Opinion
No. 29779.
March 7, 1932.
1. CRIMINAL LAW. Evidence in arson prosecution held sufficient to establish corpus delicti, as regards admissibility of confession ( Code 1930, section 785).
Evidence that defendant had attempted to burn certain automobile and its physical condition with reference to the burning, and the finding of missing parts, together with confession, as well as proof of loss on blanks of insurance company, signed by defendant, were amply sufficient to establish corpus delicti.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
That missing parts of automobile were found in place indicated in confession of defendant in arson prosecution was strong proof that crime had been committed in connection therewith (Code 1930, section 785).
3. ARSON.
Evidence in arson prosecution held sufficient to establish defendant's guilt (Code 1930, section 785).
4. CRIMINAL LAW.
Facts ascertained by reason of defendant's confession may be considered in establishing corpus delicti.
5. CRIMINAL LAW. Admitting letter, proof of loss, and bill of sale, if incompetent because not identified as bearing signature of defendant in arson prosecution, held harmless; defendant's guilt being clear (Code 1930, section 785).
Admission of such documents, if they were incompetent, was harmless, in light of defendant's confession, and evidence showing that crime charged was committed, that it was by a criminal agency, and that defendant was the agent.
6. CRIMINAL LAW. That state in arson prosecution failed to introduce policy to show that automobile was insured against fire held not error, existence of insurance being amply established by other evidence (Code 1930, section 785).
It appeared that an agent of insurance company testified that automobile in question was insured against fire, and, in addition, proof of loss signed by defendant, augmented by his confession, amply showed that automobile was so insured.
APPEAL from circuit court of Pearl River county. HON. J.Q. LANGSTON, Judge.
J.M. Morse, of Poplarville, for appellant.
The state failed to prove the corpus delicti.
Pitt v. State, 43 Miss. 472; Spiers v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 So. 166, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 185; Ratcliff v. State, 99 Miss. 277, 54 So. 947.
It was not only necessary for the state to prove that the property of the prosecutor named in the indictment was burned, but to establish also, that the fire occurred through criminal agency.
Barren v. State, 111 Miss. 231, 71 So. 374.
A confession is not admissible until the corpus delicti has been proven.
Rayborn v. State, 115 Miss. 730, 76 So. 639.
This court has repeatedly held that the corpus delicti must be proven by evidence aliunde the confessions of the accused.
Stanley v. State, 82 Miss. 498, 34 So. 360; Jenkins v. State, 41 Miss. 582; Jenkins v. State, 98 Miss. 717, 54 So. 158.
Examining the facts in the present case with reference to the law as announced in the case of the above cited, the only thing that in any manner tends to prove criminal agency in reference to the burning of the automobile was that parts of the car were secreted. We contend that this in no manner proves criminal agency, for if there was a retained title or a chattel mortgage on the car, as was hinted, in the testimony, then the appellant, might have been guilty of secreting property on which there was a lien. But certainly, it would not show that the appellant, Gipson, feloniously set fire to his automobile.
If the appellant was guilty of any crime he was guilty of removing property which was subject to a lien as set out in section 1019 of the Mississippi Code of 1930. But appellant was not indicted for this offence.
The proof of loss was, in no way identified and was simply introduced by the attorney for the state saying that he desired to introduce the same, to which seasonable objections were made.
Andrews v. Cramer, 25 So. 156.
Before books of account are admissible, they must first be authenticated.
Panola County Bank v. J.O. Nessen Lumber Company, 117 Miss. 593, 78 So. 517; Green v. Green, 145 Miss. 87, 110 So. 218, 49 A.L.R. 565.
It was not shown by any testimony whatever that there was an insurance policy on the car that was burned other than that an agent had said that there was a policy of insurance. It was not shown that this agent had ever seen the policy, had written the policy, or knew anything about it.
Town v. Lupkin, 114 Miss. 693, 75 So. 546.
We desire to call the court's attention to the fact that the indictment specifically states that the appellant was indicted under section 785 of the Code of 1930, and the gist of the offense under this section is arson for insurance money. Before the accused can be convicted, the state must show that there was a policy of insurance on the thing burned.
W.A. Shipman, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
It is the law that the corpus delicti may be established by the confession of the accused when considered with other evidence, showing the circumstances in connection therewith.
A confession may be considered, together with other evidence, to establish the corpus delicti, that is, the fact that crime has been committed, but the evidence aliunde the confession must be of such a character as will satisfy the mind that it is the real and not an imaginary crime which the accused has confessed.
Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545; Second Wharton Criminal Evidence (10) 1316; Walker v. State, 127 Miss. 246, 89 So. 921; Patterson v. State, 127 Miss. 256, 90 So. 2; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; Garner v. State, 132 Miss. 815, 96 So. 743; Walker v. State, 127 Miss. 246, 89 So. 921; Patterson v. State, 127 Miss. 256, 90 So. 2; Wood v. State, 155 Miss. 298, 124 So. 353; Pope v. State, 158 Miss. 794, 131 So. 264.
Having demonstrated that the appellant's confession of guilty was properly admitted, the case is proved against him thereby. It was not necessary for the state to introduce in evidence the documents of which complaint is made by the second specification of error.
The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted on a charge of arson, in the burning of an automobile, with felonious intent to injure, prejudice, and damage the insurer, and appeals here.
Stated briefly, the appellant was the owner of a Chrysler coupe of a certain described motor number, and on May 30, 1930, the officers found the automobile in question at the place where the appellant resided, with its wheels, battery, timing gear, and "dashboard" removed therefrom. The appellant made out and signed a "Proof of Loss" upon the blanks of the insurance company for the car including the lost articles, which proof of loss showed the number of the policy, and that it was for loss sustained by the appellant by the burning of the car. This proof of loss was signed in the presence of a witness who testified to that fact.
The officers obtained a search warrant and searched the house of the father of the appellant where he resided, and found concealed in the attic thereof the dashboard of the car. Thereupon, the appellant confessed to the officers that he had set fire to the car "to settle with" the insurance company; that he had intended to collect from the insurance company, and then reassemble the car with the missing parts which he had concealed, and he told the officers that he would show them where the wheels, battery, and timing gear were hidden. He carried them to an asparagus bed and dug down about three feet, and found the wheels, the battery, and the timing gear of the car, the wheels having the tires thereon.
An agent of the insurance company testified that the car was covered by insurance against loss by fire.
An officer testified that the car was burned on the top and seat, and there was some evidence of burning on top of the radiator.
The appellant further stated to the officers that he had poured gasoline on top of the car and set fire to it. In the proof of loss signed by him, he represented that he had run the car in the ditch and could not get out; had started for help, and when about two hundred yards away, he discovered the car was in flames.
1. It is contended that the court erred in permitting the confession of the appellant to be considered by the jury in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti.
The prosecution was initiated under section 785, Code of 1930. The evidence that he had attempted to burn the car, and the physical condition of the car itself with reference to the burning, and the finding of the concealed dashboard and the several missing parts which we have named, together with the confession and proof of loss signed by him, were amply sufficient to establish the corpus delicti.
But, in addition to this, by virtue of the confession, the officers learned certain material facts, that is, that the missing parts of the automobile were buried beneath the asparagus bed, and these parts being found in that place, were strong proof of the fact that a crime had been committed in connection therewith. These facts, when considered in conjunction with the evidence of the burned condition of the car, make out a strong case establishing the corpus delicti, and likewise establishing the appellant's guilt.
These facts ascertained by reason of the confession of the accused may be taken in consideration in establishing the corpus delicti. Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; People v. Jaehne, 103 N.Y. 192, 8 N.E. 374, and State v. Hall, 31 W. Va. 505, 7 S.E. 422. So that, we think the corpus delicti was duly established, applying the rule announced by this court in the cases of Garner v. State, 132 Miss. 815, 96 So. 743; Pope v. State, 158 Miss. 794, 131 So. 264.
2. It is insisted that a letter purporting to have been written by the appellant to the insurance company demanding payment for the loss, also the proof of loss against the insurance company for theft of the articles removed from the car, together with a bill of sale executed to the appellant by the vendor of the car, were not identified as bearing genuine signatures of the appellant.
The defendant offered no evidence in the case. The evidence offered was amply sufficient to show that the crime charged in the indictment was committed, and that it was by a criminal agency, and that the appellant was the agent. His guilt in this case is clear, and if, perchance, these documents offered in evidence were not competent, still, in the light of his confession, and the other facts, no harm could possibly have accrued to the appellant thereby.
3. It is urged that the state failed to prove, by introducing in evidence the policy of insurance itself, that the car in question was insured against loss by fire.
An agent of the company testified that it was so insured. In addition to that, the proof of loss signed by the appellant, augmented by his confession, amply shows that this car was insured against loss by fire. The terms of the contract were not material on the issue to be decided herein.
There is no reversible error in this record.
Affirmed.