Summary
finding that "mortgage consumers exercise a high degree of care in their purchasing decisions since buying a home is one of the most significant transactions people will make in their lifetimes"
Summary of this case from Brithric Enters. v. Bay Equity LLCOpinion
No. C 02-05727 CRB
March 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Golden West Financial Group and World Savings Bank ("plaintiff") bring this lawsuit against defendants WMA Mortgage Services, Inc. d.b.a World Lending Group, Inc., World Realty, Inc., World Leadership Group and World Financial Group ("defendants") alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition. Specifically, plaintiffs allege: 1) service mark infringement under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 2) trademark dilution under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 3) false designation of origin and false representation under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 4) federal unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 5) common law unfair competition and trademark infringement, and 6) statutory unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 and dilution under California Business and Professions Code section 14300.
Now pending before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from using the term "World" in their service marks. After carefully considering the papers filed by the parties, and having had the benefit of oral argument, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises from the following alleged facts:
Plaintiff Golden West is the parent holding company of plaintiff World Savings, the second largest thrift in the country, with over $65 billion in assets and over 400 offices in 38 states. Golden West is the owner of six registered marks, including: WORLD SAVINGS AND LOAN, WORLD, WORLD SAVINGS, WORLD'S 100% HOME LOAN, WORLD SAVINGS, AND WORLD'S ESCALATOR Golden West is also the owner of the service mark WORLD MORTGAGE, which it has used since 1986 in connection with mortgage lending. The foregoing registered marks, including the WORLD MORTGAGE mark are referred to collectively as the "World marks." Plaintiffs claim that long before the acts complained of, the World marks became famous service marks for financial services, especially mortgage lending services, among consumers and are exclusively associated with World. Further, plaintiff allege that the World marks represent enormous goodwill that belongs exclusively to World.
Defendant World Marketing Alliance Mortgage Services, Inc. was created in 1992 to sell and market mortgage services. In August of 1993, World Marketing Alliance Mortgage Services, Inc. shortened its name to WMA Mortgage Services, Inc. In October of 2001, WMA Mortgage Services changed its name to World Lending Group.
Defendants contend that on September 20, 2001, their outside counsel performed a trademark search for "World Lending Group" with a reputable search company and discovered that no other company was doing business as "World Lending Group" in the same field of business and the term "World" was used by more than 100 co-existing parties in connection with financial and mortgage brokerage services. Defendants further contend that in September of 2002, their outside counsel advised them that "World Lending Group" was available for use in connection with defendants' mortgage brokerage business. World Lending Group began using its name publicly in November of 2001.
World Leadership Group was formed in 2002 and by February of that year, the name was publicly used. In June of 2002, World Realty Group was formed to provide marketing and training services to the "for sale by owner" home seller.
Plaintiffs allege that defendants' use of the marks WORLD LENDING GROUP, WORLD LENDING, WORLD FINANCIAL GROUP, WORLD REALTY and WORLD LEADERSHIP GROUP are deceitful and are causing them irreparable harm for which they have no adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from using the World marks.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under the traditional standard a court may issue a preliminary injunction if it determines that: (1) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is denied, (2) the moving party will probably prevail on the merits; (3) the balance of potential harm favors the moving party; and, depending on the nature of the case, (4) the public interest favors granting relief. See International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993). Courts also apply an "alternative standard" which requires the moving party to meet its burden by showing either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted; or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. See id. These two alternative standards lie on the outer reaches of a single continuum. See id. In trademark, trade dress, and copyright infringement actions, if the moving party is able to show a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm is presumed. See Vision Sports Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 612 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1989). A preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy and "the trial court must balance the equities in the exercise of its discretion." International Jensen, 4 F.3d at 822.
DISCUSSION
A. Probability of Success on the Merits
1. Trademark Infringement
Plaintiffs claim that defendants illegally infringed on the World marks. To prove trademark infringement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the infringed marks are: 1) nonfunctional; 2) are either inherently distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning; and 3) are likely to be confused by consumers. See Internatonal Jensen, 4 F.3d at 823. the disputed issue in this case is whether there is a likelihood of confusion among customers from defendants' use of the term "World" in their marks.
a. Likelihood of confusion
The Ninth Circuit has articulated a non-exhaustive list of factors to be used in evaluating the likelihood of confusion by consumers. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-349 (9th Cir. 1979). The following factors are relevant in the analysis: 1) strength of the mark 2) proximity of the goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual confusion; 5) marketing channels used, 6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, 7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. See id. Some factors are more important than others and the relative significance of each factor will be case specific. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).
1. Strength of the Mark
"A strong mark is inherently distinctive, for example, an arbitrary or fanciful mark; it will be afforded the widest ambit of protection from infringing uses." Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 349. A descriptive mark tells something about the product and is protected only where secondary meaning is shown. See id. In the middle lies a suggestive mark; which connotes something about the product and which is afforded protection without proof of secondary meaning. See id.
Plaintiffs argue that their World marks are very strong and thus entitled to maximum protection. They claim confusion is likely to occur because both their marks and defendants' marks start with the term "World" and are followed by a more descriptive word, such as "Savings." Plaintiffs analogize this situation to other "family" cases, such as McDonald's ownership of the "Mc" and "Mac" family of marks, where McDonald's was able to prevent the use of McSleep and McPretzel. The "Mc" situation, however, is distinguishable from this case in that "Mc" is actually part of the "McDonald's" name, while "World" is a separate term from the full company name, "World Savings." Confusion is more likely to occur between McPretzel and McDonald's than between World Lending Group and World Savings.
See J J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald's Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
The relative weakness of plaintiffs' World marks is demonstrated by Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981). In Sun Banks, the court found there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks "Sun Banks" and "Sun Federal" where the word "Sun" was used by over 4,400 registered businesses in Florida. Id. at 316. Similarly, in this case, more than one hundred companies within the financial and mortgage brokerage industries use the term "world" as part of their name or mark. Thus, the strength (or rather, lack thereof) of the World marks does not lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion. See Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix. Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no likelihood of confusion where at least eight companies had registered the EPIX mark or a close variation and used the term in connection with a variety of goods, with even more usage of the EPIX mark on the Internet); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the existence of 85 different carpet companies using the term "world" in their businesses militated against a likelihood of confusion where World Carpets objected to Armstrong Cork Company changing its name to Armstrong World Industries).
2. Proximity of goods and services
With related goods there is a danger that the public will mistakenly assume there is a connection between the producers of the related goods, though no such association exists. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350. "`Complementary products or services are particularly vulnerable to confusion.'" Id. (quoting Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1253 (4th Cir. 1970)). The inquiry is whether the products or services are close in use and function.
While World Savings and World Lending Group both are involved in residential mortgage loans, the companies' respective businesses are distinct: funding loans versus brokering loans. Nonetheless, given the relatedness of the services (World Lending Group was, prior to this lawsuit, brokering loans to World Savings), there is some danger that consumers will believe World Lending Group the mortgage broker is related to World Savings the mortgage lender.
No such potential for confusion exists with respect to World Realty Group. The Realty Group provides support services to "for sale by owner" home sellers. Plaintiffs are not in this business at all. Likewise, there is no similarity of services between services offered by defendant World Leadership Group, a marketing company, and those offered by plaintiffs (savings, checking, residential mortgages).
3. Similarity of the marks
Similarity of marks is measured by the appearance, sound, and meaning of the marks when considered in their entirety and as they appear in the marketplace. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarities are weighed more heavily than differences.See id. The similarity of the marks has always been considered the most crucial factor in determining likelihood of confusion. See id. at 1205.
A visual examination of the parties' marks leads to the immediate conclusion that the marks are not so similar so as to contribute to a likelihood of confusion. Plaintiffs utilize a globe-like logo, which defendants do not. While both parties use the term "World" in their marks, the size and shape of the fonts is different. Further, defendant World Lending Group uses the abbreviation "WLG" which separates it from plaintiff "World Savings Bank." In GoTo.com, in contrast, the logos in question were "glaringly similar," both consisted of white capital letters in an almost identical font rendered on a green circle which was matted in a yellow square background. Id. at 1206.
4. Actual confusion
While a plaintiff need not offer evidence of actual confusion in order to prove trademark infringement, evidence that use of the two marks has already led to confusion is persuasive proof that future confusion is likely. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 352.
Plaintiffs' moving papers did not offer any evidence of actual confusion; indeed, plaintiffs conceded that they did not have any such evidence. In connection with their reply, however, they submitted a survey of 200 professional mortgage brokers which they claim demonstrates initial interest confusion. This new evidence is stricken. Plaintiffs have offered no justification for their failure to submit their survey evidence in connection with their initial moving papers; instead, it appears that after defendants filed their opposition plaintiffs realized their moving papers were insufficient and therefore hastily commissioned a survey to bolster their motion.
In any event, even if the Court were to consider the untimely evidence, plaintiffs' survey has several substantive flaws. First, the survey did not target defendants' market (homeowners) and therefore is not a representative sample.
Second, the individual who conducted plaintiffs' survey opines that the brokers polled will be confused that World Lending Group is connected with World Savings. The survey, however, makes no specific reference to defendants' marks; rather, it asks the respondents generically if they have a belief about a website owner who uses the term "world" among other terms. The survey's failure to refer to defendants' marks makes it insufficient to establish any actual initial confusion.
5. Marketing channels
To show infringement plaintiffs must show that the parties market their goods under conditions sufficiently similar that customer confusion as to the source of the parties' services would be likely. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. The Court finds that for the most part the parties market their services and products through distinct marketing channels. Defendants do not target their business at mortgage brokers as plaintiffs do, but rather, utilize a "warm" marketing approach directed at the contacts of family and friends.
6. Type of goods/degree of purchaser care
The sixth Sleekcraft factor examines the type of goods involved and the degree of consumer care used in making the purchase. In determining likelihood of confusion, the standard used by the courts is the typical buyer exercising ordinary caution. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353. When the buyer has expertise in the field, a higher standard is appropriate, although it will not preclude a finding that confusion is likely. See id.
Several courts have recognized that mortgage consumers exercise a high degree of care in their purchasing decisions since buying a home is one of the most significant transactions people will make in their lifetimes. See e.g., Express City Funding, Inc. v. Express Mortgage, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1095, 1104 (E.D. Mich. 1995); First Keystone Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Keystone Mortgage, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 693, 705 (E.D. Penn. 1996). Thus, the ordinary consumer in a mortgage brokering transaction carries a sufficient degree of care and/or sophistication such that they are not likely to encounter confusion.
7. Defendants' intent
Where the alleged infringer knowingly adopts a mark similar to another's so as to take advantage of the other's goodwill, there is a presumption that the public will be deceived. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354.
The Court does not find that defendants intentionally adopted a mark similar to the World marks. The evidence demonstrates that defendants adopted the term "World" into their names following research by outside counsel who advised them that there were hundreds of "world" based marks used by companies in connection with financial and mortgage brokerage services.
b. Initial interest confusion
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the use of another's trademark in a manner calculated to capture initial consumer attention, even though no sale is finally completed as a result of the confusion, may still constitute trademark infringement. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. Initial interest confusion is a distinct harm, separately actionable under the Lanham Act. See J.K. Harris Co., LLC v. Kassel, 2002 WL 1303124 at n. 2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2002). It is a "brand of confusion particularly applicable to the Internet." Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the theory of initial interest confusion to support their likelihood of confusion claim. The Ninth Circuit tends to analyze initial interest confusion within a discussion of the Sleekcraft factors, most often amidst the relatedness of the services and the level of consumer care. See e.g., Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2002).
In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997), for example, the district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendant, Penguin Books, from publishing a book entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat!, a parody regarding the O.J. Simpson trial, as violating trademarks owned by Dr. Seuss Enterprises. The Ninth Circuit referred to initial interest confusion amidst its discussion of the sixth factor in Sleekcraft, the type of goods involved and the degree of care exercised by the purchaser. Id. at 1405. The court stated that the defendant's use of a confusingly similar title to Dr. Seuss to capture initial consumer attention, even though no sale was finally completed, could still be an infringement. Id. The injunction was upheld following an analysis of theSleekcraft factors. Id. at 1404-1406.
Dr. Seuss is distinguishable from this case. In Dr. Seuss, the title used by the infringer was glaringly similar to the title utilized by the owner of the mark whereas, as is discussed above, in this case the parties' company names and logos are quite distinct. While there is a strong possibility of initial confusion by the title of the book, " The Cat NOT in the Hat!" since it imitates the entire title of the Dr. Seuss book (while merely adding the word "not"), defendants' marks only share one term — "World," a commonly used term — with plaintiffs' marks. The marks in this case are not so strikingly similar so as to capture initial consumer attention.
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction prohibiting West Coast from using terms confusingly similar to Brookfield's trademark, "Movie.Buff" 174 F.3d 1036, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1999). Brookfield, an entertainment-industry information provider, brought suit against West Coast Video, a video rental store chain, for use of Brookfield's "MovieBuff" trademark in defendant's domain name (moviebuff.com) and metatags. The Ninth Circuit concluded that West Coast's use of "Moviebuff.com" in its metatags would result in initial interest confusion as Web surfers looking for Brookfield's MovieBuff products who are taken by search engine to "westcoastvideo.com" would find a database similar to "MovieBuff" such that many consumers who were initially looking for Brookfield's products would simply choose to use West Coast's instead. Id. By using "Moviebuff.com" West Coast caused initial interest confusion to divert people looking for Brookfield's products to its own website. Id. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Brookfield.Id. at 1066-1067.
The holding of Brookfield "envisions an Internet user in search of one specific product who inadvertently comes upon a related one and uses that product instead. The Network Network v. CBS, Inc., 2000 WL 362016 at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2000). Thus, Brookfield has marginal application to this case which does not focus primarily on the Internet user, but rather concerns a wider use of defendants' marks in the advertising community. In any event, Brookfield is otherwise distinguishable. In Brookfield, both parties marketed goods and services to the entertainment consumer and the marks used were identical. Here, in contrast, the marks at is are distinct and the services offered by the parties, while tangentially related, are ultimately different.
The Ninth Circuit most recently considered initial interest confusion in Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. EPIX, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2002). There, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief for the domain name epix.com to showcase electronic pictures against the owner of the mark, EPIX. Id. at 939-940. The dispute arose when EPIX, a manufacturer of electronic imaging software, unsuccessfully attempted to register the domain name www.epix.com. Id. The Ninth Circuit instructed that actionable initial interest confusion on the Internet is determined in large part by the relatedness of the goods offered and the level of care exercised by the consumer. Id. at 945. However, the court advised that the remainder of the Sleekcraft factors complete the inquiry necessary to evaluate initial interest confusion on the Internet. Id. Weighing all of the Sleekcraft factors, the court found that the epix.com domain name did not infringe on the EPIX mark because the goods and services were unrelated, the consumer exercised a high degree of care when purchasing products, and the EPIX mark was weak. Id. at 945-946.
Interstellar is most analogous to this case. The term "World" is not particularly strong and is heavily used in the mortgage and financial industry and mortgage consumers are sophisticated and careful in their transactions. While the services offered by the parties are related, they are not identical and are marketed to different consumers through distinct channels.
c. Summary
In this case the most important factors are the similarity of the marks, the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, the strength of the marks, the proximity of the goods, and the marketing channels. Only one of these factors — proximity of the goods — weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. The fact that all the parties are engaged in the residential mortgage business, however, is insufficient in light of the dissimilarity of the marks, the relative weakness of the World marks, the different marketing channels, and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser of plaintiffs' goods (usually a mortgage broker) and defendants' goods (a mortgage purchaser).
These same factors also weigh against a finding of initial interest confusion The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to succeed on their infringement claim.
2. Dilution
Plaintiffs also allege that defendants' unauthorized use of the World marks has hindered the ability of the marks to exclusively identify plaintiffs' services. To establish dilution in the Ninth Circuit a plaintiff must show that: (1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998). Dilution occurs when the defendant's conduct lessens the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services. See id. at 1326.
Plaintiffs rely on their initial interest confusion survey to demonstrate that the World marks are famous. The Court has stricken the survey evidence as untimely. In any event, the term "world" is common in everyday usage and occurs in a variety of company names, both inside and outside the mortgage and financial industries. Courts have noted that when "`a mark is in widespread use, it may not be famous for the goods or services of one business.'" Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 1999 (citation omitted).
Even assuming that the World marks are famous, plaintiffs have not shown the fourth element of a dilution claim, that defendants' conduct has diluted the World marks. The conduct challenged here is distinguishable from that found to constitute dilution in Panavision Int'l. L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). In Panavision, the court held that defendant Toeppen had diluted Panavision's trademark when he registered a domain name on the Internet using Panavision's trademark, thereby preventing Panavision itself from securing a domain title in its own name. Id. at 1319, 1327. The court found that Toeppen's conduct diluted the value of Panavision's trademark because potential customers of Panavision would be discouraged if they could not finds its website from typing in Panavision.com, but rather, would be forced to search through hundreds of websites. Id. at 1327. There is no evidence here that defendants' use of the term "world" has diluted plaintiffs' business. To the contrary, plaintiffs boast nearly $65 million in assets and in 2002, plaintiff Golden West's profits were a record. Further, unlike Panavision, the use of the term "World" in defendants' company names has not decreased the value of plaintiffs' trademark because plaintiffs' customers can easily recognize and contact them. Since it is unlikely that plaintiffs can demonstrate that the World marks are famous or that those marks have been diluted by defendants' conduct, plaintiffs do not meet the Ninth Circuit's standard for dilution.
The Court's conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 2003 WL 716807 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2003), in which the Court restricted the ability of a plaintiff to prevail on a dilution claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"). In Mosely, the Court held that the FTDA requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution. Id. at *7. The Court further affirmed that the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. Id.
3. False Designation of Origin, Federal Unfair Competition and State Law Claims
An analysis similar to that which applies to plaintiffs' federal trademark claim applies to plaintiffs' false designation of origin and federal unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act, as well as plaintiffs' state law claims. Since it is unlikely that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their trademark infringement claims, it is also unlikely that they will prevail on these claims.
B. Irreparable Injury
In trademark cases, once the plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on the merits it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunctive relief is not granted. See Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 612 n. 3. Since it is unlikely that plaintiffs can establish a likelihood of confusion with respect to the marks at issue, their trademark infringement claims will not likely succeed; thus, they do not receive the presumption of irreparable injury. The Court finds that plaintiffs have not otherwise demonstrated irreparable injury in light of their failure to produce any competent evidence of actual confusion.
C. Balance of Hardships
In analyzing the balance of hardships, a court must consider the impact granting or denying a motion for a preliminary injunction will have on the respective enterprises. See International Jensen, 4 F.3d at 827. Therefore, the relative strength and size of each enterprise may be pertinent to this inquiry. See id.
The Court does not find that the balance of hardships tips in favor of plaintiff. Rather, plaintiffs and defendants are both susceptible to loss of sales and/or goodwill. Further, looking at the relative strength and sizes of the parties, Golden West is a "financial behemoth" compared to defendants; Golden West has $65 billion in assets and nearly 400,000 existing customers. To put size in further context, World Lending Group is just one of 7,000 brokers with which Golden West does business.
D. The Public Interest
Courts are less apt to grant injunctions where there is no likelihood of confusion among consumers. See International Jensen, 4 F.3d at 827. In fact, granting an injunction may deprive consumers of a choice of products. See id. Thus, the public interest does not weigh in favor of granting the preliminary injunction.
E. Alternative Tests
Since the first alternative tests for determining the propriety of a preliminary injunction requires a showing of probability of success on the merits, plaintiffs have not met that test. Even assuming plaintiffs have shown at least the existence of serious questions going to the merits, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that it is not likely that plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their trademark infringement claims because they have not demonstrated a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. The parties are directed to appear for an initial case management conference at 8:30 am. on Friday, April 25, 2003.