Opinion
Case No. 6D23-85
08-04-2023
Julie GODDARD, as Guardian of the Property for J.W., a minor, Appellant, v. J.S.J. UNLIMITED, LLC, and Jose Mejia-Hernandez, Appellees.
Landis V. Curry, III, and Brent R. Bigger, of Paul Knopf Bigger, Tampa, for Appellant. Kari A. Metzger and Joseph T. Metzger, of Metzger Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
Landis V. Curry, III, and Brent R. Bigger, of Paul Knopf Bigger, Tampa, for Appellant.
Kari A. Metzger and Joseph T. Metzger, of Metzger Law Group, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.
ORFINGER, Associate Senior Judge.
Julie Goddard, as guardian of the property for seven-year-old J.W., appeals a final judgment in favor of Jose Mejia-Hernandez and his employer, J.S.J. Unlimited, LLC ("J.S.J.") (collectively, "Mejia"), following the jury's finding that Mejia was not negligent when his J.S.J.-owned truck collided with J.W. who was riding a bicycle. Goddard raises two issues on appeal. She contends that the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to give two requested jury instructions regarding Mejia's alleged violations of traffic control laws. She also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding her from introducing certain rebuttal evidence. We find no abuse of discretion regarding the trial court's refusal to allow the rebuttal evidence. However, we conclude that the trial court's failure to give the two requested jury instructions requires a new trial.
This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.
Mejia was driving his truck in Lake Wales. It was daylight, the roads were dry, and the sun was not affecting his vision. At an intersection, Mejia's truck collided with J.W. and her bicycle. The road on which J.W. was traveling had a stop sign at the intersection; Mejia's road did not. Mejia testified at trial that he did not see J.W. until just before impact, but as soon as he saw her, he slammed on the brakes.
At trial, the theory of Goddard's case was that Mejia was negligent by failing to avoid the collision. In support, Goddard's accident reconstruction expert opined that Mejia was traveling at approximately 33 miles per hour, just over the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour. This expert testified that Mejia could have seen J.W. when he was 173 feet away from her. Thus, he opined that Mejia had time to brake to avoid the collision. Goddard's human factors expert similarly determined that Mejia would have seen J.W. roughly 170 to 175 feet from the intersection. Based on that distance, the human factors expert opined that Mejia would have been able to avoid the collision if he was alert.
In contrast, Mejia's expert testified that Mejia's speed was between "25 to 30 miles per hour at impact." The expert also testified that vegetation on the side of the road would have obscured J.W. until she was about 73 feet from the point of impact.
Goddard requested, over Mejia's objections, two jury instructions based on Mejia's alleged violations of the traffic control laws, sections 316.130(15) and 316.183(1) and (4)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). The first instruction, proposed Jury Instruction No. 21, related to Mejia's duty under section 316.130(15) to "avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle." The second instruction, proposed Jury Instruction No. 22, addressed a driver's duty under section 316.183(1) and (4)(a) not to speed and to drive at an appropriately reduced speed when conditions warrant.
The trial court declined to give Goddard's two requested instructions. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mejia. The trial court then entered a final judgment consistent with the jury verdict, and this appeal followed.
"A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the theory of its case when the evidence supports the theory." Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp. , 177 So. 3d 489, 517 (Fla. 2015). This includes violations of traffic laws. See Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co. v. Addison , 502 So. 2d 1241, 1242 (Fla. 1987).
Goddard's proposed jury instruction based on section 316.130(15) read:
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 21 – Violation of Statute, Ordinance, or Regulations As Evidence of Negligence Florida Statute § 316.130 : Pedestrian; traffic regulations.
Subsection (15):
(15) Every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and give warning when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused or incapacitated person.
Violation of this statute is evidence of negligence. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of negligence. If you find that
Jose Mejia-Hernandez violated this statute you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances, in deciding whether he was negligent.
Goddard argues that although there was a factual dispute as to whether Mejia violated his duty to use due care to avoid colliding with J.W., that dispute should have been submitted to the jury for resolution.
Mejia counters that the jury instruction, as requested, omits important qualifying language. Section 316.130(15) actually provides that "[n]otwithstanding other provisions of this chapter , every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and give warning when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused or incapacitated person." (Emphasis added). Mejia argues that by omitting the qualifying language, the proposed instruction placed an inaccurate emphasis on the duty of a driver without considering a pedestrian's or bicyclist's duties under the same circumstances.
We agree with Goddard that Jury Instruction No. 21 provides an accurate statement of the law. That is, every driver has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid colliding with a person walking or on a "human-powered vehicle" and "to give warning when necessary." See § 316.130(15). The "notwithstanding" portion of section 316.130(15) simply emphasizes that the duty is a standalone one, not subject to limitation by any other provisions of chapter 316.
Here, the main dispute was whether, under the circumstances, Mejia could have avoided colliding with J.W. Goddard's accident reconstruction expert opined that Mejia "had the ability to brake and avoid the impact." Likewise, Goddard's human factors expert opined that even taking into account the normal reaction time, there was no reason Mejia failed to avoid colliding with J.W. other than being distracted or not paying attention. The evidence supported giving the instruction to the jury to properly resolve the effect of Mejia's alleged statutory violation. It was error to refuse this requested instruction. See Beeman v. Cosmides , 825 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that trial court's failure to give jury instruction based on section 316.130(15) deprived bicyclist of fair determination of claim).
Goddard also proposed the following jury instruction based on section 316.183(1) and (4)(a) :
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 22 – Violation of Statute, Ordinance, or Regulations As Evidence of Negligence
Florida Statute § 316.183 : Unlawful speed. Subsection (1) and (4)(a):
(1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event, speed shall be controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance or object on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.
(4) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of subsection (1), drive at an appropriately reduced speed when:
(a) Approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing.
Violation of this statute is evidence of negligence. It is not, however, conclusive evidence of negligence. If you find that Jose Mejia-Hernandez violated this statute you may consider that fact, together with the other facts and circumstances, in deciding whether he was negligent.
Goddard's accident reconstruction expert opined that Mejia was traveling at approximately 33 miles per hour, which slightly exceeded the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour. Mejia asserts that despite the accident reconstruction expert's testimony, there is no evidence that he was speeding or otherwise driving at an unreasonable speed.
We agree with Goddard that the trial court should have given Jury Instruction No. 22. There was evidence that Mejia was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit when approaching the intersection, albeit not by much. Mejia merely points to the fact that his speed was in controversy at the time of the accident. Although controverted, because there was evidence that Mejia exceeded the posted speed just before the collision, Goddard was entitled to this requested jury instruction to allow the jury to assess the legal effect of this statutory violation on her negligence claim. See Yellow Cab Co. of Tampa, Inc. v. Pfizer Pharms., Inc. , 643 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding that although evidence of speed was controverted, jury instruction supporting plaintiff's case should have been provided). The trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction.
For these reasons, we reverse the final judgment and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
NARDELLA and SMITH, JJ., concur.