Opinion
H049127
08-08-2022
LISA GIACOMINI, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV358499)
DANNER, J.
Petitioner Lisa Giacomini initiated arbitration proceedings regarding alleged medical malpractice against real party in interest Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser Hospitals) and affiliated entities The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., (together, Kaiser). The arbitrator ruled against Giacomini, deciding her claim was time-barred under California law. Giacomini unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1286.2. On appeal, Giacomini challenges the trial court's order denying her petition to vacate the arbitration award. We reject her contentions and affirm the order.
Although The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. participated in the arbitration, they were not parties in the trial court proceedings and have not participated in this appeal.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take these facts primarily from the arbitration award and the parties' filings submitted in the trial court.
Giacomini was a member of Kaiser's health plan and executed an arbitration agreement under which she agreed to arbitrate claims of medical malpractice. On January 6, 2017, Giacomini received an epidural spinal injection from a Kaiser physician at a Kaiser facility.
For simplicity, we refer to the entities as "Kaiser," although various Kaiser organizations interacted with Giacomini. For example, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. sent Giacomini the claims examiner letter.
Within four days of the injection, Giacomini began to experience symptoms of injury. She retained an attorney around November or December 2017. On December 7, 2017, Giacomini's attorney served Kaiser with a "Notice of Intent to Commence Action Against Health Care Provider (Code of Civil Procedure section 364)" (some capitalization omitted) (notice of intent) related to the January 2017 medical procedure.
A claims examiner from Kaiser's legal department responded to Giacomini's attorney by a letter dated December 22, 2017. The letter acknowledged receipt of the notice of intent and provided information (including a copy of the arbitration provision and Kaiser's arbitration rules) should Giacomini wish to proceed with a demand for arbitration. The letter from Kaiser stated the demand for arbitration should be made on three Kaiser-related entities, identified those entities, and provided a single address for the service of process. The letter did not specify any time period for making the demand. The letter concluded, "We will await your decision as to whether you wish to proceed with formal litigation."
The December 22, 2017 letter listed Kaiser Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, Inc., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
The arbitration agreement provided, "A claim shall be waived and forever barred if (1) on the date the Demand for Arbitration of the claim is served, the claim, if asserted in a civil action, would be barred as to the Respondents served by the applicable statute of limitations."
Following the December 2017 letter from Kaiser, Giacomini took no further legal action until December 2018. Giacomini declared in a filing in the trial court that, because of the consequences of the faulty epidural, "[b]etween December 2017 and 2018" she had been "very isolated and suffered great physical and mental anguish" and had been "unable to regularly communicate with [her] attorney."
On December 14, 2018, Giacomini served on Kaiser a demand for arbitration alleging the January 2017 epidural injection had been negligently performed and caused her to suffer damages.
The parties submitted their dispute to private arbitration before a single neutral arbitrator. The parties to the arbitration were Giacomini and Kaiser (real party in interest Kaiser Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, Inc., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.).
Prior to the scheduled arbitration hearing, Kaiser submitted a motion for summary judgment. Kaiser asserted that Giacomini's professional negligence claim was time-barred under section 340.5, which sets forth a one-year statute of limitations for claims of professional negligence, including medical malpractice. Giacomini opposed the motion and submitted materials to the arbitrator, including her own declaration.
On August 12, 2019, the arbitrator conducted a telephonic hearing on Kaiser's summary judgment motion.
The following day, the arbitrator issued a written decision granting Kaiser's motion for summary judgment. The arbitrator found that Giacomini's claim was time- barred under section 340.5, and Kaiser was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to section 437c.
The arbitration award noted that Giacomini had raised "several theories" in support of her opposition to summary judgment but found that they lacked factual or legal support. The arbitrator decided that Giacomini's assertion regarding application of the statute of limitations for contractual disputes (section 337) lacked merit.
Additionally, the arbitrator rejected Giacomini's request for application of the doctrine of equitable tolling. The arbitrator described Giacomini's tolling argument as based on her claim that she suffered from" 'insanity'" and found it factually unsupported. Further, the arbitrator noted that equitable tolling did not apply because Kaiser had informed Giacomini in writing of her right to proceed with litigation by filing a demand for arbitration and where to file her demand. The arbitrator also ruled on Kaiser's objections to Giacomini's evidence, sustaining some and overruling others.
On August 13, 2019, the arbitration award was served on the parties.
On November 12, 2019, Giacomini filed in the trial court a petition to vacate the arbitration award (petition). Giacomini's petition checked four of the preprinted boxes (Judicial Council Form ADR-106) for vacatur of the arbitration award, asserting (1) the award was obtained by corruption, fraud, or other unfair means, (2) misconduct by the neutral arbitrator substantially prejudiced petitioner's rights, (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority, and the award could not be fairly corrected, and (4) the arbitrator unfairly refused to postpone the hearing or to hear evidence useful to settle the dispute. The petition attached the arbitration award.
Giacomini did not serve the petition on Kaiser Hospitals until January 30, 2020. Giacomini never served the other two Kaiser entities that had participated in the arbitration (The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.). Kaiser Hospitals opposed Giacomini's petition to vacate the arbitration award.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Giacomini's petition in April 2021. On April 16, 2021, the trial court by written order denied the petition, concluding that Giacomini had not established any of the conditions for vacating an arbitration award set out in section 1286.2, subdivision (a). Giacomini has appealed the trial court's order denying her petition to vacate.
II. DISCUSSION
Giacomini asserts the trial court erred under section 1286.2 in denying her petition to vacate the arbitration award. Kaiser Hospitals counters that Giacomini failed to comply with a number of procedural requirements under the California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.), including by failing to timely serve the petition to vacate the arbitration award after filing it in the trial court (§ 1288). Kaiser Hospitals also maintains the trial court correctly ruled that Giacomini failed to establish any of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award set forth in section 1286.2.
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
Although Kaiser Hospitals has not objected to Giacomini's appeal on jurisdictional grounds, the existence of an appealable judgment or order "is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal." (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) Reviewing courts must resolve any doubts regarding appealability before turning to the merits of the appeal (ibid.) and must dismiss an appeal taken from a non-appealable order. (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432.) We independently review whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal. (Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060 (Kirk), citing California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 252.)
"A trial court's order is appealable when it is made so by statute." (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) Section 1294 sets out the arbitration orders from which a party may appeal. It states, "An aggrieved party may appeal from: [¶] (a) An order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration. [¶] (b) An order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or vacate an award. [¶] (c) An order vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered. [¶] (d) A judgment entered pursuant to this title. [¶] (e) A special order after final judgment." (§ 1294.)
An order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration award does not appear in section 1294 and therefore is not directly appealable. (Kirk, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1060; Cinel v. Christopher (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 759, 766; Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O 'Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1453-1454 (Mid-Wilshire).) Rather, an order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration award is reviewable from a judgment on an order confirming the award. (Cooper v. Lavely &Singer Professional Corp. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 3.) No such judgment appears in the record, and Giacomini did not provide any final judgment confirming the award in response to this court's order to show cause.
In her supplemental brief asserting our jurisdiction, Giacomini cites to Maplebear, Inc. v. Busick (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 394. There, the Court of Appeal held a superior court order dismissing a petition to vacate for lack of jurisdiction was an appealable order. (Id. at p. 402.) Giacomini argues that the order at issue here should be treated like an order dismissing a petition for lack of jurisdiction and asserts Kaiser Hospitals is purposefully refusing to obtain a judgment. Kaiser Hospitals has not addressed this court's jurisdiction.
While we could dismiss the appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction (see MidWilshire, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1454), we retain the discretion to treat an appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate in unusual cases where the interests of justice will be best served by so doing. (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401; Mid-Wilshire, at pp. 1455-1456.)
We conclude such circumstances are present here. Upon its denial of the petition to vacate, the trial court was required to confirm the arbitration award (see § 1286) and thereafter enter judgment (§ 1287.4), but it appears not to have done so. (See Law Offices of David S. Karton v. Segreto (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1, 3.) It would impose needless delay and unnecessary costs for this court to direct the trial court to enter judgment at this juncture and then consider the merits of the appeal at a later date. Kaiser Hospitals has not argued the question of jurisdiction and has substantively addressed the merits of the appeal. Under these circumstances, we exercise our discretion and construe Giacomini's appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.
B. Legal Principles
The California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.) "sets forth 'a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration in this state.'" (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 761, citing Moncharsh v. Heily &Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 (Moncharsh).) The Act reflects "California's 'long-established and well-settled policy favoring arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive means of settling disputes.'" (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125, 146.)
Under the California Arbitration Act, "[a]rbitration awards may be vacated in only one of six statutorily enumerated circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2.)" (Santa Monica College Faculty Assn. v. Santa Monica Community College Dist. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 538, 546.) "The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the burden of establishing that one of the six grounds listed in section 1286.2 applies and that the party was prejudiced by the arbitrator's error." (Royal Alliance Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1106 (Royal Alliance).) The six grounds in section 1286.2 delineate "very limited circumstances." (Delaney v. Dahl (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 647, 654.)
"In general, judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited. As the California Supreme Court explained in Moncharsh[, supra] 3 Cal.4th 1 [], 'an arbitrator's decision is not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law, whether or not such error appears on the face of the award and causes substantial injustice to the parties.' (Id. at p. 6.) This is because parties who enter into arbitration agreements are presumed to know the arbitrator's decision will be final and binding; 'arbitral finality is a core component of the parties' agreement to submit to arbitration.' (Id. at p. 10.) Courts do not review the validity of an arbitrator's reasoning, and, while Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2 and 1286.6 set forth grounds for vacating or correcting an arbitration award,' "[a]n error of law is not one of those grounds." '" (Bacall v. Shumway (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 950, 957 (Bacall).)
"The exceptions to the limits on review of awards protect against error that is so egregious as to constitute misconduct or so profound as to render the process unfair. The Legislature has authorized 'judicial review in circumstances involving serious problems with the award itself, or with the fairness of the arbitration process.' (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 12, italics added.)' "The statutory provisions for [review of an arbitration award] are manifestly for the sole purpose of preventing the misuse of the proceeding, where corruption, fraud, misconduct, gross error, or mistake has been carried into the award to the substantial prejudice of a party to the proceeding." '" (Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368, fn. omitted (Heimlich).)
We independently review whether an arbitration award should be vacated under section 1286.2. (See Bacall, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 957.)
C. Analysis
Giacomini argues she has established four of the six grounds in section 1286.2, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 1286.2(a)), for vacating an arbitration award and asks this court to reverse the trial court's order denying her petition. She maintains the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(1)), the neutral arbitrator engaged in misconduct (id., subd. (a)(3)), the award exceeded the arbitrator's powers (id., subd. (a)(4)), and the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence (id., subd. (a)(5).) We address each of these grounds in turn.
1. Undue Means
A court may vacate an arbitration award if "[t]he award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means." (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(1) (hereafter section 1286.2(a)(1).) The words "corruption," "fraud," and "other undue means," as used in section 1286.2(a)(1), all" 'clearly connote[] behavior that is immoral if not illegal.'" (Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 790, 825.)
Giacomini's claim focuses on the ground of "other undue means." She asserts that the arbitration process prevented her from presenting her case, and she was simply "shunted away" by the arbitrator.
We decide that the record does not support Giacomini's claim that the arbitration award was procured by undue means. Giacomini commenced the arbitration proceedings and participated in the arbitrator's consideration of Kaiser's motion for summary judgment. The arbitrator issued a written arbitration decision that set forth his findings and the conclusions on which he ruled for Kaiser.
While the arbitrator ultimately decided Giacomini's claim was time-barred under California law and therefore did not engage in any further hearing or factfinding, this circumstance does not reflect a failure to provide Giacomini an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, Giacomini presented to the arbitrator the same legal argument she raises here (that equitable tolling applies to extend her statute of limitations), which the arbitrator considered and rejected.
Giacomini's principal argument essentially raises an error of law-namely, that the arbitrator misapplied the statute of limitations. (See Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11.) She contends that a four-year statute of limitations applies, rather than the one-year statute under section 340.5. But this assertion of legal error is not subject to our judicial review. (Prima Donna Development Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 22, 46 (Prima Donna), citing Moncharsh, at p. 33.) Giacomini cites no pertinent authority to support her conclusory argument that the arbitration award was procured by "undue means" because it was unfair. Indeed, in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, a case cited by Giacomini, the Court of Appeal rejected the contention that unfairness alone constitutes undue means. (Id. at p. 826.)
Giacomini's opening brief on appeal references the" 'one-sided'" nature of the arbitration agreement and notes that she entered into a "contract of adhesion which mandated arbitration of her dispute." Beyond making these general observations, she did not argue in her opening brief that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
However, in her reply brief, Giacomini claims the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Giacomini has not shown good cause for belatedly raising this issue, and we decline to consider this untimely argument. (See Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11; Goldstein v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1025.)
We reject Giacomini's contention that we should vacate the arbitration award under section 1286.2(a)(1).
2. Arbitrator's Authority
Giacomini also seeks vacatur of the arbitration award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4) (hereafter section 1286.2(a)(4)), which applies when "[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision." (§ 1286.2(a)(4).) Giacomini argues that her circumstance falls within the "narrow exception[]" announced in Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 11, which permits judicial review where "granting finality to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights." (Id. at p. 32.)
It is well-established that"' "[a]rbitrators do not ordinarily exceed their contractually created powers simply by reaching an erroneous conclusion on a contested issue of law or fact, and arbitral awards may not ordinarily be vacated because of such error." '" (Prima Donna, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 45, quoting Richey v. AutoNation Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909,917.) "However, '[a]rbitrators may exceed their powers by issuing an award that violates a party's unwaivable statutory rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy.' (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916.) 'This departure from the general rule applies only in "limited and exceptional circumstances." (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 32.)' [Citation.] These circumstances are limited to situations 'where an arbitrator's decision has the effect of violating a party's statutory rights or well-defined public policies-particularly those rights and policies governing the conduct of the arbitration itself.'" (Prima Donna, at p. 45.)
Citing to Civil Code section 1708, Giacomini generally argues her claims of personal injury are "guaranteed by statute." Giacomini also argues her situation is "analogous" to employment law "scenarios," such as that set forth in Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665 (Pearson). We disagree with Giacomini that Pearson or Civil Code section 1708 assists her.
Pearson involved the resolution of a statutory employment discrimination claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 670.) Our high court concluded that "the arbitrator clearly erred in ruling that the employee's claim was time-barred" (id. at p. 669.) and, critically, that "under the particular circumstances of this case, in which a clear error of law by an arbitrator means that an employee subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement will be deprived of a hearing on the merits of an unwaivable statutory employment claim, the trial court did not err in vacating the award." (Id. at pp. 669-670.)
There exists no explicit public policy at issue here akin to that underlying the decision in Pearson. Rather, Giacomini raised a standard personal injury claim, which both by statute and the arbitration agreement was subject to a statute of limitations. Giacomini cites to Civil Code section 1708, which provides that "[e]very person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or infringing upon any of his or her rights." (Civ. Code, § 1708.) But this statute "states only a general principle of law" and does not "authorize[] a cause of action for damages." (Ley v. State of California (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.) Giacomini fails to connect Civil Code section 1708 with any rights or policies pertaining to the arbitration itself. This failure is significant, because the kind of policy or statutory violation contemplated by section 1286.2(a)(4) "must relate to 'rights and policies governing the conduct of the arbitration itself,' not to rights and policies pertaining to the parties' substantive or procedural disagreements." (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robinson (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 276, 284.)
Moreover, we see no basis in the record to support Giacomini's claim that the arbitrator exceeded his powers based on the arbitration agreement or the Kaiser arbitration rules. Giacomini argues that "the order of dismissal of the arbitration was plainly in violation of the Kaiser rules that require fairness and exceeded [the arbitrator's] powers." The Kaiser rules state in relevant part that they "are intended to provide an arbitration process that is fair, timely, lower in cost than litigation, and that protects the privacy interests of all Parties." This general language does not limit the arbitrator's authority to resolve the dispute at issue. Indeed, the Kaiser rules elsewhere contemplate that an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators will decide a motion for summary judgment and reference the "California Code of Civil Procedure" in various places. While we understand that Giacomini disagrees with the arbitrator's ultimate decision, we see no basis for her assertion that the arbitrator was not empowered to decide this dispute.
Under the provision titled "Authority of Arbitrators" the Kaiser rules state, "Once appointed, the Neutral Arbitrator will resolve disputes about the interpretation and applicability of these Rules, including disputes relating to the duties of the Arbitrator and the conduct of the Arbitration Hearing. In cases involving more than one Arbitrator, however, issues that are dispositive with respect to a claim, including summary judgment motions, will be ruled on by all three Arbitrators and decided by a majority of them. Upon commencement of the Arbitration Hearing and thereafter, all substantive decisions shall be made by a majority of the full panel or as otherwise agreed by them."
For these reasons, we conclude Giacomini has failed to demonstrate a basis for vacating the award under section 1286.2(a)(4).
3. Refusal to Hear Material Evidence
Section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5) (hereafter section 1286.2(a)(5)) provides that the court shall vacate an arbitration award when "[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy." Under this subsection, Giacomini argues that the arbitrator failed to consider evidence (in the form of her declaration explaining her delay in making her demand for arbitration).
The statute also allows for vacatur of an award when arbitrators refuse to "postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown." (§ 1286.2(a)(5).) We do not understand Giacomini to argue this aspect of the statute and, in any event, we see no basis on the record supporting a conclusion that the arbitrator refused to "postpone the hearing" (§ 1286.2(a)(5)).
Vacatur of an arbitration award "for 'refusal . . . to hear evidence material to the controversy' (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)) must rest on more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence." (Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 368.) "Instead, it was designed as a 'safety valve in private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.' [Citation.] It comes into play, for example, when an arbitrator, without justification, permits only one side to present evidence on a disputed material issue." (Ibid.) "The statute thus presents a two-part inquiry: (1) Did the arbitrators refuse to hear evidence material to the controversy or engage in other conduct contrary to the provisions of the [California Arbitration Act]? (2) If so, were the rights of the party seeking to vacate the award substantially prejudiced?" (Royal Alliance, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.)
Giacomini fails to establish the threshold inquiry regarding the arbitrator's conduct. (Royal Alliance, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107). She provides no support for her claim that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the controversy. To the contrary, the arbitration award reflects that the arbitrator considered her separate statement and declaration that she submitted in opposition to Kaiser's motion for summary judgment. The arbitrator expressly considered her declaration, which he addressed in the arbitration award, and he furthermore overruled some of Kaiser's objections to the unsigned declaration. There is thus no question Giacomini had the opportunity to present this evidence to the arbitrator. Ultimately, the arbitrator disagreed with her contention that her claim was timely under California law. These facts do not justify vacatur of the arbitration award under section 1286.2(a)(5). (See Heimlich, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 370.)
4. Arbitrator Misconduct
Giacomini requests we vacate the award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(3) (hereafter section 1286.2(a)(3)), which applies when the parties' rights "were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator." (§ 1286.2(a)(3).) She asserts that the "arbitrator committed misconduct by failing to consider all evidence and disregarding the merits of Giacomini's causes of action."
As the appellant, it is Giacomini's burden to show that the trial court committed an error justifying reversal of the judgment. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) "[C]onclusory claims of error will fail." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
While she generally claims the arbitrator engaged in misconduct, we find no support in the record for Giacomini's cursory attacks on the arbitrator's integrity and fairness. Giacomini's argument appears to reassert her contentions, which we have already considered and rejected, that the arbitrator failed to provide her with a hearing on the merits and deliberately failed to consider her evidence. We decide that Giacomini has not carried her burden of showing any trial court error under section 1286.2(a)(3).
For these reasons, Giacomini has not demonstrated the trial court committed error in denying her petition to vacate the arbitration award.
Because we conclude the trial court properly denied Giacomini's petition to vacate, we do not reach Kaiser Hospitals' alternative arguments based on Giacomini's failure to comply with a number of procedural requirements under the California Arbitration Act, including that she failed to attach the arbitration agreement to her original petition to vacate (see section 1285.4) and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the petition because she failed to timely serve the petition to vacate the arbitration award within the 100-day deadline. (§ 1288.)
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal from the April 16, 2021 order is deemed to be a petition for writ of mandate, and the petition is denied. Costs in this proceeding are awarded to real party in interest Kaiser Hospitals.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Wilson, J.