Opinion
No. C-3-75-304
April 15, 2002
FINDING OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT DECLARING DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS UNITARY
This cause came before the Court upon a Joint Motion for Declaration of Unitary Status filed by the Defendants on February 27, 2001. Based upon the agreements and stipulations of the parties and the evidence received into the record without objection at the hearing on April 15, 2002, this Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and enters a Final Judgment as follows:
BACKGROUND
1. Thirty years ago, the Plaintiffs, the NAACP and a group of school children and their parents initiated this lawsuit against the Dayton Board of Education (the "Dayton Board"), its members and its Superintendent (the "Dayton Defendants") and various State parties, including the Superintendent of Public Instruction (the "State") alleging that the public schools of the Dayton Public School System ("DPS") were segregated in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Original Complaint named as State Defendants the Governor of the State of Ohio, the State Attorney General, the Ohio State Board of Education, the Ohio Department of Education and the State Superintendent. This action was terminated as to all State Defendants except the State Superintendent during the course of this litigation.
2. After numerous rulings in this case, the Sixth Circuit found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that the Dayton Defendants were liable for certain constitutional violations and as a result had perpetuated or increased public school segregation in Dayton. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), affd., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 526 (1979).
3. On December 29, 1975 and on March 23, 1976, Judge Rubin entered Orders under which every school in the district was required to have a pupil population "approaching the district percentage, but deviating no more than +/- 15% commencing with the 1976-1977 school year" (the "Remedial Orders").
4. The Remedial Orders were approved by the Sixth Circuit in 1978 and the Supreme Court in 1979. The DPS operated under the Remedial Orders from 1976 until the Court approved a Modified Student Assignment Plan on or about December 20, 1999 (the "Modified Remedial Order").
5. In 1982, the Dayton Defendants filed a Motion to Determine State Involvement to establish State liability for the cost of desegregating the DPS. This Court concluded that the Dayton Defendants and the State Superintendent were jointly and severally liable for segregation in Dayton. The State Superintendent was ordered to share equally with the Defendants "all expenses incurred to date, as well as future costs as they are incurred, in remedying the unconstitutional racial segregation in the Dayton School System." Brinkman v. Gilligan, 610 F. Supp. 1288, 1297-1298 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (the "Joint Liability Order").
6. Both parties appealed this judgment and subsequently entered into a Consent and Judgment Order which was entered on December 9, 1987 (the "1987 Consent Judgment"). The 1987 Consent Judgment required the State to pay the Dayton Defendants a lump sum as reimbursement for certain desegregation expenses incurred by the Dayton Defendants, plus fifty percent of all future transportation costs incurred by the Dayton Defendants as long as the Dayton Defendants transported students for the purposes of reducing racial isolation.
7. Upon execution of the 1987 Consent Judgment, the Joint Lability Order was vacated.
LEGAL STANDARD
8. The objective of every desegregation case is to return schools to the control of the appropriate authorities at the earliest date possible in order to "[R]estore their true accountability in our governmental system." Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992).
9. Federal judicial oversight of local school systems was "intended as a temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." Board of Ed. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991). Judicial supervision, and the jurisdiction to continue such oversight, is only granted to district courts to the extent discriminatory practices or results continue that are proximately related to past segregation. Freeman, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
10. Underscoring the temporary nature of judicial supervision, federal district courts in the following communities, to name a few, all have recently issued declarations of unitary status: Cleveland, Ohio, Reed v. Rhodes, 1 F. Supp.2d 705 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Louisville, Kentucky, Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000); Charlotte, North Carolina, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001); Denver, Colorado, Keys v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995); Wilmington, Delaware, Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 901 F. Supp. 784 (D.Del. 1995) affd. 90 F.3d 752 (3rd Cir. 1996); Topeka, Kansas ( Brown v. Board of Education), Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp.2d 1212 (D. Kan. 1999) and Pontiac, Michigan, Davis v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pontiac, 95 F. Supp.2d 688 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
11. The term "unitary status" has no single definition. Simply put, a school district that is in compliance with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is referred to as "unitary." Freeman, 503 U.S. at 486-487. The pertinent questions for determining whether a school district is unitary are: (1) Have the Defendants "complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered?"; and (2) Have the "vestiges of past discrimination been eliminated to the extent practicable?" Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992) and Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 498 U.S. 237, 249-250 (1991)).
12. The good faith of the Defendants in responding to this Court's Orders is measured by:
[W]hether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good faith commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of the law and the constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in the first instance.Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491.
13. With regard to the second part of the test for unitary status — elimination of the vestiges of segregation to the extent practicable — the term "vestige" does not simply mean racial imbalances. To qualify as a vestige, a racial imbalance must be causally related to the prior de jure violation being remedied. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. at 496 ("The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied."). Hampton v. Jefferson, 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 361 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (a vestige of de jure segregation is a current or latent imbalance that is "traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation" of the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. In addressing vestiges, courts faced with unitary status motions have focused primarily on the areas identified by the Supreme Court in Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), i.e., student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities. Some courts have also determined whether vestiges existed in ancillary areas not addressed in Green, including student achievement, gifted programs and honors courses, student discipline and drop-out graduate rates.
15. When a school district has achieved unitary status, the Court must dissolve the desegregation decree, terminate its supervision of the school district and dismiss the action. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
16. The parties have stipulated that the DPS is unitary in all respects. The Defendants have submitted expert reports into the record that corroborate this conclusion. Accordingly, the Court adopts this finding — that the DPS has either eliminated the vestiges of segregation to the extent practicable or that there are no vestiges in each of the areas of school operations identified by the Supreme Court in Green (student assignment, faculty and staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities) and in ancillary areas (such as student achievement, student discipline, assignment of students to special education classes, honors classes and gifted programs or graduation rates).
17. The Court also finds that the Dayton Board (with the assistance of the Mediator) has adopted an Academic Improvement Strategies plan that details an education reform plan centered on literacy, mathematics, professional development, student behavior, family involvement and intervention strategies targeted for the kindergarten through grade six.
18. The Stipulations of the parties and Defendants' expert reports establish that the DPS has complied with the Remedial Orders and the Modified Remedial Order to the extent practicable and has continually demonstrated its good faith commitment to the goals of those orders. The Dayton Board has also adopted numerous policies demonstrating its commitment to the Court Orders. These efforts by the Dayton School Board establish that the DPS has complied in good faith with the court orders for the length of the orders.
19. Since 1985, a majority or near majority of the members of the Dayton Board have been African Americans. During that same time, the Superintendent of the DPS and other administrators have been African Americans. The DPS also has had during that time a significant percentage of principals and faculty members who are African American. The Court finds that the leadership of the DPS is unlikely to return the district to its former ways.
20. In addition, this Court finds that the State of Ohio has fully complied with its obligations under the 1987 Consent Judgment. It is undisputed that the State made full and timely payments for its portion of the transportation cost of the students transported to achieve racial balance.
21. Defendants submit and the Court adopts a finding that the State Defendants have done all that is practicable to cooperate in eliminating vestiges of segregation related to the DPS.
CONCLUSION
22. The parties agree and the Court finds that the Defendants have eradicated all vestiges of the prior discrimination in the DPS to the extent practicable. Further, this Court finds that the Defendants have acted in good faith to eliminate all effects of the prior discriminatory acts and have proven such to the Plaintiffs and the community.
24. Based upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Joint Motion for Unitary Status is granted and that the Dayton Public Schools are declared unitary in all respects, including in all Green factors and other ancillary areas (or non- Green factors).
25. Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Remedial Orders, the 1987 Consent Judgment, the Modified Remedial Orders and all other outstanding obligations in this Action are hereby vacated and dissolved except to the extent specified in the Settlement Agreement.
26. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court hereby relinquishes jurisdiction in this matter, except that the Court retains ancillary jurisdiction to the limited extent set forth in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994) for the sole purpose of enforcing obligations of the Dayton Defendants and the Plaintiffs which are set forth in the Settlement Agreement. The Court does not retain jurisdiction (under Kokkonen or otherwise) over the State Defendants in this matter.
27. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all parties and all claims.
28. Each party shall bear their own costs of this litigation, except to the extent previously assessed otherwise by the Court.