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finding probable cause where computer searches revealed that arrestee's name was an alias used by the fugitive, the arrestee's birthdate matched that of the fugitive, and there was a striking photographic resemblance, despite failure to match fingerprints before initial arrest
Summary of this case from Sanchez v. Port Auth. of New York & New JerseyOpinion
98 Civ. 6081 (MBM)
February 20, 2002
(Attorney for Plaintiff), FREDERICK K. BREWINGTON, ESQ., Law Office of Frederick K. Brewington, Hempstead, NY
(Attorneys for Defendants), MICHAEL A. CARDOZO, ESQ., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, JOHN P. FRANCOLLA, ESQ., Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York, NY.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Saul Emilio Gonzalez was arrested on May 28, 1997, in what is now conceded by all parties to have been a case of mistaken identity. He sues the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the County of New York, Robert Silbering, Investigators Lizette Aponte-Schroeder, James Roldos, and Omar Brinkley, and Assistant District Attorney Livia Rodriguez pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, 1986, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Gonzalez also brings state law claims of abuse of process, negligence, false arrest, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeks punitive damages. Defendants move for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion is granted.
I.
The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Gonzalez: In 1987, a defendant named Ramon Perez was convicted, in absentia, of a narcotics offense in Supreme Court, New York County. A bench warrant was issued as a result of that conviction. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1)
In April 1997, Lizette Aponte-Schroeder, who was then an investigator assigned to the New York County District Attorney's Office's Family Violence and Child Abuse Bureau, received an allegation that plaintiff had engaged in child abuse. It is not disputed that she obtained a date of birth of April 17, 1954 for plaintiff and, using that date and the address for the Gonzalez family, obtained a criminal history or rap sheet reflecting that plaintiff was also known as Ramon Perez and was wanted on an outstanding narcotics warrant. After obtaining a photograph of Ramon Perez from records of the 1987 criminal case, and arranging a comparison of that photograph with a photograph of plaintiff contained in records of New York State's Department of Motor Vehicles, Aponte-Schroeder initially arranged an appointment with plaintiff and his wife for April 24, 1997. Plaintiff did not appear at that meeting. (Letter from Frederick H. Brewington to the Court of 12/12/01 ["Brewington Ltr."], at 2 ¶ 4 and 10/28/97 report attached thereto.)
On May 28, 1997, Aponte-Schroeder and two investigators not named as defendants herein went to plaintiff Gonzalez's apartment and arrested him pursuant to the outstanding warrant issued for Ramon Perez as a result of the 1987 conviction. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 2) Immediately following his arrest, Gonzalez appeared in the Supreme Court, Criminal Term, New York County before Justice Leslie Crocker Snyder. Justice Snyder ordered that Gonzalez be detained by the New York City Department of Corrections. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 5) Defendant Rodriguez, an assistant district attorney assigned to the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, was assigned the case on June 3, 1997. (Cardinale Decl. Ex. C at 2) On that day, Gonzalez appeared with defense counsel before Justice Snyder, who ordered a fingerprint check and adjourned the case again until June 5, 1997. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Compl. ¶ 19) On June 5, 1997, Rodriguez reported to the Court that Gonzalez had been fingerprinted, but that the report could not be found. Justice Snyder directed that Gonzalez be fingerprinted again and the case was adjourned to June 9, 1997. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Compl. ¶ 20) On June 9, 1997, Rodriguez represented to Justice Snyder that an initial fingerprint report returned no record for Gonzalez. (Cardinale Decl. Ex. C at 2) She stated that Gonzalez was fingerprinted again "to confirm." Gonzalez's attorney argued for his release, pointing out that Gonzalez's height and weight did not match the description of Perez. Gonzalez's attorney also pointed out that Gonzalez was from Santo Domingo, but that the fugitive Perez was reported to be from Puerto Rico. (Id. at 6, 9) Nonetheless, Justice Snyder ordered Gonzalez's continued detention pending an FBI fingerprint check. (Id. at 5) Justice Snyder stated that she was "seriously concerned about our fingerprint capabilities in this State," (id. at 4), and said she would not free plaintiff until an FBI fingerprint check confirmed that he and Gonzalez were not one and the same (id. at 10). Although the Justice acknowledged that it is "not right to keep someone in jail if it is not the person," she pointed out that, "[o]n the other hand, I have an A-1 felony-convicted defendant who may be your client and who did not return for . . . ten years." (Id. at 9) At the June 9 hearing, Rodriguez expressed no view as to continued detention; it was the Court alone that reached that determination, apparently based on plaintiff having given a date of birth and a name that matched the birth date and an alias of the fugitive Perez. (See id. at 8, 12-13)
The following day, June 10, 1997, the parties again appeared before Justice Snyder. Rodriguez produced a photograph of Ramon Perez from 1986. (Cardinale Decl. Ex. D at 2) Although the FBI fingerprint check did not produce a match, the Court ordered Gonzalez's continued detention based on the photograph. Justice Snyder said that the photograph looked exactly like Gonzalez and that there was "not a scintilla of doubt in [her] mind that [Gonzalez was] the person arrested and convicted in 1986." (Id. at 3) Again, Rodriguez did not urge detention at the June 10 hearing; that result was determined by the Court based on the apparently striking resemblance between plaintiff and the photograph of the fugitive, combined with the name and birth date coincidence the Court had noted the day before. (See, e.g., id. at 2, 3, 4)
Further fingerprint checks did not confirm that Gonzalez was Ramon Perez, the person named in the warrant. On June 20, 1997, Rodriguez consented to Gonzalez's release. (Brewington Decl. Ex. I at 5)
II.
The New York Police Department and the Office of Special Narcotics Prosecution argue that they are not suable entities. Gonzalez does not present any argument in response. The capacity of an entity to be sued is determined by New York law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). The New York City Charter provides that all actions such as this one "shall be brought in the name of the City of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." N.Y. City Charter, Ch. 17 § 396. The New York Police Department is an agency of the City of New York. Therefore, it cannot be sued except in the name of the City of New York.See Davis v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 4309, 2000 WL 1877045 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2000); Sealey v. Fishkin, No. 96 Civ. 6303, 1998 WL 1021470, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1998) (collecting cases).
The Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor does not have a legal existence separate from the Special Prosecutor himself sued in his official capacity. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 1.20(31)-(32) (McKinney 1992) (defining "prosecutor" as a district attorney, and district attorney as including a "special district attorney"); N.Y. Jud. Law § 177-c (McKinney 1983). Therefore, the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor is also not a suable entity. See Steed v. Delohery, No. 96 Civ. 2449, 1998 WL 440861, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998) (holding that the New York County District Attorney's Office is not a suable entity); cf. Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 874 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the "Office of the Sheriff" is not an entity separate from the sheriff and the county government). Moreover, even if the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor were a suable entity, it would be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Baez v.Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the District Attorney in New York represents the state, not the county); Covington v.City of New York, No. 97 Civ. 4234, 1997 WL 370628 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1997); Feerick v. Sudolnik, 816 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 2 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 1993). Because neither the New York Police Department nor the Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor is a suable entity, the complaint is dismissed as to them.
III.
Gonzalez argued initially that this motion for summary judgment is premature because he has not been able to conduct adequate discovery. Although Gonzalez does not refer to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), that subdivision provides that a court may refuse the application for judgment or order a continuance if the party opposing the motion has not been given an adequate opportunity to obtain affidavits or take depositions. To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f), the party must submit an affidavit that sets forth (1) what facts are sought and how they are to be obtained; (2) how those facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; (3) what effort has been made to obtain the facts; and (4) why those efforts failed. Concourse Rehab. Nursing Ctr. Inc. v. Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 146 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Gonzalez does explain his efforts to obtain discovery from the defendants. He also describes defendants' alleged attempts to evade discovery requests. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 10; Brewington Decl. ¶¶ 2-6) However, Gonzalez makes no attempt to explain what facts he hopes to obtain through further discovery, and, as a result, does not explain how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact. Moreover, this court ordered and defendants produced affidavits regarding the training manuals, regulations, and procedures defendants followed when arresting and detaining Gonzalez (Order Dated 2/13/01; Brewington Supp. Decl. Ex. E), and it appears that Gonzalez deposed defendants Brinkley, Roldos and Rodriguez prior to submitting his Supplemental Declaration in Opposition (Brewington Supp. Decl. Ex. A at 3; Pl.'s Supp. Mem. at 6). He has submitted transcripts of those depositions to the court, and does not indicate how further discovery might bear on any issue discussed herein.
In addition, Assistant District Attorney Rodriguez, James Roldos, and Investigator Brinkley move for summary judgment in part at least on the ground that they are immune from suit. Immunity is not "a mere defense to liability," but an "'entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). The Supreme Court has "'repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). As to that issue, the question of whether Aponte-Schroeder had been served, and the information available to the defendant officers at the time of the arrest, the court held a hearing on December 21, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e) to determine whether there really were disputed issues of fact. There appear to be none. In particular, as to Aponte-Schroeder, plaintiff concedes that he has no proof she was served. Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed as to her.
Gonzalez does not oppose the dismissal of the complaint as against defendant Robert Silbering. No evidence has been presented which implicates Silbering in Gonzalez's arrest and detention. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to Silberling. See Wright v.Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (personal involvement in alleged violations is a prerequisite to an award of damages pursuant to § 1983).
"When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or deposition." Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(e).
IV.
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for "'all of their activities that can fairly be characterized as closely associated with the conduct of litigation or potential litigation.'" Barbera v.Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1986)). However, a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity if she was performing an "investigative or administrative function rather than a prosecutorial one." Id. (citingPowers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1984)). A prosecutor seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function she was performing. See Buckley v.Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). Defendant Rodriguez claims that she is entitled to absolute immunity.
The relevant facts regarding Rodriguez are not in dispute. Rodriguez was assigned to the case on June 3, 1997, six days after Gonzalez was arrested. (Cardinale Decl. Ex. C at 2) To the extent she argued at all before the state court for Gonzalez's continued detention, such argument was based on the state and FBI rapsheets for Ramon Perez and the physical similarity between Gonzalez and Perez that appeared from photographs. (Id. Ex. C D) She also requested several fingerprint checks. (Id. Ex. A ¶ 4(d)) After the fingerprint checks failed to confirm that Gonzalez was in fact the Ramon Perez named in the arrest warrant, Rodriguez consented to Gonzalez's release on June 20, 1997. (Brewington Decl. Ex. I) She evaluated evidence that Gonzalez was also known as the Ramon Perez identified in the warrant, and either advocated for or acquiesced in Gonzalez's continued detention in the course of judicial proceedings.See Haygood v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the prosecutor had absolute immunity for similar activities and decisions). Throughout her involvement in the case, Rodriguez was acting in her role as "advocate for the State." Burns, 500 U.S. at 491 (prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for presenting evidence at a probable cause hearing in support of a motion for a search warrant).
Gonzalez argues that Rodriguez was performing an investigative function because she was "gathering evidence" to determine whether Gonzalez and Perez were in fact the same person. However, Rodriguez's function was to present evidence of Gonzalez's identity to the Court — a litigation-related duty. Although Rodriguez did ask investigators to obtain Gonzalez's fingerprints and to compare them to fingerprints for outstanding warrants, Gonzalez was deprived of his liberty not as a result of the fingerprinting, but rather as a result of, inter alia, Rodriguez's presentation and arguments to the Court. Cf. Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1987) (no absolute immunity for assisting in the execution of a search and seizure); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1984) (no absolute immunity for directing the use of wiretaps).
V.
Defendants James Roldos and Omar Brinkley ("defendant officers") claim that they are entitled to absolute immunity because they were acting as Rodriguez's agents. See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995). However, the defendant officers have not introduced any evidence to establish that they were assisting Rodriguez with her performance of functions closely tied to the judicial process. Rather, Gonzalez alleges, and defendants concede, that the defendant officers arrested Gonzalez on May 28, 1997, six days before Rodriguez was assigned to the case. (Comp. ¶¶ 7-8, 18; Def. 56.1 ¶ 2; see also Brewington Decl. Ex. E at 4) Moreover, defendants do not offer any evidence of activities they later performed at Rodriguez's request. Therefore, the defendant officers are not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that they have absolute immunity.
The officers argue in the alternative that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects an official where his or her conduct "'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v.Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The threshold issue in qualified immunity analysis is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts show that the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). If this threshold determination reveals a constitutional violation, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity if (1) his "'action did not violate clearly established law,'" or (2) "'it was objectively reasonable for the [officer] to believe that his action did not violate such law.'" Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)).
Gonzalez's complaint and legal memoranda state repeatedly, although in conclusory fashion and without elaboration, that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. However, it appears that he alleges three constitutional violations: (1) he was arrested without probable cause, (2) the officers failed to immediately investigate whether he was the person sought in the warrant, and (3) he was deprived of liberty without due process of law. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Gonzalez, he has failed to advance facts to justify the conclusion that any of these rights were violated by the defendant officers.
In cases where officers allegedly have arrested the wrong person, the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights are violated where there was not probable cause to arrest the person the officers thought they were arresting, or where it was not reasonable for the officers to believe the person arrested was the person sought. See Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F. Supp. 940, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-04 (1971)). Gonzalez does not dispute the validity of the warrant issued for Perez pursuant to his 1987 conviction. However, Gonzalez claims that the officers did not reasonably believe that he was Ramon Perez. Gonzalez points not only to the fact that his name is different from the name on the warrant, but also to the differences between his height and nationality and those listed on the warrant for Perez. (Brewington Decl Ex. F G) However, before arresting Gonzalez, it is undisputed that the defendant officers had information showing that plaintiff's name was one of aliases used by the fugitive Perez, that their birth dates matched, and that the driver's license photograph of Gonzalez appeared to match the case file photograph of Perez. Probable cause "is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[,]" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), requiring only sufficient information "to justify a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed by a particular person," United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 1990). The requirement of probable cause "does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). By that standard, the match of names, birth dates and appearance between Gonzalez and the fugitive Perez provided more than ample cause to arrest Gonzalez.
Gonzalez alleges also a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to have his identity checked before or soon after he was incarcerated. "'[W] here a police officer has or should have doubts whether a detained suspect is in fact the person sought, the officer must make immediate reasonable efforts to confirm the suspect's identity.'" Mason v. City of New York, 949 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting United States v. Valez, 769 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)). Gonzalez again cites his differing name and height to establish that the officers should have had doubts about his identity and therefore should immediately have taken his fingerprints and compared them to those on file for Perez. However, as noted above, the matching of plaintiff's name with one of Perez's aliases, the identity of birth dates, and the striking similarity in appearance between plaintiff and a photograph of Perez all tended to show that the men were one and the same. Indeed, the state court judge declined to release plaintiff even upon an initial report that the fingerprints of plaintiff and the fugitive did not match, and even when the dissimilarities in reported height and weight were pointed out to her, so convinced was she based on the other information available, particularly the resemblance between plaintiff and the photograph of Perez, that the two men were one and the same. See e.g., Cardinale Decl. Ex. D at 2, 3, 4.)
Finally, Gonzalez alleges a violation of his right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Supreme Court hypothesized that, "depending on what procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of 'liberty . . . without due process of law'." Id. at 145. Several courts have adopted this language and found a violation of a plaintiff's due process rights. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 683-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a violation where no steps were taken to confirm plaintiff's identity and plaintiff was detained for two years); Williams v. County of Sullivan, 157 F.R.D. 6, 8-9 (S.D.N Y 1994) (seven month detention); Johnson v. City of Chicago, 711 F. Supp. 1465, 1469-70 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (violation where plaintiff repeatedly denied being the person named in the warrant and no steps were taken to confirm his identity for six days). Here, Gonzalez was detained for six days before his fingerprints were taken for comparison with those on file for Perez despite the different name on the warrant and the difference in height. He was detained another 18 days following the first attempt to compare his fingerprints. Gonzalez's 24-day incarceration was significantly longer than the three days considered by the Court in Baker. However, the above quoted language inBaker, and the cases adopting it, do not consider the length of the incarceration by itself. Gonzalez presents no evidence, nor does he state in the complaint, that he repeatedly asserted his innocence to the arresting officers or to anyone else. Cf. Johnson, 711 F. Supp. at 1470 (plaintiff repeatedly denied being the person named in the warrant). Gonzalez merely stated once, in a hearing several months after the arrest, that he "does not know any Ramon Perez." (Brewington Decl. Ex. E at 8) Moreover, Gonzalez appeared before Justice Snyder six times between May 28 and June 10. He was represented by counsel beginning June 3. Justice Snyder found that there was sufficient evidence to hold him. (See, e.g., Cardinale Decl. Ex. C at 7-8; Ex. D at 2-3) Because the state provided adequate procedures, and Gonzalez does not claim that he repeatedly asserted his innocence, Gonzalez fails to establish a violation of his right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.
In sum, the facts, even viewed in the light most favorable to Gonzalez do not establish a violation of a constitutional right, and the defendant officers are entitled to summary judgment.
VI.
Gonzalez seeks also to impose municipal liability pursuant to § 1983. A municipality may be held liable for conduct of employees below the policy making level if the plaintiff shows that a violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy or custom. Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993). As explained above, Gonzalez has failed to allege a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, he cannot establish municipal liability. See Smith v.Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a municipality cannot be held liable absent a constitutional violation). Even if Gonzalez had shown a constitutional violation, he has nonetheless failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to municipal liability.
Gonzalez alleges a policy of "permitting and assisting police misconduct" (Comp. ¶ 48), by permitting the unlawful arrest and detention of Black and Hispanic citizens (Comp. ¶ 44), by covering up the unlawful arrests and detentions (id.), and by failing to identify and discipline such improper conduct (id. ¶ 45). According to Gonzalez, police officers prepare investigation reports to justify improper conduct, and omit statements and information that contradict the officer's version of the events. Gonzalez further alleges that reports of improper police conduct are not adequately reviewed, and that civilian statements that contradict police officer statements are not credited. (Id. ¶ 46(a)-(f))
However, Gonzalez has neither alleged nor submitted evidence of any facts that tend to show that such a policy was in place or to create an inference that such a policy was followed. Gonzalez refers only to his own alleged experience with officers who he says unreasonably believed that he was Ramon Perez and therefore unlawfully arrested him and failed to credit his claims that he was not Ramon Perez. See Kuriakose v. City of Mount Vernon, 41 F. Supp.2d 460, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The single incident of Gonzalez's allegedly wrongful arrest and detention is not sufficient to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy.See Dwares, 985 F.2d at 100. Gonzalez's claim that he has not been afforded an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery does not excuse his failure here. The Court ordered defendants to produce the relevant portion of the policy manual. Furthermore, Gonzalez has apparently deposed Rodriguez and the defendant officers and yet did not submit any deposition testimony to support this claim. Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Gonzalez's claim of municipal liability.
VII.
Finally, Gonzalez alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) and 1986. "The elements of a claim under § 1985(3) are: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws . . .; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is . . . deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.'"Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). The claim requires proof that the conspiracy was motivated by discriminatory racial animus. Id. Gonzalez has failed to submit any evidence of discriminatory racial animus. A claim under § 1986 must be predicated on a valid § 1985 claim. Id. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to a summary judgment dismissing Gonzalez's §§ 1985(3) and 1986 claims.
Gonzalez does not specify whether he brings his claim under § 1985(1), (2) or (3). However, the facts of this case and the language of the complaint appear to make § 1985(3) most appropriate.
VIII.
Because all plaintiff's federal claims have been dismissed, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state-law claims.
* * *
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to the federal claims; the state-law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.