Opinion
04 Civ. 4350 (SAS).
August 1, 2006
Bennie Gibson Creedmoor Psychiatric Center Queens Village, NY, Plaintiff (Pro Se).
Michael E. Peeples Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York New York, NY, For State Defendants.
Laura Wong-Pan, Esq. County of Orange Department of Law Goshen, NY, For Defendant County of Orange.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 16, 2006, Bennie Gibson filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons explained below, Gibson's motion is denied.
II. BACKGROUND
In October 2001, Bennie Gibson was indicted on one count of Auto Stripping in the Second Degree and one count of Possession of Burglar's Tools. While the charges against him were pending, the court repeatedly ordered Gibson committed as an "incapacitated" defendant pursuant to Article 730 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"). On November 10, 2005, more than four years after Gibson's arrest, the prosecutor conceded that Gibson had "served the equivalent of two-thirds of the maximum sentence that could be imposed upon him if he was convicted." The indictment was dismissed pursuant to section 730.50(3) of the CPL.
See 10/22/01 Certification of Affirmative Grand Jury Action, Ex. A to 1/24/06 Declaration of Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York Michael Peeples ("Peeples Decl.").
See generally People of the State of N.Y. v. Ben Gibson, No. 6326/2001 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) ("11/10/05 Decision and Order"), Ex. C to Peeples Decl.
Id.
See id at 2. Section 730.50(3) of the CPL states that "the first order of retention [for incapacitation] and all subsequent orders of retention must not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the highest class felony charged in the indictment or for the highest class felony of which [defendant] was convicted."
On June 9, 2004, Gibson filed this action. At the time, he was committed to Mid-Hudson pursuant to the court order. What follows is a brief summary of Gibson's allegations. In January or February of 2003, while he was a patient at Mid-Hudson, two Security Hospital Treatment Assistants violently assaulted him. Several staff members were present during the beating, and refused to intervene. The assault resulted in injuries including a sore back, neck, chest, and sides, "cut and bruised eyes swollen shut," and lacerations on the face; in addition, Gibson "could barely eat because of [a] swollen jaw." Following this incident, Gibson was "forcibly medicated by staff by needle" and then "made to sit in chair for nine days." Although an investigation of this attack occurred a few days later and several witnesses testified on Gibson's behalf, Gibson was not permitted to see the results of the inquiry. He then began to complain of the abuse, writing and making calls to the Office of Mental Health, the Inspector General, the State Attorney, the County of Orange, and the Town of New Hampton. Gibson has suffered retaliatory abuse as a result of this advocacy: his legal work was thrown in the toilet and urinated on by staff, he was threatened and denied privileges, false accusations were lodged against him, and his mail and personal belongings were searched and damaged.
See Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") at 7.
See id. at 7, 9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7, 8.
See id. at 4, 8, 9.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
In January of 2006, the Commissioner of Mental Health ("Commissioner"), Howard Holanchock, Thomas Catizone, Peggi Hearly and Governor Pataki (collectively, "State defendants") and the County of Orange moved to dismiss the lawsuit. In an Opinion and Order filed on May 8, 2006, this Court granted the County of Orange's motion to dismiss any state tort law claims against it for failure to file a timely notice of claim. The State defendants' motion to dismiss claims against Governor Pataki was also granted. The remaining portions of defendants' motions to dismiss were denied, and Gibson's motion to extend time for service was granted. Gibson now contests the Court's decision, in a Rule 60(b) motion filed on June 16, 2006.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The Rule also requires that "[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
Id.
In the Second Circuit "`[i]t is well established . . . that a proper case for Rule 60(b)(6) relief is only one of extraordinary circumstances, or extreme hardship.'" A Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for appeal. Accordingly, Rule 60(b) motions that simply attempt to relitigate issues and thereby circumvent the appellate process are routinely dismissed.
Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
See Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986)).
See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, No. 99 Civ. 4303, 2000 WL 744148, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000) (denying Rule 60(b) motion where "[t]he vast bulk of [movant's] argument constitutes nothing more than a futile effort to have this Court revisit its Opinion"); Batac Dev. Corp. v. B R Consultants, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 721, 2000 WL 307400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2000) (holding that a party "may not . . . use Rule 60(b) as a substitute for appeal or to relitigate matters already resolved by the court adversely to that party.").
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's motion asks this Court to reconsider issues it has already decided at the motion to dismiss phase, based on an extended version of arguments that were raised at that time. The motion is styled as a Rule 60(b) motion but it does not raise issues of mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or a void or satisfied judgment. It also does not raise any other "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify relief under the Rule. Instead, Gibson provides an expanded discussion of certain arguments he raised at the motion to dismiss stage. The Court considered these issues fully at that time, and Rule 60(b) does not provide a remedy where a party uses the motion to clarify and expound upon arguments previously made and rejected.
Harris, 367 F.3d at 81.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Gibson's motion is denied. The clerk of the court is directed to close the motion [No. 60 on the docket sheet].
SO ORDERED.