Summary
finding that because some contract negotiation took place during defendant's visit to the forum state, the single visit alone sufficed to establish minimum contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Monello Landscape Indus., L.L.C. v. Hatch Landscape & Design, Inc.Opinion
No. 03-CV-3353.
April 2, 2004
EXPLANATION
On May 28, 2003, plaintiff George Young Company ("Young") filed a suit for breach of contract against defendant Bury Brothers, Inc. ("Bury"). Young alleges that Bury owes Young $92,199.45 for travel expenses, per diem, ground costs, and finance charges incurred by Young employees while they were performing work for Bury in Puerto Rico. On August 12, 2003, Bury moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (3), or in the alternative, to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. For the reasons that follow, Bury's motion to dismiss and to transfer venue were denied.
The onus is on the defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(h)(1). Once the defense is raised, however, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that jurisdiction exists. Mellon Bank PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the allegations of the complaint are taken as true, Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996) and disputed facts are construed in favor of the plaintiff. Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). A plaintiff, however, may not rest solely on the pleadings to satisfy its burden. Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1984). Instead, a plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof with sworn affidavits or other competent evidence that demonstrates with reasonable particularity a sufficient nexus between the defendant and forum state in order to support jurisdiction. See Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Federal Sav. Loan Assoc., 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987); Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 58 (3d Cir. 1986).
Bury is a Puerto Rican corporation with its headquarters in Puerto Rico. Bury was a principal contractor on a construction project to expand the facilities of a pharmaceutical company in Juncos, Puerto Rico. One aspect of Bury's responsibilities on the construction project was to install "super skids" in the expanded facilities. Bury's contractual arrangement with Fluor Daniel Carribean ("FD"), the project owner, required Bury to arrange all the transportation and installation of the super skids. The particular super skids selected by the pharmaceutical company to be used for its facilities are manufactured by a company located in Pennsylvania. Bury was referred by FD to Young, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Young was to act as a subcontractor to Bury. Because FD had referred Bury to Young, Bury did not solicit any bids from Pennsylvania companies to perform this work. In anticipation of the contract between FD and Bury, and knowing that the project would require the use of the super skids manufactured in Pennsylvania, Bury and Young began negotiating terms of a contract with each other.
Super skids are modules used to process pharmaceutical products.
The company is called Kinetics and is located in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.
• On July 26, 2002, John Bury, the Engineering Director of Bury, contacted a Young representative, who was in Pennsylvania, by telephone to inquire about the services Young would be able to provide. Bury confirmed the discussion via an email sent to Young's office in Pennsylvania.
• On or about August 7, 2002, John Bury traveled to Pennsylvania to meet with Young personnel. On that trip he visited the manufacturing facility, discussed the design, transport, and installation of the super skids, requested pricing from Young for certain items, inspected the super skids, and negotiated manning requirements. Bury left Pennsylvania that same day after the meetings had concluded.
• On dates unspecified, Young sent representatives to Puerto Rico to further negotiate the contract between Bury and Young.
• On September 6, 2002, Bury sent an email to Young in Pennsylvania asking for transportation pricing, requesting that Young not provide this pricing to anyone else, and defining the rigging price Bury had requested.
• On September 11, 2002, Bury sent an email to Young in Pennsylvania requesting immediate pricing for specific contract items.
• On October 17, 2002, Young and Bury reached a verbal agreement over the telephone for Young to transport the super skids from Pennsylvania to the port in New Jersey. The Young representative participated in the telephone conversation from Pennsylvania.
• On November 8, 2002, Bury accepted, by telephone, Young's proposals for installation of the super skids in Puerto Rico. The Young representative participated in this telephone conversation from his location in Pennsylvania.
• On December 6, 2002, a Bury representative in Puerto Rico signed Young's Firm Price Proposal.
On an unspecified date, FD requested that Bury ask Young to arrange for the transportation of the super skids from Pennsylvania to a port in New Jersey. Once the super skids arrived at the port in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Bury would be responsible for transporting the super skids to the building site. After Bury transferred the super skids to the project site, Young was to perform the installation of the super skids.
Crowly Marine, who is not involved in the instant action, shipped the super skids from the port in New Jersey to the port in Puerto Rico.
Young transported the super skids to the port in New Jersey in accordance with the contract. Young employees then traveled to Puerto Rico to perform the installation work, which took approximately ten weeks to complete. On January 28, 2003, Young invoiced Bury in the amount of $80,792 for transport, installation and travel, air costs, ground costs, and per diem costs. Bury paid Young $12,000 on account of the invoice. This was $68,792 less than the amount stated on the invoice. On February 13, 2003, Young sent an invoice to Bury for $17,841.73 for additional travel, air costs, per diem, and ground costs. Bury did not pay Young the $17,841.73 nor the $68,792 still owed from the previous invoice. In addition to the invoiced amount, Young claims Bury has incurred $5,565.72 in finance charges on the amount originally owed to Young. On May 28, 2003, Young filed a claim against Bury for $92,199.45 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On June 20, 2003, Bury filed a complaint against Young in the Tribunal de Primera Instancia in San Juan, Puerto Rico. On August 12, 2003 Bury filed the instant motion.
The business transaction which is the subject of the present action is not the first time Young and Bury had conducted business together. In 1992, Young rented a crane from Bury for work at a project site in Puerto Rico. In the 1992 transaction, Young initiated the business relationship. No Bury representative met with Young in connection with this rental.
Bury has no offices outside of Puerto Rico, is not registered to do business in Pennsylvania, does not advertise in Pennsylvania, and does not have employees or bank accounts located in Pennsylvania.
II. Discussion
Bury filed this motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) and (3). Bury also moved in the alternative to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
A. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Bury challenges this court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over Bury. A two-part inquiry is used to determine whether a district court sitting in diversity can exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. First, a district court must determine whether the long-arm statute of the forum state permits the courts of the forum state to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1); Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1995). Second, a district court must determine whether the district court's assertion of personal jurisdiction would be consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Air Prods. Chem., Inc. v. Sandhu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12063, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2003) (when interpreting the powers of a federal court over a defendant, the question is whether the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment have been satisfied).
The due process analysis under either prong of the personal jurisdiction test is essentially the same regardless of whether it is limited by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Modern Mailers v. Johnson Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (due process under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment limits the long-arm statutes in the same manner); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., 10 F.3d 189, 199 (3d Cir. 1993) ("the minimum contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction applies to federal courts having subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship as well as cases brought on the basis of a federal claim.").
1. Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute
With regard to whether the courts of the forum state are permitted to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, the Pennsylvania long-arm statute extends state court jurisdiction over non-residents to the "fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b) (2004). Thus, the reach of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute is coextensive with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 296 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1985). Due to the significant reach of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, the two-part personal jurisdiction inquiry essentially collapses into the second part of the inquiry — whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Thus, if due process permits this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Bury, the Pennsylvania long-arm statute also permits this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Bury.
2. Due Process Considerations
Two types of personal jurisdiction can satisfy due process dictates. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the defendant's general or specific contacts with the forum. GE v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001). Young only argues that this court has specific jurisdiction over Bury, and thus there is no need to determine whether general jurisdiction exists. A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the plaintiff's cause of action arises from the defendant's forum-related activities, such that the defendant "'should reasonably expect being haled into court'" in that forum. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 1996) ( quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Specific jurisdiction satisfies due process when: 1) the defendant has the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum state, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985), and 2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotations omitted).
A court has general jurisdiction over a defendant when the plaintiff's cause of action arises from the defendant's non-forum related activities. North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1990). To establish general jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has maintained "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9 416 (1984).
Although the second requirement is discretionary, the Third Circuit generally engages in this analysis. Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli Assocs., 149 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1998).
The first due process requirement, minimum contacts, is defined as "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (internal quotations omitted). The second due process requirement permits jurisdiction only if it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend an action in that forum. Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317. In addition to considering the burden placed on the defendant, the determination of whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with "fair play and substantial justice" includes consideration of the following factors:
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . .; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (internal quotations omitted).
In order to determine whether this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Bury, I must first evaluate whether the contacts Bury has had with the state of Pennsylvania are minimally sufficient to make Bury defend in this forum.
a. Minimum Contacts
Bury's contacts with the forum state can be broadly characterized as: 1) a visit by a Bury representative to Pennsylvania to meet with Young representatives; 2) entry into the contract that gives rise to the underlying suit in this matter; 3) telephone calls from Bury in Puerto Rico to Young in Pennsylvania, and 4) three emails from Bury in Puerto Rico to Young in Pennsylvania. These contacts are examined in turn.
1. Visit by John Bury to Young in Pennsylvania
A single or even occasional act related to the forum may not be sufficient to establish jurisdiction if the acts create only an attenuated affiliation with the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n. 18. Several courts in this district, however, have held that even one visit by a defendant to the forum state may provide the necessary minimum contacts with the forum state if the contract that forms the basis of the suit was negotiated during that visit. See, e.g., Rototherm Corp. v. Penn Linen Unif. Serv., Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10057, at *17-18 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 1997); Stop-A-Flat Corp. v. Electra Start of Michigan, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also Air Shields, Inc. v. Sun Med., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2492, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1992) (when business visits indicate that the defendant is more than a passive purchaser of services, the connection of the visits to the forum becomes significant).
On or about August 7, 2002, John Bury traveled to Pennsylvania to meet with Young personnel. On that trip, John Bury visited the manufacturing facility, discussed the design, transport, and installation of the super skids, requested pricing from Young for certain items, inspected the super skids, and negotiated manning requirements. While not all of the actions undertaken by John Bury while in Philadelphia could be construed as contract negotiation, some of his actions were clearly related to negotiating some of the terms and conditions of the contract, for example, discussing the design, transfer, and installation of the super skids and negotiating manning requirements. While John Bury did not travel to Pennsylvania for the purpose of negotiating the contract, one of the things he did while on his Pennsylvania trip was to negotiate some terms of the contract. Because at least some contract negotiation took place during Bury's visit to Young in Pennsylvania, this single visit to Pennsylvania alone is sufficient to establish the minimum contacts necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over Bury. This visit, however, was not the only contact Bury had with Pennsylvania.
2. Entering into the Contract, Telephone Communications, and Email Communications
In addition to the visit to the forum state, Bury's contacts with Pennsylvania also included entering into a contract with Young, a Pennsylvania resident, making numerous telephone calls to Young in Pennsylvania, and sending three emails to Young in Pennsylvania. Although the mere entering into a contract with a Pennsylvania resident, without more is generally an insufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction, Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1993), Bury did not merely enter into a contract with a Pennsylvania resident. In addition to the contract with Young, there were also numerous telephone calls and three emails sent by Bury to Young. Case law clearly holds that telephone, facsimile, and email communications sent by the defendant into the forum state may count toward the minimum contacts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction. See Grand Entm't Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 1993) (telephone communications directed to the forum state can be considered in minimum contacts analysis); Am. High Mast Sys., Inc. v. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7623, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2003) (facsimiles and e-mails directed to residents of the forum state can be considered in the minimum contacts analysis). Communication sent by a defendant into the forum state, however, will not trigger personal jurisdiction if the communications do not show purposeful availment of the forum state's protection. See, e.g., Mellon Bank (East), 983 F.2d at 556. Accordingly, "minimal communication between the defendant and the plaintiff in the forum state, without more, will not subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of that state's court system." IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1998).
If Young relied solely upon the contract between Young and Bury to establish minimum contacts, we would engage in the analysis set forth in Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, to determine whether a contract between a defendant and a resident of the forum state, without more, establishes minimum contacts. In the instant action, Young asserts that a number of other factors in conjunction with the existence of a contract establish minimum contacts. The considerations set forth in Burger King are useful when analyzing the totality of the contacts that Bury has had with the forum state. One Burger King factor, the nature of prior negotiations is especially relevant. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479. Young and Bury had conducted business prior to the instant action. In 1992, Young rented a crane from Bury for work at a project site in Puerto Rico. It is unlikely that this 1992 transaction alone would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction due to the circumstances of the transaction and the fact that it occurred more than ten years ago. Bury's prior negotiations with the same resident of Pennsylvania, however, is yet another factor establishing that Bury has sufficient minimum contracts with the forum state.
Bury however did not merely enter into a contract or exchange minimal communications with a Pennsylvania resident. He did both. While either entering into the contract or directing minimal communications to the forum state, standing alone, may be insufficient to subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of this court, these contacts do not stand alone. Rather, Bury's actions and contacts stand in conjunction with each other and in addition to a visit by John Bury to Young in Pennsylvania, which by itself would establish minimum contacts. The inquiry is whether the totality of all of these contacts establish the minimum contacts required to assert jurisdiction over a defendant. Mountbatten Sur. Co. v. Reagerharris Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 333 at *16 (E.D. Pa. Jan 19, 2000).
A few cases from this district involving a defendant who engaged in a variety of different types of contacts are helpful. Johnson v. King Media, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11332 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2002), involved an out of state defendant whose contacts with Pennsylvania included purposefully entering into an agreement to conduct business with a Pennsylvania company, communicating with the plaintiff in its Pennsylvania office with regard to the business by mail, telephone and electronically. The court found that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts to justify the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Schnader, Harrison, Segal Lewis, L.L.P. v. Basic Capital Funds, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13501 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2000) involved a defendant that did not maintain offices, own real estate, advertise or have any presence within Pennsylvania. The defendant did, however, participate in a number of telephone, mail, facsimile and electronic communications with the plaintiff and did make some payments to the plaintiff for services. The court concluded that these contacts were sufficient to establish the minimum contacts needed to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
Like the defendant in both Johnson and Schnader, Bury purposefully entered into a contract with a resident of the forum state and directed telephone and electronic communications to the forum state. Like the defendant in Schnader, Bury does not advertise nor has any offices or real estate in the forum state. Also like the Schnader defendant, Bury made a partial payment to the plaintiff. The lessons of these two cases is that Bury's contacts with the forum state are enough to establish minimum contacts. In sum, I find that Bury has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state. Thus, the first of the two due process requirements has been satisfied.
b. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
In addition to establishing minimum contacts, due process requires the plaintiff to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (internal quotations omitted). This determination considers, in addition to the burden on the defendant, the following factors:
the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . .; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (internal quotations omitted).
The parties agree that the shared interest of several states in furthering fundamental and substantive social policies is not a relevant factor in this case.
While both parties argue that all but one of the factors are relevant and support finding in their favor, in the instant case, only two of the factors militate one way or the other: the burden on the defendant and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. While it may be inconvenient for Bury to defend in Pennsylvania, Bury enjoyed the benefits of entering into a business arrangement with a Pennsylvania corporation. This case is over money owed to Young as a result of expenses incurred by Young employees while transporting and installing the super skids. The witnesses and the records will likely be Young employees in Pennsylvania. Defending in Pennsylvania is not so burdensome for Bury as to warrant depriving Young of its choice of forum. In this case, the burden imposed on Bury by defending in Pennsylvania is outweighed by Young's interest in obtaining effective relief. This court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Bury, therefore comports with the notion of fair play and substantial justice. Thus, the second of the two due process requirements has been satisfied.
Because I find that Bury has sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, and that requiring Bury to defend in Pennsylvania would not offend the notions of fair play and substantial justice, the due process requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction over Bury have been satisfied.
As Pennsylvania's long arm statute allows its courts to extend jurisdiction as far as due process permits, and due process permits personal jurisdiction over Bury, the motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction was denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Improper Venue
Bury challenges venue in this district. While the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in connection with a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant bears the burden of proving that venue is improper. Myers v. Am. Dental Assoc., 695 F.2d 716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982). Because this court's subject matter jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship, the applicable statute governing venue is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a):
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
In a multi-district state, a corporate defendant is deemed to reside for the purposes of venue in any district where it would be subject to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). See also Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding venue proper "where the defendant transacts business and is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction").
Bury is a corporate defendant. Bury therefore is deemed to reside in any district where it would be subject to personal jurisdiction. Because Bury is subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see supra Section A, Bury is deemed to reside here for the purposes of venue. Because venue is proper under § 1391(a)(1) in a judicial district in which the defendant resides, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, Bury's motion to dismiss based on improper venue was denied.
Venue may also be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2). Section 1391(a)(2) permits an action to be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. As discussed in subsection 1, some of the contract negotiation took place in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Moreover, Young seeks, among other things, reimbursement for expenses associated with travel, transport, and air costs incurred by Young to perform the work in Puerto Rico. The transportation of the super skids and presumably the employees originated in Collegeville, Pennsylvania.
C. Motion to Transfer Venue
In the event that Bury's motion to dismiss was denied on both grounds, Bury moved in the alternative for transfer of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Third Circuit law holds that the party moving for transfer under § 1404(a) bears the burden of proving that transfer is appropriate. Transfer is deemed appropriate if, after weighing the proper interests, transfer is supported. In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2001). "While the burden is on the defendant, the defendant is not required to show 'truly compelling circumstances for . . . change. . . . [of venue, but rather that] all relevant things considered, the case would be better off transferred to another district.'" Id. ( quoting In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1995)). Section 1404(a) was enacted to give discretion to the district court to adjudicate transfer motions according to an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) ( quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). A motion to transfer under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district court to weigh a number of case-specific factors. In addition to the three enumerated factors in § 1404(a), specifically convenience of parties, convenience of witnesses, and the interests of justice, courts have considered a number of private and public interests when ruling on a motion to transfer. Private interests considered include: 1) the plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice; 2) the defendant's preference; 3) the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; 4) the convenience of the witnesses to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora, and 5) the location of books and records. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted). The public interests that courts consider include: 1) the enforceability of the judgment; 2) the practical considerations that facilitate the trial being expeditious and efficient; 3) the relative backlog and administrative difficulty in the two fora; 4) the local interests in the controversies; 5) the public policies of the fora, and 6) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases. Id. at 879-80 (internal citations omitted). When the court is weighing the relevant factors, transfer is only proper if the alternative forum is more convenient. A case is not suitable for transfer if the defendant merely shows that the fora are equally appropriate. Bolick Distribs. Corp. v. Armstrong Holdings, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9745, at *20 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2003).
The ease with which Bury has been able to conduct business, including sending communications, passing documents, and sending representatives, with a Pennsylvania company suggests that it will not be particularly inconvenient for Bury or its witnesses to appear in this district. Moreover, the nature of the dispute suggests that a majority of the needed witnesses will be Young employees in Pennsylvania. This case does not involve an allegation on the part of Bury that the work performed in Puerto Rico was inadequate. This dispute is over whether Bury owes Young money for expenses incurred by Young for transporting the super skids and for travel and per diem costs of Young employees when installing the super skids.
Additionally, the ease with which Bury has been able to review and pass documents with Young suggests that it will not be particularly inconvenient to get any needed documents to this district. As was the case with the witnesses, it is likely that a number of the documents are currently in Pennsylvania because the case relates to expenses incurred by Young while transporting and installing the super skids. Upon consideration of the appropriate public and private interests, it is clear that the plaintiff's interest in choosing its desired forum and the location of the witnesses and the records outweigh any burden imposed upon Bury by making him defend in this forum. Accordingly, defendants motion to transfer venue was also denied.