Opinion
No. 1142 C.D. 2012
01-30-2013
Dawn Goodwin, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Dawn Goodwin (Claimant), pro se, petitions this court for review of the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed a decision of the Referee denying benefits to Claimant under Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). After review, we affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e). Section 402(e) provides that a claimant shall be ineligible for compensation for any week in which his or her unemployment is due to a discharge from work due to willful misconduct connected with his or her work.
Employer Abington Memorial Hospital was permitted to intervene as a party principally aligned with Respondent Board by order of this court dated August 29, 2012.
Claimant was employed by Abington Memorial Hospital (Employer) as a full-time Clinical Associate from January 8, 2006, until her last day of work on January 3, 2012. Claimant's application for unemployment benefits was denied on the basis that she was ineligible under Section 402(e) of the Law. Claimant appealed, and a hearing was held before the Referee on March 1, 2012, at which Claimant testified and Employer's witnesses, Cynthia Westphal and Christopher Strain testified.
The Referee made the following findings regarding the events leading up to Claimant's separation from employment. Employer had a requirement that an employee who wished to switch a scheduled shift with another employee must complete a specific form and submit it in advance for approval by a nurse manager, the scheduler, or a clinical leader. Claimant had received a written warning on August 5, 2011, in part for unapproved schedule switches. She was instructed that in the future, any switches to her schedule must be made on the proper form and submitted at least one week in advance prior to the switch requested. Claimant was warned that any future infractions would result in discipline up to and including termination of her employment. On August 17, 2011, Employer also issued written Scheduling Guidelines to Claimant, which stated, inter alia, that any employee listed on the form who agreed to switch schedules with Claimant must sign the document.
Claimant was scheduled to work from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. on January 4, 2012. On January 2, Claimant arranged to switch her hours with two coworkers, Chris and Holly, by an exchange of text messages. Chris agreed to work for Claimant from 11:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. on January 4 and Holly agreed to work from 3:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. on that same date. Claimant prepared the request for a schedule change and listed her name and the names of the employees involved at the bottom of the form and submitted it to her clinical leader on January 3, 2012, which was approved. Although Chris had also agreed to cover the 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. shift of another employee on January 4, 2012, he never showed up for work at his scheduled 7:00 a.m. time.
Claimant was actually scheduled to work that day from 3 p.m. until 11 p.m. She explained that she had agreed to work four hours of a coworker's shift, from 11 a.m. until 3 p.m., and that another coworker, Chris, had agreed to work for this same coworker from 7 a.m. until 11 a.m. March 1, 2012 Hearing, Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 40.
When Employer's nurse manager, Cindy Westphal, learned that the shift was short-staffed on January 4, she concluded that it was Claimant who had failed to report for her scheduled shift at 7:00 a.m. Ms. Westphal then reviewed the schedule change form submitted by Claimant and concluded that Claimant had falsified the document by signing the names of the coworkers and the initials of the clinical leader who approved the switch. Ms. Westphal also concluded that Claimant failed to follow department procedures for switching her shifts. After speaking with Claimant on January 5, 2012, Ms. Westphal received an electronic mail message from Claimant in which Claimant admitted that she had falsified the document by signing the coworkers' names, that she had not followed the Scheduling Guidelines, and that she was responsible for Chris failing to report to work at 7:00 a.m. on January 4, 2012. Employer discharged Claimant for falsification of a hospital document and failing to follow its procedure.
Claimant wrote, in part, "I Dawn Goodwin on the date of 1/2/2012 falsified documents by signing the names of fellow co-worker Chris Strain & Holly Paparo. I take full responsibility for Chris Strain not showing up for his shift. I went outside of the guidelines clearly stated in AMH policies. This statement is the honest truth as I have manipulated the changing of shifts which resulted in Chris Strain being confused about when he was supposed to work. My sincere apologies to all that took place, to all parties involved." March 1, 2012 Hearing, Employer's Exhibit 9.
The Referee denied Claimant benefits. The Referee reasoned that while Employer's policy on switching schedules was not always followed in practice, because Claimant had been provided with specific instructions to strictly follow these guidelines and she admitted that she did not do so, he was constrained to agree that Employer had established willful misconduct, as Claimant's actions were "prohibited to her because of her past disciplinary actions for reasons of abusing the switching shifts procedure." Referee's Decision at 3. On appeal, the Board affirmed, adopting the Referee's decision.
On appeal to this court, Claimant presents two issues: whether the Board erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence that she falsified documents; and whether the Board erred in concluding that she was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law.
Claimant argues that the Board erroneously concluded that she was discharged for falsifying documents when the evidence shows that Holly and Chris agreed to switch shifts with her and authorized her to write their names on Employer's scheduling form. Claimant asserts that this was the way employees would fill out the form if another employee was not at work to sign his or her own name. Claimant argues that since forgery involves the "act/crime in which someone falsifies something with the intent to deceive" and there was no intent to deceive Employer, there can be no finding that she falsified documents. Claimant's Brief at 7. Claimant relies on the Referee's following statement: "In order for there to be a falsification, there must be intent or the knowledge that the writing was misrepresenting the information contain[ed] upon the document. There has been no showing that such misrepresentation took place." Referee's Decision at 3. Claimant further asserts that Employer's Clinical leader never denied receiving, processing and approving the scheduling form, and Employer will not "[accept], process or approve a shift change if proper guidelines are not followed!" Claimant's Brief at 5. According to Claimant, if the schedule change was approved, there can be no finding that she violated Employer's scheduling policy.
Employer counters that Claimant admitted in writing to Employer that she falsified the scheduling form when she signed the names of her two coworkers on that form and that she did not follow the scheduling guidelines. Employer argues that Claimant is bound by that admission, regardless of her testimony at the hearing in which she denied the falsification charge, and that the referee and the Board both reached the same conclusion. Employer further argues that there is no merit to Claimant's contention that she made this admission while she was in some sort of diminished capacity. Employer argues that Claimant's bald assertion of mental incapacity or distress does not support a defense of good cause for willful misconduct, without competent evidence establishing the relationship between the employee's alleged diminished capacity and its effect on his or her ability to follow employer's rules, citing Jordon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 684 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). Employer claims that it discharged Claimant for two separate and independent reasons, falsification and failure to properly follow procedure, and that even if the falsification charge does not stand, it proved that she failed to follow the proper procedure when switching her scheduled shifts on the day in question. We agree.
Employer has the burden of proving willful misconduct. Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 949 A.2d 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). A violation of an employer's work rules may constitute willful misconduct. Id. An employer who asserts that a claimant has been discharged for failing to follow a rule or procedure has the burden of establishing the rule and its violation by the claimant. Id. Once willful misconduct has been established, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to present evidence that she had good cause for her conduct. Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 509 Pa. 267, 501 A.2d 1383 (1985).
In this case, Employer submitted documentation of both the written scheduling guideline, which was provided to Claimant on August 17, 2011, following her second documented violation for improper shift change requests, as well as a written communication sent by Claimant to its Nurse Manager, Ms. Westphal on January 5, 2012. In that e-mail, Claimant admitted that she signed the names of her coworkers, Holly and Chris, on the form, that she was aware of the scheduling guidelines, and that she had not followed the guidelines in requesting a shift change for January 4, 2012. In addition, Claimant testified that she had previously been warned about her schedule switching problems and was well aware of Employer's specific scheduling guidelines, and that she admittedly did not follow those guidelines on the day in question. Finally, Claimant's statement in her brief that she was under some sort of diminished mental capacity when she wrote the e-mail to her Nurse Manager admitting that she falsified the document and did not follow procedures for switching, is not supported by the record. Rather, she testified that she sent the email out of anger and hurt feelings. Her motives in this regard are simply irrelevant.
Mental illness may constitute a good cause defense to a charge of willful misconduct if such illness prevents the employee from following an employer's directives and reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Offset Paperback v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 726 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). However, in Jordon v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 684 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), we held that a claimant did not justify his failure to either report to work or off of work based on his general testimony that he suffered from an organic mood disorder and a terse physician's certification that he suffered from such a condition. We determined that the physician's note did not explain why the claimant had not contacted employer and further that his own testimony that he suffered from a mood disorder was insufficient to establish good cause, because "[a]lthough arguably an expert on his own condition, Claimant is not an expert in the field of mental disorders." Id. at 1100.
Employer therefore established not only the existence of the rule, but also Claimant's awareness of the rule and her admission that she violated said rule. Therefore, the Board properly concluded that Claimant was ineligible for compensation due to her willful misconduct. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Board.
Moreover, it is irrelevant whether Claimant had "authorization" from her coworkers to sign their names to the scheduling form, as they were without authority to relieve Claimant of her obligation to strictly comply with Employer's scheduling policy. Claimant was fully aware of Employer's policy and understood that any further infractions could result in her termination from employment, yet she admittedly failed to follow this policy when switching her shift for January 4. --------
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of January, 2013, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge