Opinion
No. 570643/13.
05-07-2015
GLORIA HOMES APARTMENTS LP, Petitioner–Landlord–Respondent, v. Katrina D. WILSON, Respondent–Tenant–Appellant,–and–“John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” Respondents–Undertenants.
Opinion
Appeal from order (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), “entered” April 18, 2013, deemed an appeal from the final judgment (Arlene H. Hahn, J.), entered April 24, 2013, and so considered (see CPLR 5520[c] ), final judgment reversed, without costs, and matter remanded to Civil Court for a de novo hearing.
In a so-ordered stipulation settling the underlying nuisance holdover proceeding, tenant agreed, inter alia, to refrain from permitting any of the loud noise or stomping sounds alleged by landlord in its notice of termination. The stipulation also provided that in the event of a default, landlord may “restore for immediate hearing on the sole issue of violation of this stipulation .” Upon landlord's subsequent motion to restore on the ground that tenant breached the stipulation by permitting the noise condition to continue, the Court (Laurie L. Lau, J.) set the matter down for a hearing “as to whether or not [tenant] has breached the parties' probationary stipulation and what relief would be appropriate.” Following a hearing, the court (Arlene H. Hahn, J.) held that tenant “repeatedly breached” the stipulation and that “[landlord] is entitled to and is awarded a final judgment of possession.”
On this record, the court's finding that landlord was “entitled” to a final judgment of possession cannot be sustained. Manifestly, the stipulation at issue did not provide for the entry of judgment if tenant breached any of its provisions (see 133 Plus 24 Sanford Ave. Realty Corp. v. Xiu Lan Ni, –––Misc.3d ––––, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 25059 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists [2015] ). Indeed, no legal basis was shown by landlord or identified by the hearing court for reading into the stipulation the ultimate remedy of eviction in the absence of specific language authorizing that result. The hearing plainly did not focus on this particular question and no specific findings were made as to the parties' intent. Since the parties' intent is not clear from the face of the stipulation, the hearing court should have made findings on the issue (see Teitelbaum Holdings v. Gold, 48 N.Y.2d 51, 56 [1979] ; Brown v. Brown, 166 A.D.2d 827, 828 [1990] ). “It strikes us as advisable, then, to remit for further proceedings” (id. at 828 ).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
I concur.