Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12351.
June 20, 2007.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, David S. Landry, Judge pro tem., Superior Court No. KN-04-00116 Civil.
Appearances: Allison E. Mendel, Mendel Associates, Anchorage, for Appellant. Peter F. Mysing, Kenai, for Appellee.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, and Carpeneti, Justices. [Bryner, Justice, not participating.]
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
Kristin Cannava filed for divorce from Lane Giesler in 2004. Following trial in 2005, the superior court awarded Kristin legal custody of Lane and Kristin's only child, set a visitation schedule, calculated Lane's monthly child support obligation to be $770, and determined an Anchorage townhouse to be Kristin's sole property. Lane now appeals. Because the superior court did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, we affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS A. Facts
Lane Giesler and Kristin Cannava met in 1987 and became romantically involved. During the first few years of their relationship, Lane and Kristin attended different schools and lived in different parts of the country. At some point around 1990 or 1991, Kristin transferred to the university Lane was attending at the time and the two moved in together. After graduating in 1992, Lane and Kristin returned to Alaska and continued their relationship.
From the time Lane and Kristin returned to Alaska until about 1998, the two alternated living or staying together at either Lane's mother's home or Kristin's mother's home. During this time, Lane and Kristin entered into three significant financial transactions. First, in 1993 Lane and Kristin entered into a real estate transaction for the purchase of a townhouse in Anchorage. Lane's credit was used to obtain the financing for this purchase and both Lane's and Kristin's names were placed on the deed. Second, in 1996 Lane purchased a business, Arctic Motor Sports, and the property on which it was located. Finally, in 1997 Lane secured a business loan in the amount of $75,000. This loan was secured against the Anchorage townhouse.
In 1998 Lane's mother moved out of her home and from that point forward, Lane and Kristin lived primarily at Lane's mother's former residence. On December 29, 2002, Lane and Kristin were married. On March 18, 2003, Lane and Kristin's only child, Ryder, was born. Lane and Kristin separated sometime during May 2003, and Kristin moved back into her mother's home with Ryder. B. Proceedings
On February 13, 2004, Kristin filed a complaint for divorce, and the superior court appointed a custody investigator. Both Lane and Kristin stipulated that they would abide by the custody investigator's recommendations for fashioning an interim custody arrangement. After assessing the situation, the custody investigator recommended that Ryder continue to reside primarily with Kristin while gradually increasing his visits with Lane. Both Lane and Kristin followed this recommendation until the divorce trial.
On October 11, 2005, Superior Court Judge pro tempore David S. Landry began a five-day trial to resolve property, custody, and child support issues. On December 6, at the request of the parties, the superior court entered an interim custody order detailing a visitation schedule to be followed pending the court's final resolution of the case.
Judge Landry was appointed to serve as superior court judge pro tempore in this case pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1) of the Alaska Rules of Administration, which provides:
The chief justice, or another justice designated by the chief justice, may by special assignment appoint a retired justice of the supreme court or a retired judge of the court of appeals, the superior court, or the district court to sit pro tempore as a senior justice or judge in any court of this state where such assignment is deemed necessary for the efficient administration of justice.
On June 10, 2006, the superior court issued a decree of divorce, a decree of custody, and a memorandum decision and order on custody, child support, and property. In its memorandum decision, the superior court determined, in relevant part, that Kristin should retain primary physical and legal custody of Ryder; that Lane's monthly child support obligation would be $770 per month; and that the Anchorage townhouse was Kristin's separate property. The court also established a detailed visitation schedule for Lane. Lane now appeals these portions of the superior court's decision.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We will only reverse a trial court's resolution of child custody issues when we are "convinced that the record shows an abuse of discretion or if controlling factual findings are clearly erroneous."
Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990).
The trial court has wide discretion in calculating and ordering child support and "such determinations will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of discretion."
Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Alaska 1987).
The trial court's characterization of property as marital or separate may involve both questions of fact and law. We review the trial court's findings of facts "under the clearly erroneous standard, and questions of law are reviewed de novo using our independent judgment."
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1122 (Alaska 2004).
Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Setting Limited Visitation Rights or Awarding Legal Custody to Kristin.
The superior court awarded physical and legal custody to Kristin and established a detailed visitation plan for Lane. Under this plan, Lane will receive increasing amounts of visitation time as Ryder gets older. Until Ryder enters kindergarten, Lane will have eight hours of daytime visitation during the week, one overnight visit every other weekend, and two 1-week blocks of time per year, provided those blocks are at least sixty days apart. After Ryder enters kindergarten and until he reaches the age of ten, Lane will have overnight weekend visitation every other weekend, and three weeks of summer visitation, two of which may be taken together. After Ryder reaches ten years of age, Lane's summer visitation will increase to four weeks, all of which may be taken consecutively. The court also allotted Lane visitation time with Ryder on most holidays.
On appeal, Lane argues that the court made two errors with regard to the issues of child custody and visitation. First, Lane claims that the superior court's visitation plan is "excessively limited" and that such a limited plan is not supported by the record. In Lane's words, "[n]one of the court's findings directly address why this is in Ryder's best interests, or why spending more time with his father . . . would be detrimental to Ryder's welfare." Second, Lane claims it was error for the court to award sole legal custody to Kristin. According to Lane, the court wrongfully departed from the custody investigator's recommendation that Lane and Kristin should share legal custody.
1. Physical custody and limited visitation
Under AS 25.24.150(a), the superior court is required to "award custody on the basis of the best interests of the child." In determining the best interests of the child, the court is to consider the factors listed in AS 25.24.150(c)(1)-(9). In considering these factors, the court "need not refer to all of them" and may limit its discussion to "those factors that it considers actually relevant in light of the evidence presented in the case before it." In the case at hand, Lane does not dispute that the superior court made findings based upon these statutory factors. Instead, he asserts that the superior court's findings were only "partially supported by the evidence at trial, and [were] insufficient to support the extremely limited visitation awarded to Lane." A review of the court's findings belies this assertion.
AS 25.24.150(c) provides that the superior court shall consider:
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs;
(3) the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each parent;
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and child, except that the court may not consider this willingness and ability if one parent shows that the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged in domestic violence against the parent or a child, and that a continuing relationship with the other parent will endanger the health or safety of either the parent or the child;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other members of the household directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.
Park v. Park, 986 P.2d 205, 207 (Alaska 1999).
In reaching its conclusions about physical custody and visitation rights, the superior court expressly discussed the factors listed in AS 25.24.150(c)(1)-(9). Of these factors, two appear to have weighed most heavily in the superior court's analysis.
First, with regard to "the capability and desire of each parent to meet [the child's] needs," the superior court agreed with the custody investigator's assessment that Kristin "has a better knowledge of child development and effective parenting practices than [Lane]." The court observed that Kristin had been responsive to all of Ryder's needs without any direct financial assistance from Lane since the separation. This observation was supported by testimony at trial. The court also observed that Kristin had taken the lead in attending to Ryder's medical needs, and this too was supported by testimony at trial. By contrast, the court noted that the custody investigator had found Lane to have "gaps in his knowledge about safe and effective parenting." The court also expressed the opinion that Lane had put his own personal and business needs ahead of Ryder's needs.
AS 25.24.150(c)(2).
Kristin testified to the following: "I have paid for Ryder solely. . . . [U]ntil less than a year ago, I provided Lane with diapers, wipes, [and] food. . . . And, yes, I provide up until this day solely for Ryder financially." When asked how much child support Lane had contributed since separation, Kristin answered "none."
When asked at trial if he had left Kristin to take care of securing health insurance for Ryder, Lane responded: "I suppose."
Second, with regard to "evidence of domestic violence, child abuse or child neglect," the superior court found that Lane may have anger management issues. The court noted that the custody investigator had reviewed Lane's prior legal history and found that this history included "legal difficulties stemming from anger outbursts." The court also noted that Lane had been recently charged with assault in the second degree and assault in the third degree and that those charges were still pending. Although the court acknowledged that none of these past or current legal difficulties had yet resulted in a conviction, it nonetheless found that they provided evidence to support the notion that Lane has anger management issues.
AS 25.24.150(c)(7).
In sum then, the superior court found, on the basis of trial testimony and the custody investigator's report, that two of the statutory factors weighed in favor of Kristin while the other seven factors were of little consequence. It then ruled accordingly. None of this suggests an abuse of discretion.
Lane nevertheless asserts that the superior court's limited visitation schedule in this case is unnecessarily restrictive. He describes the schedule as "excessively limited," "extremely limited," and a denial of "meaningful visitation time." Lane suggests that because the visitation plan is so limited, the superior court was required to meet higher than usual standards of proof. In his words, "[w]hen visitation is limited excessively, even more is demanded of the court's findings." However, Lane does not identify any case law that establishes the visitation schedule as particularly harsh or insufficiently supported by the court's findings.
Lane cites to Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf for the proposition that "[i]n order to limit visitation to weekends, [the court] must find that the non-custodial parent is unfit." Even setting aside the fact that the superior court in this case did not limit Lane's visitation to weekends, Lane's citation to Lone Wolf is misplaced; the case simply does not stand for the proposition Lane believes it to stand for. In Lone Wolf, we held that it was an abuse of discretion, in the absence of any findings or reasons, for the superior court to refuse an unemployed father weekday visitation with his children when the mother worked a rotating seven-day work schedule. We clearly limited our holding in Lone Wolf to the "unique factual situation" it presented and the case at hand does not track that situation.
741 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1987).
Id. at 1190-91.
Id. at 1190.
Lane also cites to J.F.E. v. J.A.S. for the proposition that visitation restrictions cannot be justified by isolated incidents or events in the distant past. This is apparently an effort to call into question the court's reliance on its findings about Lane's anger management issues. However, this effort is misplaced. In J.F.E., we held that the superior court could not require supervised visitation on the basis of evidence that a father had placed his child in a bowl on a stove top and taken photographs and videos of his child bathing. After deciding that the evidence did not establish lewd or insensitive behavior, we noted in passing that the stove top and bathing incidents were too distant in time and isolated in character to be indicative of the father's caregiving capabilities. In the case at hand, however, the superior court's finding that Lane likely has an anger management issue was not based on some distant, isolated event. Rather, the superior court specifically described a continuing pattern of legal troubles indicating a continuing anger management issue. Moreover, unlike the superior court in J.F.E., the superior court in this case did not order that Lane's visits be supervised.
930 P.2d 409 (Alaska 1996).
Id. at 410-12.
Id. at 411-12.
In the end, there is an absence of case law demonstrating that the superior court's visitation schedule for Lane is excessively limited or insufficiently supported by the court's findings. The superior court reviewed the statutory factors, weighed them in favor of Kristin, awarded Kristin primary physical custody, and ultimately devised a carefully crafted visitation schedule for Lane and his son. Although this schedule may be somewhat limited in the beginning, it will become more generous as Lane's son grows older. The superior court did not abuse its discretion.
See Schmitz, 88 P.3d at 1123 (noting that "[b]ecause a parenting plan is intended to be a dynamic instrument, it may allow for changes under certain circumstances") (internal quotations omitted).
2. Legal custody
In her report, the custody investigator "recommended that the court order the parties to have joint legal custody and engage in co-parenting counseling immediately." Lane argues that the superior court erred in awarding sole legal custody to Kristin because it departed from the custody investigator's recommendation and failed to adequately justify this departure.
As we have previously explained, a custody investigator's report is treated like all other evidence and "it is [therefore] within the trial court's discretion to give the report the amount of weight the court deems appropriate." As such, "[t]he trial court is not obligated to adopt a custody investigator's recommendations." In fact, the trial court need not even explicitly discuss a custody investigator's report or explain why it deviated from the report so long as the court considers the appropriate statutory factors. Thus, the superior court's departure in this case from the custody investigator's recommendation does not, in and of itself, suggest any error on the part of the court.
Chase v. Chase, 109 P.3d 942, 946 (Alaska 2005); see also Evans v. Evans, 869 P.2d 478, 480 (Alaska 1994).
Chase, 109 P.3d at 945.
Id. at 946 (holding that "the superior court did not abuse its discretion . . . by reaching a decision that contradicted the custody investigator's recommendation or by declining to discuss the report explicitly").
Moreover, although the superior court declined to adopt the custody investigator's recommendation, the superior court's reasoning and decision were consistent with the investigator's factual observations. According to the superior court, its decision to award legal custody to Kristin was necessary because it did "not believe that these parents [would be] able to share this responsibility since they [could] barely communicate." The court worried that "any possible areas of disagreement [about Ryder would] only reignite the animosity between the parents." These concerns mirrored the custody investigator's concerns. According to the custody investigator's report:
[T]he parties have almost completely failed in any attempts at communication about their son, absent the intervention of a third party. . . . They don't like each other. They don't trust each other. . . . To recommend joint custody, when they have such a dismal track record, . . . could be a set-up for continued conflict.Thus, the superior court and the custody investigator generally agreed about the bleak state of Lane and Kristin's relationship; they simply disagreed about what sort of legal arrangement would be best given that state. It was well within the discretion of the superior court to disagree with the custody investigator on what legal arrangement would be best.
Finally, the superior court's finding that the parties were unable to share responsibility or communicate was sufficient to justify awarding sole legal custody to Kristin. As we have previously explained, "cooperation between parents is essential if the arrangement [of joint custody] is to be in the best interests of the child." Even "[t]he most ardent proponents of joint custody assume cooperation between parents and agreement about child rearing practices as basic requirements for joint custody." Thus, it was proper for the superior court to refuse to award joint legal custody given its finding that Lane and Kristin were unable to cooperate. The superior court did not abuse its discretion.
McClain v. M cClain, 716 P.2d 381, 386 (Alaska 1986); see also Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99-100 (Alaska 1990).
McClain, 716 P.2d at 386.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in its Calculation of Lane's Child Support Obligation.
After awarding primary physical custody to Kristin, the superior court set out to determine child support pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 90.3. In setting child support, the court recognized that Lane had drawn no salary from his business during the 2003 tax year; the business had paid for over $32,000 of Lane's personal expenses during that same time; Lane had paid an additional $13,200 for housing, utilities, and food; and Lane had received a permanent fund dividend in the amount of $1,000. Totaling these amounts together, the court concluded that $46,000 had been spent by or on behalf of Lane during the 2003 tax year. In the superior court's words:
[Lane] takes no salary from the business. But [Lane's accountant] Mr. Tarries indicated that over $32,000.00 in personal expenses were paid for [Lane] out of the business as noted in the 2003 tax return. [Lane] notes monthly expenses for housing, utilities and food in an amount of approximately $1,100.00 per month or $13,200.00 per year. This money must be coming from the business income in the form of draws since the court is not aware of any other sources of income for [Lane]. Additionally, [Lane] receives a yearly permanent fund check in an amount that averages $1,000.00 per year. Taking all these figures and adding them together and the court arrives at a figure of $46,200.00 per year. No evidence was presented indicating that [Lane] has any tax liability. Therefore, the court finds that the adjusted income for purposes of Civil Rule 90.3 shall be $46,200.00.
On the basis of this imputed income figure of $46,200, the court arrived at a child support obligation of $770 per month.
Lane does not dispute the superior court's finding that he was using his business credit cards to pay his personal expenses. Rather, he disputes that these charges constituted personal income for the purposes of calculating child support. According to Lane, his personal charges to his business credit cards were regularly coded to his business's personal draw account "so that they d[id] not appear as business expenses on the tax return." Lane also maintains that at the same time that he was charging his personal expenses to his business credit cards and coding those charges to his business's personal draw account, he was "forced to contribute his savings to the business." He notes that his accountant "attempted to explain" that under these circumstances the charges to Lane's personal draw account did not constitute income and insists that the superior court simply misunderstood the nature of his financial situation, tax return, and income.
Kristin argues that Lane has waived this argument by (1) failing to address the issue of child support in his written closing argument below; (2) failing to file any pleading with the superior court objecting to the child support order or seeking a recalculation of the amount; and (3) failing to include the issue in his statement of points on appeal. However, the issue of child support was a primary issue at trial about which there was ample debate and testimony, and Lane has adequately briefed the issue on appeal. Consequently, we think it appropriate to reach the merits of Lane's argument. See Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Alaska 1982) (noting that we may still consider an issue even if not included in the statement of points on appeal if "the issue was raised at trial and it is adequately briefed on appeal and if opposing counsel are sufficiently apprised of the issue").
However, the superior court did not misunderstand Lane's explanation of his financial situation; rather, it doubted the validity of his explanation. The superior court noted that Lane had provided "no current numbers concerning his business"; that Lane had provided no evidence of "any other sources of income" apart from Lane's business; and that calculating child support in this case was "a difficult task" due to Lane's failure to properly account for his finances. In sum, the superior court simply did not accept Lane's account.
On appeal, Lane argues that while he was using his business credit cards to pay his personal expenses, he was pouring his own personal savings from his mother's life insurance back into the business. However, as Kristin notes, Lane did not receive money from his mother's life insurance until after the 2003 tax year that the superior court was considering for purposes of child support.
A review of the record reveals that the superior court's rejection of Lane's account was well-founded. Lane admitted at trial that he could not explain how he had obtained cash to pay for gasoline; Lane's accountant admitted that Lane's bookkeeping was "not up to date" because Lane had repeatedly changed bookkeepers; and Lane was apparently unable to provide any concrete documentation that he actually segregated his credit card expenses into business and personal categories.
When asked at trial where he obtained the cash to pay for gasoline, Lane first responded, "From my pocket." After Kristin's attorney pointed out to Lane that his financial documentation could not explain the cash, Lane replied, "I don't know what to tell you."
When asked at trial if he had provided any documents showing how he had segregated his business and personal expenses, Lane responded, "Nope."
Faced with sparse documentation and a questionable account of Lane's financial situation, the superior court opted to impute income to Lane. It added together (1) the $32,000 in personal expenses that Lane admitted were paid by his business; (2) the $13,200 in personal expenses that Lane admitted he paid yearly for housing, utilities, and food; and (3) the $1,000 that Lane received yearly from his permanent fund dividend check, and arrived at a total annual income of $46,200. This was a reasonable method of imputing income, and, given the facts of this case, not an abuse of discretion. C. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Determining the Townhouse To Be the Sole Property of Kristin.
Lane argues that even if it was proper for the superior court to impute income to him, it still erred by failing to take into account taxes that would be owed on the imputed income. Under Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a)(1)(A)(i), federal income tax is to be deducted from a parent's gross income in order to determine the parent's adjusted annual income. We have previously interpreted this rule to require that federal income tax be estimated and deducted even from imputed income. Rodvik v. Rodvik, 151 P.3d 338, 351 (Alaska 2006). In the case at hand, however, such a deduction is unnecessary for two reasons. First, the superior court imputed income to Lane based upon the actual amounts that Lane spent throughout the 2003 tax year. As a result, the superior court's calculations were based on disposable income and effectively reflected Lane's adjusted annual income after taxes. Second, Lane's 2003 tax return established that Lane did not actually pay any federal income taxes that year, and Lane has not presented any evidence on appeal that this was an isolated one-time occurrence.
In 1993, before they were married, Lane and Kristin entered into a real estate transaction for the purchase of an Anchorage townhouse. It is undisputed that Lane co-signed for the loan for this transaction and that title was taken jointly in both Lane's and Kristin's names. However, Lane and Kristin have disputed and continue to dispute the nature of this transaction.
We note that the Anchorage townhouse was apparently never used as the marital home. At trial, Lane testified that during the period of time before the townhouse was rented out, he and Kristin only "used it on the weekends . . . and [when they] were in Anchorage."
According to Kristin, neither she nor Lane ever intended the townhouse to be anything other than her sole property. At trial, Kristin testified that she came up with the idea to purchase a townhouse because she needed a place to stay while attending classes for her master's degree in Anchorage; that she followed up on this idea by reading want ads, researching property values, and finding a real estate agent; that after she located the townhouse, she asked Lane to co-sign the loan with her and that he reluctantly agreed so long as she promised to remove his name from the property within one year; and that she negotiated the price, signed the closing paperwork, and paid the down payment, all without any help from Lane. Kristin further testified that, after the initial purchase, she decided to rent the townhouse to her brother and continued to rent it to other tenants when her brother moved out. She testified that she was always responsible for the management and upkeep of the townhouse and that Lane's only contributions were a toilet plunger, shelving that was never installed, and the repair of a door handle.
Lane disagrees with Kristin's account. According to Lane, he and Kristin owned the townhouse as tenants in common. At trial, Lane testified that he came up with the idea to purchase a townhouse as a means of converting what would otherwise be wasted rent payments into a long-term investment; that there was very little management involved in renting the townhouse out because a single set of tenants occupied the property for nearly eight years straight; and that he participated in the upkeep of the townhouse by performing repairs and improvements. Lane further testified that he allowed Kristin to keep whatever profits the townhouse generated because those profits were small and he "didn't really care too much." On appeal, Lane also asserts that the source of the down payment was disputed and that neither party produced records showing the source of the funds.
We note, however, that Lane did admit at trial that the amount of rent Kristin received exceeded "the cost to have the place," and therefore presumably covered the cost of the mortgage and general upkeep.
In its decision, the superior court expressly adopted Kristin's account of the townhouse transaction and incorporated this account into its findings of fact. According to the court, "the parties always believed the property to be the separate property of [Kristin] even though it remains titled in both their names." After adopting Kristin's version of the facts, the court concluded that these facts established that Kristin had "rebutted the presumption that this jointly titled asset should remain the joint property of the parties." The court then proceeded to characterize the townhouse as "the separate property of [Kristin]."
The court made the following findings of fact:
It was [Kristin] who came up with the idea and who ultimately located the property. Due to her credit at the time, [Lane] agreed to the use of his credit so that [Kristin] could purchase the property. The use of [Lane's] credit was for the limited purpose of obtaining financing. The court believes the testimony of [Kristin] when she says the couple always intended to have [Lane's] name removed from the title as soon as possible. [Kristin] was responsible for the original down payment to purchase this property. Both parties agreed that the ongoing management of the townhouse was the responsibility of [Kristin]. [Kristin] was responsible for the general maintenance and upkeep of the property. [Kristin] always claimed the property on her separate income tax returns.
On appeal, Lane argues that the superior court erred as a matter law. According to Lane, the superior court could not have extinguished his interest in the townhouse without reforming the deed. Reforming the deed, Lane asserts, would have required the superior court to find "clear and convincing evidence that the terms of the deed were based on mutual mistake." Because the court made no such finding, Lane concludes, the court did not reform the deed and therefore could not have extinguished his interest in the townhouse. In addition, Lane contends that the evidence in the record is insufficient to satisfy the standard of proof for reformation of a deed and that we should therefore remand the issue to the superior court with "a directive to divide th[e] property between the joint owners."
When the parties to a deed are unmarried cohabitants, standard property law presumptions may be rebutted by a showing of an intent to take unequal interests in the property. As we have previously explained, "for unmarried cohabitants, the intent of the parties . . . control[s] property division for property acquired before separation." In determining the intent of cohabitants, courts are to consider, among other factors, whether the cohabitants (1) contributed to the improvement and maintenance of the disputed property; (2) participated in a joint business venture; and (3) filed joint tax returns.
D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94, 97 (Alaska 1994) (noting that "[w]here the parties cohabit, the court must also examine the intent of the parties with respect to the ownership of the property").
Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 957 (Alaska 1991).
Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002).
In the case at hand, the superior court found that Kristin and Lane had acquired the townhouse during their period of unmarried cohabitation. It then proceeded to consider factors relevant to determining Lane's and Kristin's intentions. The superior court noted that Kristin had paid the original down payment; had been responsible for the improvement and maintenance of the townhouse; had been responsible for the management of the townhouse; and had claimed the townhouse on her separate income tax returns. Based upon these factors, the superior court concluded that Lane's name had been placed on the deed simply as a means of "obtain[ing] financing" and that both Kristin and Lane had always intended the townhouse to be Kristin's property. Given this intent, the superior court awarded the townhouse to Kristin. This was not an abuse of discretion.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court.