Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:08cv779-WHA (WO).
January 14, 2009
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendant, National General Assurance Company ("NGAC"), on September 19, 2008.
The Plaintiff improperly named the GMAC Insurance Company as the Defendant in the Complaint. According to the Defendant, GMAC is a brand name used by NGAC, and is not a legal entity. The Defendant, NGAC, does not dispute that it is the proper party in this case.
The Plaintiff, Lenzie Gill, originally filed his Complaint in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, bringing a state law claim for fraud against the Defendant, claiming damages in excess of $100,000. The case was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. No motion to remand was filed. It appears to the court that complete diversity of the parties exists and the requisite amount is in controversy.
For the reasons to be discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing, or pointing out to, the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.
Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, the evidence of the nonmovant must be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in its favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
III. FACTS
The submissions of the parties establish the following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant:
On November 7, 2007, the Plaintiff's vehicle, a 1993 Buick, was involved in an collision with another driver. At the time of the accident, the 1993 Buick was covered under a policy of automobile insurance provided by the Defendant. In accordance with the terms of the insurance policy, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff $2000, covering the total loss of the Buick. The State of Alabama then issued a salvaged title to the vehicle to the Defendant.
Gill claims that on November 20, 2007, he spoke with a representative of the Defendant and was advised that he could purchase the salvaged title to the 1993 Buick from the Defendant for approximately $200. Gill claims that the Defendant's representative further advised him that he could drive the salvaged 1993 Buick on the roadways of Alabama so long as he obtained insurance for the automobile. Based on this conversation, on January 3, 2008, Gill purchased the salvaged 1993 Buick from the Defendant. Gill also purchased liability insurance for the 1993 Buick from the Defendant.
On April 15, 2008 Gill was informed by personnel in the Probate Court for Montgomery County, Alabama that he could not obtain a renewal tag or operate the vehicle on Alabama roadways due to the fact that it has a salvaged title. Gill ceased operating the 1993 Buick.
On June 2, 2008, Gill, represented by counsel (not the same attorney who filed this suit), entered into an Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Release and Trust Agreement with the Defendant ("Release Agreement"). Under the Release Agreement, Gill received $13,500.00 in exchange for the following release:
It is understood and agreed this is a full and final settlement of any claim for the injuries and damages, both known and unknown, I/we may have under the uninsured and/or underinsured automobile coverage of policy number 1002679873A01, issued in the name of Gill, Lenzie, by National General Assurance Company, a GMAC Insurance Company, as well as claims for bad faith and for compensatory damages, claims for punitive damages or exemplary damages, interest, attorneys' fee liens, workers' compensation liens, losses, costs, claims for bad faith, claims for breach of contract, claims for fraud or misrepresentation, damages or demands, both compensatory and punitive, in whatever name or nature, in tort, in contract, under statute, claims for loss of consortium and/or support either by statute or common law, claims and demands whatsoever, in law, or in equity, which were alleged in this action, or which could have been alleged as a result of this incident.
On August 22, 2008, Gill filed his complaint against the Defendant in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County alleging one count of fraud. The Defendant removed the action to this court and filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on September 19, 2008.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment makes two major arguments in support of the motion: (1) Gill's fraud claim fails because it is based on an alleged misstatement of law, and (2) Gill's fraud claim is barred by a release agreement which he signed.
To recover on a claim of fraud, the Plaintiff must show that: (1) the representation was false; (2) the misrepresentation concerned a material fact; (3) the Plaintiff justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation; and (4) the Plaintiff suffered damages proximately resulting from his reliance. Patel v. Hanna, 525 So. 2d 1359, 1360 (Ala. 1988).
First, the Defendant argues that the alleged statement underlying Gill's fraud claim, that the salvaged 1993 Buick could be driven on the roadways in Alabama, is a misstatement of law, not one of fact, and, therefore, cannot constitute fraud. There is no dispute that the statement allegedly made to Gill was not an accurate statement of the law in the state of Alabama. Alabama Code § 32-8-87(a) provides in part: "No motor vehicle for which a salvage or junk certificate has been issued by this state or any other state shall be driven or operated on the highways or other public places of this state."
Alabama courts have repeatedly held that "misrepresentation or concealment as to [a] matter of law cannot constitute remedial fraud, because everyone is presumed to know the law, and therefore cannot in legal contemplation be deceived by erroneous statements of law." See e.g., Empiregas, Inc. of Ardmore v. Hardy, 487 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala. 1985) (quoting Clayton v. Glasscock, 127 So. 538 (Ala. 1930)). "[S]uch representations are ordinarily regarded as mere expressions of opinion on which the hearer has no right to rely." Id. The Alabama Supreme Court recently reiterated that the law is presumed to be known by all. Johnson v. Sorenson, 914 So. 2d 830, 839 (Ala. 2005).
The general rule is not without qualification. Bank of Loretto v. Bobo, 67 So. 2d 77, 85-86 (Ala.App. 1953), cert. denied, 67 So. 2d 90 (Ala. 1953). Alabama courts have held misrepresentations of law actionable where the mistake of law "amounted to an implied assertion that facts existed which justified the conclusions of law expressed." Id. at 85. Alabama courts have also found an exception where the parties are in a relationship of trust and confidence, or some other peculiar fact or circumstance exists. Id. Situations falling under this exception have been limited to where the speaker is an attorney or where denying relief would be against public policy. Id.; see also Spry Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Deaton, 363 So. 2d 786, 789 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) (applying the public policy exception where the court found the public was harmed as a third party to the fraudulently obtained contract in restraint of trade).
In this case the court finds the general rule to apply, and the recognized exceptions to be inapplicable. Here, the "alleged mistake of law did not in any way imply a set of facts" and was "a pure mistake [of law]." See Epps Aircraft, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 859 F. Supp. 533, 538 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (finding misstatement as to tax liability was a pure mistake of law). Both parties had a mutual understanding of the facts surrounding the transaction and the only representation allegedly made by the Defendant's representative concerned the legality of operating the salvaged 1993 Buick on Alabama roadways. There is no evidence that the speaker was an attorney, or in a confidential relationship with Gill. The Plaintiff has not suggested that a ruling in the Defendant's favor will implicate any public policy concerns, and the court finds there to be no public policy concerns at issue in this case. Therefore, the Plaintiff's fraud claim is improperly predicated on an alleged misstatement of the law of the State of Alabama.
The Defendant's second argument also has merit. The Defendant contends that the Release Agreement bars Gill's fraud claim. The Release Agreement says that it is a "final settlement of any claim for the injuries and damages . . . under the . . . automobile coverage of policy number 1002679873A01 . . . as well as . . . claims for fraud . . . which could have been alleged as a result of this incident." Gill admits that he both knew of the fraud claim and was represented by counsel when the Release Agreement was executed.
"In the absence of fraud, a release supported by valuable consideration will be given effect according to the intentions of the parties to be judged from what appears within the four corners of the instrument itself. . . ." Hampton v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 706 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996) (quoting Conley v. Harry J. Whelchel Co., 410 So.2d 14, 15 (Ala. 1982)). "Additionally, [the court] note[s] that when a release is otherwise unambiguous, its construction and legal effect, being questions of law, may be decided under proper circumstances by a summary judgment." Id. at 1199 (citing Boggan v. Waste Away Group, Inc., 585 So.2d 1357 (Ala. 1991)).
Both parties agree that the alleged fraud would not have taken place but for the November 7, 2007 automobile collision. Gill, however, argues that the court should interpret the Release Agreement to preclude only those claims with a strictly direct causal relationship with the collision. The court finds that interpretation to be unsupported by the language of the Release Agreement. Here, the alleged statements were made in the course of the Plaintiff and the Defendant's dealings regarding Gill's insurance policy through the Defendant, and as a result of the collision. Those statements are inextricably linked to the Plaintiff's policy and the collision that caused, and were the primary subject of, the later dealings between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Thus, the court finds that the Release Agreement precludes the Plaintiff from bringing an action for fraud based on the statements allegedly made by the Defendant during the course of those dealings. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 4) is due to be and is hereby ORDERED GRANTED. A Final Judgment will be entered separately.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." , , (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. (c). (b) a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. (b). , , (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. , , , , , (1988); , , (11th Cir. 1998). (c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , 69S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). Rev.: 4/04 : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. (a) and (c) set the following time limits: (a) A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below. (b) "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later." (c) If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion. (d) Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. (e) If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid. Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. Fed.R.App.P. (c). A notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant. A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. (a)(4).