Opinion
Cause No. A-04-CA-576-JN.
December 8, 2005
JUDGMENT
The above-entitled cause of action came to be heard before the Court in a bench trial on 2 November 2005. The trial concluded on 3 November 2005. Now, based on the evidence presented at trial, the applicable legal authority, and the entire case file, the Court enters the following judgment in this cause.
I.
At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs Carlos and Mary Gonzales (collectively "Plaintiffs") have owned two properties in San Marcos, Texas — Plaintiffs have owned a house located at 1912 Mulberry Court (the "Mulberry Property"), which they had purchased in 1996; and, a house located at 1917 Castlegate Circle (the "Castlegate Property"), which they had purchased in 2001.
While all of Plaintiffs' pleadings state that Plaintiffs had acquired the Mulberry Property sometime in 1996, Plaintiff Carlos Gonzales ("Mr. Gonzales") testified that he had purchased the property in 1994. This discrepancy is immaterial to this judgment. As such, the Court accepts 1996 as the year in which Plaintiffs' had acquired the Mulberry Property.
On 13 February 2002, Plaintiffs took out a home equity loan with Washington Mutual on the Mulberry Property. Plaintiffs executed a promissory note and a deed of trust in favor of Washington Mutual, and thereby granted Washington Mutual a security interest in the Mulberry Property.
In late August, or early September of 2002, Mr. Gonzales spoke with Mr. Jerry Jensen ("Mr. Jensen"), a representative of the Ameriquest Mortgage Company ("Ameriquest"), about the possibility of refinancing the Mulberry Property. In their initial conversation (and in conversations that followed), Mr. Gonzales informed Mr. Jensen that Plaintiffs wanted to obtain cash, from a loan with Ameriquest, for improvements to the Mulberry Property, which they intended to rent out. Mr. Gonzales also informed Mr. Jensen that the Castlegate Property was Plaintiffs' new primary residence.
The named Defendant in this cause is improperly identified as Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation. In actuality, Ameriquest Mortgage is a Company, not a Corporation.
In early October of 2002, Ameriquest agreed to refinance the Mulberry Property as Plaintiffs' "second property," and a closing was scheduled for 22 November 2002. Around this time, Plaintiffs had stopped making their monthly mortgage payments to Washington Mutual.
On 22 November 2002, Plaintiffs appeared at the office of the First American Title Insurance Company ("First American") for a closing. At the closing, Plaintiffs signed necessary closing documents. Unbeknownst to them, however, the loan did not close as an originally structured "second property" loan. Instead, soon after the closing, Plaintiffs learned that, in order to close, the loan had to be restructured as an "investment property" loan. Plaintiffs also learned that due to this restructuring, the terms of the loan would change. Specifically, they learned that the new amount of the loan would be lesser, the interest rate on the loan would be higher, and the cash advance from the loan would be smaller then they had originally anticipated. Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs agreed to the new terms of the loan, and a new closing was scheduled for 5 December 2002.
Sometime between 22 and 27 of November 2002, Mr. Jensen learned that Plaintiffs had stopped making monthly mortgage payments to Washington Mutual. Thereupon, Mr. Jensen called Plaintiffs and advised them that Ameriquest would not refinance the Mulberry Property unless Plaintiffs paid the past-due mortgage payments to Washington Mutual. Plaintiffs paid the due mortgage payments to Washington Mutual on 27 November 2002.
On 5 December 2002, Plaintiffs again appeared for a closing at the office of First American. At the closing, Plaintiffs executed a promissory note and a deed of trust in favor of Ameriquest, and thereby granted Ameriquest a security interest in the Mulberry Property. In the deed of trust, Plaintiffs expressly disclaimed the Mulberry Property as their homestead.
Following the execution of the closing documents, the loan closed, and Ameriquest paid $181,684.05 to satisfy the Washington Mutual lien and $3,759.77 to satisfy various state and local tax liens. Around this time, Plaintiffs' past-due mortgage payments to Washington Mutual bounced due to insufficient funds.
In late December of 2002, or early January of 2003, Washington Mutual informed Plaintiffs that their mortgage was in default and that Washington Mutual intended to foreclose on the Mulberry Property. Ultimately, Washington Mutual did not foreclose; however, Plaintiffs stopped making their monthly mortgage payments to Ameriquest.
In February of 2003, Ameriquest sent a notice to Plaintiffs advising them that their loan was in default and that Ameriquest intended to foreclose on the Mulberry Property. To avoid foreclosure, Plaintiffs negotiated a settlement agreement with Ameriquest: Ameriquest agreed not to foreclose, and to release all if its claims against Plaintiffs, if Plaintiffs paid Ameriquest $200,000 within 45 days. Plaintiffs failed to secure a loan for the agreed $200,000 settlement amount, and as such, failed to pay Ameriquest within 45 days. Consequently, in November of 2003, Ameriquest informed Plaintiffs that it would foreclose on the Mulberry Property.
On 13 July 2004, Plaintiffs filed a suit in the 22nd District Court of Hays County, Texas. In their Original Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged two core claims: (1) a claim for the court's declaration that Ameriquest's lien on the Mulberry Property is an invalid lien on Plaintiffs' homestead; and (2) a claim for damages based on common law and statutory fraud, and negligent misrepresentation for damage to Plaintiffs' credit reputation.
On 8 September 2004, Ameriquest removed this action from the State Court to the U.S. District Court, for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. Moreover, on 22 February 2005, Ameriquest asserted affirmative defenses based on common law fraud, statutory fraud, estoppel, equitable subrogation, settlement and release, and waiver.
On 10 May 2005, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In turn, Ameriquest filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on 8 July 2005. The Court denied both motions on 19 October 2005.
II.
As mentioned above, Plaintiffs sought the Court's declaration that the lien that Ameriquest had placed on Plaintiffs' Mulberry Property is an invalid lien on Plaintiffs' homestead. More precisely, Plaintiffs alleged the following: the Mulberry Property is (and always has been) Plaintiffs' homestead; according to Texas law, only one home equity loan lien may be placed upon a homestead within a twelve month period; Plaintiffs took out a home equity loan with Washington Mutual in February of 2002; Plaintiffs refinanced the Mulberry Property with Ameriquest in December of 2002; because Washington Mutual's home equity lien on the Mulberry Property had been less than twelve months old when Plaintiffs refinanced it with Ameriquest, and because Plaintiffs received cash back from their loan with Ameriquest, the lien that Ameriquest placed on the Mulberry Property is an unconstitutional home equity lien on a homestead.Ameriquest has asserted the affirmative defense of estoppel, and has argued that it has a valid lien on non-homestead property because Plaintiffs disclaimed the Mulberry Property as their homestead. Specifically, Ameriquest has argued that: at all times relevant hereto Plaintiffs have owned two pieces of property — the Mulberry Property and the Castlegate Property; Plaintiffs informed Mr. Jensen on numerous occasions that the Castlegate Property, not the Mulberry Property, was Plaintiffs' primary residence, and thus Plaintiffs' homestead; Plaintiffs signed a deed of trust and other documents disclaiming the Mulberry Property as their homestead; and, because Plaintiffs declared that the Castlegate Property was their primary residence, and disclaimed the Mulberry Property as their homestead, they should be estopped from being able to now claim homestead protection on the Mulberry Property.
The central issue for the Court to determine in addressing Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim is whether the Mulberry Property was indeed Plaintiffs' homestead at the time they refinanced the Mulberry Property with Ameriquest. To make this determination, the Court must look to Texas law.
Under Texas law, "homestead" is a legal interest in real property created by the Texas Constitution. Heggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex. 1992). Once established, this legal interest protects generally the property from a forced sale for the payment of debts. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
A homestead claimant has the initial burden to establish the homestead character of his property. In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Lifemark Corp. v. Merritt, 655 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). To satisfy this initial burden, "the claimant `must show a combination of both covert acts of homestead usage and the intention on [his part] to claim the [property] as homestead.'" Bradley, 960 F.2d at 507 (quoting Sims v. Beeson, 545 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Once the claimant has satisfied his initial burden, and thereby established the homestead character of his property, "the burden shifts to the creditor to disprove the continued existence of the homestead." Id. (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971); Lifemark, 655 S.W.2d at 314).
To satisfy its burden, and thereby disprove the continued existence of a homestead, the creditor may, in two situations, raise the defense of estoppel on the basis of claimant's homestead disclaimer. See Bradley, 960 F.2d at 510 n. 16 (citing First Interstate Bank of Bedford v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277, 283-84 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ)). First, the creditor may estop the claimant from claiming homestead rights on the basis of his disclaimer where, at the time of the disclaimer, the claimant owned only one piece of property that was not used as the claimant's homestead. The creditor may prove that, at the time of the disclaimer, the property was not used as homestead by showing "abandonment" or existence of "ambiguous possession." Estate of Montague v. Nat'l Loan Investors L.P., 70 S.W.3d 242,247 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). "Abandonment of a homestead requires both the cessation or discontinuance of use of the property as a homestead, coupled with the intent to permanently abandon the homestead." Id. (citing Womack v. Redden, 846 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1992, writ denied)). "Ambiguous possession" exists "`where physical facts open to observation lead to a conclusion that the property in question is not the homestead, the use of the property is not inconsistent with the claimant's representations that the property is disclaimed as the homestead, and the representations were intended to be and were actually relied upon by the lender.'" Id. (quoting Bland, 810 S.W.2d at 285-86).
"If the claimant owns only one piece of property which the claimant occupies and uses as his home, the claimant is not estopped to set up the homestead exemption notwithstanding declarations, whether written or oral, which state to the contrary." Id. (citing Bland, 810 S.W.2d at 283-84). "The refusal to estop the claimant is based on the theory that the fact of actual possession and use of the property as a home is so obvious at the time of the mortgage that the [creditor] is charged with notice of the fact of the homestead." Bland, 810 S.W.2d at 283-84.
Second, the creditor may estop the homestead claimant from claiming homestead rights on the basis of the claimant's disclaimer where, at the time of the disclaimer, the claimant owned two or more pieces of property either of which could have qualified as claimant's homestead. Bland, 810 S.W.2d at 284. Indeed, it is well established that "[w]here the tangible facts respecting two pieces of property are such that homestead character could attach to either, to the exclusion of the other, according to the intention of the claimant, a declaration by the claimant of his intention in this respect may estop him from disputing the truth of the declaration." Id. at 284 (citing Hughes v. Wruble, 131 Tex. 444, 448, 116 S.W.2d 368, 370 (1938)); see Parrish v. Hawes, 95 Tex. 185, 66 S.W. 209 (1902); Coyel v. Mortgage Bond Co., 124 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1939, no writ); First Coleman Nat'l Bank of Coleman v. Childs, 113 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1938, writ ref'd); Carstens v. Landrum, 17 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.Com.App. 1929).
That Plaintiffs had established the homestead character of the Mulberry Property at the time they took out the home equity loan with Washington Mutual is here undisputed. Also undisputed here are the facts that Plaintiffs disclaimed the homestead character of the Mulberry Property in the deed of trust that they had signed at the 5 December 2002 closing, and that Plaintiffs had owned two properties at the time of their disclaimers. Plaintiffs have, however, disputed the validity of their homestead disclaimers. Specifically, Plaintiffs have argued that they should be relieved of their disclaimers because: (1) they did not know what they had signed; (2) some of the documents that they had signed are ambiguous; and (3) Ameriquest knew, or should have known, that the Mulberry Property was Plaintiffs' homestead at the time that Plaintiffs had disclaimed it as such. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' arguments.
Specifically, Plaintiffs have stressed that the loan applications list the Mulberry Property both as the "subject property" being refinanced and as Plaintiffs' "primary residence," and that the non-homestead affidavit reads that "neither the Affiant nor any member of Affiant's family will occupy the [Mulberry Property] as a legal homestead or primary residence and that Affiant now uses and claims as a legal homestead and principal residence [the Mulberry Property]."
Plaintiffs have argued considerably that the fact that they took out a home equity loan on the Mulberry Property, and the fact that their driver's licenses list their address as the Mulberry Property, and the fact that the Mulberry Property was pricier than the Castlegate Property, should have raised Ameriquest's concerns as to the the homestead character of the Mulberry Property.
First, a declaration in a mortgage or deed of trust that the property is not homestead will not be relieved against on the ground that the mortgagor did not know that it contained such a declaration unless it is made to appear that the other party in some way prevented him from reading it or knowing what it contained. Parker v. Schrimsher, 172 S.W. 165 (Tex.Civ.App. 1914). Because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence whatsoever that Ameriquest, or anyone else for that matter, had prevented them in anyway from reading the deed of trust, which they had signed, they are not relieved from the declarations they made in the deed of trust.
Second, the ambiguities in the documents that Plaintiffs have stressed, are of no consequence. Indeed, in light of Mr. Jensen's articulate explanation for the existence of such ambiguities, the Court finds these ambiguities less than material. In particular, Mr. Jensen explained amply that the computer program that Ameriquest had used to process loans at the time of Plaintiffs' loan, was configured, based on loans processed most frequently, to assume that the borrower was also the owner of a single piece of property being refinanced. Based on this configuration, the computer program populated automatically all fields provided for the borrower's address with the address of the property being refinanced. It was then incumbent upon the loan processor, such as Mr. Jensen, to change manually this designation in the loan documents where, as here, the borrower owned more than one piece of property. Mr. Jensen had failed admittedly to check and correct this information on some of the documents that Plaintiffs had signed. Mr. Jensen's mistake, however, neither alleviates, nor in any way diminishes, the fact that Plaintiffs disclaimed the Mulberry Property as their homestead in the deed of trust.
Finally, the tangible facts relating to the Mulberry Property and to the Castlegate Property were such, at the time of Plaintiffs' disclaimers, that, in light of Plaintiffs' disclaimers, homestead character could have attached to the Castlegate Property, to the exclusion of the Mulberry Property. Mr. Jensen, whom the Court found to be a very credible and convincing witness, testified that Mr. Gonzales reassured him repeatedly that the Castlegate Property was Plaintiffs' new homestead, and that Plaintiffs were remodeling the Mulberry Property so that they could rent it out. Mr. Gonzales' oral declarations made sense because at that time Mr. Gonzales had been remodeling a bathroom at the Mulberry Property, and the Castlegate Property was a fully functional residential home free from ongoing construction. Moreover, Mr. Jensen testified that he inspected the tax records for the Mulberry Property and found that Plaintiffs did not claim homestead exemption on the Mulberry Property at the time they disclaimed it as their homestead. Mr. Jensen found this significant because, based on his calculations, Plaintiffs would have saved approximately $3,000 annually had they claimed homestead exemption on the Mulberry Property. Lastly, Mr. Jensen, whom the Court found to be well versed in the mortgage business, testified that, based on his experience, it is quite common for owners of numerous pieces of property to rent out a pricier property while living in a cheaper one. According to Mr. Jensen, such practice makes sense especially where, as here, an owner of multiple properties struggles financially. Such an owner can generally save money by moving out of a large, pricy property into a smaller, cheaper property. Indeed, living in a smaller, cheaper property translates typically into lower bills; while renting a larger, pricier property translates typically to higher revenue from rent. Taken together, these tangible facts dispelled any doubt as to the truth of Plaintiffs' disclaimers.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence whatsoever showing that they could not have occupied the Castlegate Property at the time they disclaimed the Mulberry Property as their homestead.
Here, Mr. Gonzales testified that Plaintiffs had a difficult time making ends meet at the time they refinanced the Mulberry Property with Ameriquest. Mr. Gonzales also testified that the up-keep and overall cost of living was cheaper at the smaller Castlegate Property than at the larger Mulberry Property. As such, it makes complete sense to the Court, based on finances alone, that Plaintiffs moved out of the Mulberry Property and into the Castlegate Property.
Because Plaintiffs' disclaimed the homestead character of the Mulberry Property in the deed of trust, and because the tangible facts relating to the Mulberry Property and to the Castlegate Property were such, at the time of Plaintiffs' disclaimers, that homestead character could have attached to the Castlegate Property, to the exclusion of the Mulberry Property, Plaintiffs are estopped from disputing the truth of their disclaimers.
Having found that Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming the homestead exemption on the Mulberry Property, the Court now turns its attention to Plaintiffs' damages claims for harm to their credit.
Plaintiffs have alleged that their credit rating has been damaged as a result of their reliance on Mr. Jensen's false representations. More precisely, Plaintiffs have alleged that: Mr. Jensen advised them not to make the October, November, and December 2002 payments to Washington Mutual because Ameriquest would pay off the Washington Mutual home equity loan after the closing on 22 November 2002; Plaintiffs relied on Mr. Jensen's advice and stopped paying on the loan with Washington Mutual; Ameriquest did not pay off the Washington Mutual loan as Mr. Jensen had represented; and, Plaintiffs' default on their October, November, and December payments to Washington Mutual damaged their credit rating. Plaintiffs have alleged that Mr. Jensen's, and thereby Ameriquest's, representations constitute common law and statutory fraud, as well as negligent misrepresentation.
To establish a claim of common law fraud the following elements must be proved: "a material representation that was false, was known to be false when made or was made recklessly as a positive assertion without knowledge of its truth, that was intended to be acted upon, that was relied upon, and which caused injury." Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Ashland, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 852, 867 (Tex. 2001) (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998)). The same elements must be proved to establish a claim of statutory fraud, except that "proof of knowledge or recklessness [is not a required] prerequisite to the recovery of actual damages." Id. (citing Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. § 27.01 (West 1987); Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied)). To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant made a representation in the course of his business, or in transaction in which he had a pecuniary interest; (2) the defendant supplied false information for the guidance of others in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; and (4) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the representation. Federal Land Bank Ass'n v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991).
Here, Plaintiffs have failed to prove any of the elements required to establish either a common law fraud claim, a statutory fraud claim, or a claim for negligent misrepresentation. First, and foremost, aside from Mr. Gonzales' testimony that Mr. Jensen had told him not to make the October, November, or December mortgage payments to Washington Mutual, Plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that Mr. Jensen even made such statements, much less that he made such statements knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Ameriquest has, on the other hand, offered convincing evidence disproving the occurrence of any false representations. To be sure, Ameriquest established that Plaintiffs had signed no less than three documents in which they acknowledged that no prior agreements or contracts existed between them and Ameriquest. Moreover, Mr. Jensen, whom the Court found to be a substantially more credible witness than Mr. Gonzales, testified that he never told Plaintiffs to stop making their mortgage payments to Washington Mutual because Plaintiffs' loan with Ameriquest hinged in large part on Plaintiffs' credit history. To maintain a favorable credit history, Plaintiffs had to keep current their payments to Washington Mutual. As such, it made no sense whatsoever for Mr. Jensen to encourage Plaintiffs to stop paying Washington Mutual, and thereby damage their credit history (unless, of course, he desperately did not want Plaintiffs to obtain a loan with Ameriquest).
Specifically, at the 5 December 2002 closing, Plaintiffs had signed the following three documents: (1) the "Adjustable Rate Note," (2) the "Loan Agreement Rider," and (3) the "Important Notice to Borrowers." By signing these three documents, Plaintiffs acknowledged "[t]he written loan agreements represent the final agreements between the parties and may not be contradicted by evidence or prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent oral agreements of the parties," and that "[t]here are no unwritten oral agreements" between them and Ameriquest.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs signed "Important Notice to Borrower(s)," in which they acknowledged that: "(1) [they had] been given an opportunity to read [their] loan documents, [had] read them, and fully underst[ood] the terms of [the loan]; and (2) [they had] received a full and complete set of the loan documents [they had] signed . . . including a copy of this notice."
Plaintiffs have argued vehemently that Mr. Jensen wanted desperately to collect commission from the refinance of the Mulberry Property. Taking Plaintiffs' argument as true, it is patently illogical for the Court to infer that Mr. Jensen wanted to damage Plaintiffs' credit history, especially when the loan, which he wanted so desperately Plaintiffs to obtain, depended largely on their credit history. Indeed, the evidence has shown that after learning that Plaintiffs had defaulted on their payments to Washington Mutual, Mr. Jensen contacted Plaintiffs and warned them that unless they paid the past-due balance to Washington Mutual, their loan with Ameriquest would not close.
Second, assuming arguendo that Mr. Jensen had represented falsely to Plaintiffs that Ameriquest would pay off the Washington Mutual loan after the 22 November 2002 closing, and that Plaintiffs did not need to make further payments on that loan, Plaintiffs nonetheless have failed to show that they had relied on those alleged misrepresentations. Logic dictates that in order to show reliance on a misrepresentation, one must show that the misrepresentation motivated his action. To show that the misrepresentation motivated his action, one must show that the misrepresentation preceded his action, and that he acted in accordance with the misrepresentation. Here, Mr. Jensen's alleged misrepresentations could not have logically motivated Plaintiffs to default on their mortgage payments to Washington Mutual because their default occurred prior to the alleged misrepresentation. Indeed, Mr. Gonzales testified that Mr. Jensen allegedly told him to stop making payments to Washington Mutual in late October. Ameriquest, however, established that Plaintiffs had already defaulted on their mortgage to Washington Mutual by early October. Because Mr. Jensen's alleged misrepresentations could not have logically motivated Plaintiffs to default on their mortgage payments, Plaintiffs could not have logically relied on those alleged misrepresentations in defaulting on their mortgage payments.
Finally, even if Plaintiffs relied on Mr. Jensen's alleged misrepresentation, they nevertheless have failed to show, beyond preponderance of the evidence, that their alleged reliance has caused either a harm to their credit rating, or a pecuniary injury resulting therefrom. Plaintiffs have alleged only that due to their delinquency on three mortgage payments to Washington Mutual, they were unable to secure a $200,000 loan, which they claim they sought to settle with Ameriquest. However, aside from testimony that delinquencies present on a credit report are viewed generally as unfavorable, Plaintiffs offered no evidence showing that their failure to obtain the $200,000 loan resulted from their delinquency with Washington Mutual. Conversely, Ameriquest has put on evidence that has shown that Plaintiffs' long history of poor credit caused likely the denial of their loan. Indeed, Plaintiffs' credit history reflects a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a great number of past-due payments, and other substantial deficiencies, most of which occurred long before Plaintiffs came in contact with Mr. Jensen or Ameriquest. In light of Plaintiffs' long history of poor credit, and other evidence presented at trial, it is doubtful that three delinquent mortgage payments, which occurred after Plaintiffs came in contact with Ameriquest, have caused damage to Plaintiffs' credit rating, or prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining a loan.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to prove any of the elements required to establish a common law fraud claim, a statutory fraud claim, or a claim for negligent misrepresentation, their damages claim for harm to their credit fails.
Having put to rest Plaintiffs' core claims in the above analysis, the Court finds no need to address Ameriquest's remaining affirmative defenses of common law fraud, statutory fraud, equitable subrogation, settlement and release, and waiver.
III.
Based on the foregoing the Court finds that Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming homestead exemption on the Mulberry Property. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prove any of the elements required to establish either a common law fraud claim, a statutory fraud claim, or a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Accordingly, the Court hereby enters the judgment in favor of Defendant Ameriquest Mortgage Company on all of Plaintiffs' claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED.