Opinion
No. 2-079 / 01-0794
Filed August 28, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, L. Vern Robinson, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff on his claims for trespass, breach of contract, conversion, and punitive damages.
AFFIRMED.
Terry J. Abernathy and Stephanie L. Hinz of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
James C. Larew of Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Holiday Mobile Home Court appeals from a judgment in favor of Crockett Grabbe on his claims for trespass, breach of contract, conversion, and punitive damages. It contends (1) there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for submitting the conversion and trespass claims to the jury, (2) there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for submitting the punitive damages claim to the jury, and (3) the trial court erred in denying its motion for remittitur based on the excessiveness of the punitive damages award. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Dr. Crockett Grabbe became a resident of the Holiday Mobile Home Court in North Liberty in 1982. He purchased a mobile home and rented a lot from Holiday. Grabbe suffers from a variety of physical ailments. In September 1998, he purchased a house in Iowa City, which he believed would afford him a better living situation, if modified to accommodate his disabilities. He lived part-time in both his residences until he could sufficiently fix up the house in Iowa City to meet his needs. He continued paying his rent to Holiday.
Joe and Allie Alberhasky, owners of Holiday, heard that Grabbe intended to move out of the park. Holiday sent Grabbe a letter dated September 30, 1998, informing him of its policy requiring certain mobile homes to be removed from the court upon sale. The letter informed Grabbe that this policy applied to his mobile home. Grabbe indicated to Holiday that he would be terminating his lease on December 1, 1998. Grabbe subsequently delayed the termination date.
On March 31, 1999, Grabbe delivered his monthly rent check to Holiday and indicated he planned to terminate his lease in May. That same day, Holiday initiated an action for forcible entry and detainer (FED) against Grabbe, citing as the reason that "tenant is no longer residing Holiday Court." Holiday cashed Grabbe's rent check a few days later. On April 5, 1999, Holiday sent Grabbe a sixty-day notice to quit dated March 31, 1999. Grabbe received the notice to quit by certified mail. The notice informed him his oral lease of his mobile home lot would terminate sixty days after delivery of the notice to quit.
The record reveals that Grabbe actually had a written lease.
On April 6, 1999, Allie Alberhasky filed an affidavit of service with the clerk of the district court, which stated that she mailed notice of the FED action to Grabbe by certified mail. In truth, Grabbe had not been served with notice of the FED action. On April 13, 1999, the court awarded judgment in Holiday's favor at the hearing on the FED action after Grabbe, who was unaware the action had been commenced, failed to appear. The next day, Holiday moved Grabbe's mobile home from its cement pad without informing him. It placed the home about 75 feet to the rear of its original location. Holiday detached the utilities, air conditioner, awning, and skirting from the home prior to moving it. It failed to secure the water heater prior to the move. Grabbe's home was damaged by water and vandals. Holiday failed to set steps by the home after moving it. As a result, Grabbe had trouble accessing the home after it was moved due to his physical ailments.
Grabbe filed a motion to set aside the FED judgment on April 20, 1999. The court heard his motion on May 5, 1999. At the hearing Holiday conceded Grabbe had not been served with notice of its FED action. The court set the FED judgment aside and withdrew the writ of possession.
Grabbe then filed suit against Holiday, alleging trespass, breach of contract, conversion, abuse of process, and infliction of severe emotional distress. He requested punitive damages. He later added a negligence claim. The court directed a verdict in favor of Holiday on Grabbe's claims of abuse of process and infliction of severe emotional distress, and it did not allow the negligence claim to go to the jury. The court overruled Holiday's motion for directed verdict as to the conversion, trespass, and punitive damages claims. The jury returned verdicts in Grabbe's favor on those claims and for breach of contract. It awarded him $4906 in actual damages and $58,100 in punitive damages. The district court denied Holiday's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur. Holiday appeals.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the correction of errors at law. Crookham v. Riley, 584 N.W.2d 258, 265 (Iowa 1998). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. If there is substantial evidence supporting the claim, then the motion should be denied. Id. "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted).
We review whether an award of punitive damages is excessive de novo. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 1685-86, 149 L.Ed.2d 674, 687 (2001). We note that while Holiday did not specifically argue before the district court that the punitive damages award was excessive in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, it does not appear under the current state of Iowa law that is necessary to preserve such error for appellate review. Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 144 (Iowa 1996); Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 398-99 (Iowa 1994).
We note that the United States Supreme Court does not appear to require appellate courts to consider a due process claim that has not been raised in the courts below. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 1684, 149 L.Ed.2d 674, 685 (2001) (stating that "[i]f no constitutional issue is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review the trial court's `determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard'" (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2922, 106 L.Ed.2d 219, 240 (1989))); Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77, 109 S.Ct. at 2921, 106 L.Ed.2d at 239 (holding that petitioner's reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was unavailing after having failed to raise that argument in the district court, court of appeals, or certiorari petition). We note that in Ezzone and Wilson, our supreme court relied on United States Supreme Court decisions to determine that Iowa appellate courts had a constitutional duty to consider the excessiveness of punitive awards. We apply the precedent in our state to this case.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR CONVERSION AND TRESPASS.
Holiday contends there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for submitting the conversion and trespass claims to the jury. It argues a conversion did not occur because it had no intent to deny Grabbe access to his property and he was not in fact denied access. It maintains there was also no trespass because Grabbe's right to access and possess his home was hardly interrupted.
Conversion is the act of wrongful control or dominion over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with that person's possessory right to the property. Ezzone, 525 N.W.2d at 396. The interference must be so serious that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the property. Kendall/Hunt Publ'g Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988). A claim of trespass on land is the wrongful interference with one's possessory rights in property. Robert's River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Iowa 1994).
Iowa Code sections 562B.25 and 562B.27A (1999) authorize the forcible entry and detainer of mobile homes. "[T]he landlord may . . . recover possession of the mobile home space pursuant to an action in forcible detainer for any material noncompliance with the rental agreement. . . ." Iowa Code § 562B.25(4). In addition, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement for a material noncompliance with the agreement not less than thirty days after the tenant receives a written notice so specifying. Iowa Code § 562B.25(1), (4). A petition for forcible entry and detainer may be served upon the tenant by personal service or by sending notice by certified or restricted certified mail, whether or not the tenant signs a receipt for the notice. Iowa Code § 562B.27A.
We conclude there was sufficient evidence to generate a jury issue regarding the claims of conversion and trespass. Evidence showed Holiday entered Grabbe's rented premises and moved his mobile home to another location. Holiday did this without Grabbe's knowledge and without properly serving him notice of the FED pursuant to statute. Grabbe's mobile home was damaged during the move. After moving Grabbe's home, Holiday did not set steps near the home, making it more difficult for him to access it. The home was vandalized in the location where Holiday had left it. We affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Holiday claims there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law for submitting the punitive damages claim to the jury. It contends the focal point of Grabbe's argument for punitive damages was that the FED was wrongfully obtained. It argues none of the alleged facts deal with how the trespass or conversion could support punitive damages; instead, they deal only with his abuse of process claim, which was dismissed for insufficient evidence.
Section 668A.1(1)(a) provides the standard for an award of punitive damages. Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Iowa 2000). Under this section, an award of punitive damages stands only when there is proof of conduct that establishes a "willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another." Wilson, M558 N.W.2d at 142 (citing Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a)). Our supreme court has approved the following definition of "willful and wanton" conduct for section 668A.1(1) purposes:
[T]he actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences.Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 617 (quotations omitted). The evidence to support an award must be clear, convincing, and satisfactory. Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a).
Punitive damages serve "as a form of punishment and to deter others from conduct which is sufficiently egregious to call for the remedy." McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Coster v. Crookham, 468 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Iowa 1991)). Punitive damages are appropriate only when actual or legal malice is shown. Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 617. Mere negligent conduct is therefore not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. Id.
We conclude there was sufficient evidence to submit the claim for punitive damages to the jury. Allie Alberhasky testified that she filed the FED action as "an opportunity to help [Grabbe] get moved, get the trailer moved." That way, she testified, he would not have to do the work himself as far as unblocking it and incurring extra expenses. She thought it was not advisable to ask Grabbe for his permission to move his home, and she did not do so. She had assumed he had moved out of the home, based on the statements of his neighbor and the fact that she had not seen him at the park for some time, but she did not discuss with him whether he had moved out.
Allie Alberhasky testified they were thinking about setting steps outside Grabbe's door after moving the home, but never got around to it. Former Holiday employee Dale Steffen, who actually moved the home, testified that he did not expect Grabbe to be able to enter his home at its new location. Holiday left it in a spot where people would probably not think anyone was living there.
Steffen did not do anything to secure the water heater prior to moving the home. Grabbe's home sustained substantial water damage in the moving process. Allie Alberhasky had filed a sworn affidavit, in which she stated Grabbe had been served with an original notice of the FED action and of the April 13 hearing. However, she had never actually served Grabbe with notice pursuant to statute, and as a result Grabbe did not attend the hearing on the FED. Attached to her affidavit alleging she served Grabbe was the certified mail receipt for the notice to quit, not the FED notice. Allie Alberhasky was experienced in filing actions in court, including FED actions, in relationship to her business at Holiday.
From this evidence, we conclude the issue of whether Grabbe was entitled to punitive damages was properly submitted to the jury. We affirm on this issue.
V. REMITTITUR.
Holiday argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for remittitur based on the excessiveness of the punitive damages award. It relies on the Due Process Clause to support its argument.
Awards of punitive damages are tested with a view of the extent and nature of the outrageous conduct, the amount necessary for future deterrence, and with deference to the relationship between the punitive award and plaintiff's injury, as is reflected in any award for compensatory damages. Ezzone, 525 N.W.2d at 399. In addition, we consider all circumstances surrounding the conduct and relationship between the parties. Id. Provocation of the conduct by the plaintiff is a factor. Id.
Upon our review, we determine the punitive award is not excessive. Holiday moved Grabbe's home after instituting an FED action. It did not notify Grabbe of the FED action as required by statute. Grabbe's home was damaged during the move. Allie Alberhasky indicated she pursued the FED action and moved the home to assist Grabbe in selling it. The jury obviously did not believe her testimony. We conclude Holiday engaged in outrageous conduct. The punitive damage award is necessary to deter Holiday from engaging in similar conduct against other tenants. The relationship between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages is not disproportional. We find no provocation on the part of Grabbe justifying Holiday's conduct. In considering all relevant factors, we affirm the trial court's ruling denying Holiday's motion for a new trial on the issue of the excessiveness of the punitive award.
VI. CONCLUSION.
We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury verdicts in Grabbe's favor on his claims of conversion, trespass, and punitive damages. We conclude the punitive award is not excessive. We affirm the trial court's rulings.
AFFIRMED.