Opinion
CA 9:20-cv-03666-DCC-MHC
07-20-2022
Wesley L. Givens, Plaintiff, v. Daniel Harouff, Officer Piotevein, Sgt. Love, Ms. Merchant, Charles Williams, Carter Earlie, Susan Duffie, John Palmer, Bennett, and A. Green Harouff, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Daniel Harouff, Officer Piotevein, Sgt. Long, Charles Williams, Carter Earlie, Susan Duffie, John Palmer, and Bennett (“Defendants”) (ECF No. 63) and a motion filed by Plaintiff titled “Dispositive Motion” (ECF No. 60). The Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff Wesley L. Givens (“Plaintiff”) of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 64. Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 71. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 62) and a Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 82). Defendants oppose both motions, ECF Nos. 66 and 85. The matters are ripe for review. Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while an inmate within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). Specifically, in his Amended Complaint, he alleges use of excessive force, inadequate conditions of confinement related to food and personal items, and inadequate medical treatment while housed at Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”).
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by officers from August 27, 2020, through September 24, 2020. ECF No. 20 at 9. Plaintiff also alleges that “on many occasions” he was deprived of a “mattress, blankets, sheets, crocs, cup, spork, shower, medical/dental, law library, and legal mail/personal mail.” ECF No. 20 at 8. Finally, he alleges that he was given nutraloaf that was frozen, spoiled, and had glass in it, which he mailed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina as evidence. ECF No. 20 at 10.
Defendants have submitted numerous documents to the Court, including affidavits, incident reports, medical records, and videos. Defendants identified four dates from the relevant time frame set forth in the Amended Complaint when Plaintiff was placed in restraints because of his behavior: August 27, September 1, September 2, and September 4, 2020. Defendants videotaped each of these incidents in their entirety. ECF No. 63-4 (videos from September 1, 2020); ECF No. 63-6 (videos from September 2, 2020); ECF No. 63-8 (videos from September 24, 2020).
Allegations stemming from the August 27, 2020, incident are the focus of Plaintiff's companion action brought at around the same time as the current action. See Givens v. Harrouff, et al, C/A No. 9:20-cv-03554-DCC-MHC (filed Oct. 7, 2020) (“Givens I”). Thus, as explained below in the Discussion section, that date, and any allegations stemming from that date, are not addressed in this Report and Recommendation.
With regard to the September 1, 2020, incident, the record and accompanying video evidence show that on that date Plaintiff began to break the window of his outer cell door. Plaintiff was given several directives to stop, but he refused. Plaintiff destroyed the sprinkler head in his cell which caused water to be disbursed inside his cell. Chemical munitions were deployed but were unsuccessful in stopping Plaintiff from continuing to damage his cell. Additional security staff reported to Plaintiff's cell and chemical munitions were deployed a second time. At that point, Plaintiff complied and was restrained. Plaintiff was allowed to decontaminate and was escorted to medical where he was evaluated by medical personnel. During this process, Plaintiff, who has an extensive history of spitting on officers, continued to face officers despite orders not to do so. As a result, he was placed on the ground and then ultimately escorted back to his cell where he was taken out of restraints without further incident. Finally, the videotape contains the interview of medical personnel who evaluated the Plaintiff after this incident. As reflected in the nurse interview and the associated medical report, Plaintiff sustained no injuries as a result of this incident. ECF No. 63-4; ECF No. 63-5. The nurse noted that the “medical exam was ended due to [Plaintiff's] aggressive behavior.” ECF No. 63-5 at 15.
On September 2, 2020, Plaintiff was placed in restraints because of his “constant destructive behavior.” ECF No. 63-7 at 1. Plaintiff complied with the correction officers' directives to be restrained when the officers arrived at his cell. Plaintiff was restrained, assessed by a nurse, and placed in a cell under constant observation. The restraints were later removed, and Plaintiff was assessed by a nurse again. As set forth in the nurse's videotaped interview and the associated medical records, Plaintiff did not sustain any injuries. ECF No. 63-6; ECF No. 63-7.
On September 24, 2020, Plaintiff was again placed in restraints because he was damaging his cell and putting feces on his cell door. ECF No. 63-8; ECF No. 63-9. While restrained, Plaintiff threatened the life of a correctional officer along with his wife and children. Because of his continued misconduct, Plaintiff was placed in a restraint chair which is the next step in the force continuum as outlined in the SCDC Use of Force Policy. During this process, Plaintiff was repeatedly examined by medical personnel. At one point, Plaintiff complained that his arm was broken. During the medical examination of his arm, the nurse reported that Plaintiff would not comply with the nursing check and that his arm had no swelling, bruising, or deformity. ECF No. 63-10. Throughout this incident, medical personnel examined the restraints, had restraints repositioned, and medical personnel were able to place a finger between the restraint and Plaintiff's wrists. The medical records and videotaped nurse's interviews do not reflect any injury to Plaintiff on September 24, 2020. ECF No. 63-8; ECF No. 63-10.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 63. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's companion action.
As noted above, Plaintiff filed another action (Givens I) around the same time as the current action. In Givens I, Plaintiff's claims arose from his transfer from Lieber Correctional Institution (“LCI”) to PCI on August 27, 2020, and he raised the same or substantially similar constitutional violations as the current action, though he expands the dates and defendants named in this action.See Givens I, C/A No. 9:20-cv-03554-DCC-MHC. Specifically, in the current action, Plaintiff alleges the various constitutional violations took place from August 27, 2020, through September 24, 2020, identifying some of the same Defendants from Givens I. ECF No. 20 at 9.
Plaintiff alleged the defendants in Givens I violated his constitutional rights by (1) using excessive force (2) denying him blankets/clothing/mattress, (3) sexually assaulting him, (4) denying him medical care, and (5) by violating the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Defendants Daniel Harouff, John Palmer, and Officer Poitevien were also named in Givens I.
Plaintiff's duplicate claims likely violate the rule against claim splitting. See Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 635 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The rule against claim splitting ‘prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal and requires that all claims arising out of a single wrong be presented in one action.'” (citation omitted)). In any event, the undersigned incorporates the Report and Recommendation from Givens I into this Report and Recommendation as if stated fully herein. See Givens I, C/A No. 9:20-cv-03554-DCC-MHC, ECF No. 67 (Report and Recommendation entered July 19, 2022). To the extent the current action involves claims stemming from August 27, 2020, all Defendants in the current action are entitled to summary judgment on those claims for the same reasons already articulated in Givens I. See id.
B. Plaintiff's current action.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their individual capacities and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As with Givens I, the gravamen of the Amended Complaint pertains to alleged excessive force by Defendants, though Plaintiff includes a litany of other alleged constitutional violations. As discussed below, none of Plaintiff's claims are viable, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
1. Official Capacity Claims
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Defendants are SCDC employees; thus, with regard to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep'tof Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Accordingly, summary judgment is proper for Defendants in their official capacities as to all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
2. Individual Capacity Claims
To state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff must show Defendants' personal involvement in order for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”).
a. Excessive Force Claims
To establish a constitutional excessive force claim, an inmate must establish both an objective and subjective component. Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 2019). “The objective component asks whether the force applied was sufficiently serious to establish a cause of action.” Id. This is not a high bar: “as long as the force used is more than de minimis, the objective component is satisfied, regardless of the extent of the injury.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2021).
The subjective component is more demanding and asks a single question: “whether the officers acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Id. at 302 (citation omitted). That is, the subjective component is concerned with the underlying intent or motive of the officer that applied the force. Id. The core inquiry for the Court is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
This subjective standard is unlike the “objective reasonableness” test courts apply under the Fourth Amendment: “The question is not whether a reasonable officer could have used force to maintain discipline, but whether these particular officers did use force for that reason.” Brooks, 924 F.3d at 113 (emphasis in original).
Corrections officers employ force in “good faith”-i.e., permissibly-when “they are motivated by an immediate risk to physical safety or threat to prison order.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Conversely, officers cross the line into an impermissible motive when “they inflict pain not to protect safety or prison discipline but to punish or retaliate against an inmate for his prior conduct.” Id.; see also Brooks, 924 F.3d 113 (noting corrections officers cross the line “when they inflict pain not to induce compliance, but to punish an inmate for intransigence or to retaliate for insubordination”). An officer's use of force on an inmate who is “‘restrained and compliant and posing no physical threat' raises the specter of such an impermissible motive.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (quoting Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 102 (4th Cir. 2017)).
An officer's subjective motive may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 308-09. The Supreme Court has set forth the following non-exclusive factors to assist courts in assessing whether an officer has acted with the requisite state of mind: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force'; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'” Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)). “If a reasonable jury could find, based on inferences drawn under the Whitley factors or other evidence, that correctional officers used force maliciously to punish or retaliate against an inmate, then summary judgment is not appropriate.” Dean, 984 F.3d at 302-03.
Here, Plaintiff does not provide any specific dates, times, or locations of any alleged excessive force event. Rather, Plaintiff provides a date range of August 27, 2020, through September 24, 2020. ECF No. 20 at 9. Thus, as a practical matter, Plaintiff has not stated an excessive force claim, as he has not alleged sufficiently specific facts from which an inference of unconstitutional misconduct could be drawn.
Indeed, Plaintiff's claims, as pled, do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See ECF No. 20; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for any misconduct. See id. at 678. The Amended Complaint contains conclusory allegations that do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. See id. (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations). Indeed, there are no facts from which to infer that Defendants engaged in conduct that ran afoul of the Constitution. See id. at 679 (noting “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))).
Assuming Plaintiff is referring to the use of force incidents identified by Defendants in their Motion, Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Specifically, after considering the aforementioned Whitley factors and facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the subjective component of an excessive force claim. The video evidence submitted to the Court clearly shows the force used by Defendants on September 1, 2, and 24 was not constitutionally excessive. There was a need for Defendants to escort Plaintiff out of his damaged cell and the force used was minimal to achieve the transfer. See Frost v. New York City Police Dep't, 980 F.3d 231, 256 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[A]lthough perhaps the struggle . . . could have been gentler, the video footage does not suggest that the officers' actions could reasonably be viewed as excessive.”). In all of the incidents, Plaintiff had been destructive to his cell and was disruptive. Defendants' conduct was entirely appropriate given the circumstances. See Dean, 984 F.3d at 302 (noting officers employ force in good faith when their actions are motivated by an immediate risk to physical safety or by a threat to prison order).
The video evidence and the associated Incident Reports overwhelmingly demonstrate that Defendants' actions were taken in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, rather than maliciously or sadistically. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting summary judgment is proper under Scott when there is evidence, like a videotape, “of undisputed authenticity that shows some material element of the plaintiff's account to be ‘blatantly and demonstrably false.'” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff has not produced evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude otherwise. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 2016) (“To survive summary judgment, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The undersigned therefore recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Shiheed v. Harding, 802 Fed.Appx. 765, 768 (4th Cir. 2020) (upholding summary judgment for officers where video evidence clearly demonstrated that excessive force was not used in violation of the Eighth Amendment after analyzing Whitley factors).
b. Other constitutional claims
Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants also violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth and First Amendments. Specifically, he maintains that the conditions of his confinement at PCI constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because prison officials denied him blankets/clothing/mattresses, he was not given adequate medical care, and he was not provided adequate nutrition. As to his First Amendment claims, he alleges Defendants denied him access to the law library and interfered with his mail.
These claims fail. As with Plaintiff's excessive force claim, these claims in the Amended Complaint do not provide factual detail beyond averring generally that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that a court is not bound to accept as true a complaint's threadbare, conclusory legal statements that are couched as factual allegations). Despite his various filings, Plaintiff has not produced evidence sufficient to support any of these claims, much less create a genuine dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment.
Although unclear, Plaintiff may also be alleging that Defendants violated the Constitution by violating SCDC's policies. However, this Court has found that violations of policies and procedures alone, even if they occurred, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting § 1983 “does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred”). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a claim on this basis, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
i. Eighth Amendment claims
Plaintiff's claims, that prison officials denied him blankets/clothing/mattresses, failed to provide him adequate medical care, and did not provide him adequate nutrition, are allegations that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (“[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.'” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994))).
Plaintiff also vaguely alleges that he was sexually assaulted “since [he] arrived at [PCI].” See ECF No. 20 at 10; see also Jackson v. Holley, 666 Fed.Appx. 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting allegations of sexual abuse can amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment). Plaintiff does not provide evidence, much less allege facts with sufficient specificity, for his allegations to survive summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (noting that, in the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”). Moreover, the only evidence before the Court is evidence presented by Defendants of an investigation by the Division of Police Services related to a strip search conducted by SCDC employees, which may be what Plaintiff was referring to in his Amended Complaint (although, again, it is not clear). See ECF No. 63-15; ECF No. 63-16. That evidence shows no sexual assault occurred during the strip search, and Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown or argued otherwise. See Ellis v. Elder, No. 7:08-CV00642, 2009 WL 275316, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 2009) (“In stating such a claim, however, the inmate must allege facts on which he could prove that the unwanted touching had some sexual aspect to it; his own perceptions alone that the contact was of a sexual nature are not sufficient.” (citing and collecting cases)).
1. Conditions of confinement
Plaintiff alleges that he was given nutraloaf that was frozen, spoiled, or had glass in it. To demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment based upon such conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must establish (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of Defendants. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff has failed to do so.
Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendants denying him blankets/clothing/mattresses are the same as those raised in Givens I, C/A No. 9:20-cv-03554-DCC-MHC, ECF No. 67. In Givens I, the undersigned found, inter alia, that there was no evidence showing that Plaintiff was denied any of these items; rather, the evidence showed the opposite. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise new claims against Defendants in this action (i.e., that he was denied these items in the date range identified in his Amended Complaint), his claims fail for the same reasons.
Here, Plaintiff has not shown a sufficiently serious deprivation of “adequate food” to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 233. Plaintiff was placed on nutraloaf based on an October 19, 2020, incident in which he exhibited combative behavior and spit in an officer's face. ECF No. 63-11 at 2. Plaintiff was given the same nutraloaf that all other similarly situated inmates were given at PCI. ECF No. 63-11 at 2. There is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff was given nutraloaf that was frozen, spoiled, or had glass in it. Moreover, Plaintiff does not contend that he is unable to eat any of the food provided by SCDC such that he is being deprived of adequate nutrition. See Salters v. Wright, No. CIV.A. 4:13-1536, 2013 WL 5739025, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2013) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” (quoting LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993))).
The nutraloaf that Plaintiff mailed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was not preserved, and, in any event, that evidence is not before this Court.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225 (noting deliberate indifference requires that a prison official know of and disregard the objectively serious condition or deprivation). Defendant Palmer reviewed all relevant SCDC documents and averred there were no contemporaneous complaints made about the nutraloaf by Plaintiff. ECF No. 63-11 at 2. Plaintiff has failed to show otherwise. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment on this claim.
2. Medical Claims
Plaintiff also alleges he was denied medical care. To sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs were serious. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs” (emphasis added)).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
Here, Plaintiff's claim fails for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants acted personally to deny medical care or interfered with any treatment. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171 (noting a plaintiff must show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights); Wilcox, 877 F.3d at 170 (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate on this ground alone.
Second, Plaintiff has failed to show sufficient evidence to satisfy either the objective or subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he either requested or was denied medical treatment. Indeed, an examination of Plaintiff's SCDC medical records reveals just the opposite and reflects an extensive amount of medical attention received by Plaintiff. From the date of Plaintiff's transfer to PCI on August 27, 2020, through December 31, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by medical professionals a total of eighty-one times. See ECF No. 63-14. Plaintiff has failed to show otherwise. Thus, his claims fail. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (noting that, in the face of a properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rest on his allegations to get to a jury without “any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint”).
These medical records also reflect numerous occasions on which Plaintiff refused evaluation, refused to answer any questions, or was so argumentative and combative that the medical encounter was terminated by the medical examiner. Plaintiff cannot establish a deliberate indifference claim on such facts. See, e.g., Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 892 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no deliberate indifference when inmate refused offered medical care); Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no deliberate indifference when inmate refused to take preliminary test before beginning treatment); Scarbrough v. Thompson, No. 10-CV-901, 2012 WL 7761439, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012) (holding that where inmate refused medical care from a nurse, “any alleged delay or interference in treatment was due to [the inmate's] own actions” and could not subsequently “be transformed into an Eighth Amendment claim”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:10-CV-901, 2013 WL 1100680 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
To the extent Plaintiff may be alleging he was denied medical care in relation to his excessive force claims, the uncontroverted evidence before the Court blatantly refutes such claims. See ECF No. 63-4 (videos from September 1, 2020); ECF No. 63-5 (incident reports and medical records from September 1, 2020); ECF No. 63-6 (videos from September 2, 2020); ECF 63-7 (incident reports and medical records from September 2, 2020); ECF No. 63-8 (videos from September 24, 2020); ECF No. 63-9 (incident reports and medical records from September 24, 2020); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
ii. First Amendment claims
Plaintiff vaguely alleges that Defendants denied his access to the law library and that Defendants interfered with his mail, which implies a violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff has failed to show such a violation.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's claim that he was denied access to the law library does not, in and of itself, state a violation of the First Amendment. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1385 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting Supreme Court precedent has not held that there is a right of access to a law library; it has held that there is a right of access to the courts'). To the extent Plaintiff alleges a denial of access to the courts, this claim fails. Plaintiff has not offered evidence showing any alleged inadequate access to the law library resulted in injury, such as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977) (noting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state inmates their First Amendment right to “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to the courts), abrogated by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting, to raise a claim that he has been unconstitutionally denied access to the courts, Plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations-rather, he must identify with specificity an actual injury resulting from Defendants' conduct (citing Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1382-84)).
The only evidence in the record concerning this vague allegation is contained in Defendant Palmer's affidavit. ECF No. 63-11 at 3. In his affidavit, Defendant Palmer noted that Plaintiff was required to submit a Request to Staff form in order to access the law library because Plaintiff resided in the Restricted Housing Unit. ECF No. 63-11 at 3. He averred that, as demonstrated in the Offender Activity Tracking System document, Plaintiff utilized the law library on January 26, 2021. Defendant Palmer further attested that Plaintiff was allowed access to the law library in the same manner as every other restricted housing inmate, and he averred that there was no documentation regarding any denial of access to the law library. ECF No. 63-11 at 3.
Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff argues Defendants impermissibly interfered with his mail, Plaintiff has failed to show any interference gave rise to a constitutional violation. As noted above, Plaintiff mailed an actual piece of nutraloaf to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which Plaintiff acknowledged in his Amended Complaint. As a result of this incident, Defendant Palmer issued a memorandum dated October 22, 2020, instructing SCDC personnel to “observe [Plaintiff] place any legal paperwork into an envelope to ensure no unauthorized items are sent out in the mail.” ECF No. 63-11 at 2, 7. The memo further instructed that SCDC staff were not to read Plaintiff's legal correspondence. ECF No. 63-11 at 7. Other than this single change to how Plaintiff's mail was dealt with, Plaintiff had full access to all mail just like every other inmate at PCI, which is reflected in the relevant mail delivery logs. ECF No. 63-11 at 2, 8-23. Plaintiff has not shown how this single restriction violated his First Amendment rights. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404-08 (1989) (noting, as a general matter, prisoners have the right to send and receive mail); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (noting restrictions on this right are valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Corey v. Reich, No. CIV.A. 0:02-2801-12, 2004 WL 3090234, at *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2004) (“[P]rison administrators are allowed to take reasonable precautions to ensure that prison mail is not used for illicit purposes, and Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that the general procedures employed by the prison here to handle both legal and regular mail as set forth in the Defendants' affidavits and in Plaintiff's own exhibits is improper or violates his constitutional rights.”), aff'd, 103 Fed.Appx. 753 (4th Cir. 2004).
C. Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion
Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion asserts reasons why Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims and argues that he has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on the claims. See ECF No. 60. The undersigned has considered all of the arguments set forth in Plaintiff's Motion in analyzing, reviewing, and setting forth reasons why Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the undersigned recommends denying Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 62) and a Motion for a Restraining Order (ECF No. 82). In his first motion, Plaintiff requests “separation/permanent restraining order due to past improper misconduct from SCDC employees and injuries.” ECF No. 62. In his second motion, Plaintiff requests an order requiring his transfer to one prison and preventing his transfer to a different prison. ECF No. 82 (requesting to “be transferred to Kirkland Correction for safe keeping in Columbia [and] have a permanent separation against Perry . . . Correction”). Defendants oppose both motions. See ECF Nos. 66 (noting that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at Perry Correctional Institution was Defendants are employed and that Plaintiff's motion does not set forth any factual basis or authorities upon which the motion is based); 85 (noting, again, that Plaintiff no longer is incarcerated at Perry).
Plaintiff has not made a clear showing for relief. A party seeking a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Id. at 22. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Id. at 2023. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Id. at 24. Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has met these four elements.
The standard for obtaining a TRO is the same as a preliminary injunction. Maages Auditorium v. Prince George's County, Md., 4 F.Supp.3d 752, 760 n.1 (D. Md. 2014).
Nor has Plaintiff established that he is entitled to a permanent injunction. “A permanent injunction resolves the merits of a claim and imposes an equitable remedy because a legal one is inadequate” Simmons v. Stokes, No. CIV.A. 5:11-175-RMG, 2012 WL 3134221, at *13 (D.S.C. June 20, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:11-CV-175-RMG, 2012 WL 3134236 (D.S.C. Aug. 1, 2012), aff'd sub nom. Simmons v. McFadden, 490 Fed.Appx. 580 (4th Cir. 2012). A party seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate that (1) he has suffered irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
As explained above, Plaintiff is unable to meet these requirements. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motions for a restraining order/injunctive relief be denied. See Jones v. Cartledge, No. CIV.A. 9:11-2109-GRA, 2012 WL 4103824, at *11 (D.S.C. Aug. 21, 2012) (recommending that motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent transfer to a different prison be denied), report and recommendation adopted, No. CA 9:11-02109-GRA, 2012 WL 4100404 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2012); see Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular institution[.]”) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
V. THE UNSERVED DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
Pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff - must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant . . . [b]ut if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); see Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 627 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (June 10, 2019) (“Rule 4(m) requires the dismissal of defendants who remain unserved ninety days after the filing of a complaint unless ‘the plaintiff shows good cause.'”).
By Order filed February 3, 2021, service was authorized on Defendants Nurse A. Green Harouff (“Nurse Harouff') and Ms. Merchant. ECF No. 27. On March 24, 2021, the Summonses for these Defendants were returned unexecuted. The returns indicate that the United States Marshal has been unable to locate these Defendants and note that the Office of General Counsel for the South Carolina Department of Corrections cannot accept service for Nurse Harouff or Ms. Merchant. ECF No. 33.
In an Order dated April 1, 2021, Plaintiff was notified that the summonses for Defendants Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant were returned unexecuted. The returns indicated that the United States Marshal was unable to locate these Defendants and that the Office of General Counsel for the South Carolina Department of Corrections could not accept service for these Defendants. ECF No. 40. Plaintiff was notified that he must provide additional identification or location information he might have for these Defendants. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff was warned that Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant may be dismissed as party Defendants if they are not served with process. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's Order, in which he provided the same descriptions and addresses for Defendants Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant that he provided on the initial Forms USM-285. See ECF Nos. 33 & 42.
The Court issued an Order on May 5, 2021, informing Plaintiff that he had not provided any new information. The Court reminded Plaintiff that he is responsible for providing information sufficient to effect service on these Defendants and that the United States Marshal cannot serve an inadequately identified defendant. ECF No. 43. The Court again warned Plaintiff that Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant may be dismissed as party Defendants if they are not served with process. Id. At the Court's direction, the clerk of court mailed two blank USM-285 forms to Plaintiff, along with a copy of the Court's order. See ECF Nos. 43 and 44.
However, Plaintiff never returned the Forms USM-285, did not provide any additional information regarding Defendants Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant for purposes of service of process, and did not submit any proof that either of these Defendants was served. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends, pursuant to Rule 4(m), that this case be dismissed without prejudice as against Nurse Harouff and Ms. Merchant.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) be GRANTED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's “Dispositive Motion” (ECF No. 60), Motion to Request Separation/Permanent Restraining Order (ECF No. 62), and Motion for Restraining Order (ECF No. 82) be DENIED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Defendants Nurse A. Green Harouff and Ms. Merchant be DISMISSED without prejudice, pursuant to Rule 4(m). Finally, it is RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED.