Opinion
01 Civ. 00793 (JFK)
March 26, 2002
For Petitioner, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN, P.C., New York, New York, Of Counsel: Frances M. Maloney
For Respondent, SHIFF TISMAN, New York, New York, Of Counsel, Stephen E. Tisman
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the motion of Petitioner GFI Securities LLC ("GFI") to vacate an arbitration award (the "Award") entered against it on December 1, 2000. Respondent, Marcos Labandeira ("Labandeira"), opposes GFI's motion and cross-moves to have the Court confirm the arbitration award and to sanction GFI. GFI asserts two grounds for vacatur: (1) manifest disregard of the law and evidence; and (2) misconduct by the arbitrators under 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(3). For the reasons set forth below, GFI's motion to vacate the Award is denied. Labandeira's cross-motion to confirm the Award is granted and Labandeira's motion for sanctions is denied.
Petitions to vacate arbitration awards, like petitions to compel arbitration, must be brought in state court unless some other basis for federal jurisdiction exists, such as diversity of citizenship. See Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns Co., 220 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1) because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. Petitioner is an inter-dealer brokerage registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), whose principal place of business is located in the state of New York. Respondent is an Associated Person of the NASD who now resides in Madrid, Spain.
Venue is proper in this Court under 9 U.S.C. § 9 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The claim arose and the arbitration award was rendered within the Southern District of New York.
Background
GFI, an inter-dealer brokerage, functions primarily as an intermediary to link the complicated trading needs of U.S. and foreign-owned banks and other financial institutions. (Tr. 1622) The brokers at GFI primarily work with the "traders" who are their contacts at the dealer institutions. Labandeira worked as an emerging markets credit derivatives broker at Cantor Eitzgerald Securities before he was hired by GFI. Labandeira was hired by Donald Fewer, who at the time was the Manager of GFI's Emerging Markets ("EM") Credit Derivatives Desk. (Tr. 77). Labandeira began working at GFI on June 8, 1998 as an inter-dealer broker on GFI's EM Credit Derivatives Desk. (Tr. 95). Labandeira demanded a written contract of employment (the "Agreement") lasting for at least two years and providing a base salary of $200,000.00. (Tr. 110). Pursuant to the Agreement, his employment could be terminated at any time and without notice for certain reasons including: "[the] engagement in conduct injurious to the Company or any Related entity or to the reputation of either." (GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. H ¶ 4(B)(ii)). On March 18, 1999 GFI terminated Labandeira's employment. (Tr. 908, 1121).
refers to the page number of the hearing transcript.
On March 31, 1999, Labandeira commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court, New York County, alleging breach of the Agreement. GFI filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the court action pending arbitration. Labandeira later withdrew his state action and submitted to arbitration before the NASD. On April 30, 1999, Labandeira filed a Statement of Claim to the NASD alleging that he was terminated in breach of his contract. (GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. C.) On July 16, 1999, GFI filed its Statement of Answer responding that Labandeira was terminated for cause as that term is defined in the Agreement and asserting affirmative defenses. (GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. B.).
Hearings were held before the Panel of three arbitrators (the "Panel") beginning May 22, 2000 and ending October 20, 2000 for a total of ten days. On December 1, 2000, the Panel issued an award granting contractual damages to Labandeira, dismissing. GFI's counterclaims, and assessing GFI solely responsible for forum fees. GFI was found liable for $208,282.78 in damages.
Discussion
This Court is empowered to confirm and enter judgment upon arbitration awards pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act (the "Arbitration Act"). See 9 U.S.C. § 1-14. In particular, 9 U.S.C. § 9 provides that:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. . . .
The Supreme Court has reminded lower courts that the Arbitration Act establishes a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). "Undue judicial intervention would inevitably judicialize the arbitration process, thus defeating the objective of providing an alternative to judicial dispute resolution." McDaniel v. Bear Stearns Co., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7054, 2002 WL 72938, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2002) (quoting Tempo Shane Corp. v. Bertek Inc., 120 E.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1997)). For these reasons, arbitration decisions are accorded "great deference." Id. Given that arbitration is meant "to permit a relatively quick and inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes," Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich Co. A.G., 579 E.2d 691, 701 (2d Cir. 1978), a court's review of an arbitration award is limited. Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. and Health Care Employees Union v. Brooks Drug Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1992);Maze v. Prudential Secs., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 4887, 1993 WL 515375, at *2 (S.D.N Y Dec. 8, 1993). Arbitration awards are subject to very limited review to avoid undermining the twin goals of arbitration — settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation. Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993); Campbell v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 341, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
GFI moves on the grounds that (1) the Award was rendered in manifest disregard of the law and of the evidence; and (2) the Panel committed misconduct by not hearing critical evidence. Mindful of the limited nature of this Court's review, the Court turns to GFI's specific bases for vacatur.
I. Manifest Disregard of the Law and of the Evidence
GFI argues that the Award should be set aside because the Panel manifestly disregarded the law and evidence in rendering its decision. In the arbitration proceeding, Labandeira alleged that GFI breached his employment agreement by terminating him without "cause" as that term is defined in the Agreement. GFI argues that the evidence established that GFI was justified in terminating Labandeira's employment for cause because Labandeira breached the express terms of the Agreement by injuring GFI and its reputation in the industry. The Agreement states that GFI may terminate Labandeira's employment "for cause at any time forthwith and without any notice or liability to Labandeira. Cause shall mean . . . (ii) engagement in conduct injurious to the Company or any Related Entity or to the reputation of either." (GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. H ¶ 4(B)).
GFI claims that Labandeira was terminated after making two errors in his early months of employment. First, GFI claims that Labandeira botched a deal with Goldman Sachs. Labandeira responded that the transaction was not as harmful as GFI contends and that GFI's testimony was contradicted. Labandeira argues that the testimony of his supervisor Fewer and Carl Dou of Deutsche Bank, a trader involved in this transaction, confirmed his version of events. Second, GFI claims that Labandeira botched a trade with J.P. Morgan. Labandeira responded that the events of this transaction were not uncommon and were attributable to the volatility of the market. (Tr. 149).
GFI claims that incidents such as these were injuring GFI's reputation and constituted a cause basis for them to terminate Labandeira. After these two mistakes, GFI claims Labandeira was put on notice of his deficient performance when he was asked to accept a fifty percent (50%) reduction in salary and was offered a position on the EM Repo Desk which brokered less complex products. (Tr. 678-79, 729, 1628). In contrast, Labandeira claims he was terminated because of GFI's financial problems caused by the Russian Debt Event that occurred in August 1998. (Tr. 1582). This Event made his Agreement financially burdensome for GFI. Additionally, Labandeira claims that other employees were also being asked to take a salary reduction and that the request was not linked to performance. GFI responds that there is no causal connection between the Event and Labandeira's termination.
GFI argues that the issue presented to the Panel was whether an employer could terminate an employee for cause under a provision of an employment contract. GFI argues that while the Panel indicated to the parties that "they were well aware of the governing legal principles of contract law in New York," their decision shows that they "either refused to apply these legal principles or ignored them altogether." (GFI's Mem. Supp. at 17). GFI claims that the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Labandeira was terminated for cause and "given Labandeira's lack of any evidence to the contrary, the Panel manifestly disregarded the law and evidence when they awarded contractual damages to Labandeira." (GFI's Mem. Supp. at 20). GFI claims that this disregard is further evidenced by the lack of an explanation of the Panel's decision in the Award.
A. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Section 10 of the Arbitration Act lists four grounds on which courts may vacate an arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a). In addition, an arbitration award may be vacated upon a clear showing that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law. Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE, Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l; Ltd., 888 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1989); Maze, 1993 WL 515375, at *2. To advance the goals of arbitration, courts may vacate awards only for "an overt disregard of the law and not merely for an erroneous interpretation." Folkways, 989 F.2d at 111. Judicial inquiry is extremely limited under this standard. See New York Stock Exch. Arbitration between Fahnestock Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991). Manifest disregard means more than error or misunderstanding. To find manifest disregard:
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). In addition, "[t]he governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." Id. at 934. The Court is "not at liberty to set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning or applicability of law urged upon it." Id. "Neither the erroneous application of rules of law, nor the arbitrator's erroneous decision of the facts is ground for vacating the award." Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 85 Civ. 5751, 1992 WL 251445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1992) (citing Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985).
GFI bears the burden of proof as the party moving to vacate the Award and must make a highly convincing showing. Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Ottley v. Schwartzberg, 819 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1987)); McDaniel, 2002 WL 72938, at *6; Campbell, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44.
B. Manifest Disregard of the Evidence
Review of an arbitration award on the basis of manifest disregard of the facts is "severely limited." Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Local 814, No. 99 Civ. 9828, 2000 WL 1364367, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2000) (citingHalligan v. Piper Jaffray, 148 F.3d 197, at 202 (2d Cir. 1998);Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 22); see McDaniel, 2002 WL 72938, at *5. While judicial review on this basis is limited, a court may modify or vacate an arbitrator's award for manifest disregard of the evidence if there is "strong evidence" contrary to the findings of the arbitrator and the arbitrator has not provided an explanation of his decision. Beth Israel, 2000 WL 1364367, at *6 (emphasis added). However, the court may not re-weigh the evidence or question the credibility findings of the arbitrator. McDaniel, 2002 WL 72938, at *5; Beth Israel, 2000 WL 1364367, at *6.
C. Explanation of the Panel's Decision
Arbitrators need not give reasons for their determinations. Folkways, 989 F.2d at 112. A lack of accompanying justification will not render the award in manifest disregard of the law. Id. Any ambiguity in the award must be resolved, if possible, in a manner supporting the award's confirmation. Maze, 1993 WL 515375, at *2; see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (2d Cir. 1972)
The Second Circuit has held that "if a ground for the arbitrator's decision can be inferred from the case, the award should be confirmed."Sobel, 469 F.2d at 1216; see also Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1997); McDaniel, 2002 WL 72938 2002, at *6; Coppola v. Charles Schwab Co., No. 90 Civ. 6248, 1991 WL 180345, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1991). If there is "even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached," the court must confirm the arbitration award. Areca, Inc. v. Oppenheimer Co., Inc., 960 E. Supp. 52, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 579 F.2d at 704; Siegel, 779 F.2d at 894). When a court is inclined to hold that an arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, the panel's failure to explain the award can be taken into account. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 204 (emphasis added) (noting that the court did not hold that arbitrators should "write opinions in every case or even in most cases"). While it is difficult to apply this standard of review where the panel gives no explanation for their decision, a reviewing court must still evaluate the conduct and conclusions of the arbitrators to determine whether the allegedly disregarded law was applicable and ignored. Willemijn, 103 F.3d at 12; Areca, 960 F. Supp. at 57.
In the present case, the Panel gave a brief, five page decision that did not articulate their reasoning but did summarize the evidence presented. Their decision was obviously not intended to portray all of the evidence and arguments that were before them. In support of its claim of manifest disregard of the law, GFI relies on the facts surrounding its termination of Labandeira and what it maintains it proved during the hearings. Given that the Panel weighed the pleadings, testimony and evidence in reaching its award, it can and should be assumed that it considered the evidence in light of the relevant contract law. Although the Panel did not fully explain its decision, this Court does not find that the applicable law was ignored.
GFI's approach is more factual than law based. The bulk of GFI's claim goes to disregard of the evidence. This was a fact intensive breach of contract case. Both parties presented witnesses to the Panel to support their version of the events. Similarly, both parties recapped the evidence in detail on this petition. The Court will not re-weigh the evidence presented to the Panel or question its credibility findings. GFI's burden is high and the Court is constrained in its review of the Award.
The Court has reviewed the arguments of the parties and finds that GFI has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the Panel knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether. GFI's arguments amount to disagreements with the Panel's view of the evidence. The Panel as trier of fact was entitled to make factual findings and credibility determinations and this Court is not empowered to disregard those findings.
GFI's motion on this ground is denied.
II. Panel Misconduct
GFI argues that the Award must be set aside because of the Panel's misconduct. Labandeira claimed he did not know that he was terminated for cause until he received a letter that his attorney Mr. Tisman ("Tisman") wrote to GFI's counsel at the time of the termination. (GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. K). During the Arbitration hearing, Labandeira, on direct examination, responded to Tisman's questions about the content of the letter and his conversations with Tisman. (Tr. 911-12; 915-16). During cross-examination, GFI attempted to elicit more information concerning these communications. Labandeira asserted the attorney-client privilege. GFI objected to Labandeira's claim of privilege and argued that Labandeira had already waived the privilege by testifying to his communications. GFI argues now that it did not have a fair hearing because it was not allowed to cross-examine Labandeira about communications with Tisman, or to call Tisman as a witness and such refusal constitutes misconduct. Labandeira argues that the privilege ruling was correct, and even if it were not, the excluded evidence was collateral to the issue of GFI's alleged cause for terminating Labandeira and in any case was cumulative.
Both sides submitted briefs and presented oral arguments on this issue for the Panel. (Tr. 1003-21). The Panel sustained the privilege objection and also ruled that Tisman did not have to testify. The Panel stated in the Award:
During the hearings in this matter, Respondent [GFI] made a motion requesting permission to question Claimant [Labandeira] and pierce attorney-client privilege, since Claimant had made reference to conversations with counsel during direct testimony. Both parties submitted briefs on the issue. The Panel decided not to permit questioning that would break attorney-client privilege. In addition, the Panel determined that it would not honor a subpoena requesting that Claimant's counsel appear as a witness for Respondent.
(GFI's Notice of Pet. Exh. A at 3).
Section 10(a)(3) of the Arbitration Act provides that the court may issue an order vacating an arbitration award "[w]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(3). This provision has been narrowly construed so as "not to impinge on the broad discretion afforded arbitrators to decide what evidence should be presented." Ripa v. Cathy Parker Mgmt., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0577, 1998 WL 241631, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1998) (citations omitted); see also Pompano-Windy City Partners v. Bear Stearns Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that "the arbitrator is the judge of the admissibility and relevancy of evidence submitted in an arbitration proceeding") (citations omitted). If the arbitrator's refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence prejudices of one of the parties, the court may set aside the award. Areca, 960 E. Supp. at 54; Mallory Factor Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., No. 99 Civ. 4819, 1999 WL 1021076, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999); Aferiat v. Grossman, No. 96 Civ. 1744, 1998 WL 99797, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1998). The misconduct of the arbitrator must amount to a denial of fundamental fairness to warrant vacating the award. Areca, 960 F. Supp. at 54-55 (citations omitted); Aferiat, 1998 WL 99797, at *5; see also Tempo, 120 F.3d at 20 (stating that "except where fundamental fairness is violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened up to evidentiary review"). However, although not required to hear all the evidence proffered by a party, an arbitrator "must give each of the parties to the dispute an adequate opportunity to present its evidence and argument." Tempo, 120 F.3d at 20. "Only the most egregious error which resulted in adversely affecting the rights of a party would justify . . . and require vacatur of an award." Pompano-Windy City Partners, 794 F. Supp. at 1277 (quoting Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487, 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). An award cannot be set aside because of an arbitrator's refusal to hear cumulative or irrelevant evidence. Areca, 960 F. Supp. at 55; Ripa, 1998 WL 241631, at *3.
Arbitration proceedings are not constrained by formal rules of evidence or procedure. Areca, 960 F. Supp. at 56 (citations omitted). Moreover, "[i]n handling evidence an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by the federal courts." Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Tempo, 120 F.3d at 20; Bates v. Long Island R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993); Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 861 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1988); Aferiat, 1998 WL 99797, at *5 (citation omitted). A fundamentally fair hearing requires that the parties be permitted to present evidence and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Aferiat, 1998 WL 99797, at *5. However, an arbitrator's refusal to hear evidence does not automatically require the vacatur of an award. Arbitrators must have enough evidence to make an informed decision, but "they need not compromise the speed and efficiency that are the goals of arbitration by allowing the parties to present every piece of relevant evidence." Areca, 960 F. Supp. at 55 (quoting Brandt v. Brown Co. Securities Corp., No. 94 Civ. 6640, 1995 WL 334381, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1995) (emphasis in original).
The Panel here was not bound to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, even if it had, their decisions to not allow the cross-examination of Labandeira or to force Tisman to testify did not violate the Rules of Evidence. The attorney-client privilege is not waived if merely the fact of the communication is disclosed, the substance of the communication is not at issue, and there is no prejudice to the opposing party. The substance of privileged communications is protected while the fact that they may have occurred is not. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Cooper, 90 F.R.D. 442, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Second Circuit recognizes a "`subject matter waiver' that allows an opposing party `to reach all privileged conversations regarding a particular subject once one privileged conversation on that topic has been disclosed.'" In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1987). Labandeira's testimony regarding communications with his attorney does not constitute such a waiver. Labandeira did not testify to the substance of the conversation but only that he had conversations and what they were generally about.
GFI was not denied a fundamentally fair hearing. The issue before the Panel was whether GFI had cause to terminate Labandeira. Labandeira's knowledge or belief as to this alleged cause is not relevant to the determination to be made by the Panel under contract law. Several witnesses testified regarding the two botched transactions GFI claims formed the basis for cause. Labandeira also testified to his recollection of the events. The Panel had sufficient testimony on which to base its decision. Learning more about the substance of the conversations between Tisman and Labandeira that occurred on the eve of his termination would not affect their decision on whether GFI had cause for terminating Labandeira. That determination was based on the testimony and the Panel's evaluation of whether these incidents constituted harm or injury to GFI's reputation as required under the Agreement. The Panel indicated its consideration of the issue. Both sides were given the opportunity to present arguments on the issue which the Panel considered.
GFI's motion is denied; accordingly, confirmation of the arbitration award is appropriate. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. The Court directs that a judgment be entered upon the December 1, 2000 arbitration award.
III. Labandeira's Motion for Sanctions
Labandeira moves for an award of attorney's fees incurred in defending this motion and prejudgment interest on the Award at an annual rate of nine percent (9%).
A. Attorney's Fees
Labandeira moves for attorney's fees, not as a prevailing party, but as a sanction against GFI for Labandeira having to oppose this motion. Sanctions under Rule 11 are generally imposed when a pleading is filed for improper purposes, not well grounded in fact, or not warranted by existing law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Liberally construed, GFI's pleading satisfies the test of reasonableness. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 896 F.2d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 1990). Although the Court finds GFI's position unpersuasive, it is not so wholly frivolous to justify awarding fees. See Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. Shipping A/S, 184 F. Supp.2d 271, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. Ltd. v. Connell Rice Sugar Co., Inc., No. 87 Civ. 6369, 1991 WL 123962, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1991) (awarding attorney's fees against a party whose challenge was "wholly devoid of merit"). Therefore, Labandeira's motion for sanctions is denied.
B. Post-Judgment Interest
Labandeira requests an award of post-judgment interest calculated at an annual rate of nine percent (9%). The award of post-judgment interest is in the discretion of the trial judge and there is a presumption in favor of awarding such interest. Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation, Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1984); In Matter of Arbitration between Soft Drink and Brewery Workers Union Local 812, IBT, AFL-CIO, No. 95 Civ. 8081, 1996 WL 420209, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1996). Interest on an arbitration award is payable from the date of the award rather than from the date the award is confirmed. Aferiat, 1998 WL 99797, at *12. Accordingly, the Court grants Labandeira interest calculated at an annual rate of 9% from December 1, 2000.
CONCLUSION
Having denied GFI's motion to vacate, confirmation of the arbitration award is appropriate. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. The Court directs that a judgment be entered upon the December 1, 2000 arbitration award. Interest on the award shall be paid at an annual rate of 9% from December 1, 2000. Labandeira's motion for sanctions is denied. The Court orders this case closed and directs the Clerk of the Court to remove the case from the Court's active docket.
SO ORDERED.