Opinion
4:02CV3060.
December 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On February 20, 2002, the plaintiff, Michael Genthe, filed a complaint against the defendant, Quebecor World Lincoln, Inc. (Quebecor), alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. (West 1995). Now before me is the defendant's motion for summary judgment, filing 25. For the following reasons, I find that the defendant's motion must be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is employed as a "Journeyman II" at the defendant's printing and bindery facility. In this position, he "tends various machines and equipment used in binding books, periodicals and pamphlets and assembles related printed materials . . . ." (Def.'s Index of Exhibits in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter Def.'s Index), filing 26, Exhibit 5 at Ex. 9.) He also suffers from Marfans Syndrome, which is described by his treating physician as "a connective tissue disorder" that involves the heart, "musculoskeletal system," eyes, skin, and blood vessels. (See Pl.'s Index of Exhibits In Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter Pl.'s Index), filing 35, Ex. 13, Kugler Dep. at 8.) As a result of this disorder, the plaintiff has experienced several heart problems, including tachycardia with an associated enlarged heart, atrial fibrillation, and atrial ventricular node re-entry; aortic insufficiency (or regurgitation) and aortic dilation (or aneurism) that prompted an operation to replace his ascending aorta and aortic valve; and seizures. (See id. at 10-16.) He has also had surgery to correct eye problems (see id. at 22:19-23:14; Pl.'s Index, Exhibit 13 at Ex. 8), and he has a "significant disorder of his chest wall," (Pl.'s Index, Ex. 13, Kugler Dep. at 9:5-7).
The plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filing 30, lacks a separate statement of material facts. Local Rule 56.1(b) requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to "set forth . . . a separate statement of each material fact . . . and as to each shall identify the specific document or discovery response or deposition testimony (by page and line) which it is claimed establishes the issue." Although the plaintiff has submitted a wealth of materials in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, (see filings 33-35), his failure to adhere to the local rules has required me to spend a significant amount of time searching through those materials to identify evidence supporting his brief. The plaintiff is strongly encouraged to adhere to the requirements set forth in the local rules in the future.
On several occasions since approximately June 14, 2000, the plaintiff unsuccessfully applied for different positions within the defendant's facility. He then filed the instant suit, alleging that the defendant's refusal to hire him for any of these positions was the result of discrimination in violation of the ADA.. (See Compl., filing 1, ¶¶ 12-20, 23-27.)
The evidence indicates that the plaintiff initially applied for a position as Forklift Operator, and that he subsequently applied for a position as "Journeyman I" on two separate occasions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted by the court when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence favoring the party opposing the motion is sufficient to allow a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If the moving party meets its initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, and "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," id. at 256 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)).
The ADA prohibits "covered entit[ies]" from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to prevail on a claim of discrimination in violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he or she is qualified to perform the essential functions of his or her position; and (3) that he or she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). "The employer must then rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action."Id. at 1135. If the employer successfully rebuts the presumption of discrimination, "the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's non-discriminatory reason is pretextual."Id. In this case, the defendant has argued that it is entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff has failed to establish the first element of his prima facie case and because it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment actions. (See Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Def.'s Br.") at 2.) I shall present my analysis of the defendant's arguments below.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether the Plaintiff is Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA
As I explained above, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA in order to present a prima facie case of discrimination. See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see also supra Part II. Under the ADA, an individual is considered disabled if he has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities"; if he has "a record of such an impairment"; or if he is "regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The defendant claims that the plaintiff's "demand for reasonable accommodation makes it clear that he is pursuing his ADA claim under an alleged disability claim as opposed to a `perceived' or `record of disability [claim.]'" (Def.'s Br. at 10.) In other words, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim is based only upon the first, "actual disability" definition set forth in section 12102(2)(A). However, the plaintiff has specifically alleged that he not only has a substantially limiting impairment, but that he also "has a record of having a disability, and[/]or is regarded by Quebecor as having a disability." (See Compl., filing 1, ¶ 21.) The defendant's motion for summary judgment fails to address whether or not the plaintiff can establish that he is disabled under these alternate definitions, and after reviewing the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, I believe that there is a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiff can do so.
In addition, I find that there is a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiff suffers from an impairment that substantially limits one of his major life activities. In arguing that the plaintiff cannot establish that he is substantially limited in a major life activity, the defendant focuses primarily upon the major life activity of working (see Def.'s Br. at 11-21), while mentioning in passing that "[t]here is nothing in the medical records that would suggest that Mr. Genthe is unable to perform his day-to-day life care functions such as bathing, dressing, walking, bending, breathing, or other types of major life activities." (Id. at 20.) The plaintiff agrees that he is not substantially limited in his ability to work and grants that most of the complications associated with his impairment do not appear to be substantially limiting in any other major life activity. (See Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Pl.'s Br.") at 19.) However, he argues that his seizures significantly limited the major life activity of "cognitive thinking."See Brown v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 286 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002) ("The ability to perform cognitive functions on the level of an average person certainly falls within [the] category [of major life activities.]"). See also Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that epileptic seizures substantially limited the major life activities of walking, seeing, and speaking). The plaintiff has come forward with evidence indicating that in 1997 and 1998, he suffered seizures approximately three times per week, and that as a result, he was restricted from driving or operating heavy machinery for a period of six months. (See Pl.'s Index, Ex. 4, Michael Genthe Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; id., Ex. 5, Heidi Genthe Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. See also id. at Ex. 7-B, "Bryan Memorial Hospital Emergency Report" dated 11/19/97 (describing "absence-type seizures" demonstrated by plaintiff).) Although the evidence shows that these seizures were eventually controlled, (see Pl.'s Index, Ex. 4, Michael Genthe Aff. ¶ 8; id., Ex. 5, Heidi Genthe Aff. ¶ 7), there is also evidence that the plaintiff's co-workers have observed at least one recent seizure (see id., Ex. 6, Pietrowski Aff. ¶ 10.) Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970), I find that there remains a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity.
Since there remain genuine issues as to whether the plaintiff has a substantially limiting impairment, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment, I must reject the defendant's argument that the plaintiff cannot present a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the ADA.
B. Whether the Defendant Has Articulated a Legitimate, Non-discriminatory Reason for the Alleged Adverse Employment Actions, and If So, Whether the Plaintiff Can Demonstrate That the Employer's Non-discriminatory Reason Is Pretextual
Although the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot present a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the ADA, the defendant argues that it is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment because it has articulated "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its decisions not to hire the plaintiff for the forklift operator or Journeyman I positions. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Specifically, the defendant's evidence indicates that the plaintiff was not selected for these positions because other applicants were found to be more qualified than the plaintiff. (See Def.'s Index, Ex. 3, Hruza Aff. ¶¶ 2-3;id., Ex. 2, Fruchtl Aff. ¶¶ 3-5, 7. See also Def.'s Br., Statement of Uncontroverted Facts, ¶¶ 5-9.) While I agree that the defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decisions,see, e.g., Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1110 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that employer's belief that the person hired was more qualified than the Title VII plaintiff constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision), I believe that the plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's proffered reason may have been a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate both "that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment action was false and that discrimination was the real reason." [Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069] at 1072 [(8th Cir. 1998)] (emphasis added). "This burden will not be met by simply showing that the reason advanced by the employer was false; rather, [the plaintiff] must demonstrate that a discriminatory animus lies behind the defendants' neutral explanations." Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 1996). Specifically, the plaintiff "must do more than simply create a factual dispute as to the issue of pretext; he must offer sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination." Mathews v. Trilogy Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1160, 1165 (8th Cir. 1998).Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 1998).
To demonstrate pretext, the plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of Peter Pietrowski, an employee of Quebecor who served on the committee that considered the applications for one of the positions sought by the plaintiff. (See Pl.'s Index, Ex. 6, Pietrowski Aff. ¶¶ 2-6.) Pietrowski recalls that "there was an extensive discussion about Michael's medical condition and whether he was qualified for the job because of his disabilities, including his eyesight and his heart." (See id. ¶ 6.) He also states that the plaintiff was selected as "first alternate" for one of the positions, "which means he would be automatically appointed as a J-1 Apprentice if a new J-1 Opening occurred in the next 90 days." (Id. ¶ 7.) Nevertheless, when a J-1 opening arose shortly after the plaintiff's selection as alternate, the defendant moved to make a direct hire of another individual, thereby completely circumventing the selection process. (See id. ¶ 8.) Although the defendant's actions led to the filing of a grievance, and although the defendant may have promised to hire the plaintiff for a J-I Apprentice position in order to settle this grievance, the plaintiff ultimately did not receive a J-1 Apprentice position. (See id.)
The plaintiff has also submitted the deposition of Gail Schraeder, another employee of Quebecor who served on a committee that considered applications for a second position that the plaintiff sought. (See Pl.'s Index, Ex. 10, Schraeder Dep. at 12:4-15:16.) Although Schraeder thought that the plaintiff should be given the position, (see id. at 15:21-16:5), management believed that the plaintiff was not physically capable of handling the job, (see id. at 29:5-30:7).
The plaintiff's evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer that a discriminatory animus lies behind the defendant's reasons for not hiring the plaintiff. Since there is a genuine issue as to pretext, the defendant's motion for summary judgment cannot be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment, filing 25, is denied.