Gibson v. Borough of West Chester

Full title: ROBERT GIBSON, v. BOROUGH OF WEST CHESTER, et al

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Jan 12, 2004

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-9089 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2004)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-9089

January 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM

JAMES GILES, Chief Judge, District

Introduction

Robert Gibson brings this action against the Borough of West Chester, Corporal Patrice Baumann, Officer David Franz, and Sergeant Martin Deighan, seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and the common law of Pennsylvania, to redress injuries allegedly suffered during his detention for disorderly conduct and subsequent aggravated assault on a police officer. Now before the court is the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, made pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

Factual Background

Consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party follow. At approximately 10:45 on December 15, 2000, after having consumed two beers and three glasses of wine at his home, Mr. Gibson and his brother-in-law, John Price, went to the Cafe Chicane in West Chester. In the upstairs bar of that establishment, Mr. Gibson consumed three martinis. Around midnight, Mr. Gibson observed another patron, Nicholas Rathert, staring at him from across the bar in a way that he found objectionable. Believing that Mr. Rathert was upset because of an earlier exchange he had had with a woman at the bar, perhaps Mr. Rathert's friend, Mr. Gibson made an obscene hand gesture in his direction. Responding to the insult, Mr. Rathert crossed the room to encounter Mr. Gibson. The two men began to fight. Restaurant employees and patrons separated them. Each was lead out of the bar through different exits. As Mr. Gibson was being escorted out of the rear entrance by a bar patron, he was engaging in a profane and belligerent tirade.

When Mr. Gibson came around to the front of the building, he was punched squarely in the face by Mr. Rathert. He fell to the ground with blood flowing from his nose, and eventually, his mouth. Upon rising, Mr. Gibson, who was dazed by the blow, mistakenly thought one of the bar's bouncers was Mr. Rathert, and tried to assault him. Bystanders tried to calm and restrain Mr. Gibson. Then police arrived on the scene.

Sergeant Deighan and Corporal (then Officer) Baumann came first. Officer Frantz followed. Sgt. Deighan directed Mr. Gibson to sit on some steps nearby. Corporal Baumann approached Mr. Gibson, asked his name and questioned him about the bar fight. Mr. Gibson was clearly intoxicated and uncooperative. Corporal Baumann told Mr. Gibson that he was being placed under arrest for disorderly conduct and public drunkenness. He was handcuffed with his arms behind him. Mr. Gibson repeatedly used abusive and profane language towards Corporal Baumann. She claims that she asked him whether he would like medical attention. He claims that his requests for medical attention went ignored. No medical personnel or ambulance came to the scene.

Mr. Gibson was walked over to a squad car by the officers. He refused the officers' request that he enter the car fully. He now claims that he was having difficulty moving with his hands cuffed behind his back. Sgt. Deighan went to the opposite side of the car and pulled Mr. Gibson across the car seat, while Corporal Baumann slid his legs into the vehicle. Mr. Gibson kicked and flailed in the back seat, yelling obscenities. Corporal Baumann drove the squad car to the West Chester Police Station, which was only four blocks away.

In the garage of the police station, Mr. Gibson told Corporal Baumann and Officer Frantz that they would have to remove him from the vehicle. Corporal Baumann attempted unsuccessfully to pull him out of the driver's side by his feet. Mr. Gibson's loafer shoes came off. Officer Frantz then successfully pulled Mr. Gibson out through the passenger side door. Mr. Gibson then went limp. The two officers had to drag him by his arms out of the garage area and down a corridor to an empty cell.

The officers laid Mr. Gibson face-down on the cell floor. Officer Frantz then proceeded to remove Mr. Gibson's pants for what he has characterized as safety reasons. In the process, he pulled Mr. Gibson's underwear partially down his buttocks. During this time, Mr. Gibson claims that he was docile and cooperative, yet acknowledges that he called the officers derogatory names. The officers claim that Mr. Gibson was kicking and resisting all the while and that modest force was necessary to accomplish their purpose. Mr. Gibson claims that Corporal Baumann put a knee on his head, smashing his nose into the floor and causing it to begin to bleed again. He also claims that Corporal Baumann used OC spray on him as he lay on the floor with his hands cuffed behind his back. The officers left Mr. Gibson handcuffed when they left the cell, allegedly to see if Mr. Gibson would cease being resistant. Approximately 10 minutes later, it is claimed, Mr. Gibson's demeanor changed. Officer Frantz returned, asked Mr. Gibson to place his hands through the cell, and the handcuffs were removed. Mr. Gibson then washed his face, removed his bloody sweater and shirt, and fell asleep on the cell cot.

Mr. Gibson claims that he was obviously in need of medical care all the time that he was in the cell and that none was provided. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. Deighan did come by Mr. Gibson's cell to check on him. Sgt. Deighan believed he might be having some difficulty breathing through his nose. At Mr. Gibson's request, Sgt. Deighan called the Good Fellowship Ambulance Company to transport him to the hospital.

When the ambulance arrived, one of the paramedics, April Breniser, entered Mr. Gibson's cell. She confirmed that he wanted medical treatment. He told her that he had been assaulted by Corporal Baumann. Mr. Gibson, wearing only his boxer shorts, was escorted from the cell to the ambulance by Sgt. Deighan and Corporal Baumann. He stopped just outside the ambulance, refused to get in, called Corporal Baumann derogatory names and told her to stay away from him. However, he eventually acquiesced to the officers' instructions to enter the rear of the ambulance. The EMTs strapped his legs to a stretcher. Corporal Baumann then entered the ambulance and told Mr. Gibson that the standard procedure for transporting a prisoner was to handcuff his hands to the sides of the gurney. Mr. Gibson refused, crossing his arms across his chest. Corporal Baumann tried to pull his left arm down to secure it to the gurney. Mr. Gibson then punched her twice in the face. Mr. Gibson now alleges that he was only trying to stop Corporal Baumann from using an illegal choke hold on him, and that his arms flailed in response to her use of force. A criminal jury found otherwise. Sgt. Deighan and Officer Peacock then entered the ambulance and attempted to subdue Mr. Gibson who was spitting and flailing about, as he had succeeded in freeing his legs from the restraining straps.

It took the officers several minutes to subdue Mr. Gibson. During the scuffle, Officer Baumann's arm became hyperextended. Mr. Gibson's arm became entangled in Sgt. Deighan's radio cord, which was on the belt near his gun, and therefore his hand was in the vicinity of the officer's gun. Responding quickly, Sgt. Deighan struck Mr. Gibson once in the face with a fist to cause him to relent in his resistance and struggle. Mr. Gibson relented. Eventually, the officers were able to replace the straps on Mr. Gibson's legs and handcuff him to the gurney. Mr. Gibson was transported by ambulance to Chester County Hospital. There, x-rays were taken of his face. Medical personnel diagnosed him with a broken nose and released him without treatment. There was no ostensible injury from the blow received from Sgt. Deighan.

On April 26, 2002, Mr. Gibson was convicted by a trial jury of aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3)); aggravated harassment by prisoner (18 Pa.C.S. § 2703.1); simple assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), (3)); public drunkenness (18 Pa.C.S. § 5505); and disorderly conduct (18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1)). He initiated this civil action on December 16, 2002.

Analysis

A. Claims Against the Individual Officers

1. § 1983

a. Application of Heck v. Humphrey

Defendants argue that Mr. Gibson's § 1983 claims are "no more than a thinly veiled, illegitimate attempt to collaterally attack his Pennsylvania state court criminal conviction." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. at 13). Specifically, they argue that Mr. Gibson's federal civil rights claims are barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Id. at 486-87. Mr. Gibson's state court conviction has been affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 2003 PA Super. 2002 (unpublished). Thus, this court must decide whether a judgment in favor of Mr. Gibson on any of his factual allegations would necessarily imply that his state court conviction was invalid.

Mr. Gibson was convicted by a jury for striking Corporal Baumann in the face in the back of the Good Fellowship Ambulance. During his criminal trial, he claimed that his use of force was justified because of an illegal choke hold he claimed Corporal Baumann used on him. Corporal Baumann denied having used a choke hold. Were the jury in this case to find that Corporal Baumann did use an illegal choke hold, and that doing so constituted excessive force in violation of Mr. Gibson's civil rights, it would imply that his state court conviction was invalid. Thus, under Heck, Mr. Gibson's claim against Officer Baumann as to the Good Fellowship Ambulance episode cannot proceed and must be dismissed.

Even if Heck did not foreclose Mr. Gibson's claim about the alleged choke hold, his claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Under Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), this court must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment whenever the Pennsylvania courts would do so. In Pennsylvania, collateral estoppel applies where: 1) the issues in the two actions are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material to justify invoking the doctrine; 2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; and 3) a final judgment on the specific issue in question was rendered in the first action. Commonwealth v. Holder, 805 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted). Mr. Gibson advanced, and fully litigated, a defense of justification, which was rejected by the jury. That defense is sufficiently similar to the choke hold claim made here to warrant issue preclusion under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

However, Mr. Gibson's remaining allegations of cell-room misconduct by Corporal Baumann and the other officers are not barred by the decision inHeck, or the related doctrine of collateral estoppel.¹

1 In Nelson v. Jarshurek. 109 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1997), the third circuit found that summary judgment was not appropriate where a § 1983 plaintiff, who had been convicted in Pennsylvania state court of resisting arrest, alleged that the police had used excessive force while taking him into lawful custody. Although the court recognized that Heck posed some difficulty for trial, it found that a jury instruction that the defendant was "justified in using `substantial force'" to effectuate the arrest would prevent a jury finding inconsistent with the plaintiffs previous conviction. Id. at 146. As in Nelson, adjudicating Mr. Gibson's factual allegations of excessive force after he was placed in the cell at the police station, with an appropriate instruction to the jury, will not necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction.

In order to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must establish that: 1) a deprivation of a constitutionally or federally secured right occurred, and 2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 1985). Mr. Gibson claims that Corporal Baumann, Officer Frantz, and Sgt. Deighan violated his Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive force during his cell detention.See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). As the defendants were acting in their capacities as public employees when they arrested Mr. Gibson, their actions were taken under color of state law. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).

b. Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity

Claims of excessive force must be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). The court must judge the reasonableness of a particular use offeree "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. Officers may exercise a reasonable amount of physical force under the circumstances to effectuate an arrest. Id. Mr. Gibson, at times, used profane and abusive language toward the officers and was uncooperative with their repeated instructions to him. Nonetheless, each of his factual allegations must be evaluated to determine whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Gibson's claims of excessive force. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suits brought against them under § 1983 as long as their conduct, taken pursuant to their discretionary functions, "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The test for qualified immunity, outlined inSaucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party alleging injury, 1) the facts show the officers conduct violated a constitutional right, and 2) the constitutional right was clearly established, based on the specific context of the case. Id. at 201. The third circuit has interpreted the second step of this inquiry as follows: "[i]f it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer what the law required under the facts alleged, he is entitled to qualified immunity." Bennet v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136-37. However, "[i]f the requirements of the law would have been clear, the officer must stand trial." Id. at 137. The analysis required by the defendants' claim of qualified immunity is distinct from the merits-based inquiry required by the plaintiff's excessive force claim.

Generally, courts are encouraged to rule on claims of qualified immunity early in any litigation because such immunity, if it exists, is essentially "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982). If a case were allowed erroneously to go to trial, qualified immunity would be effectively lost. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). However, the third circuit has recognized that this imperative to resolve qualified immunity issues "is in tension with the reality that factual disputes often need to be resolved before determining whether the defendant's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right."Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002). In some situations, the existence of disputed, historical facts material to the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct will give rise to a jury issue.See Sharrar v. Felsing. 128 F.3d 810, 828 (3d Cir. 1997): see also Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 499 (3d Cir. 1995).

According to counsel's representations at oral argument on November 25, 2003, Mr. Gibson's excessive force claims against the individual officers began from the time he entered the cell at the West Chester Police Station and not before. Mr. Gibson's first allegation is that Corporal Baumann used excessive force deliberately when she knelt on his head while he was not resisting and was docile. He claims that she smashed his face into the floor, causing his nose bleed. From the parties' statements and review of a surveillance videotape, the court cannot "see" what actually happened. Thus, the court leaves the question of whether Corporal Baumann deliberately smashed Mr. Gibson's face into the floor without justification, as he alleges, for determination by a jury before ruling on her claim of qualified immunity.

Mr. Gibson's second claim is that Corporal Baumann used excessive force by spraying him with OC spray while he was handcuffed in the cell. He again alleges that he was docile and compliant when this occurred. Given the conflicting accounts of the parties and the quality of the videotape, the court finds that evidence on this point is also inconclusive, and leaves this question for factual determination by a jury.

Mr. Gibson also alleges that the removal of his pants by Officer Frantz constitutes unreasonable police action. In particular, he argues that his pants were removed, and his buttocks exposed, in an attempt to humiliate him and in retaliation for his derogatory comments. Officer Frantz claims that he was following police regulations insofar as officers are required to make sure that pretrial detainees do not have personal items in their cells. Similarly, given Mr. Gibson's intoxicated condition, the officers claim they were concerned that he might possess an item which could be used to harm himself. The issue of whether Mr. Gibson's pants were removed for his own safety or to humiliate him will be a question for the jury since Mr. Gibson essentially claims that at that time it was obvious that he was not a danger to himself or anyone else.

Mr. Gibson also claims that the officers failed to remove his handcuffs in a timely manner once he was placed in his cell. He suggests that the handcuffs were left on after Corporal Baumann used the OC spray as a means of punishment. The officers allege that they waited until Mr. Gibson calmed down to remove the handcuffs, for their own safety and to exercise control over a noncompliant detainee. Because the evidence is inconclusive, the court also leaves the question of whether the officers left Mr. Gibson handcuffed for purposes of punishment when they exited the cell will be left to the jury to determine.

The court will revisit the issue of qualified immunity after a jury makes specific factual findings that will be determinative of the circumstances confronted or not confronted by the officers inside the cell.

Mr. Gibson's final fourth amendment claim is that Sgt. Deighan used excessive force when he punched Mr. Gibson in the back of the ambulance. This claim must be dismissed. Mr. Gibson had just broken free of his restraints, assaulted another officer, refused to comply with verbal commands, and had his hand entangled near Sgt. Deighan's radio and gun. Under the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for Sgt. Deighan to use a single, partial blow to get Mr. Gibson's attention and to gain control over him for officer safety. Plaintiff has offered no expert testimony that Sgt. Deighan's actions were improper. Therefore, Sgt. Deighan is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in his favor as to this claim.

c. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Mr. Gibson also alleges that his eighth amendment rights were violated, such that he is entitled to relief under § 1983. Specifically, he argues that the defendant officers ignored his repeated requests for medical attention, thereby demonstrating deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Deliberate indifference to a pre-trial detainee's medical needs is properly pled as a violation of the fourteenth amendment.Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). However, the third circuit has allowed improperly pled claims of deliberate indifference to medical needs to proceed under the eighth amendment. Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003). In order to establish a constitutional violation has occurred, the plaintiffs evidence must show: 1) a serious medical need and 2) acts or omission by officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Id. at 582. A medical need is serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the need for medical attention. Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F. Supp.2d 255 (D.N.J 2000) (citingMonmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987). A finding of deliberate indifference must be based on what a prison official actually knew, rather than what a reasonable person should have known. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

Regardless of whether Mr. Gibson asked for medical attention at the scene of his arrest, or whether he refused the offer of such attention, he did not have a "serious medical need" such that he required immediate medical attention. Although Mr. Gibson was eventually diagnosed with a broken nose, he was not in such physical distress as to require emergency medical care at the hospital, where he was examined but given no treatment. Likewise, his failure to receive additional treatment after his release from custody, shows that his injury was not legally "serious." Under the circumstances, defendant officers were justified in not seeking medical attention for him immediately after arrest. Mr. Gibson's actions outside the bar and in the squad car are totally inconsistent with his having a serious medical need, that is, an inability to breathe. In fact, it was upon observing that Mr. Gibson's breathing through his nose was labored that Sgt. Deighan offered and secured medical transport for Mr. Gibson to the hospital by ambulance. Thus, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant officers as to this claim.

2. § 1985

In order to prevail on a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must establish: 1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, any person of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges or immunities, 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 4) that plaintiff was either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Bd. of Carpenters Joiners. Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1983) (construing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-3 (1971)). Mr. Gibson has not fully plead these elements. Therefore, his § 1985 claim against defendant officers is dismissed.

3. Assault and Battery

Under Pennsylvania law, a police officer may be held liable for assault and battery during an arrest if the force used is unnecessary or unreasonable. Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). Pennsylvania courts have allowed claims of excessive force involving the application of handcuffs to proceed as claims for assault and battery.Osgood v. Borough of Shamokin Dam, 420 A.2d 613 (Pa.Super. 1980). As discussed above, there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether Officer Baumann smashed the plaintiff's face into the floor of his cell and whether she used OC spray on him, while he was docile and with his hands cuffed behind his back. The court leaves this claim for a determination by a jury.

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In order to prevail on a common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff is required to prove both that the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent of causing severe emotional distress, and that there is competent medical evidence documenting such emotional distress. See, e.g., Robinson v. May Dept. Stores Co., 246 F. Supp.2d 440, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2003) andKazatsky v. King David Memorial Park 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. 1985). There is no evidence that defendants engaged in "outrageous" conduct or that Mr. Gibson was required to seek medical attention for any emotional distress relating to the events of December 16, 2000. Therefore, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendant officers as to this claim.

B. Claims Against the Borough of West Chester

1. § 1983

Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may be found liable for violating an individual's civil rights under limited circumstances. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the deprivation of a constitutional right; 2) that action was taken pursuant to a custom or policy of the local government unit; and 3) that such action was the cause of the deprivation. Id. Mr. Gibson has offered no evidence that any alleged constitutional violation was undertaken pursuant to a custom or policy of the Borough of West Chester. Thus, his § 1983 claim against the Borough must be, and is, dismissed.

2. § 1985

As discussed above, Mr. Gibson did not properly plead a § 1985 claim. Even if he had, his claim against the Borough would be barred because a public entity and its officials may be considered a single entity, and are thus, incapable of conspiracy. See e.g., Scott v. Township of Bristol, 1990 WL 178556 (E.D.Pa. 1990). Therefore, Mr. Gibson's § 1985 claim against the Borough of West Chester is dismissed.

3. State Law Claims

The Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PPSTCA") grants municipalities governmental immunity from liability from damages resulting from an injury to a person or property caused by an act of the city, except for in specific cases of negligence by city employees acting in their official capacities. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-56 (2003). Mr. Gibson claims that the individual defendants engaged in intentional tortious conduct towards him. The PPSTCA, therefore, bars his claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Borough of West Chester. Thus, these claims are dismissed.

C. Corporal Baumann's Compulsory Counterclaim

Corporal Baumann asserts a counterclaim against Mr. Gibson for assault and battery. She alleges that Mr. Gibson spat on her during his detention, punched her in the face in the back of the ambulance, and continued to struggle with her when she subsequently tried to subdue him. As the jury in Mr. Gibson's criminal case found him guilty of aggravated assault, this court must grant summary judgment in favor of Corporal Baumann as to liability. Mr. Gibson's assault of her has already been determined by the criminal jury. However, pursuant to the court's order of November 18, 2003, her claim for damages shall proceed only in recoupment.

Conclusion

An appropriate order follows.