Opinion
Civil No. 3:99-CV-1463-X.
June 8, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to the District Court's Order of Reference, filed May 23, 2000, came to be considered Defendants' Motion To Stay Disclosures And Discovery And For Protective Order And Brief, filed on April 20, 2000. At issue is whether the defendants in this case are shielded from discovery until their affirmative defense of qualified immunity is decided. Having read the pertinent pleadings, this Court ORDERS that the motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part for the following reasons:
I. Background
This action is brought by Francis N. Gilbert ("Gilbert") claiming a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various Texas state law causes of action. The case is based upon events underlying plaintiffs arrest on June 27, 1997. Defendants are the City of Dallas, Texas, Detectives D.L. Furr, T.J. Vice, J.F. Thompson, and D.M. Waterson, Sergeant D.L. Holmes, and Chief of Police Ben Click ("defendants").
Defendants, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), now move the Court to stay discovery and for protective order and brief, pending a determination of the qualified immunity issue.
II. Standard of Review
A. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity "shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982))). Police officers are governmental officials specifically entitled to assert this qualified immunity defense Gassner v. City of Garland, 864 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Court now turns to qualified immunity as it relates to the issue of discovery.
B. Discovery and Qualified Immunity
The protection of the qualified immunity defense is an "immunity from suit, not simply an immunity from liability." Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1552 (5th Cir. 1988). To this end, a defendant entitled to claim qualified immunity should be shielded as much as possible from "the burdens of broadreaching discovery." Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d 705, 706 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800). In order to ensure the utmost protection from broadreaching discovery, qualified immunity should be treated as a threshold issue which acts as a bar to a court's ability to hear the petitioner's claim. Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1299 (5th Cir. 1987).
The Fifth Circuit has held that "a party asserting the defense of qualified immunity is not immune from all discovery, only that which is `avoidable or overly broad.'" Wicks v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987)). Under the Lion Boulos test, discovery must not proceed until the District Court first finds that the plaintiff's pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Wicks, 41 F.3d at 995.
This heightened pleading standard requires the plaintiff to plead with particularity all material facts which he contends will establish his right to recovery, including those facts which will defeat the defense of qualified immunity. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). The complaint must allege facts that, if proven, would demonstrate the defendants violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
If the complaint sufficiently alleges facts to surmount the qualified immunity defense, the court must then determine whether discovery is necessary to "clarify those facts upon which the immunity defense turns." Wicks, 41 F.3d at 995. If the qualified immunity defense turns "purely on a question of law" or upon facts "not disputed by the parties," then the "court should rule on the motion to dismiss without discovery." Id. at 994 n. 9. However, "when the district court is "unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts' and when the discovery order is "narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim,' an order allowing such limited discovery is neither avoidable nor overly broad" Id. at 994 (quoting Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507-08).
III. Analysis
A. Individual Defendants
While the District Court has not ruled on the issue of whether Gilbert has met the heightened pleading standard, for purposes of this analysis it appears the requirements have been met. However, it does not follow that this entitles Gilbert to full discovery After meeting the heightened pleading requirement, the court may permit discovery to enable Gilbert to ascertain only the facts that could overturn the defendants' right to qualified immunity. Wicks, 41 F.3d at 994.
This should not be construed as a ruling on the particularized pleading requirement under Schultea. Rather, the Court simply finds that the plaintiffs entitlement to discovery turns not on whether the plaintiff's pleadings meet Schultea's pleading standard, but on whether the plaintiff has sufficiently articulated the need for discovery to garner facts that could overturn the defendants'right to qualified immunity. See Id. at 994 (quoting Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507-08).
Gilbert characterizes discovery in general terms, stating simply "discovery should be permitted." Pl's. Resp. At 4. Before subjecting officials to broad and far-reaching discovery, the defendants' qualified immunity defense must be overturned. Williamson v. United States Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d 368, 382 (5th Cir. 1987). Gilbert may not develop his case against the individual defendants until the qualified immunity issue has been resolved. Gilbert's response fails to address how "narrowly tailored" discovery will enable him to introduce detailed facts specifically pertinent to an immunity defense. Therefore, he is not entitled to proceed with discovery against the individual defendants at this time.
B. Municipalities
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects "individuals acting within the bounds of their official duties, not the governing bodies on which they serve." Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Board, 803 F.2d 129, 133 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980)). Since a municipality is not entitled to qualified immunity, plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct discovery in order to pursue their claims against municipal defendants. Sorrells v. City of Dallas, 192 F.R.D. 203, 210 (citing Beck v. Taylor County, 1998 WL 682265 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29 1998).
The City of Dallas is not entitled to qualified immunity status. Therefore, discovery directed by the plaintiff against the City should be allowed to proceed. Individual defendants argue that if discovery is permitted against the City it will require their involvement and threaten the protections provided through qualified immunity. Def.'s Reply at 3-4. However, "parties who may be entitled to qualified immunity are not necessarily exempt from discovery when called as a witness to claims against a non-immune defendant." Sorrells, 192 F.R.D. at 210 n. 8.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds good cause, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), to grant the motion with respect to the individual defendants' immunity defense, but to deny the motion with respect to the City of Dallas.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part, the Defendants' Motion to Stay Disclosures And Discovery And For Protective Order And Brief, and ORDERS that discovery be stayed in this case as to the individual defendants, pending a decision on the issue of qualified immunity, but allowed to proceed against the City of Dallas.