Opinion
1:19-CV-05720-ELR
2022-07-25
Cecilia L. GIORDANO, Plaintiff, v. ADAPTIVE LEARNING CENTER FOR INFANTS AND CHILDREN, INC., Defendant.
Tilden Robert Reid, T. Robert Reid, LLC, Roswell, GA, for Plaintiff. Alexandra Bowen, The Cincinnati Insurance Company, Peachtree Corners, GA, for Defendant.
Tilden Robert Reid, T. Robert Reid, LLC, Roswell, GA, for Plaintiff.
Alexandra Bowen, The Cincinnati Insurance Company, Peachtree Corners, GA, for Defendant.
ORDER
Eleanor L. Ross, United States District Judge
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Cecilia Giordano's "Motion for New Trial." [Doc. 135]. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion.
I. Background
Plaintiff initiated this employment discrimination and breach of contract action against Defendant Adaptive Learning Center for Infants and Children, Inc. ("Adaptive") on September 1, 2019. See generally Compl. [Doc. 1]. For approximately ten (10) years, Plaintiff worked for Defendant as an Inclusion Specialist. [See Doc. 71 at 3]. However, Plaintiff claims that Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and breached her employment contract by unlawfully terminating her on or around December 21, 2018, after Plaintiff allegedly experienced a series of seizure-like episodes (for which she was temporarily hospitalized). [See id. at 3–6]. In turn, Defendant claimed that it did not terminate Plaintiff, but rather, that Plaintiff resigned from her position following a December 21, 2018 meeting between several of Defendant's employees (including Kelly Van Sant and Charles Schoen), Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's husband. [See id. ] Following the close of discovery, Defendant submitted its motion for summary judgment on November 2, 2020. [See Doc. 44]. Without opposition from Defendant, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to submit her response brief, which the Magistrate Judge granted. [See Doc. 46]. Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment on December 4, 2020, and Defendant timely submitted its reply brief. [See Docs. 64, 67].
For additional factual background, the Court refers to Magistrate Judge Catherine M. Salinas’ non-final Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). [See Doc. 71 at 4–9].
The Magistrate Judge issued her non-final R&R recommending that the undersigned deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment on March 23, 2021. See R&R. This Court adopted the R&R (without objection from either Party) by an Order dated April 15, 2021, and directed the Parties to file a proposed consolidated pretrial order within thirty (30) days. [See Doc. 74].
On June 24, 2021, the undersigned issued a "Notice Setting Trial" specially setting this matter for a jury trial to begin Monday, September 13, 2021. [See Doc. 76]. The Court set a pretrial conference for September 2, 2021, and explained that the undersigned would rule on any motions in limine during the conference. [See Doc. 77].
On August 30, 2021, three (3) days before the pretrial conference, Plaintiff noticed the depositions of two (2) of her treating physicians: Elizabeth LiCalzi, M.D. and David P. Williams, M.D. [See Docs. 84, 85]. That same day, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Leave to Take [Video] Depositions of Medical Treatment Providers and Present Them at Trial in Lieu of Live Testimony." [Doc. 86]. By her motion, Plaintiff sought leave from the Court to depose Drs. Williams and LiCalzi on the eve of trial and to present videos of their deposition testimony at trial instead of calling them as live witnesses. [See generally id. ]
At the September 2, 2021 pretrial conference, the Court denied Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave to Take [Video] Depositions of Medical Treatment Providers and Present Them at Trial in Lieu of Live Testimony" [Doc. 86] and ruled on the Parties’ motions in limine , as memorialized in the "Order on Trial Matters" issued the following day. [See Doc. 95]. On September 10, 2021, the Court issued an "Amended Order on Trial Matters," the sole purpose of which was to clarify that the undersigned granted Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 3 over Plaintiff's objection, rather than granting it without objection. [See Doc. 102]. Additionally, the Parties "agree[d] on redactions to" portions of the notes taken by Defendant's Program Coordinator, Kelly Van Sant, during the aforementioned December 21, 2018 meeting between Plaintiff, Plaintiff's husband, and Defendant's employees. [See Doc. 135 at 3].
In light of the above two (2) Orders on Trial Matters [Docs. 95, 102], it is unclear why Plaintiff now contends that the Court "never entered a Pre-Trial Order" in this case. [See Doc. 135 at 2].
Although Plaintiff contends in her instant motion that "[t]he Court's instruction required the [P]arties to agree on redactions" to Ms. Van Sant's notes as part of her discussion of the pretrial conference, Plaintiff does not provide any citation to the instruction to which she refers. [See Doc. 135 at 3]. Further, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff concedes that the "redacted versions of these notes was entered into evidence at trial" following a stipulation by the Parties. [See id. ]; [see also Doc. 126-1 at 9–10].
Trial in this matter commenced on September 13, 2021. Before the jury was seated, counsel for the Parties and the Court discussed how Plaintiff, her counsel, and her witnesses would be allowed to discuss Plaintiff's medical records and diagnosis during the trial. [See Doc. 140 at 8:9–16:25]. Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel argued that Plaintiff and her husband should be permitted to testify that "they brought several [medical] records to the [December 21, 2018] meeting." [See id. at 12:8–10]. Additionally, Plaintiff's counsel contended that Plaintiff and her husband should be permitted to testify regarding any "information they relayed to the employer" during the December 21, 2018 meeting, including that Plaintiff had "been released from the hospital with no restrictions[,]" that her seizure-like episodes were not the result of epilepsy, and that Plaintiff "was told" by doctors that her seizure-like episodes were "anxiety episodes due to conversion disorder." [See id. 9:18–20, 10:22–11:15, 12:8–10]. Plaintiff's counsel argued at trial that the foregoing types of testimony would not be offered as proof of a medical diagnosis or for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to demonstrate "what information" Plaintiff and her husband gave to Defendant in advance of Defendant's purported termination of Plaintiff. [See id. at 11:11–15].
Plaintiff did not obtain any treating physician or expert witness to testify at trial as to her medical records or diagnosis, nor did she depose any such witnesses before trial. On September 3, 2021, following the Court's denial of her motion to depose Dr. Williams on the eve of trial and present his testimony to the jury by video, Plaintiff subpoenaed Dr. Williams to appear at trial. [See Docs. 86, 95, 97-1]. Dr. Williams moved to quash the subpoena on September 10, 2021. [See Doc. 103]. Upon consideration, the Court found that Plaintiff's subpoena placed undue burden on Dr. Williams and granted his motion to quash. [See Docs. 105, 114] (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) ). At the outset of trial, before the jury was seated, Plaintiff's counsel made an oral motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order granting Dr. Williams’ motion to quash. [See Docs. 105; 114; 140 at 4:21–25]. The Court denied the oral motion. [See Doc. 140 at 6:16–18].
In response, defense counsel objected to Plaintiff or her husband being able to testify regarding Plaintiff's diagnosis or medical records on the basis of hearsay. [See id. at 13:22–25]. The Court agreed with defense counsel and further stated that testimony regarding Plaintiff's diagnosis or medical records would require medical testimony from an expert witness or treating physician, not a layperson such as Plaintiff or her husband. [See id. at 14:7–21].
On the second day of trial, during the cross-examination of Defendant's Executive Director, Charles Schoen, Plaintiff's counsel sought to admit into evidence Defendant's response to Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 1 ("RFA No. 1") for the purpose of impeachment. [See id. at 18:4–27:16]. Plaintiff's RFA No. 1 asked Defendant to admit "that Plaintiff was qualified for the Inclusion Specialist position," to which Defendant responded: "Defendant admits Plaintiff's First Request for Admission[.]" [Doc. 135 at 18–19]. Defense counsel objected to Plaintiff's proposed use of RFA No. 1 in this manner during Mr. Schoen's testimony, and the Court sustained the objection. [See Doc. 140 at 18:4–27:16]. Thereafter, at the jury charge conference, Plaintiff requested for the first time that the Court "force[ ] a stipulation" (or judicial admission) and instruct the jury that Defendant had admitted Plaintiff was a qualified individual pursuant to the ADA. [See Doc. 135 at 22]. Specifically, Plaintiff "requested jury instructions that took the burden off Plaintiff from proving" one of the elements of her disability discrimination claim, "that she was qualified for her position." [Id. ] (citing Doc. 134 at 7–8, 15).
The Court engaged in a lengthy discussion with the Parties and ultimately rejected Plaintiff's request, finding that "the question as asked [in] the RFA and the response are not comprehensive enough" as neither "refer[red] to any particular time"—including whether the supposed admission applied to the point in time when Defendant allegedly terminated Plaintiff—and thus, would not be helpful to the jury. [See Doc. 134 at 6:22–7:5]. In particular, the Court rejected Plaintiff's argument that her RFA No. 1 warranted a jury instruction that Defendant admitted Plaintiff "was always qualified" pursuant to the ADA during the full span of her ten (10)-year employment. [See id. ] However, Plaintiff preserved her objection that she should be entitled to "a forced stipulation[,] [w]hether ... in the jury instruction or some other method[.]" [See id. at 13:11–13].
At the conclusion of the four (4)-day trial, on September 17, 2021, the jury began its deliberations. [Doc. 123]. The Court provided the jury with the verdict form proposed by Plaintiff, wherein the first question read:
Discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence:
1. That Adaptive Learning Center for Infants and Children, Inc. terminated Cecilia Giordano on December 21, 2018?
[space indicating "Answer Yes or No"]
If your answer is "No," this ends your deliberations on this discrimination claim and you should proceed to the next form.
[See Doc. 124 at 1]. Later that same day, the jury returned its verdict, and announced that it answered "no" to this first question. [Id. ] Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for discrimination pursuant to the ADA failed because the jury found that Defendant had not terminated Plaintiff, and as such, judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. [See Docs. 123, 124, 125].
Additionally, the jury ruled in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's only other claim (for breach of contract). [See Doc. 124 at 3].
Plaintiff's instant "Motion for a New Trial" followed on October 15, 2021. [Doc. 135]. Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion. [Doc. 138]. Having been fully briefed, the motion is now ripe for the Court's review. The Court begins by setting forth the relevant legal standard.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 59 governs motions for new trial and provides (in pertinent part) that the Court "may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
A losing party may ... move for a new trial under Rule 59 on the grounds that "the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair ... and may raise questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence or instructions to the jury." [ ] Thus, under Rule 59(a), a district court may, in its discretion, grant a new trial if in [the court's] opinion, the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence ... or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.
See McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940) ); see also Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 807 (11th Cir. 2017) (decision to grant or deny motion for new trial is within the discretion of the court). A district court "should give great deference to the jury's verdict and grant a new trial sparingly." OneSource Facility Services, Inc. v. Mosbach, 205CV525FTM34DNF, 2008 WL 11430040, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2008).
"A Rule 59 motion for a new trial based on evidentiary grounds is to be granted only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice." Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890 F.3d 942, 948 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted); accord Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Floyd v. City of Sanibel, 2:15-CV-795-PAM-CM, 2018 WL 5295819, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 2018) (same). The Eleventh Circuit further holds that "new trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great—not merely the greater—weight of the evidence." Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). "[A] jury's verdict is not contrary to the great weight of the evidence simply because the party moving for a new trial believes that his evidence is more persuasive than his opponent's." See Noel v. Terrace of St. Cloud, LLC, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1204–05 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Redd v. City of Phenix City, 934 F.2d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) ).
Additionally, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 61, "a new trial is warranted only where the error has caused substantial prejudice to the affected party (or, stated somewhat differently, affected the party's ‘substantial rights’ or resulted in ‘substantial injustice’)." See Knight, 856 F.3d at 807 (quoting Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Rsch., Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2004) ). Specifically, Rule 61 provides:
[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 61. To satisfy this standard, the moving party "bears the burden of proving that the error probably had a substantial influence on the jury's verdict." Proctor v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). In the Eleventh Circuit,
the inquiry is always directed to the same central question—how much of an effect did the improperly admitted or excluded evidence have on the verdict? To answer this question, we look to a number of factors, including the number of errors, the closeness of the factual disputes (i.e., the strength of the evidence on the issues affected by the error), and the prejudicial effect of the evidence at issue. We also consider whether counsel intentionally elicited the evidence, whether counsel focused on the evidence during the trial, and whether any cautionary or limiting instructions were given.
Peat, 378 F.3d at 1162.
III. Discussion
Having set forth the relevant legal standard, the Court addresses Plaintiff's arguments. By her instant motion, Plaintiff contends that a new trial is warranted because she was "substantially prejudiced" for two (2) reasons: first, because the Court excluded information that Plaintiff and her husband communicated to Defendant's employees regarding her alleged disability and portions of notes taken by Ms. Van Sant at the December 18, 2021 meeting; and second, because the Court excluded Defendant's response to Plaintiff's RFA No. 1 and declined to admit it either as a judicial admission (pursuant to Rule 36) or an instruction to the jury. [See Docs. 135 at 1; 139 at 1]. In sum, Plaintiff argues she was substantially prejudiced due to the Court's evidentiary rulings.
As noted above, the Parties stipulated to redactions of Ms. Van Sant's notes for trial. Thus, absent any citation to the record, it is unclear why Plaintiff argues the Court wrongfully excluded the unredacted notes.
Because her instant motion seeks a new trial based on evidentiary grounds, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 imposes on Plaintiff the burden to demonstrate that the verdict is against the clear and great weight of the evidence "or will result in a miscarriage of justice." See Chmielewski, 890 F.3d at 948 ; see also Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186 ; Hewitt, 732 F.2d at 1556 ; Floyd, 2018 WL 5295819, at *1. And pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, Plaintiff must demonstrate she was substantially prejudiced by the Court's evidentiary rulings for a new trial to be warranted. See Knight, 856 F.3d at 807 ; see also Peat, 378 F.3d at 1162.
Here, the Court cannot find that the jury's verdict was against the clear and great weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice. See Chmielewski, 890 F.3d at 948 ; see also Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186 ; Hewitt, 732 F.2d at 1556 ; Floyd, 2018 WL 5295819, at *1. Indeed, much of the focus of the four (4)-day trial and the testimony of both Parties’ witnesses concerned the question on which the jury ultimately rested its decision—whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff. [See Doc. 124]. Both Parties had ample opportunity to produce evidence to present their case on the issue of termination, and moreover, the verdict form that listed the question of whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff as the first question (instructing the jury that "if your answer is ‘No,’ this ends your deliberations on this discrimination claim") was proposed by Plaintiff: ?
[Id. at 1].
Because the evidence that Plaintiff claims was wrongfully excluded from trial simply does not bear on the jury's determination regarding whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff, nothing suggests the jury's verdict was against the clear and great weight of the evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice. Lipphardt, 267 F.3d at 1186 ; cf. Noel, 212 F. Supp. 3d at 1204–05 (citing Redd, 934 F.2d at 1215 ) ("a jury's verdict is not contrary to the great weight of the evidence simply because the party moving for a new trial believes that [her] evidence is more persuasive than [her] opponent's").
For the same reason, even if the Court were to find that it erred with regard to the above evidentiary rulings, the Court does not discern any resulting substantial prejudice or injustice to Plaintiff as required by Rule 61. See Knight, 856 F.3d at 807 ; see also Peat, 378 F.3d at 1162. In examining the factors set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Peat, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the evidence she claims was wrongfully excluded had a prejudicial effect on jury's determination. See 378 F.3d at 1162. Again, the jury ultimately decided in Defendant's favor based on its finding that Defendant did not terminate Plaintiff, which was the first question on the verdict form submitted by Plaintiff (and she does not now object to that verdict form). [See Docs. 124, 135]. None of the excluded evidence Plaintiff raises in her motion goes to the issue of whether she was terminated. [See generally Doc. 135]; see also Proctor, 494 F.3d at 1352 (internal citation omitted) (a party moving for a new trial "bears the burden of proving that the error probably had a substantial influence on the jury's verdict"). And because the jury found that Defendant did not terminate Plaintiff at all, the jury did not reach the questions of whether Defendant terminated Plaintiff because of her disability or because Defendant regarded her as disabled, and it did not decide whether Plaintiff was a "qualified individual" pursuant to the ADA. Therefore, none of Plaintiff's above arguments in favor of a new trial concern the underlying issue that barred judgment in her favor. As the Eleventh Circuit instructs, "a new trial is warranted only where the [purported] error has caused substantial prejudice to the affected party (or, stated somewhat differently, affected the party's ‘substantial rights’ or resulted in ‘substantial injustice’)." See Peat, 378 F.3d at 1162. Because the evidence that Plaintiff claims was wrongfully excluded from trial simply does not bear on the jury's verdict that Defendant did not terminate Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff did not suffer "substantial prejudice" from the exclusion of that evidence. See id. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion. [Doc. 135].
IV. Conclusion
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish that a new trial is warranted, the Court DENIES her "Motion for New Trial." [Doc. 135].
SO ORDERED , this 25th day of July, 2022.