Opinion
2021-00187JD
05-10-2023
NANCY GEORGE Plaintiff v. MIAMI UNIVERSITY Defendant
Sent to S.C. Reporter 6/28/23
Scott Sheets, Magistrate
JUDGMENT ENTRY
PATRICK E. SHEERAN, JUDGE
{¶1} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), Plaintiff filed objections to the magistrate's December 21, 2022 decision which are now fully briefed and before the Court. On a related matter, the parties have also filed motions to strike, in large part, based on timeliness.
{¶2} Civ.R. 53(D)(5) instructs that "[f]or good cause shown, the court shall allow a reasonable extension of time for a party to * * * file objections to a magistrate's decision." Defendant sought such leave, which this Court granted for good cause. See January 3, 2023 Entry. Plaintiff now quibbles that Defendant presented the extension as "unopposed" and argues that Defendant sought a greater extension than it represented when seeking Plaintiff's consent. Upon review of the correspondence between counsel, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff consented to a 7-day extension. Without an extension, Defendant's objections were originally due on January 4, 2023. With the additional 7 days requested, Defendant's objections were due on January 11, 2023. Even if Plaintiff could retrospectively oppose the extension, Defendant demonstrated good cause and the extension was reasonable. Therefore, Defendant's objections are indeed timely.
{¶3} In contrast, Plaintiff's response is untimely. However, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's explanation for her untimeliness and will accept the filing. The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff raises new issues not supported by the evidence as a basis for striking Plaintiff's response. In fact, the Court finds no reason to reject any of the briefs before it.
{¶4} It is the Court's view that, "[w]hether or not objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without modification." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). However, once a party files objections to a magistrate's decision, "the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In reviewing the objections, the court does not act as an appellate court but rather conducts "a de novo review of the facts and conclusions in the magistrate's decision." Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted).
{¶5} Therefore, the Court DENIES the parties' motions to strike. And upon a de novo review, the Court finds no reason to modify the magistrate's decision. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objections.
Background
{¶6} Plaintiff claims Defendant is liable to her for injuries she sustained when she fell and was hit by a Zamboni when leaving Defendant's Goggin Ice Center (the center) after watching her son, Andrew George, play ice hockey as a part of a men's hockey league on March 11, 2018. Specifically, while exiting the center and walking along the bottom aisleway running parallel to the glass and boards that separate the seating area from the ice, Plaintiff suddenly slipped and fell as she stepped down from a step leading from the aisleway onto a lower floor below. As Plaintiff was falling, she immediately slid through an open door in the boards and onto the ice where she was struck by a Zamboni being used to resurface the ice. The case proceeded to trial before a magistrate on the issues of liability and damages.
{¶7} Based on the evidence presented at trial, the magistrate found that "the danger of the open door, more specifically that it presented the risk of being struck by the Zamboni was not open and obvious" and that "[t]he open rink door simply did not alert plaintiff that she might be almost instantly hit by the Zamboni if she accidentally fell in the aisleway." The magistrate further found that Defendant "breached its duty in failing to ensure that the door remained closed while the Zamboni was being operated" and "the presence of the open door while the Zamboni was operating was also one of the proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries." However, the magistrate also concluded "that plaintiffs own contributory negligence in failing to negotiate the step and/or exercise ordinary care for her own safety was a concurrent, proximate cause of her injuries." As a result, the magistrate allocated 30% of the fault to Plaintiff and 70% of the fault to Defendant. In recommending judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the magistrate awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $35,025.00.
{¶8} Defendant argues the magistrate erred when he found that the open door and the Zamboni were not open and obvious conditions such that Defendant would be relieved of its duty to Plaintiff. Defendant specifically contends that it owed no duty to warn Plaintiff of an open door and a visible Zamboni which were readily observable and discernible to her. Defendant further argues that Plaintiffs own negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries. Alternatively, Defendant generally argues that it was not negligent.
Discussion
{¶9} Initially, the Court notes that Defendant made no objections to the magistrate's recitation of the evidence. Upon review, the Court finds no error with the magistrate's findings of fact. Additionally, the Court notes that Defendant did not object to the magistrate's award of damages. Accordingly, the Court will limit its discussion to the magistrate's conclusions of law and decision.
{¶10} To prevail on a claim for negligence, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach of the duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-787, 2013-Ohio-5106, ¶ 6. First, Defendant argues that the magistrate erred when he found that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff.
{¶11} It is well established that the duty owed by an owner or occupier of premises generally depends on whether the injured person is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996). It is undisputed that Plaintiff, as a spectator of a sporting event, was on Defendant's premises for purposes that would classify her as an invitee. See Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952). An owner or occupier of premises generally owes its invitees "a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and has the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers." Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5.
{¶12} However, a premises owner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the premises regarding dangers that are open and obvious. Id. ("the open-and-obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims."). Under the open-and-obvious doctrine, an owner or occupier owes no duty to warn an invitee of "open and obvious dangers" on the premises because, absent any attendant circumstances, "the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning" and it is reasonable to expect that the invitees "entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves." Cordell v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-749, 2009-Ohio-1555, ¶ 6, 19 (internal citations omitted). When determining whether the open-and-obvious doctrine applies, a court "considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiffs conduct in encountering it." Armstrong at ¶ 13. Indeed, "[t]he fact that a plaintiff [is] unreasonable in choosing to encounter the danger is not what relieves the property owner of liability. Rather, it is the fact that the condition itself is so obvious that it absolves the property owner from taking any further action to protect the plaintiff." Id.
{¶13} Defendant specifically argues that the open-and-obvious doctrine bars Plaintiffs negligence claim. Upon review, the Court disagrees. Under the circumstances, the magistrate properly determined that "while the open rink door certainly served as a warning that one could inadvertently end up on the ice, due to a fall or otherwise, the open door would not alert a reasonable person to the fact that he or she could be run over or struck by a Zamboni." The Court also agrees that
[t]he presence of the Zamboni might warn invitees of the danger of the machine itself and to stay off the ice and out of its path but it would not alert an invitee that there is a danger of falling directly into its path through an open rink door if one were to slip and fall while exiting the center.
Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff knew the Zamboni was being operated and that the door was open as she exited the center, the danger of falling through the open door and being hit by the Zamboni was not "so obvious" that it is reasonable to expect Plaintiff to take notice of that risk and take appropriate measures to protect herself. Given the increased risk posed to invitees by operating the Zamboni when the rink doors are open, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant should be absolved from taking further action to ensure that the rink doors-which serve to separate the seating area from the ice rink-are closed when the Zamboni is operating.
{¶14} While Defendant does not state any objection with particularity regarding the magistrate's finding of breach, the Court nevertheless notes that the magistrate properly concluded that "Defendant's attempt to delegate the responsibility to close the door to exiting players did not discharge its burden" to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition and "failing to ensure that the door remained closed while the Zamboni was being operated" constitutes a breach of the duty owed to Plaintiff.
{¶15} Though Defendant agrees with the magistrate that Plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care when navigating the step was a proximate cause of her fall, it objects to the magistrate's finding that Defendant's failure to ensure the rink door was closed when the Zamboni was operating constitutes a concurrent proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Defendant argues the only proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries was her own negligence. Initially, the Court notes that Defendant provided no support for its position that its negligence could not also constitute a second proximate cause in this case. The only explanation Defendant provides is speculation of what Plaintiff's injuries could have been if the rink door had been closed. In the Court's view, the requirements of specificity and particularity call for more than unadorned disagreements. See Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) ("An objection to a magistrate's decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.").
{¶16} Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by Defendant's contention that the magistrate's finding that "it is reasonably foreseeable that someone could * * * fall through the open rink door and sustain injury while the Zamboni was operating" is inconsistent with his findings that the open-and-obvious doctrine did not apply. See, e.g., Armstrong at ¶ 12 (The Ohio Supreme Court has "warned courts about the danger of confusing the concepts of duty and proximate cause."). Indeed, Defendant did not have to anticipate the exact injury that occurred for it to be reasonably foreseeable that some type of injury may occur when the rink doors are left open while the Zamboni is operating. See Zachariah v. Roby, 178 Ohio App.3d 471, 2008-Ohio-4832, 898 N.E.2d 998, ¶ 44 (10th Dist.). Based on its de novo review, the Court finds no basis to modify either the magistrate's finding that the Zamboni operating while the rink door was left open, in part, proximately caused Plaintiffs injuries or his allocation of fault between the proximate causes.
{¶17} For the reasons stated above, the Court OVERRULES Defendant's objections and adopts the magistrate's decision and recommendation as its own, including all findings of fact and conclusions of law. Judgment shall be rendered in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $35,025.00. Court costs are assessed against Defendant. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.