Opinion
No. 158
11-19-2015
In the Matter of Estevan GENTIL, Respondent, v. Ira MARGULIS, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, Respondent, and Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, Appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, Richard J. Masters and John M. Castellano of counsel), appellant pro se. Law Office of Garnett H. Sullivan, South Hempstead (Garnett H. Sullivan of counsel), for Estevan Gentil, respondent.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott, Richard J. Masters and John M. Castellano of counsel), appellant pro se.
Law Office of Garnett H. Sullivan, South Hempstead (Garnett H. Sullivan of counsel), for Estevan Gentil, respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the petition dismissed.
After one juror was found unable to serve, defendant refused to substitute an alternate juror and requested a partial verdict on the one count on which the jury had indicated it had reached a verdict. The Appellate Division granted the petition on the basis that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial and did not address the issue of consent (120 A.D.3d 1414, 993 N.Y.S.2d 115 2014 ). Because defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial on two of three counts by requesting a partial verdict and by saying nothing about the court's plans for retrial (People v. McFadden, 20 N.Y.3d 260, 959 N.Y.S.2d 108, 982 N.E.2d 1241 2012; Matter of Marte v. Berkman, 16 N.Y.3d 874, 925 N.Y.S.2d 388, 949 N.E.2d 479 2011 ), we need not reach the issue of manifest necessity.
FAHEY, J. (concurring).
I agree with the majority that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, but for a different reason. A defendant's consent to a mistrial, and concomitant waiver of double jeopardy protection, “may ... be implied from the circumstances leading up to the dismissal of the jury” (People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77 1986 ). This Court has held, however, that whether a defendant has “consented to a mistrial is a factual question” (id. at 389, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77; see Matter of Marte v. Berkman, 16 N.Y.3d 874, 875, 925 N.Y.S.2d 388, 949 N.E.2d 479 2011 ). As such, that “factual determination ... may not be disturbed by this Court if there is any support for that finding in the record” (Marte, 16 N.Y.3d at 875, 925 N.Y.S.2d 388, 949 N.E.2d 479).
In this CPLR article 78 proceeding in the nature of prohibition, however, the Appellate Division made no factual finding with respect to whether defendant consented to the mistrial. Rather, the Appellate Division's decision was based solely on that Court's conclusion that “there was no manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial” (Matter of Gentil v. Margulis, 120 A.D.3d 1414, 1417, 993 N.Y.S.2d 115 2d Dept.2014 ). Thus, there are no factual findings by a lower court for us to review (cf. Marte, 16 N.Y.3d at 875, 925 N.Y.S.2d 388, 949 N.E.2d 479; Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d at 389, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77). Furthermore, we have no power to make our own factual determination on this issue (see N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 3[a]; CPLR 5501 [b] ).
While the majority relies on the waiver of double jeopardy protection in People v. McFadden, 20 N.Y.3d 260, 959 N.Y.S.2d 108, 982 N.E.2d 1241 (2012), that case is clearly distinguishable. In McFadden, the defendant affirmatively requested a mistrial (see id. at 262, 264–265, 959 N.Y.S.2d 108, 982 N.E.2d 1241). Here, the issue is whether defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial, which presents a factual question (see Marte, 16 N.Y.3d at 875, 925 N.Y.S.2d 388, 949 N.E.2d 479; Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d at 389, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77).
I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division on the ground that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial on counts two and three of the indictment. As the majority notes, after the trial court determined that one juror was unable to continue deliberations, defendant refused to consent to the substitution of an alternate juror.
For there to be a “manifest necessity” for a mistrial, such that double jeopardy does not bar retrial, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to a mistrial (see Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d at 388, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 494 N.E.2d 77; Matter of Enright v. Siedlecki, 59 N.Y.2d 195, 199–200, 464 N.Y.S.2d 418, 451 N.E.2d 176 1983 ). Here, the trial court considered reasonable alternatives to a mistrial, except for the taking of a partial verdict on count one (see Matter of Robles v. Bamberger, 219 A.D.2d 243, 247, 640 N.Y.S.2d 882 1st Dept.1996, lv. denied 88 N.Y.2d 809, 647 N.Y.S.2d 714, 670 N.E.2d 1346 1996, mot. to appeal dismiss appeal granted 88 N.Y.2d 962, 647 N.Y.S.2d 714, 670 N.E.2d 1346 1996; cf. Matter of Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501, 508, 872 N.Y.S.2d 401, 900 N.E.2d 952 2008, cert. denied 556 U.S. 1193, 129 S.Ct. 2012, 173 L.Ed.2d 1105 2009 ). Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to take a partial verdict on count one does not bar retrial on counts two and three.
CPL 310.70(2) provides that “[f]ollowing the rendition of a partial verdict ..., a defendant may be retried for any submitted offense upon which the jury was unable to agree,” with certain exceptions that are not relevant here. Thus, the trial court's failure to take a partial verdict on count one does not prevent defendant from being retried on counts two and three, inasmuch as the jury was “unable to agree” on counts two and three (CPL 310.702; see Matter of Dissell v. Adams, 115 A.D.2d 1006, 1008, 497 N.Y.S.2d 570 4th Dept.1985 ).
Defendant's reliance on the Appellate Division's dismissal of the entire indictment in Robles is misplaced. In that case, although the jurors indicated that they had reached a partial verdict, there was no indication as to the count upon which the jury had reached a partial verdict before the trial court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury (see Robles, 219 A.D.2d at 247–248, 640 N.Y.S.2d 882). There, the Appellate Division properly dismissed the indictment in its entirety (see id. at 248, 640 N.Y.S.2d 882). Here, by contrast, the jury clearly stated that it was deadlocked on counts two and three and, by inference, that it had reached a partial verdict on count one only. Defendant therefore may be retried on counts two and three of the indictment (see CPL 310.702; Dissell, 115 A.D.2d at 1008, 497 N.Y.S.2d 570).
Chief Judge LIPPMAN and Judges PIGOTT, RIVERA and ABDUS–SALAAM concur; Judge FAHEY concurs in result in an opinion in which Judge STEIN concurs.
Order reversed, without costs, and petition dismissed, in a memorandum.