Summary
noting that documents submitted by the inmate indicate that prison officials provided him with adequate resources to access the courts
Summary of this case from Brown v. VoorhiesOpinion
CASE NO. 2:06-cv-00065.
March 20, 2008
OPINION AND ORDER
On October 26, 2006, final judgment was entered dismissing the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. No. 26. On December 13, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that judgment, Doc. No. 38, and, on January 4, 2008, the mandate of the court of appeals issued. Doc. No. 39. This matter is now before the Court on petitioner's January 22, 2008, motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Doc. No. 40. For the reasons that follow, petitioner's motion is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Petitioner's motion may properly be considered under Rule 60(b), because he challenges a "defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding," and does not raise a substantive claim for relief. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005). Specifically, petitioner contends that relief from judgment is warranted because this Court improperly dismissed his claims as procedurally defaulted. See id. As cause for his failure to timely appeal state court proceedings to the Ohio Supreme Court, petitioner again alleges, as he did previously, that prison officials denied him access to materials and legal resources necessary to file timely appeals. In view of the entire record, the Court remains unpersuaded by petitioner's argument.
Petitioner's motion is untimely under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), which requires that such a motion be filed within one year of the judgment challenged. See Censke v. Calhoun County Jail, 2007 WL 2076448 (W.D. Michigan July 17, 2007), citing Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 355 F.3d 574, 588-589 (6th Cir. 2004) and McDowell v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 931 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1991).
Pursuit of an appeal does not affect the time in which a party must file a motion under Rule 60(b). McDowell, 931 F.2d at 383. In addition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) provides the court with no discretion to extend the one-year time period contained in Rule 60(b). Smith v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 776 F.2d 1330, 1332-1333 (6th Cir. 1985).Id. (footnote omitted). Petitioner requests relief from this Court's October 26, 2006, final judgment of dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. See Doc. Nos. 26, 27. His motion, filed on January 22, 2008, is therefore untimely under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3).
In any event, relief from judgment is not warranted under Rule 60(b)(6).
Rule 60(b)(6) should apply "only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the first five numbered clauses of the Rule." Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Pierce v. United Mine Workers, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed.2d 925 (1986)); see also Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199, 71 S.Ct. 209, 212, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that Rule 60(b)(6) may be used to grant relief in case of extreme and undue hardship). Courts . . . must apply subsection (b)(6) only "as a means to achieve substantial justice when 'something more' than one of the grounds contained in Rule 60(b)'s first five clauses is present." Hopper, 867 F.2d at 294; see also Emergency Beacon Corp., 666 F.2d at 758.Olle v. Henry Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) encompasses "unusual and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief." Id. (emphasis in original).
Parties seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) . . . must file their motion within a "reasonable" time, which ordinarily depends on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief.Id.
Petitioner has offered no justification for his failure until December 27, 2007, to obtain the information now attached in support of his motion for relief from judgment. Thus, it does not appear that petitioner filed his motion within a reasonable time as required under Rule 60(b)(6). Moreover, even assuming that the motion is timely under Rule 60(b)(6), the record fails to reflect that relief is warranted.
In support of his contention that the Court improperly dismissed his claims as procedurally defaulted, petitioner has now attached what purports to be a letter dated January 6, 2008, from Jonathan Grill, a counselor with the United States Bureau of Prisons, which states:
In response to your inmate request form, Program Statement #1315.07 on "INMATE LEGAL ACTIVITIES" prohibits employees from the Federal Bureau of Prisons from providing inmates with state legal assistance and/or state legal materials.
During your incarceration at U.S.P. Allenwood (from 2003 to 2006) you were denied these state legal materials due to this program statement by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
These materials did include: 1.) State law books, 2.) State case citations, 3.) Stamps, 4.) Copies, 5.) Envelopes, 6.) Stationary, and 7.) Writing utensils.See Exhibits to Rule 60(b) motion. However, the "Program Statement" attached to Grill's letter outlines the manner in which the prison in fact provides "reasonable access to legal materials for preparation of legal documents." See id. Further, in view of the entire record, the documents now referred to by petitioner in support of his Rule 60(b) motion do not establish that he was denied access to the courts by prison officials during the time period at issue.
Petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted because he failed to timely appeal the state appellate court's May 25, 2004, denial of his appeal, the state trial court's July 6, 2004, denial of his petition for post conviction relief and the state appellate court's May 5, 2005, denial of his Rule 26(B) motion. On September 13, 2004, during the period that he could have timely appealed the trial court's July 6, 2004, denial of his post conviction petition, petitioner instead filed a motion for delayed appeal. Likewise, on July 6, 2005, during the period that he could have timely appealed the appellate court's denial of his appeal, he filed a petition for post conviction relief in the state trial court. Further, as detailed in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, at 16-19, documents submitted by petitioner indicate that prison officials provided him with adequate resources to access the courts. See Exhibits in Support of Cause, Doc. No. 14. These documents also indicate that, although prison officials advised petitioner that they would not purchase books on his behalf, they provided him with the address of the Ohio Supreme Court so that he could obtain the information required to file his appeal. See Traverse, Exhibits to Traverse. As previously noted, further legal research should not have been necessary, in any event, in order for petitioner to file a timely appeal.
In short, to the extent that petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion may be considered timely, the record fails to reflect that petitioner can establish cause for his procedural defaults. Petitioner has offered no reason to warrant relief from final judgment of dismissal in this case.
For all the foregoing reasons, petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion is DENIED.