Opinion
02-22-00315-CV
03-09-2023
Stormie Graham, Appellant v. AT Owner 16, L.P. aka Providence at Marine Creek, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-003017-1
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Elizabeth Kerr, Justice
Appellant Stormie Graham, appearing pro se, appeals the trial court's judgment in a forcible-detainer action granting Appellee AT Owner 16, L.P. aka Providence at Marine Creek possession of an apartment located in Fort Worth, Texas. We vacate the judgment in part and affirm in part.
I. Background
In November 2019, Graham and Appellee entered into a lease contract for an apartment. The lease was for a one-year term commencing on January 1, 2020. Because Graham leased the apartment as part of a government-regulated affordable-housing program, the lease contained an addendum requiring her to, among other things, provide Appellee information confirming her income and continued eligibility to participate in the affordable-housing program upon request. The addendum stated that failure to provide that information would be considered "a substantial violation" of the lease and would provide good cause for terminating or not renewing the lease.
Near the end of the lease term in December 2020, Appellee repeatedly requested that Graham recertify her eligibility to participate in that program. Despite these requests, Graham failed to recertify her eligibility-placing her in default. As a result, Appellee did not allow Graham to renew her lease, and Appellee sent her written notice to vacate.
The lease provided that after the initial lease term expired, it would renew on a month-to-month basis unless either party gave written notice of termination. The lease further provided that upon default by Graham, Appellee could end her right to occupancy by giving her at least a 24-hour written notice to vacate.
In May 2022, Appellee filed a forcible-detainer action, alleging that Graham remained on the property after having been given written notice to vacate. The justice court rendered judgment for Appellee, and Graham appealed to County Court at Law No. 1. On August 4, 2022, after a de novo trial, the county court at law signed a final judgment awarding Appellee possession of the apartment as well as court costs and $2,500 in attorney's fees. Graham filed a notice of appeal the following day.
On August 16, 2022, the county court at law issued a writ of possession commanding the constable to deliver possession of the apartment to Appellee. The constable executed the writ on August 25, 2022, and Graham no longer resides in the apartment.
II. Discussion
Though Graham's appellate argument is not entirely clear, she appears to contend-without citing any legal authorities-that her rights were violated when she was forcibly removed from the apartment despite her pending appeal before this court. She asks us, among other things, to "reverse the award of possession of the [apartment] . . .; attorney's fees . . .[;] and court fees" to Appellee and "render judgment that Appellee take nothing by its claims." In response, Appellee, construing Graham's appellate complaint as an assertion that the trial court erred by issuing a writ of possession, argues, among other things, that the appeal is moot because Graham is no longer in possession of the apartment.
Specifically, Graham asserts that her removal from the apartment violated Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution. But this constitutional provision governs eminent-domain actions-that is, the government's "[t]aking, damaging or destroying property for public use"-and is thus inapplicable to the present case. Tex. Const. art. I, § 17.
In addition to the reversal of the trial court's judgment, Graham requests "economic damages," "noneconomic damages," "exemplary damages," an order requiring Appellee to provide her a "letter of excellent residency," and "such other and further relief, at law and in equity, as may be just and appropriate to correct the wrongs done unto [her] by Appellee." But because Graham did not assert any counterclaims requesting this affirmative relief in the trial court, we cannot grant her such relief on appeal. See Cnty. of Dall. Collector v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dall., 41 S.W.3d 739, 746 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.) ("We cannot grant appellant more relief than was requested of the trial court." (citing CRA, Inc. v. Bullock, 615 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1981))); see also Tex.R.App.P. 43.2.
Appellee also asserts that Graham failed to preserve the issue for appeal and that, because Graham failed to secure a supersedeas bond, the trial court did not err by issuing the writ of possession. As set forth below, we conclude that the possession issue is moot, so we need not address Appellee's other arguments.
A. The Possession Issue Is Moot
As a preliminary matter, we address Appellee's argument that this appeal is moot because Graham has been evicted from the apartment. Because "[t]he only issue in a forcible[-]detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises," Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006), a forcible-detainer appeal becomes moot upon an appellant's eviction from the property unless (1) the appellant asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property, or (2) damages or attorney's fees remain at issue. Martinez v. HD Tex. Invs. LLC, No. 02-21-00178-CV, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Sept. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gillespie v. Erker, No. 02-20-00331-CV, 2021 WL 733084, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc., No. 02-20-00014-CV, 2020 WL 1057320, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because Graham has been evicted from the apartment, the possession issue is moot unless Graham has a meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the apartment. See Martinez, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1; Gillespie, 2021 WL 733084, at *1; Ratliff, 2020 WL 1057320, at *1. The apartment lease has expired, and Graham presents no basis for claiming a right to possession after expiration of the lease. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. Thus, Graham's appeal-as it pertains to the possession of the apartment-is moot. See Devilbiss v. Burch, No. 04-16-00711-CV, 2018 WL 2418476, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 30, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
Graham appears to mistakenly believe that the trial court's judgment of possession would automatically be stayed when she appealed. But Rule 510.13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a judgment in an eviction case will not be stayed "unless within 10 days from the judgment the appellant files a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court pursuant to Section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code." Tex.R.Civ.P. 510.13. The record does not reflect that Graham ever filed a supersedeas bond. Thus, the trial court did not err by issuing a writ of possession instructing the constable to evict Graham despite her pending appeal.
Even if the lease renewed on a month-to-month basis after the expiration of the initial lease term, see supra note 1, because Graham defaulted by failing to recertify her eligibility to participate in the affordable housing program, Appellee could terminate her right to occupancy by sending her a written notice to vacate and did so on April 1, 2022. The notice gave Graham until midnight on April 5, 2022, to vacate the premises. Thus, at the latest, Graham's right to occupancy terminated on that date.
Because the possession issue is moot, we must vacate the trial court's judgment of possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785-90 (holding that because the "case [wa]s moot . . . the court of appeals erred in dismissing only the appeal and leaving the trial court's judgment in place"); Martinez, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1 &n.3 (similar, quoting Marshall); Devilbiss, 2018 WL 2418476, at *2.
B. Attorney's Fees and Court Costs
In her brief, Graham asks us to reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees and court costs to Appellee. As this issue does not depend on the trial court's possession determination, it is not moot. See, e.g., De La Garza v. Riverstone Apartments, No. 04-06-00732-CV, 2007 WL 3270769, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.). But we hold that she has waived her complaint due to inadequate briefing: Graham has provided no substantive analysis, no citations to the record, and no citations to any legal authorities to show that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees and court costs to Appellee. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1; Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that error may be waived by inadequate briefing); McKinnon v. Wallin, No. 03-17-00592-CV, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that pro se appellant had waived his issues by inadequate briefing); see also Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure." (first citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); and then citing Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied))). We therefore affirm this portion of the trial court's judgment. Cf. Devilbiss, 2018 WL 2418476, at *3 (vacating judgment of possession but affirming judgment in all other respects); Stewart v. Warren Props., Inc., No. 04-13-00141-CV, 2014 WL 470146, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb. 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).
III. Conclusion
We vacate the judgment in part and affirm in part. Because the possession issue is moot, we vacate the trial court's judgment of possession. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.