Opinion
Case No. 20070596-CA.
Filed November 6, 2008. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, 994400490 The Honorable Fred D. Howard.
Gary H. Weight, Provo, for Appellant.
John G. Mulliner, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and McHugh.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pamela Gibby (Wife) appeals the trial court's decision granting Richard Gibby's (Husband) motion in limine to preclude the introduction of evidence relating to Wife's claim against Husband. We review the trial court's grant of Husband's motion in limine under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 635 (stating that a trial court's decision regarding a motion in limine is "reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The trial court's order granting the motion in limine expressly prohibited Wife from presenting evidence regarding an alleged deficiency owed by Husband to her and effectively precluded her from further prosecuting that claim. The trial court reasoned that Wife bargained for the language in the parties' divorce decree permitting large portions of her property settlement to be secured through promissory notes signed by Husband in his capacity as a representative of the pertinent LLC. Wife exercised her rights on multiple occasions during the relevant time period. It is undisputed that Wife later subordinated her rights in the property in question in order to accommodate the sale of the property and — after the buyers defaulted — Wife foreclosed on and resold the property pursuant to her legal rights. The trial court ruled that Wife had selected the means of securing her property settlement and enforced those means to a conclusion sufficient to preclude any further equitable relief.
The trial court's ruling to prohibit evidence regarding any deficiency allegedly owed by Husband to Wife was not an abuse of the discretion we afford trial courts in deciding motions in limine. The trial court relied sufficiently on the record before it in determining that Husband was not personally liable for the debts secured by his signing of the promissory note in a representative capacity, which was an issue decided in Husband's favor by the same trial judge in a companion civil case. In asking us to rule that the trial court erred by failing to grant her equitable relief in the instant case, Wife incorrectly assumes that the differences between law and equity are much more distinct than they actually are. See Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1976) (stating that "equitable claims or defenses may be asserted and tried along with or against legal claims or defenses in the same action");Marlowe Inv. Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402, 1404 (1971). Contrary to Wife's assertions, both legal and equitable remedies were available in the companion case.
While we agree with Husband that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine, we do not agree with his argument that Wife's appeal is frivolous. We therefore deny his request for attorney fees made pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 33.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge.