff was unable to respond to it prior to the opposition deadline on May 17, 2023, or (2) stay the matter on the condition that Plaintiff provide a status update in sixty days. Plaintiff subsequently filed five handwritten letters with the Court over July and August of 2023 requesting a three-to-six-month "hold" on the proceedings, reasoning that he needed more time to ready his case because he lost three months of preparation due to his arrest and mental health diagnosis, and he lacks access to pencils, paper, and the mail.
On June 24,2023, the Court received a second, largely identical letter from Plaintiffs mother.
On August 30,2023, the Court issued an order setting the matter for oral argument, offering Plaintiff the option of participating by Zoom, and noting that if he was seeking a continuance or another form of relief, the Court would require medical documentation demonstrating why court participation would be inappropriate given his diagnosis. On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court explaining that he was unable to participate in the hearing because he was incarcerated at Patton State Hospital, but nonetheless wanted the Court to rule on Defendants' motion. On October 20, 2023, the Court held a hearing at which Defendants offered oral argument on their pending motion and Plaintiff did not appear.
The Court declines to further delay judgment on the present motion considering Plaintiff was given the opportunity to be heard, he is plainly capable of communicating with the Court, he has failed to provide medical documentation demonstrating the need for a continuance or any other form of accommodation, and he is no longer requesting the Court "hold" the proceedings.
Accordingly, the Court now turns to the merits of Defendants' summary judgment motion.
IL DISCUSSION
a. Standard of Review
The summary judgment record consists only of the parties' properly supported statements of material fact and the portions of the record referenced therein. See Dorsey v. N. Light Health, 2022 ME 62, ¶ 10, 288 A.3d 386. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the summary judgment record, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at trial." Chartier v. Farm Fam. Life Ins. Co., 2015 ME 29, ¶ 6, 113 A.3d 234; see M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case, and there is a 'genuine issue' when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact." Toto v. Knowles, 2021 ME 51, ¶ 8, 261 A.3d 233.
b. Constitutional Claims
Plaintiffs last surviving claim alleges, pursuant to section 1983, that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, which is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const, amends. VIII, XIV. However, as Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiffs claim must fail as a matter of law because the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies only to convicted persons, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff was at all relevant times a pretrial detainee. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 671 n.40 (1977) (clarifying that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "was designed to protect those convicted ofcrimes" and consequently applies "only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions"); (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 6; Defs.' S.M.F. ¶ 2.)
Pretrial detainees are instead protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002), which provides "at least as much" protection as that which the Eighth Amendment affords convicted inmates, Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullan, 485 F.3d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). Although Plaintiffs complaint does not expressly identify the Fourteenth Amendment- in fact, the provision arose only in Defendants' argument for summary judgment and Plaintiffs related objection--the Court will liberally construe Plaintiffs allegations to encompass a due process claim. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (explaining that a pro se plaintiffs complaint is subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers").
i. Medical and Mental Health Care
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prison officials are prohibited from "treating a pretrial detainee with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health." Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Revere, 463 U.S. at 244). To establish a violation of this standard, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). First, Plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation is "objectively, sufficiently serious." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Plaintiff must establish that the "prison officials possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind;" namely, one of "deliberate indifference" to the detainee's health. Id. "Deliberate" is defined to require that prison officials were subjectively "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exist[ed]," and that they in fact drew that inference. Id. at 837. "Indifference" exists when prison officials were aware of and failed to reasonably respond to the risk. Id. at 844. Thus, indifference is negated if prison officials were either unaware of the risk or were aware and "responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not avoided." Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by intentionally placing extremely harsh chemicals and drugs in his food and water and then denying him medical and mental health treatment for the brain injuries purportedly caused by those substances. For these claims to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to both the subjective and objective inquiries. See Boivin v. Somatex, Inc., 2022 ME 44, ¶ 10, 279 A.3d 393 ("A plaintiff opposing summary judgment must in turn present a prima facie case for each challenged element of [their] claim."). Plaintiff has failed to meet that burden.
First, the record is devoid of evidence establishing a genuine dispute that these alleged constitutional violations are, "objectively, sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. There is simply no record evidence substantiating Plaintiffs claim that his food and water was laced with drugs and chemicals, much less that those substances injured his brain. Plaintiff has not designated an expert witness to testify as to the contents of his food and water or his related brain injuries, nor has he established his own qualifications to offer such testimony, and Plaintiff has admitted that he never personally observed anyone place the drugs and chemicals in his food and water. (Defs.' S.M.F. ¶ H.) Second, although Defendants were subjectively aware of the purported risk- Plaintiff explicitly sought treatment for his brain injuries caused by the drugs and chemicals in his food and water-there is substantial, undisputed record evidence that they responded reasonably by continuing to thoroughly treat Plaintiffs health. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 10-11.)
i. Segregated Housing
"A pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from punishment prior to conviction." Suprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). Consequently," [i]n evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention .. . the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee." Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. To establish that a particular restriction is unconstitutional, pretrial detainees must demonstrate that (1) officials expressly intended it to be punitive or that (2) it is not "reasonably related to a legitimate government objective." Id. at 538-39. Here too, Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to each of these elements.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants assigned him to segregated housing as punishment for seeking medical and mental health treatment for brain injuries caused by the drugs and chemicals placed in his food and water. This assertion is unfounded in the record. Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendants expressly intended to punish Plaintiff for his medical complaints by assigning him to segregated housing or that doing so was unrelated to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose. Indeed, there is ample evidence that Defendants assigned Plaintiff to segregated housing and placed him on suicide watch as a direct result of his threats to commit suicide. (Defs.' S.M.F. ¶¶ 21-22; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J, 9.) On these facts, Plaintiff cannot preclude summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the Court GRANTS Defendants Joyce and Costello's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs sole remaining claim. The clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).