Opinion
CASE NO. 572 CRD-6-87
SEPTEMBER 12, 1988
The claimant was represented by Thomas F. Kelsey, Esq., Trantolo Trantolo, P.C.
The respondent was represented by Edward Scully, Esq., Wollenberg, Scully Nicksa.
This Petition for Review from the February 25, 1987 Ruling on a Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner for the Sixth District was heard March 25, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and A. Thomas White, Jr.
OPINION
Respondent has appealed the February 25, 1987 Sec. 31-297(b), C.G.S. ruling establishing a conclusive presumption of compensability. It argues that Claimant's notice of claim under Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. was defective in failing to provide in simple language the date and place of the accident.
The notice of claim set forth fully in the note below states that Kevin P. Grady was injured "at various times and places prior to December 19, 1984" and continuing to state that he injured his back "as a result of repetitive trauma in the course of his employment" Section 31-275(8), C.G.S. makes repetitive trauma injuries compensable as follows:
NOTICE OF CLAIM
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Kevin P. Grady of 33 Gram Road, East Hartford, Connecticut was, while in the employ of G L Oxygen and Medical Company, at various times and places, prior to December 19, 1984, injured out of and in the course of his employment as follows: Mr. Grady was injured as a result of repetitive trauma in the course of his employment which involved delivering heavy oxygen bottles to respondent's customers and injured his back and claims compensation in his own interest. The claimant requests an immediate informal hearing for the purpose of determining: 1. Compensability 2. Payment of existing medical bills. 3. Securing further medical treatment. 4. Any other relief which might appertain. The employer is hereby requested to forward to this office copies of any and all medical and/or incident reports regarding this injury.
"[I]n addition to accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred, an injury to an employee which is causally connected with his employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment. . . .".
Repetitive trauma injuries by their very nature as recognized in the statutory definition cannot be "definitely located as to. . .time and. . .place". Were we then to construe Sec. 31-294 as requiring claimants to give specific dates and places of accidents in their notices of claims for repetitive trauma injuries it would effectively negate legislative intent as expressed in Sec. 31-275(8). Under such a construction, no claimant could ever perfect a repetitive trauma claim. "[T]he law favors rational and sensible statutory construction.", State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 563 (1980). "A statute is to be construed so that all of its parts have meaning, so that it makes common sense and so that it does not lead to bizarre results.", Eagle Hill Corporation v. Commission on Hospitals and Health Care, 2 Conn. App. 68, 75 (1984) (citations omitted). We therefore find no defect in the Sec. 31-294 notice of claim.
However, the notice does raise jurisdictional questions under Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., 13 Conn. App. 276, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 805 (1988) and Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988). As we indicated in Boutin v. Industrial Components, 4 Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 237 CRD-6-83 (1987) and Pich v. Pratt Whitney, 4 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 163, 354 CRD-6-84 (1988), the notice of claim for repetitive trauma injuries under Sec. 31-294 must be given within one year of the last repetitive activity or trauma. A notice of claim served August 28, 1985 stating that the repetitive trauma or activity occurred "at various times and places prior to December 19, 1984" leaves open the question whether repetitive trauma or activity was before August 28, 1984.
It may be that the repetitive trauma or activity continued until the last day worked, December 19, 1984. If that he so, then jurisdiction clearly lies under Pelletier v. Caron Pipe Jacking, Inc., supra, but the Commissioner below must take evidence to establish that jurisdictional fact. If jurisdiction can thus be established, the Motion to Preclude may then be in order and the Commissioner may so rule.
The matter is remanded to the Sixth District for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.