Opinion
Civil Action 3:18-CV-2250-X
06-09-2022
GFRS EQUIPMENT LEASING FUND II LLC, Plaintiff, v. DIANE TRANG NGUYEN, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BRANTLEY STARR, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is plaintiff GFRS Equipment Leasing Fund II LLC's (GFRS) Amended Motion for Attorney's Fees against defendants Diane Trang Nguyen and Trinity Spa, LLC (Trinity). [Doc. No. 58.] Previously, the Court granted GFRS's motion for default judgment against Nguyen and Trinity for breach of contract, violations of section 134.003 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, and common-law fraud. [Doc. No. 54.] Then, GFRS moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Texas law. [Doc. No. 55.] The Court denied without prejudice GFRS's motion and required GFRS to submit itemized time records substantiating its motion. [Doc. No. 56.] So GFRS filed an amended motion with itemized time records. [Doc. No. 58.]
Unfortunately, GFRS's amended motion is also deficient. GFRS appears to be asking the Court to award attorney's fees and costs against all defendants for all claims that GFRS prosecuted in this case. (Other than Nguyen and Trinity, there were six other defendants at some point(s) in this litigation.)
For example, on page 25 of GFRS's amended motion, GFRS seeks $308.00 for work that was apparently neither exclusively about defendants Nguyen and Trinity (and the claims on which the Court granted default against them) nor about claims against other defendants that were intertwined with Nguyen and Trinity (and the claims on which the Court granted default against them).
Doc. No. 58 at 25.
Under Texas law, GFRS must segregate its fees and costs by defendant and claim. Against Nguyen and Trinity, GFRS is entitled to only two types of fees: (1) fees incurred in pursuit of exclusively the breach of contract and section 134.003 claims against Nguyen and Trinity; and (2) fees that GFRS incurred in pursuit of those claims against Nguyen and Trinity, with the wrinkle that the fees are also “intertwined” with work against other defendants and/or other claims.
See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 313-14 (Tex. 2006) (holding that “any attorney's fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are unrecoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees. Intertwined facts do not make tort fees recoverable; it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated.”).
GFRS also seeks attorney's fees for the common-law fraud claim. However, Texas law appears to foreclose attorney's fees for fraud claims. See, e.g., MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 600, 666-667 (Tex. 2009) (“[E]ven if the [plaintiff's] fraud claim arose from a breach of contract, that is no basis for an attorney's fee award.”); Bus. Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot Oil Serv., 401 S.W.3d 224, 243 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, pet. denied). GFRS is welcome to argue to the contrary in its amended motion, but it should heed Chapa: “For more than a century, Texas law has not allowed recovery of attorney's fees unless authorized by statute or contract.” Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added).
See Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 312-14.
An apparent example of the first type of fees to which GFRS can seek is on page 22 of the amended motion:
Doc. No. 58 at 22.
And an apparent example of the second type is on the same page:
Id.
It is not on the Court to sift through GFRS's motion and segregate the fees. So, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE GFRS's amended motion for attorney's fees. The Court GRANTS GFRS forty-five days from the entry of this order to file an amended motion for attorney's fees consistent with this opinion and the requirements of Texas law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.