Opinion
B191039
5-9-2007
PIERRE GENEVIER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.
Pierre Genevier, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Jim Schiavenza, Assistant Attorney General, Richard J. Rojo and Jung D. Shin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Plaintiff and appellant Pierre Genevier appeals from the judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant and respondent State of California to appellants First Amended Complaint (FAC). Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding respondent: (1) immune from liability under Government Code section 818.8; (2) not liable under the section 815.6 exception to section 818.8; and (3) immune from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. We affirm.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review from a judgment of dismissal entered following an order sustaining a demurrer is well established. We review the order de novo to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. "We deem to be true all material facts that were properly pled. We must also accept as true those facts that may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged. We may also consider matters that may be judicially noticed, but do not accept contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (City of Morgan Hill v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 861, 869-870, citations omitted.) We independently construe relevant statutes, as their interpretation is a question of law on which we are not bound by the trial courts analysis. (Ibid.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
Appellant commenced this action on September 30, 2005, with the filing of a complaint for damages for intentional misrepresentation and negligence by three employees of respondent. As we understand it, the gravaman of the cause of action for intentional misrepresentation is that various government officials made various misrepresentations in their communications to appellant, including that appellant was not a "refugee" and therefore not eligible for Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) benefits from the County of Los Angeles (the county); appellant relied on these misrepresentations by sending "new complaints to the [California Department of Social Services (the department)] and to the governor to try to stop this nonsense." The county followed respondents compliance instructions, which caused appellant damages. The gravaman of appellants negligence cause of action is that respondent breached its duty to "review administrative wrongdoings honestly and promptly, and to encourage social services to comply with administrative decisions. . . ."
According to respondents brief, appellant first filed an action in the state court; the case was removed to the federal district court; the federal district court dismissed the case; on appeal from that dismissal, the 9th Circuit dismissed with prejudice all of the defendants, except for respondent which it dismissed without prejudice as to the misrepresentation claim only. Thus, although the FAC refers to three state employees as "defendants" (Assistant General Counsel for the State Department of Social Services, Robert Campbell; Presiding Administrative Law Judge Ronald Mendoza; and Chief Administrative Law Judge John R. Castello), respondent is the only defendant in the present action.
With the rules of appellate review in mind, we set forth the facts gleaned from the FAC:
• Appellant, a French citizen, entered the United States on a visa waiver program on April 16, 2002; he subsequently applied for political asylum.
• As part of his application for General Relief Benefits, appellant obtained verification from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated September 5, 2002, that he was legally present in the United States as a" refugee." (Complaint, Exhibit 1.1.)
• Three weeks later, appellant applied to the county for RCA benefits; his application was approved. But two months after that, the county terminated appellants RCA benefit. Appellant requested a state hearing from the department to contest the countys action. That hearing took place on December 31, 2002, before Administrative Law Judge Casimiro U. Tolentino.
• On February 5, 2003, Judge Tolentino ordered the county to: (1) allow appellant eight months of RCA benefits effective from the date asylum was granted, crediting against that amount any benefits appellant had already received; (2) issue RCA benefits to appellant from September 5 through 24, 2002; (3) reevaluate appellants eligibility for permanent housing benefits; and (4) resolve appellants allegations of discourtesy and lack of respect by county workers. (Complaint, Exhibit 2.2.)
According to Judge Tolentinos written decision, which was incorporated into the FAC, the order was based on the finding that the county incorrectly discontinued appellants RCA benefits effective November 30, 2002, failed to determine his eligibility for Medi-Cal, effective September 5, 2002, and failed to correctly determine his eligibility for homeless assistance and permanent housing assistance, effective September 5, 2002.
• In a "Notice of Action" (NOA) dated March 13, 2003, the county notified appellant that: (1) it had re-evaluated his eligibility for RCA benefits following a March 3, 2003, interview at which appellant failed to provide INS verification of his refugee status; (2) determined that appellant had already received benefits for the period September 5 through September 24, 2002; and (3) concluded appellant was not eligible for housing assistance. (Complaint, Exhibit 3.1.) Appellant did not request a hearing on the countys actions. Instead, apparently taking the position that the March 13 NOA constituted a failure to comply with the state Administrative Law Judges order, appellant sought rehearing of that decision to challenge the countys compliance. Appellants rehearing request was denied on March 27, 2003. (Complaint, Exhibit 2.3.) A letter to appellant from a department attorney dated April 17, 2003, advised appellant of his right to petition the superior court for review.
The record does not include appellants request for rehearing or any written denial of that request. However, a letter to appellant from Assistant General Counsel Campbell that refers to the denial of appellants request for rehearing has the subject line: "Hearing No. 03 337 495" and the decision is captioned: "Hearing #023370495." Although these numbers are not identical, it appears from the context that the letter refers to the February 5, 2003 decision.
• In a separate NOA dated April 2, 2003, the county notified appellant that it had received confirmation from the INS that the designation of "refugee" on appellants Alien Status verification form dated September 5, 2002, was the result of error. Therefore, appellant was not entitled to an additional month of RCA benefits. In addition, appellant was not eligible for permanent housing assistance or CalWORKS homeless assistance payments. (Complaint, Exhibit 3.2.) Appellant filed a request for hearing on the April 2 NOA, which was scheduled for hearing on June 4, 2003. Meanwhile, the State Hearing Division notified appellant that he could only contest the INS finding with the INS.
The request for rehearing is not included in the record, but is referred to in a letter to appellant from Chief Administrative Law Judge Castello. (Complaint, Exhibit 4.2.)
• On May 5, 2003, appellant wrote to the department expressing concerns about the way Presiding Administrative Law Judge Ronald Mendoza had handled his complaints about the countys compliance with the February 5, 2003 decision.
• Chief Administrative Law Judge John R. Castello responded in a letter dated May 28, 2003, in which he explained: (1) the State Hearing Division has authority only to decide whether the local agency applied the laws and regulations correctly; the determination could only be challenged by a formal appeal to the departments legal division and to the courts; (2) Judge Tolentinos initial acceptance of appellants refugee status is not binding on the federal government and appellant must resolve the issue of his refugee status with the federal government; and (3) notwithstanding Judge Tolentinos initial determination, once the INS re-determined appellants refugee status, the county had authority to take subsequent actions in reliance on that later determination.
• In an NOA dated June 17, 2003, the county notified appellant that his general relief would be terminated effective June 30, 2003, because he was an "ineligible alien." (Complaint, Exhibit 3.2.)
• In a letter to appellant dated October 2, 2003, the departments Assistant General Counsel Robert C. Campbell responded to the following issues apparently raised by appellant in earlier letters to the Governor of the State of California: (1) the amount of RCA benefits to which he was entitled; (2) his eligibility for homeless assistance; and (3) the change in his immigration status. (Complaint, Exhibit 4.3.)
B. The Demurrer and the Trial Courts Ruling
On January 20, 2006, respondent demurred to the FAC on the grounds that: (1) the action was barred by the six month statute of limitations set forth in section 945.6; (2) respondent was absolutely immune under section 818.8 because a public entity is not liable for injury caused by negligent or intentional misrepresentations by an employee of the public entity; and (3) respondent was absolutely immune under section 818.2, subdivision (b) (§ 818.2(b)) because a public entity is not liable for actions of an employee where the employee is immune from liability and, in this case, staff attorney Campbell and Administrative Law Judges Mendoza and Castello, were immune under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.
Appellant opposed the demurrer. He argued: (1) under the doctrine of equitable tolling, the action was timely filed; (2) section 818.8 did not apply because this case falls under the section 815.6 exception for failure of the public entity to discharge a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment; and (3) the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity did not apply because the complained of acts by Campbell, Mendoza and Castello — making misrepresentations in written correspondence to appellant — were ministerial, not judicial, inasmuch as those acts were not part of the normal hearing process.
The mandatory duties identified by appellant in the FAC were those found in California Department of Social Services Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP), regulation 22-078, dealing with the countys compliance. (See FAC ¶¶ 6.1, 7.1, 10.2, 14.1 and 25.)
The trial court ruled in appellants favor in two respects: (1) it overruled respondents statute of limitations claim, finding the lawsuit was timely filed under the doctrine of equitable tolling; and (2) it overruled respondents general government immunity claim finding the case fell under the section 815.6 exception to general government immunity because appellant had sufficiently alleged a breach of a mandatory duty.
The record is somewhat confusing because the minute order in the clerks transcript is inconsistent with the trial courts pronouncements at the hearing. At the hearing, the trial court announced: "As to government immunity . . . [t]he immunity claim by [respondent] does not apply as [appellants claim] falls under the purview of [section] 815.6." (Italics added.) The minute order omits the "not" italicized in our quote from the reporters transcript; according to the minute order, the trial court found "the immunity by [respondent] does apply as it falls under the purview of [section] 815.6." As a general rule, the reporters transcript governs over the clerks transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise. (See, In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 731, fn. 4.) Here, there are no circumstances that would dictate deviation from the general rule. On the contrary, it is apparent from a careful reading of the reporters transcript that omission of the word "not" in the minute order was a clerical error.
However, the trial court sustained the demurrer on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity, observing: Respondent "is absolutely immune from this action. This is an incurable defect in [appellants] first amended complaint and thus cannot be amended which warrants a grant of the demurrer without leave to amend." Appellants motion to vacate the order of dismissal was denied. On May 4, 2006, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Found the Section 815.6 Exception to Governmental Immunity Applied
Appellant has argued in his brief that the trial court erred in concluding that respondent was immune from liability under section 818.8. But appellant misunderstands the trial courts ruling. As we have explained, the trial court actually agreed with appellant that the allegations of the complaint came within the section 815.6 exception to general governmental immunity. Since appellant prevailed in the trial court on this issue, we need not address the issue on appeal.
B. The Trial Court Properly Found Respondent Immune Under the Doctrine of Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding respondent immune from liability under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. He contends the doctrine does not apply because the misrepresentations occurred in correspondence with appellant and not during the hearing process. We find the doctrine is nevertheless applicable.
The doctrine of judicial immunity "bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judges jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. [Citation.] The judge is immune unless `he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.] [Citation.]" (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851, fn. omitted (Howard).) "The rationale behind the doctrine is twofold. First, it `protect[s] the finality of judgments [and] discourage[es] inappropriate collateral attacks. [Citation.] Second, it `protect[s] judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants. [Citation.] " (Id. at p. 852.)
Not all acts taken by judges are entitled to immunity. In Forrester v. White (1988) 484 U.S. 219 (Forrester), the United States Supreme Court distinguished between "paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court" and "administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to perform." The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity applies to the former, but not the latter. (Id. at p. 227; see also Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 851, fn. 3 ["Acts and decisions which are not judicial or adjudicative, i.e., acts and decisions performed and made by a judge which are administrative or legislative" are not subject to absolute judicial immunity.], citing Forrester, supra.) In other words, judicial immunity exists for "actions[] relating to a function normally performed by a judge and where the parties understood that they were dealing with the judge in his official capacity." (Olney v. Sacramento County Bar Assn. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 807, 811.)
"Under the concept of `quasi-judicial immunity, California courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to persons other than judges if those persons act in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. Thus, court commissioners `acting either as a temporary judge or performing subordinate judicial duties ordered by the appointing court have been granted quasi-judicial immunity. [Citation.] So also, quasi-judicial immunity from civil suits for acts performed in the exercise of their duties has been given to . . . administrative law hearing officers [citations] . . . and prosecutors [citation]. . . . As with the reason for granting judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity is given to promote uninhibited and independent decisionmaking. [Citation.]" (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pp. 852-853.)
Our own research has found no authority, and appellant cites to none, that stands for the proposition that section 815.6 acts as an exception to the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. In Lebbos v. State Bar (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 656, the court commented in dicta that, since communications in the course of a quasi-judicial proceeding are protected notwithstanding section 815.6, it can be inferred that the litigation privilege bars actions for violation of mandatory duty where the alleged violation consisted of communications in the course of a disciplinary investigation. (Id. at p. 667, fn. 4.)
Here, appellant was clearly dealing with Campbell, Mendoza and Castellano in their official capacities as Assistant General Counsel to the department, Presiding Administrative Law Judge and Chief Administrative Law Judge, respectively. Because the challenged acts by these officials — communicating with appellant in an attempt to resolve appellants concerns over the countys compliance with the February 5, 2003, decision — were performed in their quasi-judicial capacities, they are entitled to the protection of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 853.) Campbell, although not technically an administrative law judge, was communicating with appellant as a representative of the California Department of Social Services, the agency charged with overseeing the countys compliance with the Administrative Law Judges decision. In other words, like the Administrative Law Judges, Campbell was a neutral third party in appellants dispute with the county. As such, he too was entitled to the protection of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. (Cf. id. at p. 860 [quasi-judicial immunity afforded to a psychologist performing family evaluation because psychologist was a "neutral third part[y] . . . performing dispute resolution services . . . connected to the judicial process"].) Accordingly, because these individual actors are immune from liability, under section 815.2(b), respondent is immune from any derivative liability.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own costs on appeal.
Our opinion does not preclude appellant from asking the INS to clarify or adjust (as the case may be) his legal status or from re-applying for county benefits.
We concur:
COOPER, P. J.
FLIER, J.