Summary
awarding CLS rate where requested and in absence of objection
Summary of this case from Damian v. School District of PhiladelphiaOpinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-7794
October 15, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
On July 9, 2003, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ordered Defendant to conduct a name-clearing hearing. Now before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons that follow, I grant Plaintiff's motion.
II. DISCUSSION
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides for an award of attorneys fees to a prevailing party in any action to enforce § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000). Plaintiff, as the prevailing party in this litigation, bears the burden of demonstrating that the fee request is reasonable. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). Courts assess the reasonableness of a claimed fee using the "lodestar" formula, which entails multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the appropriate hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckert, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001). Although the lodestar is presumed to yield a reasonable fee, the district court has considerable discretion to adjust the lodestar upward or downward after the opposing party objects to the fee request. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (citing Bell v. United Princeton Props., 884 F.2d 713, 721 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiff seeks an award of $11,637.50 in attorney's fees and $299.48 in costs representing the work of Plaintiff s attorney, Tshaka Lafayette. Defendant broadly contests Plaintiff's motion on the ground that it does not contain sufficient documentation and specifically contests one entry for "Preparation for Kraig Graham Deposition."
A. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rate
A court determines a reasonable hourly rate by assessing the prevailing party's attorney's experience and skill compared to the market rates in the relevant community for lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184; Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N. J., Inc. v. ATT Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1450 (3d Cir. 1988). The prevailing party bears the burden of showing that the requested hourly rates are reasonable. Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 15 F. Supp.2d 621, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citing Washington v. Phila. County Ct. of Com. PL, 89 F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1996)). The opposing party must then show a sufficient basis to contest the reasonableness of the fees. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 14 F. Supp.2d 721, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Once the opposing party's objection is made with the required support, a court has considerable discretion to adjust the fee in light of the objections of the adverse party. Bell, 884 F.2d at 721.
The Third Circuit has held that the attorney's fee schedule composed by Community Legal Services ("CLS") is "a fair reflection of market rates in Philadelphia." Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 187. According to the CLS guidelines, attorneys with two to five years of experience should be compensated at an hourly rate between $160 and $180. Plaintiff requests that Mr. Lafayette, who has been practicing in the field of employment and civil rights litigation for four years, be compensated at the rate of $175 per hour. (Pl.'s Mot. For Att'y's Fees (Lafayette Aff.).) Defendant does not object to this rate. Therefore, this Court finds that $175 is a reasonable hourly rate in these circumstances.
B. Reasonableness of Hours Expended
A prevailing party may request fees for work that is "useful and the type ordinarily necessary to secure the final result obtained." Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 560-61 (1986). A court has "the affirmative function" to "review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184 (quoting Pub. Interest Research Group of N. J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995)). The court, however, cannot generally reduce hours sua sponte; rather, objections must be specific for the court to reduce the amount of fees requested. United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Defendant raises two objections to Plaintiff's fee request. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's fee petition lacks sufficient documentation because it does not contain a contemporaneous time record of the activities performed. The Third Circuit has held that "[a] fee petition is required to be specific enough to allow the district court to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work performed." Washington, 89 F.3d at 1037 (citing Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190) (internal quotation omitted). This requirement is satisfied by "fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities" but "it is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted." Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190 (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amer. Radiator Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973)). Plaintiff's motion, which contains a list detailing the time expended on various enumerated tasks, is sufficiently specific to enable this Court to determine the reasonableness of hours expended on each task.
Second, Defendant contests the four hours Plaintiff's counsel expended preparing Plaintiff for his deposition on the ground that Plaintiff was never deposed and notice of Plaintiff's deposition was never sent. Plaintiff's counsel responds that it was reasonable to anticipate and prepare for Plaintiff's deposition given that: (1) depositions of aggrieved plaintiffs are commonplace; and (2) defense counsel's statements at the Rule 16 conference suggested that Plaintiff would be deposed. Plaintiff's counsel's actions were entirely reasonable; this Court does not require counsel to sit on his hands waiting for a ruling when he should be actively preparing his case.
III. CONCLUSION
I conclude that Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of $11,637.50 and costs in the amount of $299.48. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff s Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, Defendant's response thereto, and Plaintiff's reply, it is hereby ORDERED that:
Plaintiff's Motion for Counsel Fees and Costs (Document No. 23) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is hereby awarded and Defendant is hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff the sum of $11,637.50 in attorneys' fees and $299.48 in costs.