Opinion
No. 98C-06-015.
Submitted: January 31, 2000.
Decided: March 9, 2000.
Jeffrey I. Clark, Esquire Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A. P.O. Box 497, Dover, Delaware 19903.
Craig A. Karsnitz, Esquire Young Conaway Stargatt Taylor, P.O. Box 594, Georgetown, Delaware 19947.
Stuart M. Grant, Esquire, Denise T. DiPersio, Esquire, Grant Eisenhofer, P.A., 1220 North Market Street, Suite 500 Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
Dear Counsel:
Defendants, Connor Broadcasting Delaware Company ("Connor Broadcasting") and Great Scott Broadcasting ("Great Scott") had filed motions for reargument pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) from this Court's Memorandum Opinion dated October 27, 1999. On December 3, 1999, this Court granted reargument and supplemented its prior opinion by ruling as a matter of law that a contract existed in this case. The parties were given the opportunity to submit memoranda in support of their positions on the issues as limited by the Court.
All parties submitted lengthy memoranda on the issues. For the most part, the briefs merely reiterated the arguments espoused during the Motion for Summary Judgment and requested the Court to revisit its previous rulings. As a result, the Court will not allow the parties to rehash the same issues at oral argument that have already been argued in great detail. However, a careful review of the stances enunciated by the parties have demonstrated to the Court that it needs to revisit its prior ruling that a contract existed as a matter of law.
A motion for reargument should not be used merely to "rehash the arguments already decided by the court." Whitsett v. Capital School Dist., Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-04-032, Vaughn J. (Jan. 28, 1999).
The manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct errors prior to an appeal. To prevail on reargument, the moving party must demonstrate that the Court "overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision."
Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. Surely Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 88-JA-118, Ridgely, P.J. (Jan. 14, 1994) citing Whitsett Rest. Group, Inc. v. Ramada, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 11506, Jacobs, V.C. (Dec. 19, 1990) (Letter Op.).
After reviewing the submissions of the parties, I find that the Court has misapprehended the law applicable to this case by stating that there was a contract as a matter of law in its letter dated December 3, 1999. It is the Court's opinion that genuine issues of material facts still exist. There is a genuine dispute as to whether enough material terms were in the Letter of Intent or the unexecuted Asset Purchase Agreement for a contract to be finalized and, if a breach occurred, what remedy was available to the Plaintiffs. The Court has before it enough conflicting deposition testimony which exhibits the contradictory viewpoints of the litigants about what stage the negotiations were in and whether a final contract had been agreed to. This conflicting testimony must warrant the Court to affirm its Memorandum Opinion of October 27, 1999. Consequently, summary judgment is not appropriate at this time.
For clarification purposes, the Court's Memorandum Opinion of October 27, 1999 will stand as the law of this case. The Court's letter of December 3, 1999 is vacated insofar as it decided that a contract existed as a matter of law. It will be left to the finder of fact to determine whether a contract existed in this case, and what remedy is available to the Plaintiffs if this alleged contract or Letter of Intent was breached.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
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WLW/dmh oc: Prothonotary xc: Order Distribution