Opinion
December 21, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Miller, J.
Present — Dillon, P.J., Doerr, Green, Pine and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously reversed on the law with costs, motion denied, complaint reinstated and matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff sustained personal injuries when the vehicle he was driving left the road just before a bridge over Skaneateles Creek and careened down an embankment, landing in the creek. Plaintiff commenced this action against the county, alleging both improper design and improper maintenance of the bridge on the ground that the approach to the bridge had no guiderails. Plaintiff's cause of action for improper design was dismissed on Statute of Limitations grounds and the action proceeded to trial on the theory of negligent maintenance only.
At trial, the county took the position that the only way plaintiff could prove that the county had notice of a defective condition was with proof of prior similar accidents. Plaintiff argued that proof of prior similar accidents was only one means of proving notice. The court, after being informed by plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff could not offer proof of prior similar accidents, dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice. We reverse and reinstate plaintiff's claim.
A municipality owes a continuing duty to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition (see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 283; Blake v. City of Albany, 48 N.Y.2d 875; Sniper v. City of Syracuse, 139 A.D.2d 93, 96), and this encompasses a duty to provide safe guiderails (see, Kirisits v. State of New York, 107 A.D.2d 156, 158). For a municipality to be cast in damages for negligent maintenance of a roadway, plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality had actual or constructive notice of the existence of a defective condition (see, Blake v. City of Albany, supra; Sniper v. City of Syracuse, supra; Barrett v. City of Buffalo, 96 A.D.2d 709). Proof of prior similar accidents is one method by which a plaintiff may prove that a dangerous condition existed and that the municipality had notice of it (see, Vega v. Jacobs, 84 A.D.2d 813). There are, however, other methods of proof which may be available (see, Noskewicz v. City of New York, 155 A.D.2d 646; Kelly v. Town of Islip, 141 A.D.2d 611, 612, lv. dismissed and denied 73 N.Y.2d 865). Plaintiff might prove through admissions of county employees that the county had actual notice of a defective condition and its decision not to install guiderails lacked a reasonable basis (see, Friedman v. State of New York, supra, at 284; Alexander v. Eldred, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 466). Alternatively, plaintiff might prove constructive notice by offering proof that the defect is so obvious and existed for so long that a municipality, charged with the duty to maintain its highway in good condition, should have discovered and corrected it (see, Blake v. City of Albany, supra). By limiting plaintiff to proof of prior similar accidents, the court improperly restricted plaintiff's ability to prove his case.