Summary
holding that "[t]he authority to inspect and license elevators is based upon the exercise of police power, the residual source of which is in the Commonwealth and inheres in its subdivisions upon their creation."
Summary of this case from Lozano v. City of HazletonOpinion
December 8, 1939.
December 9, 1939.
Municipal corporations — Powers — Elevators — Inspection and licensing — Acts of April 8, 1937, P. L. 277, and May 28, 1907, P. L. 297.
The Act of April 8, 1937, P. L. 277, by implication repealed the Act of May 28, 1907, P. L. 297, and the Ordinance of the City of Philadelphia of April 15, 1808, p. 104, enacted pursuant thereto, and divested the city of the power to inspect and license elevators.
Argued December 8, 1939.
Before KEPHART, C. J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.
Appeal, No. 323, Jan. T., 1939, from decree of C. P. No. 5, Phila. Co., June T., 1938, No. 4172, in case of Girard Trust Company et al. v. City of Philadelphia et al. Decree affirmed.
Bill in equity.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Chancellor, ALESSANDRONI, J., as follows:
This bill in equity was filed to enjoin the Bureau of Elevator Inspection of the City of Philadelphia from inspecting elevators in the city and charging a fee therefore on the ground that the Act of April 8, 1937, P. L. 277, confers authority to perform this function upon the Department of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and impliedly repeals the authority of the municipal corporation under the Act of May 28, 1907, P. L. 297.
Preliminary objections filed on behalf of the City of Philadelphia were dismissed on the theory that the Act of 1937 divested the City of Philadelphia of its authority to continue a system of municipal inspection of elevators within its corporate limits unless it could be shown that the regulation by the municipal corporation was adapted to its own peculiar conditions and local problems. A responsive answer was thereupon filed by the City averring that the municipal corporation retained its authority since the operation of the municipal bureau was not in conflict with the Act of 1937, nor the operation thereof, but complementary or supplementary thereto and necessary for the public safety. Numerous distinctions between the requirements of the city and those of the state were set forth.
Upon a careful consideration of the pleadings and the admissions contained therein and the evidence offered in support thereof the Court makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT:1. The Bureau of Elevator Inspection of the City of Philadelphia and the Division of Elevator Inspection of the Department of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania perform the same function, namely, the inspection of elevators and their component parts and the issuing of licenses.
2. The evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of purely local problems in the operation of elevators within the City of Philadelphia, and that regulation by the municipal corporation is adapted to its own peculiar conditions.
3. The Act of 1907, P. L. 297, and the ordinance of the City of Philadelphia of April 15, 1908, p. 104, established a system of elevator inspection in the City of Philadelphia and created an administrative agency with full power and authority to prescribe rules and regulations governing the standards of safety for the construction, installation, operation and maintenance of elevators.
4. The Act of 1937, P. L. 277, established a general system of elevator inspection throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and created a separate and independent administrative agency with equal power and authority to prescribe like rules and regulations.
5. An inherent incompatibility exists between the Acts of 1937, P. L. 277, and the ordinance of April 15, 1908, p. 104, and the respective provisions thereof are irreconcilable.
6. The Act of 1937, P. L. 277, and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto were intended to furnish the sole standards for the inspection of elevators.
DISCUSSION.The question involved in this bill in equity is primarily one of law which was carefully considered in dismissing the preliminary objections filed on behalf of the City of Philadelphia. The authority to inspect and license elevators is based upon the exercise of police power, the residual source of which is in the Commonwealth and inheres in its subdivisions upon their creation, although it is subject to revocation and restriction which may occur not only by express prohibition but also by the exercise of the paramount authority in such manner that the intention to do so by implication is clearly discernable. Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, Article 7, Section 91, Bosack v. Schuylkill County, 311 Pa. 157. A subsequent statute which sets up a general or exclusive system governing the entire subject-matter of the former law and intended as a substitute for it, or one which establishes a uniform and mandatory system repeals the pre-existing enactments by implication: Rhoads v. Building and Savings Assn., 82 Pa. 180; Fort Pitt B. L. Assn. v. Model Plan B. L. Assn., 159 Pa. 308.
It is not denied that the Act of 1937 is both uniform and mandatory and in addition covers the entire subject of elevator inspection throughout the Commonwealth. Section 3 of the Act provides that no elevator shall be permitted to be installed or used within the Commonwealth which does not comply with the rules and regulations of the Department of Labor and Industry, and it is further provided in Section 4 that no person shall inspect elevators unless he has passed a written examination prescribed by that department. It would seem that not only are the foregoing characteristics established thereby but also that an inspection not provided by the Act cannot be made.
Nor is it contended that the Commonwealth does not have the authority to enter this field of regulation, but rather that by doing so it has not indicated its intention to displace an existing system of local inspection without express words to that effect. Express repeal is unnecessary where a subsequent statute is manifestly intended as a substitute for a former act. Bosack v. Schuylkill County, supra, at page 162. This is in accordance with established principles of law as well as with reason and common sense.
The defendant contends that the Act of 1907 and the ordinance of 1908 together with the regulations adopted pursuant thereto are complementary to the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the Act of 1937 and are designed to provide for purely local problems and adapted to the peculiar conditions of the municipality, thereby bringing this case within the principles of the decision in the case of Brazier v. Phila., 215 Pa. 297.
The evidence offered in support thereof does not establish this contention. It is true that the city requires elevator operators within its limits to be licensed whereas Article 2 of the regulations issued by the Department of Labor and Industry merely provided for satisfactory proof of competency and does not disturb any local ordinance pertaining to operators. This, however, and other differences established by the evidence submitted on behalf of the defendant merely constitute distinctions in administrative detail. A review of the testimony and the exhaustive written regulations of the Department of Labor and Industry, (the regulations of the City are not reduced to writing) convinces this Court that each Bureau performs the same functions, namely, the inspection of elevators and their component parts and the issuing of licenses, and that each act is designed for the same purpose, namely, to protect the public by ascertaining that each elevator is capable of sustaining with safety the load which it was designed and intended to carry. Much of the testimony reduced itself to statements by the employees of each Bureau on the relative merits and efficiency in the operation of their respective units, a question which this Court fortunately is not required to decide. Nor are we required to pass upon the question whether the State performs its duty adequately or whether authorizing insurance agents to inspect insured elevators constitutes an unlawful delegation of the police power. If the facilities of the State are not adequate or its service inefficient, the remedy is to compel the State to perform its function properly rather than continue the authority which has been revoked. After carefully considering the evidence we are convinced that it utterly failed to establish the existence of purely local problems and peculiar conditions which the regulations of the City were adapted or designed to meet.
An examination of the case of Brazier v. Phila., supra, indicates that the problem presented therein is not analogous to that now before this Court. In 1902 the City of Philadelphia passed an ordinance to regulate the use of automobiles and provided for inspection, license and the limitation of speed to 7 miles per hour. An Act of Assembly in 1905 provided that no vehicle could be operated on the highways of the Commonwealth without a license issued by the State. It too provided a rate of speed not to exceed 1 mile in 3 minutes on the highways and 1 mile in 6 minutes in boroughs, townships or cities. It was contended that the subsequent statute superseded and obliterated the ordinance of 1902. The Court found that the ordinance contained "many provisions more detailed and specific and better adapted in our judgment to protect the people" and concluded "that the Legislature intended that the local authorities having jurisdiction over such a class of subjects, and having special knowledge of the conditions of their own localities, might, by ordinance, determine what should be a reasonable rate of speed." The wisdom of this conclusion is apparent. Although it might be safe to permit vehicles to travel at a given rate of speed through a sparsely populated borough, the operation at the same speed in densely populated areas, such as the City of Philadelphia, would constitute a wilful disregard of the safety of others. This would be applicable in each community and it would prove inexpedient, if not impossible, for the State to provide speed regulations for each individual area. It was evidently the intention of the Legislature to permit the existence of complementary local ordinances and to allow local legislators to decide what constituted a reasonable rate of speed in their community, the peculiar conditions of which was a matter of special knowledge.
The determination of the safety of elevators, however, is not affected by similar conditions. A particular elevator is designed and intended to carry a certain load with safety whether it is installed in Philadelphia or in a rural district. The determination of whether at any particular time it can perform its intended function with safety likewise does not depend upon its location nor are there any peculiar local conditions which are factors in arriving at such a conclusion.
Finally, we are convinced that the provisions of the two enactments are clearly repugnant and irreconcilible. Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. 126. Each department has full power and authority to establish standards of safety in the construction, maintenance and operation of elevators and to provide regulations which are adapted to that end. The mere existence of two independent administrative agencies with unlimited power to fix conflicting standards governing the same subject-matter and who even now appear antagonistic indicates that which is possible in the future. Requirements of each agency could be made so conflicting that operation would be impossible. This fact clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend the existing municipal regulation to continue. This Court is, therefore of the opinion that the Act of 1937 in setting up a uniform and mandatory system which so irreconcilably conflicts with the pre-existing local system clearly intended to regulate the entire subject-matter by a general system and repeal all other enactments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1. The Act of 1937, P. L. 277, repealed the Act of 1907, P. L. 297, and the Ordinance of April 15, 1908, p. 104, by implication and divested the City of Philadelphia of the power to inspect and license elevators.
There were no requests for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law presented on behalf of the plaintiff.
Of the 39 requests for Findings of Fact presented on behalf of the defendant the following are affirmed: 10th, 12th, 14th, 17th, 27th, 29th, 32d 33rd; the following are refused: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39.
DECREE NISI.AND NOW, to wit, this 8th day of May, 1939, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the City of Philadelphia and its officers named herein as defendants and each of their deputies, officers, servants and employees are enjoined and restrained from inspecting elevators and from attempting to assess and collect charges therefor, and it is hereby declared that the City of Philadelphia is divested of all power and authority to inspect elevators within its corporate limits, to collect charges therefor or to issue certificates of inspection.
Exceptions by defendants dismissed and final decree entered. Defendants appealed.
Errors assigned, among others, related to the action of the court below in dismissing the defendants' exceptions.
Samuel Feldman, Assistant City Solicitor, with him Joseph Sharfsin, City Solicitor, for appellants.
Charles J. Biddle and Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., for appellees, were not heard.
The decree of the court below is affirmed on the able opinion of the learned chancellor, Judge ALESSANDRONI.
Decree affirmed.