Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-11367.
June 14, 2006.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Dillingham, Fred Torrisi, Judge, Superior Court No. 3DI-02-00020 CI.
David Gary Gladden, pro se, Dillingham.
Krista S. Stearns, Boyd, Chandler Falconer, LLP, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Bryner, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Fabe, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
The city of Dillingham sued David Gary Gladden to collect unpaid sales and personal property taxes, outstanding business-licensing fees, and certain penalties and interest. The superior court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, and Gladden appeals. Gladden argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because the city never provided him with discovery. But because the city provided Gladden with initial disclosures, had no obligation to provide additional discovery to Gladden, and set out a prima facie case of entitlement to judgment, we affirm the superior court's summary judgment order.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
David Gary Gladden operated a sole-proprietorship in the city of Dillingham known as "Gladden Rentals." The business involved leasing units of a four-plex to residential tenants and providing them with coin-operated laundry services.
The city of Dillingham filed a superior court action in Dillingham to collect past-due taxes and business-licensing fees from Gladden. Gladden responded by filing a document with the court demanding that the city verify its claims and provide proof that it had the authority to collect taxes and was properly bonded. Gladden then also filed a separate "Request for Information" in which he demanded that the city provide him with, among other things, copies of certain contracts and insurance policies.
Dillingham later offered to settle with Gladden. Gladden responded by filing a document entitled, "Conditional Acceptance Predicated Upon Full Disclosure," in which Gladden demanded that the city make certain disclosures relevant under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. He later renewed this demand in a series of documents entitled "Actual Notice of Fault," "Actual Notice of Default," and "Actual Notice of Recorded Default." The city did not directly respond to these demands.
Settlement efforts proved futile and the city served Gladden with several requests for admission under Alaska Civil Rule 36, asking Gladden to admit that he had: received various sales-tax assessment notices; not responded to those notices; not paid any sales taxes since 1999; and not acquired a business license in 1999, 2000, or 2001. Gladden failed to respond within the thirty-day period allowed under Civil Rule 36(a).
The city then moved for summary judgment, asserting that Gladden owed the city past-due sales taxes, interest, and penalties; that the city was entitled to collect estimated past-due sales taxes from Gladden; that Gladden was liable for penalties owing to his failure to acquire a city business license in 1999, 2000, and 2001; that Gladden owed the city past-due personal property taxes, interest, penalties, and force-filing fees; and that the city was entitled to an injunction requiring Gladden's future compliance with the city's sales-tax and business-licensing ordinances.
In support of its motion, the city filed sixteen exhibits documenting its computation of Gladden's actual and estimated tax deficiencies, its unsuccessful attempts to collect them, and its authority to collect the relevant taxes, estimated taxes, interest, penalties, and fees under the city's municipal code. The city also supported its motion with affidavits from city manager John Fulton and city clerk Vivian Braswell. The city further moved to have its unanswered requests for admission deemed admitted.
In opposing the city's summary judgment motion, Gladden accused the city of pursuing the case against him in bad faith and with unclean hands; he questioned Dillingham's authority to tax and renewed his demands for information and verification.
Superior Court Judge Fred Torrisi granted the city's request to deem its unanswered requests admitted. The court then granted the city's motion for summary judgment, finding that no material facts were in dispute and that no evidence existed to show that Dillingham had acted in bad faith or withheld any evidence from Gladden.
Gladden appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
Gladden's central claim on appeal is that the superior court erred in entering summary judgment because the city failed to provide him with adequate discovery. He also argues that Dillingham should have verified its claims and that the superior court's summary judgment order violated his right to trial by jury. The city contests each position and asserts that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. We will uphold a summary judgment order when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we determine that the moving party established both "entitlement to judgment as a matter of law" and "the absence of a genuine factual dispute." A party establishes entitlement to judgment by presenting a prima facie case, that is, an offer of admissible evidence that, if taken as true, would entitle the party under applicable law to the relief it requested. Once a moving party has set out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to raise a genuine issue of material fact. B. The City's Prima Facie Case
Morris v. Rowallan Alaska, Inc., 121 P.3d 159, 161 (Alaska 2005).
Id. (quoting Powell v. Tanner, 59 P.3d 246, 248 (Alaska 2002)).
Cf. Guerrero v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 123 P.3d 966, 971 (Alaska 2005); Hymes v. Deramus, 119 P.3d 963, 968 (Alaska 2005) (holding that prima facie showing of entitlement to complete summary judgment would not be made if offer of admissible evidence did not cover all claims).
Hymes, 119 P.3d at 968 n. 22 ("The non-moving party need not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue `until the moving party makes a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment on established facts.'" (quoting Alaska Travel Specialists, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 919 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1996))).
In its motion for summary judgment, Dillingham sought to collect unpaid personal property and estimated sales taxes, outstanding business-licensing fees, and certain penalties and interest. The superior court granted its request in full.
With respect to its tax claims, the city could demonstrate the legal right to have judgment entered in its favor upon establishing (1) that it was authorized to impose the taxes, fees, penalties, and interest it sought to collect; (2) that it had properly assessed the taxes, fees, penalties, and interest; and (3) that Gladden owed and had failed to make the required payments. With respect to the city's business-licensing claim, the city needed to show (1) that it was authorized to require businesses in Dillingham to be licensed and (2) that Gladden had operated a business in Dillingham but had failed to acquire required licenses. All factual aspects of the city's claims had to be supported by a verified offer of admissible evidence.
The city's authority to impose and collect the taxes and business-licensing fees at issue here was a legal element of its claims and was established by state statute and Dillingham's own municipal ordinances. Under Alaska's Rules of Evidence, the superior court was entitled to take judicial notice of the existence of those laws and could presume them to be valid absent a contrary showing.
See Alaska Rule of Evidence 202, "Judicial Notice of Law," providing, in relevant part:
(b) Without Request — Mandatory. Without request by a party, the court shall take judicial notice of the common law, the Constitution of the United States and of this state, the public statutes of the United States and this state, the provisions of the Alaska Administrative Code, and all rules adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court.
(c) Without Request — Optional. Without request by a party, the court may take judicial notice of:
. . . .
(3) Duly enacted ordinances of municipalities or other governmental subdivisions, and emergency orders or unpublished regulations adopted by agencies of this state.
(Emphasis added.)
The city of Dillingham is a first class municipal corporation organized under the laws of the state of Alaska; it is not within an organized borough. State law authorizes first class cities to collect taxes on property and sales, and provides that "[a] city outside a borough may exercise a power not otherwise prohibited by law." The prerogative to charge a fee for a business license is one such power.
See generally Alaska Statutes Title 29, "Municipal government."
See, e.g., Alaska Division of Community Advocacy, Alaska Community Database Community Information Summaries (CIS), Dillingham, http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/commdb/CIS.cfm? Comm_Boro_name=Dillingham (last visited June 1, 2006).
See AS 29.35.010(6); AS 29.45.010.
See AS 29.35.010(6); AS 29.45.700.
AS 29.35.260(a); see also AS 29.35.400 ("A liberal construction shall be given to all powers and functions of a municipality conferred in this title.").
See McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735, 740 (Alaska 2001) ("McCormick points to no language in state law prohibiting a municipality from charging a fee for a business license. In the absence of such a prohibition or interference with the function of a state statute, Dillingham may properly charge the fee.").
As documented by the city in its motion for summary judgment, Dillingham exercises each of these powers and does so under the direct authority of the Dillingham Municipal Code. Dillingham's Municipal Code authorizes the city to impose and collect a tax on personal property and expressly authorizes the city to collect overdue personal property taxes, related interest and penalties, late, and force-filing fees. The code authorizes the city to impose and collect a tax on sales made within the city and provides that sellers must collect the tax from their buyers and remit the tax to the city. In the event that a seller fails to do so, the code authorizes the city to collect estimated sales taxes, interest, and penalties from the delinquent seller. Finally, the code also authorizes the city to require businesses within the city to acquire a "Dillingham business license" and provides that the city may collect penalties from persons who operate a business in Dillingham without such a license.
See Dillingham Municipal Code (DMC) 04.15.020 and 04.15.160 (2002). DMC 04.15.020, "Property subject to taxation, rate, council resolution," provides, in part:
A. All real and personal property not expressly exempt by the city or otherwise assessed by this title shall be subject to annual taxation at its full and true value as of January 1st of the assessment year.
DMC 04.15.160, "Assessment — Delivery to council, resolution, tax levy," provides, in part:
C. Upon receipt of the assessment roll, as amended or supplemented, the city council shall, by resolution, fix the rate of tax levy, designate the number of mills upon each dollar of assessed real and personal property, levy the tax, and provide the dates when payments are due and delinquent.
See DMC 04.15.230. DMC 04.15.230, "Real and personal property — Collection, delinquency, remedies," provides, in relevant part:
B. Methods of Collection of Personal Property Taxes. Personal property taxes together with the penalty and interest, may be collected, after the same become due, either by distraint or in a personal action brought in the name of the city against such owner in the courts of the state, or both such methods of collection may be used, in the discretion of the council. Neither of such methods shall be deemed exclusive remedies.
C. Collection by Distraint and Sale.
1. Persons Subject to Enforcement.
If, at any time a taxpayer is more than six months delinquent in any of the sales or personal property taxes levied by the city due the city, he/she shall be subject to the enforcement procedures provided in this chapter, which are in addition to any other enforcement procedures already provided for and is not exclusive.
See DMC 04.15.180. DMC 04.15.180, "Penalties and interest," provides:
A. A penalty of ten percent of the tax due plus any surcharge required to be imposed under AS 12.55.039 shall be added to all delinquent taxes, and interest of six percent per year shall accrue on unpaid taxes, not including penalty from the date due until paid in full.
B. Taxpayers failing to a file a business/personal property assessment return postmarked by January 31st will be charged a late filing fee of fifty dollars. There will be adjustments made to the assessments on returns postmarked after February 28th or the close of business the first workday following February 28th in the event the twenty-eighth falls on a weekend day.
See DMC 04.15.100. DMC 04.15.100, "Violations," provides:
For failing to file a tax statement or filing a false statement in an attempt to evade taxation, the city may impose upon the property owner a filing fee of one hundred dollars. When filing late, a fee of fifty dollars will be added. Any person subject to this penalty shall also pay a surcharge required to be imposed under AS 12.55.039.
See DMC 04.20.030 and 04.30.080. DMC 04.20.030, "Imposition of tax," provides:
A. There shall be levied and collected within the city a tax on all sales at retail made within the city, all professional or occupational services, all materials furnished and services rendered in connection with the accomplishment of a specific project or end product, all rental or property, facilities and accommodations. The applicable tax rate (see Section 4.20.080A) shall be added to the sales price.
B. Where a purchaser has failed to pay and a seller has failed to add to the sales price and collect the tax imposed by this chapter, the tax is included in the purchase price and, as in other cases, constitutes city funds in the hands of the seller held in trust for the city from the moment of collection. The city shall be paid but a single tax on a single sale. The burden of the tax here imposed shall, in the normal course of events, rest upon the purchaser except as provided in this subsection.
DMC 04.20.080, "Tax rate," provides:
A. The tax to be added to the sale price, shall be ten percent for alcohol and transient lodging and six percent for all other sales at retail. Any one sale of items separately priced shall be taxed upon the aggregate amount. Each seller shall be furnished the schedule of tax payable on each taxable amount from one cent to one hundred dollars.
B. The revenue from a coin-operated machine shall be treated in gross without reference to the amount paid or played on a particular transaction.
See DMC 04.20.115, "Filing of returns and remittance of tax to city."
See DMC 04.20.180 "Estimation by city," providing:
In the event that the city is unable to ascertain the tax due to be remitted by a seller by reason of the failure of the seller to keep accurate books or records, allow inspection, failure to file a return, or falsification of records, the city may make an estimate of the sales tax due based on any information available to it. Notice of the estimate of sales taxes due shall be furnished [to] the seller and shall become final for the purposes of determining liability of seller to the city in thirty days unless the seller earlier files an accurate return, supported by satisfactory records, indicating a lesser liability.
See DMC 04.20.220, "Interest on late payments," providing:
A seller who fails to remit payments in a timely matter shall be liable for interest charges often and one-half percent per annum on the amount of delinquent taxes accruing from the due date until paid in full.
See DMC 04.20.210, "Violations — Penalties," providing, in part:
B. Failure to File a Return. A seller who fails to file a return as required by this chapter or who fails to remit taxes collected, or which should have been collected, is subject to a penalty. The penalty is five percent of the taxes collected, or which should have been collected, per month, until paid. The filing of an incomplete return is the equivalent of filing no return.
See, e.g., DMC 04.16.010, "General," providing, in part:
In order to operate a business within the city, it is necessary to obtain a Dillingham business license.
See DMC 04.16.060, "Penalties — Enforcement," providing, in part:
Any person who has effective control of a business required by this chapter to have a Dillingham business license and each business required by this chapter to have a Dillingham business license shall be subject to a civil penalty of one hundred dollars up to and including the forty-fifth day of unlicensed operation. For each day of operation without a valid Dillingham business license beyond the forty-fifth day, the amount of the penalty shall be one hundred dollars per day, with each day of unlicensed operation constituting a separate offense. . . .
As used in this section, the following persons have effective control of a business: its proprietor or proprietors. . . .
Gladden suggests that the city had a duty not only to invoke these provisions, but also to validate their existence. But under the doctrine of the presumption of government regularity, ordinances and statutes are presumed to be valid and enforceable unless and until a challenging party presents evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption. If Gladden believed the statutes and ordinances involved in this case were invalid, it fell to him to present evidence to demonstrate their invalidity.
See Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 1978) (describing the doctrine).
See, e.g., McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735, 738 (Alaska 2001) (holding that the burden of overcoming the presumption of regularity lies with the party alleging irregularity).
In its motion for summary judgment, the city alleged that Gladden had filed his 2001 personal property taxes late and had failed to remit taxes on his business's personal property ("business personal property" taxes) in both 2001 and 2002. The city sought back property taxes, interest, penalties, late fees, and force-filing fees. The city also claimed that Gladden had made taxable sales but had not remitted appropriate sales taxes from January 1, 1999 to 2003. It estimated Gladden's sales tax liability and asserted that he was liable for the estimated amount, for interest on the estimated amount, and for penalties. Finally, the city claimed that Gladden had operated a business in Dillingham in 1999, 2000, and 2001 without acquiring a Dillingham business license, thus entitling the city to recover penalties.
The city supported these allegations with copies of several documents: Gladden's late-filed 2001 personal property tax return; a 2001 business personal property return that the city had force filed on his behalf; a force-filed 2002 business personal property tax assessment form; worksheets and spreadsheets outlining the method the city used in computing Gladden's actual and estimated tax deficiencies; and correspondence reflecting the city's several attempts to collect from Gladden. The city also submitted affidavits of city manager John Fulton and city clerk Vivian Braswell. Fulton averred that he had personal knowledge of Gladden's business activities, and knew that Gladden had made taxable sales in Dillingham without remitting sales taxes to the city. Braswell averred that Gladden had failed to acquire business licenses.
The superior court found that the city's "notices, statements, spreadsheets and affidavits" met the city's burden of establishing a prima facie case. We agree. The allegations of fact contained within the city's offer of admissible business records and testimony, if accepted as true, would entitle the city to judgment under the provisions of law cited in its motion.
C. The Absence of a Genuine Factual Dispute
Once the city presented its prima facie case, the burden shifted to Gladden; he could defeat the city's motion by demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual dispute. But Gladden offered no evidence to refute the city's factual assertions. Accordingly, the superior court granted the city's motion for summary judgment, finding that no material facts were in dispute.
Cf. Hymes v. Deramus, 119 P.3d 963, 968 (Alaska 2005).
On appeal, Gladden's central argument is that summary judgment was inappropriate because Dillingham did not provide him with adequate discovery. He argues that the city should have provided him with responses to the questions and requests he set out in his Request for Information, Conditional Acceptance Predicated Upon Full Disclosure, and Actual Notices.
Gladden also argues that the city's failure to provide him with adequate discovery violated good faith and should foreclose summary judgment under the doctrine of "unclean hands." But, as the superior court found, Gladden has offered "no evidence that the city . . . withheld relevant evidence, or that it acted in bad faith." Gladden has therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding these claims.
Although the city acknowledges that it did not provide Gladden with any formal discovery after making its initial disclosures under Civil Rule 26, it argues that it had no duty to provide additional discovery, because Gladden never made a "discernable discovery request" and because many of his requests were duplicative.
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise directed by order or rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the factual basis of each of its claims or defenses;
(B) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information and whether the attorney-client privilege applies;
. . . .
(D) subject to the provisions of Civil Rule 26(b)(3), a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible things that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings[.]
We agree. As the superior court noted, many of Gladden's requests were "broadly stated," "vague," and "fail[ed] to reference the extensive exhibits filed with the City's motion." The court found that Gladden had made "[n]o showing of relevance . . . for [his requested] disclosures" and that it was "not apparent . . . how [the disclosures requested by Gladden] would assist [him]." Ruling against Gladden, the court concluded that the city had not withheld any "relevant evidence." Civil Rule 26 allows parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged that is "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action" and "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Most of the items requested by Gladden did not meet this standard.
For example, Gladden's Request for Information included the following questions and demands:
a. What jurisdiction is the court operating under?
b. From what and where does City of Dillingham derive its authority?
c. Provide me with the contract to do business with City of Dillingham that has my signature on it.
d. Provide me with the contract between [lawyer for the city] and City of Dillingham with her signature on it[.]
e. Please produce and present certified copies of the Oath of Office subscribed to by [lawyer for the city], as prescribed by the Constitution of the [U]nited States of America.
f. Please produce and present certified copies of the bonds or insurance policies held by [lawyer for the city], as prescribed by the Constitution of the [U]nited States of America.
Gladden's Conditional Acceptance Predicated Upon Full Disclosure included ten additional questions and demands, most of which addressed legal issues that had no bearing on the city's claims against Gladden:
Gladden claimed to be making these demands under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. As discussed in the text below, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has no relevance to this case.
1. Name and address of the collector or assignee:
2. Name and address of the Debtor:
3. What are the terms of assignment for this account?
4. Please provide complete evidence of some lawful contractual obligation on the part of the alleged debtor to the creditor, including a verified copy of any ex parte communications in this matter.
5. Please disclose how the alleged deficiency was calculated and where the records are located. Are those records public, and available for inspection? Are the records certified, and if so by whom? What are the agents['] credentials, commissions, oaths of office, bonds, licenses, etc?
6. Has the alleged amount been entered in any prospectus, pro forma, or other book or ledger as a certified receivable and or negotiable security exchanged with some clearinghouse?
7. Has the alleged debt been reported to any credit agency as per the Fair Credit Reporting Act?
8. Have any insurance claims been made by any creditor or assignee regarding this account?
9. Has the purported balance of this account been used in any tax deduction claim?
10. Is there an official bond in place for the alleged debtor/tax collector in this case?
To the extent that these requests sought disclosure of relevant matters "reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence," the city provided Gladden with the requested information. It supplied the "name . . . of the collector," (the city of Dillingham), the name of "the Debtor," (Gladden) and the municipal ordinances under which the city was bringing its claim (and from which it "deriv[ed] its authority"). A letter from the interim city manager provided Gladden with tax-assessment information, as well as evidence of "how the alleged deficiency was calculated and where . . . records are located." The city attached the letter to its motion for summary judgment, along with several other exhibits and two supplemental affidavits that also provided Gladden with similar information.
Gladden has failed to identify any other discoverable information he sought that the city failed to provide. In addressing the city's summary judgment motion, the superior court parsed Gladden's requests, reviewed all of the evidence provided by the city, and concluded that the city had given Gladden all the relevant and discoverable information that he had demanded. Our review of the record confirms that conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the city did not preclude Gladden from raising a genuine issue of fact by denying him discovery.
D. Failure to Verify
Gladden next argues that Dillingham improperly failed to verify its claims. In support of this argument, he has referred to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act, and AS 09.63.020. But Gladden has failed to establish how these provisions have any application here.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006) et seq.
See 12 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 226.1 (2006) et seq.
AS 09.63.020, "Certification of documents," provides:
(a) A matter required or authorized to be supported, evidenced, established, or proven by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making it (other than a deposition, an acknowledgment, an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official other than a notary public) may be supported, evidenced, established, or proven by the person certifying in writing "under penalty of perjury" that the matter is true. The certification shall state the date and place of execution, the fact that a notary public or other official empowered to administer oaths is unavailable, and the following:
"I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true."
(b) A person who makes a false sworn certification which the person does not believe to be true under penalty of perjury is guilty of perjury.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act governs the collection of consumer debt and has no bearing on this case. Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act discusses verification only in the context of mortgage debts and is similarly inapt. And AS 09.63.020 simply establishes a permissible way to verify a claim when the law requires verification; it does not itself impose a duty to verify on a party to a civil lawsuit. Gladden cites no provision of law that would have required the city to verify any pleading in this case that it submitted in unverified form. We find no merit in this argument.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a, defining "debt" as any
obligation . . . of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes[.]
Cf. Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that taxes levied upon plaintiffs' automobiles were not "debts" within meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that per capita tax owed to local taxing district was not a "debt" encompassed within scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32, 226.34.
See AS 09.63.020(a) ("A matter required or authorized to be supported, evidenced, established, or proven by . . . verification . . . may be supported, evidenced, established, or proven by the person certifying in writing `under penalty of perjury' that the matter is true." (emphasis added)).
E. Right to a Jury Trial
Gladden argues that the superior court's award of summary judgment violated his right to trial by jury. But we have previously held that summary judgment does not impinge on the constitutional right to a trial by jury where no genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the parties:
The Alaska Constitution . . . preserves the right to a jury trial in civil cases only to the "same extent as it existed at common law." Alaska Const. art. I, § 16. At common law — as under current Alaska law — a court had the power to remove factual issues from the jury's consideration "where the court decide[d] there [was] insufficient evidence to raise a question of fact to be presented to the jury." Thus, a party's right to a jury trial will be violated by a summary judgment order only when summary judgment is improperly granted — that is, when a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Article I, section 16 provides:
In civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law. The legislature may make provision for a verdict by not less than three-fourths of the jury and, in courts not of record, may provide for a jury of not less than six or more than twelve.
Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 477 (Alaska 1998) (citations omitted).
Article I, section 16 provides:
In civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law. The legislature may make provision for a verdict by not less than three-fourths of the jury and, in courts not of record, may provide for a jury of not less than six or more than twelve.
Christensen v. NCH Corp., 956 P.2d 468, 477 (Alaska 1998) (citations omitted).
Because Gladden failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists, and because the city has shown its entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law, the superior court's summary judgment order did not violate Gladden's right to trial by jury.
Gladden has raised several other points that require only brief attention. First, Gladden complains that the state has improperly ignored his Freedom of Information Act requests. This point is improperly raised, since the state is not a party to this appeal and Gladden's FOIA requests are not a part of the appellate record. Second, Gladden contends that the city cannot prove that its sales tax ordinances were validly reenacted in the late 1970s, because it lost an exhibit pertaining to an ordinance that re-titled the city's municipal code. We addressed and rejected an identical claim in McCormick v. City of Dillingham, 16 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2001). Our decision in McCormick is controlling here. Last, Gladden advances several conclusory arguments addressing peripheral issues: (a) that Dillingham has generally violated his rights, causing him considerable irreparable emotional and economic injury; (b) that Dillingham cannot claim sovereign immunity; (c) that Dillingham has not allowed him to access records of the oaths and bonds of a variety of municipal officers; (d) that the superior court should have taken judicial notice "of public records and that published decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are public records."; (e) that Dillingham's tax ordinances conflict with state statutes; and (f) that the city has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because none of these arguments has any apparent merit, and Gladden's conclusory briefing precludes meaningful appellate review, we consider these issues to be abandoned. See Lewis v. State, 469 P.2d 689, 692 n. 2 (Alaska 1970); cf. Casciola v. F.S. Air Service, Inc., 120 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Alaska 2005).
IV. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's order granting summary judgment.