Opinion
01-21-00217-CV
09-01-2022
BRENDA GONZALES, Appellant v. GERALD DELGADO AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 246th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1999-42218
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Countiss and Farris.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JULIE COUNTISS, JUSTICE
Appellant, Brenda Gonzales, challenges the trial court's February 7, 2021 Confirmation of Judgment, Foreclosure of Lien and Release of Bank Lien, entered after a bench trial, in the suit to determine arrearages filed by appellee, Gerald Delgado. In four issues, Gonzales contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and only awarding her a $20,539.04 "cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages" and not any medical support arrearages.
We affirm.
Background
Gonzales and Delgado are the parents of G.D., born in 1992, B.D., born in 1993, and J.G., born in 1996 (collectively, "the children"). On October 12, 1999, the trial court signed an Agreed Order Establishing the Parent-Child Relationship which required Delgado to pay $560 as his child support obligation each month beginning on November 1, 1999 (the "1999 agreed order"). The 1999 agreed order also required Delgado to obtain and maintain health insurance for the children within fifteen days of the entry of the 1999 agreed order. And it granted Gonzales a $5,000 judgment against Delgado for "retroactive child support."
In portions of the record, J.G. is referred to as J.D. For ease, in this opinion, we will refer to Gonzales and Delgado's third child as J.G.
After G.D. turned eighteen years old, the 1999 agreed order reduced Delgado's child support obligation to $465 per month, and after B.D. turned eighteen years old, the 1999 agreed order reduced Delgado's child support obligation to $370 per month.
On January 3, 2013, after Gonzales and Delgado participated in a negotiation conference with the Office of the Attorney General of Texas ("OAG"), the trial court signed an Agreed Child Support Review Order ordering Delgado to pay $246 as his child support obligation each month beginning on January 1, 2013 (the "2013 agreed order"). The 2013 agreed order also required Gonzales to obtain and maintain health insurance for J.G., who was not yet eighteen years old. And it granted Gonzales a $35,164.81 judgment against Delgado for "all unpaid child support and any balance owed on previously confirmed child support arrearages or retroactive support judgments." The 2013 agreed order stated that Gonzales "d[id] not request medical reimbursement" from Delgado. (Emphasis omitted.)
In 2016, Gonzales filed a First Amended Motion for Enforcement of Child Support Order, asserting that Delgado's "total arrearages at the time of filing [was] $35,494.13." Gonzales requested "confirmation of all arrearages and rendition of judgment plus interest on arrearages." On May 24, 2016, the trial court signed an Order for Enforcement of Child Support Order, awarding Gonzales a $36,286.21 judgment against Delgado for "previously confirmed child support arrearages and unconfirmed child support" (the "2016 order").
On September 29, 2020, Delgado filed a Suit to Determine Arrearages, in which he alleged that the children were over eighteen years old. According to Delgado, on October 21, 1999, the trial court signed the 1999 agreed order obligating Delgado to make child support payments and awarding Gonzales a $5,000 "judgment for retroactive child support." On January 1, 2013, the trial court signed the 2013 agreed order, "confirming child support arrearage[s] in the amount of $35,164.81." That order stated that it "include[d] all unpaid child support and any balance owed on previously confirmed child support arrearages or retroactive support judgments" and "[t]he judgment for th[at] amount [was] a cumulative judgment." (Emphasis and internal quotations omitted.) On May 24, 2016, the trial court signed the 2016 order, stating that the court "f[ound] and confirm[ed] that the balance owed by . . . Delgado on previously confirmed child support arrearages and unconfirmed child support [was] $36,286.21" and the "[j]udgment for th[at] amount [was] cumulative." (Emphasis and internal quotations omitted.)
Delgado also alleged that the total amount of child support arrearages that he owed as of September 21, 2020 was $20,954.32, but Gonzales had "filed a fraudulent lien against [Delgado's] personal property in an amount in excess of $68,000 . . . with the inten[t] to defraud [Delgado] out of [about] $49,000." Although Delgado "made [Gonzales] aware of the incorrect amount of the lien and provided supporting documentation [as to] the accurate amount of the lien," Gonzales "refuse[d] to release . . . th[e] portion of the lien that [was] in dispute." Delgado requested that the trial court "render an order to determine the amount of arrearages [he owed] and discharg[e] the excess money from the lien."
Gonzales answered, generally denying the allegations in Delgado's Suit to Determine Arrearages and seeking affirmative relief from the trial court. As to her request for affirmative relief, Gonzales alleged that the trial court's 1999 agreed order required Delgado to pay $560 each month as his child support obligation. Delgado was also required to provide health insurance for the children and pay fifty-percent of unreimbursed medical expenses for the children. And the 1999 agreed order awarded Gonzales a $5,000 judgment against Delgado for "retroactive child support."
Gonzales further alleged that on January 3, 2013, after a "negotiation conference" between Gonzales, Delgado, and the OAG, the trial court signed the 2013 agreed order, which ordered Delgado to pay $246 each month as his child support obligation and ordered Gonzales to provide health insurance for J.G., who was not yet eighteen years old. According to Gonzales, the parties agreed "to an arrearage[s] amount for child support," although they did not "properly calculate interest." And Gonzales alleged that the arrearages amount in the 2013 agreed order did not include Delgado's "unpaid obligation to provide health insurance for the children." On May 24, 2016, the trial court signed the 2016 order.
According to Gonzales, Delgado "fail[ed] to pay the total amount of child support and medical support . . . due," and because of this, on September 17, 2020, Gonzales "issued Notices of Child Support Lien pursuant to Texas Family Code [section] 157.312." Further, on September 18, 2020, Gonzales "issued a Notice of Application for Judicial Writ of Withholding pursuant to Texas Family Code [section] 158.301." Gonzales requested that the trial court determine the amount of arrearages owed by Delgado.
In response to Gonzales's request for affirmative relief, Delgado answered, generally denying the allegations in Gonzales's request for affirmative relief and asserting certain affirmative defenses.
The OAG filed a petition in intervention, requesting that the trial court "confirm and enter judgment for all support arrearages" in the amount of $21,026.75 as of October 18, 2020.
At trial, Delgado testified that he has three children with Gonzales, who are now in their twenties. Each month he receives a letter from the OAG that tells him how much he owes in "back child support" to Gonzales. Delgado then sends a payment to the OAG. The letter he receives from the OAG tells him how much he owes in child support arrearages. Before filing his Suit to Determine Arrearages, the last letter from the OAG that Delgado saw stated that he owed about $20,000 for "back child support."
According to Delgado, in 1999, the trial court signed the 1999 agreed order,in which Delgado agreed to pay $560 each month as his child support obligation for the children. The 1999 agreed order also granted Gonzales a $5,000 judgment against Delgado for "retroactive child support." And it required that Delgado maintain health insurance for the children. Under the 1999 agreed order, Gonzales and Delgado agreed to split unreimbursed medical expenses for the children.
The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the 1999 agreed order.
After G.D. turned eighteen years old, Delgado was to pay $465 each month as his child support obligation until his second child, B.D., turned eighteen years old. After that, Delgado was required to pay $370 each month as his child support obligation until J.G. turned eighteen years old.
On November 1, 1999, Delgado began paying $560 as his child support obligation. Delgado also provided health insurance for the children. At the time, Delgado was working for American Eagle Wheel Corporation ("American Eagle") as a sales representative and his health-insurance payments were "take[n] . . . out of [his] [pay]check" by his employer. Delgado paid for the children's health insurance even before the 1999 agreed order was signed. According to Delgado, he "always" had health insurance for the children; he provided health insurance for the children as required. The 1999 agreed order did not require Delgado to "provide cash medical support" to Gonzales.
During Delgado's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence copies of two of Delgado's "paycheck stubs" from 1999. One of the paycheck stubs lists a "[p]ay [d]ate" as "11/26/1999." It also lists certain deductions including "Guardian Pr[e]tax," which Delgado testified was the cost of health insurance for the children that had been deducted from Delgado's paychecks. According to Delgado, "Guardian" was the name of the health insurance. The second paycheck stub lists a "[p]ay date" of "11/18/1999," and lists a "Guardian [P]retax" deduction of $398.32 from appellant's "[g]ross [p]ay." $398.32 was deducted from Delgado's paycheck for health insurance for the children.
The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of a letter dated August 26, 1999, stating: "As a commissioned sales[person], your health insurance premiums are deducted from your commission check once a month." Delgado testified that he received the August 26, 1999 letter from his employer, American Eagle, about health insurance. And the letter provided "evidence [of] the amounts that [he] paid" for health insurance for himself and his children. Delgado agreed that the letter did not state which of his family members were covered by health insurance through Delgado's employer.
Delgado also testified that at the time of trial, he owned his own company and had been self-employed for about ten years. He stopped working at American Eagle around 2007. After that, he was employed as a subcontractor elsewhere. Delgado did not have any documents, other than those discussed above, that showed that he had paid for the children's health insurance "every single month." But according to Delgado, he always worked, and because he "had to have [health] insurance for the [children]," he got "private insurance" when he stopped working for American Eagle.
Delgado further testified that the 2013 agreed order contained his signature and Gonzales's signature; it was an agreement between Delgado, Gonzales, and the trial court. The 2013 agreed order confirmed the arrearages that he owed to Gonzales, which was $35,164.81. The 2013 agreed order stated that it "found and confirmed that . . . Delgado [was] in arrears in the amount of $35,164.81 as of November 30, 2012." (Emphasis omitted.) And that amount "include[d] all unpaid child support and any balance owed on previously confirmed child support arrearages or retroactive support judgments." As a result of the 2013 agreed order, Delgado was ordered to pay $35,164.81 to Gonzales. According to Delgado, Gonzales and he agreed that he owed Gonzales $35,164.81.
The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the 2013 agreed order.
The 2013 agreed order also changed which parent was responsible for providing health insurance for the children. Under the 2013 agreed order, Gonzales was required to provide health insurance for the children who were still under eighteen years old. And the 2013 agreed order stated that Gonzales "d[id] not request medical reimbursement" from Delgado. (Emphasis omitted.) Delgado was not required to pay Gonzales "cash medical support" for the health insurance that she was providing under the 2013 agreed order.
Delgado further testified that the trial court signed the 2016 order, which stated that, as of April 30, 2016, he owed $36,286.21 in confirmed and unconfirmed child support arrearages. Delgado understood the 2016 order to mean that he owed about $36,000 to Gonzales "[f]or everything." The 2016 order "confirmed everything" that he owed to Gonzales. There was not "any other money" that should have been included in the 2016 order but was not.
During Delgado's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the OAG's Financial Activity Report related to Delgado's child support obligation. The OAG's Financial Activity Report states that as of April 30, 2016, Delgado owed $36,286.21 in child support arrearages to Gonzales. As of November 4, 2020, Delgado owed $20,559.18 in child support arrearages to Gonzales. Delgado testified that the OAG's Financial Activity Report contained the "correct calculation" for what he owed to Gonzales.
Delgado also testified that in September 2020, his bank account was "frozen" by Gonzales. At that time, Gonzales claimed that Delgado owed her about $68,000. Delgado disputed the amount that Gonzales alleged that he owed in "unpaid child support and medical support." And the OAG's Financial Activity Report stated that Delgado owed Gonzales $21,454.32 on September 1, 2020, not $68,000. Delgado asked that the trial court confirm the amount of child support arrearages he owed based on the OAG's Financial Activity Report.
Gonzales testified that she has three children, who are now in their twenties, and she is a medical assistant. Delgado is the children's father. As to the 1999 agreed order, Gonzales confirmed that she and Delgado agreed to the order. In the 1999 agreed order, Delgado agreed to provide health insurance for the children beginning in November 1999, and he agreed to pay $560 each month as his child support obligation. The amount of Delgado's child support obligation decreased as each of the children reached eighteen years old. In the 1999 agreed order, the trial court ordered Delgado to pay Gonzales a $5,000 judgment for "retroactive child support" and provide health insurance for the children from November 1999 to December 2012.
Gonzales also testified that at the time of the 1999 agreed order, she knew that Delgado was working at American Eagle, but she could not remember whether Delgado had health insurance for the children. Gonzales did not have any documentation showing that Delgado did not provide health insurance for the children. And she had nothing "to dispute" the documentation from Delgado showing that he had provided health insurance for the children as required by the 1999 agreed order. But Delgado never gave her "any notification" that he was paying for the children's health insurance and did not give her insurance cards for the children. When asked if Delgado "pa[id] for health insurance" for the children from November 1999 to December 2012, Gonzales stated, "No."
Gonzales further explained that she provided health insurance for the children after the 1999 agreed order was signed. According to Gonzales, she paid $267 each month for the children's health insurance. In total, Gonzales paid $42,186 for health insurance for the children from November 1999 to December 2012, for which she stated Delgado "owe[d]" her. During Gonzales's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a document titled, "Medical Support Only Obligation of Gerald Delgado - [N]o [I]nterest," stating that "[a]n open balance of [$]42,186[] still remain[ed]."
Gonzales also testified that she and Delgado had agreed to the 2013 agreed order. At the time of the 2013 agreed order, Gonzales only had one child under eighteen years old-J.G. Delgado remembered initialing the 2013 agreed order. In the 2013 agreed order, the trial court ordered Gonzales to provide health insurance for J.G., and Gonzales agreed to do so. Gonzales and Delgado also agreed on the amount of child support arrearages that Delgado owed. The 2013 agreed order modified "what . . . Delgado was paying" for his child support obligation, ordering that he pay $246 each month beginning on January 1, 2013. The 2013 agreed order stated that Gonzales did not "request medical reimbursement at th[e] time," which Gonzales testified meant that she "d[id] not request medical reimbursement" from Delgado. She did not ask Delgado to reimburse her for the amount she had paid for health insurance for the children. Before the 2013 agreed order was signed, Gonzales had never asked the trial court to determine "the unpaid medical support" that Gonzales believed "Delgado owed."
In 2016, Gonzales filed an amended motion to enforce unpaid child support, in which she asked the trial court to "update the agreed child support arrearages from the 2013 [agreed] order." When the 2016 order was signed, all of the children were over eighteen years old. And Gonzales testified that based upon the 2016 order, Delgado owed $36,286.21 as of April 30, 2016. Gonzales "agree[d] to the number that the [trial] [c]ourt granted a judgment for" in the 2016 order. According to Gonzales, the $36,286.21 amount in the 2016 order did not "include anything for unpaid medical support."
During Gonzales's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the 2016 order, which states that the trial court "f[ound] and confirm[ed] that the balance owed by . . . Delgado on previously confirmed child support arrearages and unconfirmed child support [was] $36,286.21 as of April 30, 2016." (Emphasis omitted.) Further, the 2016 order provides that "[j]udgment for th[at] amount [was] cumulative." And "[j]udgment should be awarded against [Delgado] in the amount of $36,286.21 for the arrearages and interest."
Gonzales stated that she was "not surprised" about the $20,000 amount listed on the OAG's Financial Activity Report related to what Delgado still owed in child support arrearages. But Gonzales sought an amount from Delgado that was different than the amount on the OAG's Financial Activity Report. And when asked why she was seeking $68,000 from Delgado, instead of about $20,000, she stated that it was because she "had the children the whole time" and she felt that "he should give [her] a payback." And Delgado should pay her "[h]is portion of the health insurance" for the years that she alleged Delgado did not pay it. In other words, because Gonzales did not remember Delgado "having [health] insurance" for the children in 1999 and Delgado never "provided [her] with anything to show that he had insurance on the [children]," Gonzales wanted "to make [Delgado] pay for health insurance [for the time period] when [she] alleg[ed] [that] he did not have it." Gonzales wanted Delgado to "go back and pay what [she] th[ought] he should have paid from 1999 . . . until 2012," because she was not "sure if [Delgado] had health insurance" for the children during that time.
Gonzales testified that she sought affirmative relief from the trial court to determine arrearages and grant a judgment against Delgado for "unpaid child support and medical support." Gonzales stated that the trial court should award her $42,186 as medical support arrearages because she paid for health insurance for the children from November 1999 to December 2012. And she wanted to have the trial court correct "clerical errors in the calculation of the arrearages and interest in [its] previous orders." But Gonzales had nothing to contradict Delgado's evidence that he did have health insurance for the children. Gonzales admitted that before 2020, she never sought an order or moved the trial court to "enforce [her] allegation that [Delgado] didn't have health insurance" for the children from November 1999 to December 2012, and she never sought to recover any uninsured medical expenses from Delgado.
Kelly Joseph, an attorney, testified that he represented Gonzales in 2016. As to the 1999 agreed order, Joseph stated that it required Delgado to provide health insurance for the children and to pay fifty-percent of any uninsured medical expenses. In 2016, Gonzales filed an amended motion to enforce unpaid child support. According to Joseph, the 2016 order was "limited to the unpaid child support that . . . Delgado owed," and Gonzales and Delgado had agreed to the $36,286.21 amount listed in the 2016 order. The OAG's Financial Activity Report did not "calculate the medical support" that Delgado owed to Gonzales.
In its February 7, 2021 Confirmation of Judgment, Foreclosure of Lien and Release of Bank Lien, the trial court "f[ound] and confirm[ed] that the balance owed by . . . Delgado . . . on previously confirmed child support arrearages [was] $20,539.04 . . . as of January 24, 2021." And it "f[ound] that attorney's fees of $1,750[] should be assessed against . . . Delgado[] . . . and in favor of" Gonzales. Thus, the trial court granted Gonzales "a cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages . . . against . . . Delgado[] in the amount of $20,539.04" and "a judgment for reasonable and necessary attorney['s] fees[] against . . . Delgado[] in the amount of $1,750[]." "All [other] relief requested and not expressly granted [by the trial court was] denied." The trial court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law after it signed its February 7, 2021 Confirmation of Judgment, Foreclosure of Lien and Release of Bank Lien.
Gonzales does not challenge on appeal the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. See In re Marriage of Slagle, No. 14-16-00113-CV, 2018 WL 2306736, at *3 n.8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And Gonzales does not assert on appeal that the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law was harmful. See Guillory v. Boykins, 442 S.W.3d 682, 694 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
Medical Support Arrearages
In her first and fourth issues, Gonzales argues that the trial court erred in awarding her a $20,539.04 "cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages" and not an additional $42,186 for medical support arrearages because res judicata did not bar her request for medical support arrearages and the OAG's Financial Activity Report was "no evidence of [Delgado's] medical support arrearages." (Internal quotations omitted.)
Trial courts have wide discretion in determining issues of custody, control, possession, support, and visitation matters involving children. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re K.R.P., 80 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). We review a trial court's award of arrearages under an abuse-of-discretion standard. In re L.A.F., 270 S.W.3d 735, 737-38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see also Reddick v. Reddick, 450 S.W.3d 182, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (most appealable issues in family-law case are reviewed for abuse of discretion). A judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that the trial court abused its discretion. In re L.A.F., 270 S.W.3d at 738. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without any reference to guiding rules and principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment. In re K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2020, no pet.); Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re K.M.B., 606 S.W.3d at 894; Bush v. Bush, 336 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Review in this context is two-pronged: an appellate court determines whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in applying its discretion because it made an unreasonable decision. Stamper v. Knox, 254 S.W.3d 537, 542 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied). Traditional sufficiency review comes into play under the first prong. Stamper, 254 S.W.3d at 542; Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588. We then determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. West v. West, No. 01-14-00350-CV, 2016 WL 1719328, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 558. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence of substantive and probative character supports its decision. Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Holley, 864 S.W.2d at 706.
In a bench trial, when, as here, the trial court does not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is implied that the trial court made all findings necessary to support the trial court's judgment. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied); see also In re Marriage of Slagle, No. 14-16-00113-CV, 2018 WL 2306736, at *3 n.8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the implied findings are supported by the evidence, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. In re N.A. F., No. 05-17-00470-CV, 2019 WL 516715, at *4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 11, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Gonzales asked the trial court to award her $42,186 in medical support arrearages, in addition to the $20,539.04 in child support arrearages that Gonzales admitted he owed, because she paid for health insurance for the children from November 1999 to December 2012, when Delgado was purportedly not providing health insurance for the children. In its February 7, 2021 Confirmation of Judgment, Foreclosure of Lien and Release of Bank Lien, the trial court "f[ound] and confirm[ed] that the balance owed by . . . Delgado . . . on previously confirmed child support arrearages [was] $20,539.04 . . . as of January 24, 2021." And it granted Gonzales "a cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages . . . against . . . Delgado[] in the amount of $20,539.04." "All [other] relief requested and not expressly granted [by the trial court was] denied." Thus, we conclude that the trial court impliedly found Delgado's medical support arrearages to be $0. See In the Interest of P.G.G., No. 05-14-01217-CV, 2016 WL 2621064, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Our review of the record supports the trial court's implied finding that Delgado owed $0 in medical support arrearages. Delgado testified that the 1999 agreed order required him to maintain health insurance for the children beginning on November 1, 1999, and he provided health insurance for the children as required by the 1999 agreed order. At the time, Delgado was working for American Eagle as a sales representative and his health-insurance payments were "take[n] . . . out of [his] [pay]check" by his employer. Delgado paid for the children's health insurance even before the 1999 agreed order was signed. According to Delgado, he "always" had health insurance for the children; he provided health insurance for the children as required.
During Delgado's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence copies of two of Delgado's "paycheck stubs" from 1999. One of the paycheck stubs lists a "[p]ay [d]ate" as "11/26/1999." It also lists certain deductions including "Guardian Pr[e]tax," which Delgado testified was the cost of health insurance for the children that had been deducted from Delgado's paychecks. According to Delgado, "Guardian" was the name of the health insurance. The second paycheck stub lists a "[p]ay date" of "11/18/1999," and lists a "Guardian [P]retax" deduction of $398.32 from appellant's "[g]ross [p]ay." $398.32 was deducted from Delgado's paycheck for health insurance for the children.
The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of a letter dated August 26, 1999, stating: "As a commissioned sales[person], your health insurance premiums are deducted from your commission check once a month." Delgado testified that he received the August 26, 1999 letter from his employer, American Eagle, about health insurance. And the letter provided "evidence [of] the amounts that [he] paid" for health insurance for himself and his children.
Additionally, Delgado testified that at the time of trial, he owned his own company and had been self-employed for about ten years. He stopped working at American Eagle around 2007. After that, he was employed as a subcontractor elsewhere. Delgado did not have any documents, other than those discussed above, that showed that he had paid for the children's health insurance "every single month" that he was required to under the 1999 agreed order. But according to Delgado, he always worked, and because he "had to have [health] insurance for the [children]," he got "private insurance" when he stopped working for American Eagle.
Gonzales testified that under the 1999 agreed order, Delgado was required to provide health insurance for the children from November 1999 to December 2012. At the time the 1999 agreed order was signed, Gonzales knew that Delgado was working at American Eagle, but she could not remember whether Delgado had health insurance for the children. Gonzales did not have any documentation showing that Delgado did not provide health insurance for the children. And she had nothing "to dispute" the documentation from Delgado showing that he had provided health insurance for the children as required by the 1999 agreed order.
When asked why she was seeking $68,000 from Delgado, instead of about $20,000, which Delgado admitted he owed her in child support arrearages, Gonzales stated it was because she "had the children the whole time" and she felt that "he should give [her] a payback." And Delgado should pay her "[h]is portion of the health insurance" for the years that she alleged Delgado did not pay it. In other words, because Gonzales did not remember Delgado "having [health] insurance" for the children in 1999, and Delgado never "provided [her] with anything to show that he had insurance on the [children]," Gonzales wanted "to make [Delgado] pay for health insurance [for the time period] when [she] alleg[ed] [that] he did not have it." Gonzales wanted Delgado to "go back and pay what [she] th[ought] he should have paid from 1999 . . . until 2012," because she was not "sure if [Delgado] had health insurance" for the children during that time. But she had nothing to contradict Delgado's evidence that he did have health insurance for the children as required by the 1999 agreed order.
In a bench trial, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Hatteberg v. Hatteberg, 933 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). The trial court has several alternatives available when presented with conflicting evidence. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986); Torrez v. Thornton, No. 12-11-00182-CV, 2012 WL 698887, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler Feb. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court may choose to believe some witnesses over others. Martinez v. Lopez, No. 01-09-00951-CV, 2011 WL 2112806, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). We are mindful that "the trial [court] is best able to observe and assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility, and to sense the forces, powers, and influences that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal." In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (internal quotations omitted).
A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision to award arrearages on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 66. If the trial court's implied finding is supported by the evidence, we must uphold the trial court's judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case. Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109; In the Interest of N.A. F., 2019 WL 516715, at *4. Because there is evidence in the record to support the trial court's implied finding that the amount that Delgado owed for medical support arrearages was $0, we hold that the trial court did not err in only awarding Gonzales a $20,539.04 "cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages" and $0 in medical support arrearages.
We need not address Gonzales's remaining arguments related to her first and fourth issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We overrule Gonzales's first and fourth issues.
Void Orders
In her second issue, Gonzales argues that the trial court erred in only awarding her a $20,539.04 "cumulative money judgment for child support arrearages" and not an additional $42,186 for medical support arrearages because it relied on the 2013 agreed order and the 2016 order which are void.
Whether a judgment is void is a question of law, which we determine de novo. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); In re E.M., No. 02-13-00337-CV, 2014 WL 5409091, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). A judgment is void when the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties or property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act. Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003); Saudi v. Brieven, 176 S.W.3d 108, 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). But when a court acts contrary to a rule, statute, or constitutional provision, the judgment generally is not void. See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990).
Gonzales argues that the 2013 agreed order and the 2016 order are void because they "impermissibly forgave [Delgado's] unpaid medical support arrearages." And "[i]f the parties or the [trial] court forgive arrearages before the trial court determines them, then the [trial court's] order is void." Gonzales relies on Williams v. Patton, 821 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1991) to support her position.
In Williams, after the parties divorced, father was obligated to pay a certain amount each month for his child support obligation. 821 S.W.2d at 141-42. Mother later filed a motion for contempt for father's failure to pay child support and a motion to modify the child support obligation. Id. at 142. While those motions were pending in the trial court, mother and father entered into a settlement agreement in which father agreed to pay mother a certain amount and increase the amount of his child support obligation if mother agreed to release father from his obligation for his child support arrearages. Id. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether mother and father could settle claims for child support arrearages before the unpaid amount had been reduced to a written judgment. Id. at 141. It held that mother and father could not modify court-ordered child support arrearages without court approval until the trial court either reduced the unpaid child support to a written judgment or lost jurisdiction. Id. at 143; see also Ochsner v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. 2016) (noting Williams held that former section of Texas Family Code barred parents from settling claims for child-support arrearages).
Here, Gonzales and Delgado did not modify or extrajudicially forgive unpaid medical support arrearages. Williams is inapplicable, and Gonzales's reliance on it is misplaced. Gonzales does not raise another argument as to why she believes the 2013 agreed order and the 2016 order are void. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); see also QTAT BPO Sols., Inc. v. Lee & Murphy Law Firm, G.P., 524 S.W.3d 770, 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (arguments not made in appellant's brief are waived). Accordingly, we hold that the 2013 agreed order and the 2016 order are not void. Cf. Burkett v. Burkett, No. 13-18-00385-CV, 2019 WL 3331635, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg July 25, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
We overrule Gonzales's second issue.
Exclusion of Evidence
In her third issue, Gonzales argues that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence Gonzales's "Exhibit 7" because it was "admissible as a matter of law."
It is unclear from Gonzales's briefing what exact evidence she complains that the trial court erred in excluding. Although Gonzales references an "Exhibit 7" in her briefing, there is no Respondent's Exhibit 7 in the reporter's record, and Gonzales does not direct this Court to a portion of the record where "Exhibit 7" is contained. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (appellant's brief must "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record" (emphasis added)); Richardson v. Marsack, No. 05-18-00087-CV, 2018 WL 4474762, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing," including requiring "appellants to state concisely their complaints, to provide succinct, clear, and accurate arguments for why their complaints have merit in law and fact, to cite legal authority that is applicable to their complaints, and to cite appropriate references in the record." (emphasis added)). The Court will not search the record to find evidence not appropriately cited by Gonzales. See Bullough v. Meyer, No. 05-00-00772-CV, 2001 WL 789285, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas July 12, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); see also Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.- El Paso 2007, no pet.) (appellate court has no duty or right to perform independent review of record).
We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or in a way that is arbitrary and unreasonable. U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012). A party complaining of error in the exclusion of evidence must show not only that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence but that the trial court's error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 380 S.W.3d at 132 (reversal only appropriate where error harmful); Fairmont Supply Co. v. Hooks Indus., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires an appellant's brief to "contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(i). Where an appellant fails to advance a viable argument on appeal with citations to appropriate authority, an appellate court is not required to independently review the record and applicable law to determine whether the alleged error occurred. Happy Harbor Methodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins, 903 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); see also In re A.D.A., 287 S.W.3d 382, 390 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2009, no pet.) ("It is not the proper role of th[e] Court to create arguments for an appellant-we will not do the job of the advocate."). An appellant who fails to adequately brief a complaint waives her issue on appeal. Washington v. Bank of N.Y., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854-55 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.); see also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Tex. 1994).
Here, Gonzales, in her briefing, fails to assert that the trial court's purported erroneous exclusion of "Exhibit 7" was harmful. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1). In other words, Gonzales does not provide this Court with any argument, analysis, or citation to proper legal authority to explain why the exclusion of "Exhibit 7" probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See id.; U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 380 S.W.3d at 132 (reversal only appropriate where error harmful); Fairmont Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d at 532; see also Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Accordingly, we hold that Gonzales waived her third issue due to inadequate briefing. See In the Interest of G.P., No. 01-16-00346-CV, 2016 WL 6216192, at *24-25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (appellant waived complaint trial court erred in admitting certain evidence because he failed to provide explanation, analysis, and citation to appropriate legal authority to explain how purported error probably caused rendition of improper judgment); Moore v. Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., Inc., 140 S.W.3d 870, 874-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (appellant failed to explain how exclusion of evidence probably caused rendition of improper judgment).
Even if Gonzales did not waive her third issue due to inadequate briefing, Gonzales, in her briefing, states that Respondent's Exhibit 5, which the trial court admitted into evidence, contained "the identical payment record as" her purported "Exhibit 7," which she complains the trial court erred in excluding. Any error in the exclusion of evidence is harmless where the same or similar evidence was admitted elsewhere without objection. See Loftin v. Loftin, 630 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2021, no pet.) ("Exclusion of evidence is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative of other evidence in the record." (internal quotations omitted)); In the Interest of G.P., No. 01-16-00346-CV, 2016 WL 6216192, at *25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.