Opinion
January 19, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Jiudice, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
The plaintiff's complaint is predicated upon a claim that the respondents Pamela M. Carroll, Paul F. Stockschlaeder, Stockschlaeder, McDonald Sules, and Nicholas J. Boland (hereinafter the respondents), lawyers who represented the respondent bank in an unrelated action to foreclose on a mortgage executed by the plaintiff, obtained a judgment in favor of the bank by, inter alia, fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's first, third, and fourth causes of action, which sounded in malicious prosecution. The judgment which was rendered in favor of the bank constitutes prima facie evidence that the respondents, as counsel for the bank, had cause for bringing the foreclosure action ( see, Scomello v. Caronia, 232 A.D.2d 625; Lawson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 223 A.D.2d 532; Campo v. Wolosin, 211 A.D.2d 660; Whitmore v. City of New York, 80 A.D.2d 638; Caminito v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 848, 849, affd 19 N.Y.2d 931). The plaintiff's conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations were insufficient to rebut this presumption or to raise a triable issue of fact ( see, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562; Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 231).
Furthermore, the respondents established a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment with respect to the second cause of action, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, as their conduct was not extreme and outrageous ( see, Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121; Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135; Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560).
We have not considered those issues raised by the plaintiff which are not properly before the Court on this appeal.
Miller, J.P., Thompson, McGinity and Luciano, JJ., concur.