Opinion
HHDCV176080340S
02-20-2018
General Motors, LLC v. William Burson
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Sheridan, David M., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD [#100.31.] and DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD [#108]
Sheridan, J.
The plaintiff, General Motors ,LLC, seeks an order of this court vacating a decision and award made on June 15, 2017 in favor of defendant William Burson in an arbitration proceeding conducted by the Department of Consumer Protection, Automobile Dispute Settlement Program, with respect to a dispute under Connecticut’s " Lemon Law" statute, General Statutes § 42-179. The plaintiff contends that the arbitrator exceeded his powers and rendered a decision that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The defendant has moved to confirm the arbitration award. The Department of Consumer Protection has intervened and has opposed the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award.
For the reasons set forth herein, the court finds the issues in favor of the defendant William Burson, and confirms the arbitration award.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court’s review of the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award is governed by General Statutes § § 42-181(c) and 52-418.
General Statutes § 42-181(c)(4) provides: " A review of such application shall be confined to the record of the proceedings before the arbitrator. The court shall conduct a de novo review of the questions of law raised in the application. In addition to the grounds set forth in sections 52-418 and 52-419, the court shall consider questions of fact raised in the application. In reviewing questions of fact, the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that the factual findings of the arbitrator are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the substantial rights of the moving party have been prejudiced. If the arbitrator fails to state findings or reasons for the award, or the stated findings or reasons are inadequate, the court shall search the record to determine whether a basis exists to uphold the award."
General Statutes § 52-418 provides, in pertinent part: " Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court ... shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
The court reviews the arbitrator’s findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. " [I]n determining whether an [arbitrator’s] finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer ... to the [arbitrator’s] right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part ... This limited standard of review dictates that, [w]ith regard to questions of fact, it is [not] the function of the trial court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the [arbitrator]." (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, 247 Conn. 274, 282, 722 A.2d 1205 (1998). " [E]vidence is sufficient to sustain ... [a] finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred ... The fact that a possibility exists that two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the arbitrators’ finding from being supported by substantial evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burns v. General Motors Corp., 80 Conn.App. 146, 152, 833 A.2d 934, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 909, 840 A.2d 1170 (2003). " Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred ... This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review." Lawrence v. Dep’t of Energy & Envtl. Prot., 178 Conn.App. 615, 637 (2017).
As to questions of law, the court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the arbitrator correctly applied the law. This also pertains to claims that the arbitrator has exceeded his powers by failing to adhere to the statute compelling arbitration. " Where the parties arbitrate pursuant to statute, the statute itself defines the powers of the arbitrators. Any deviation by the arbitrators from the statutory bounds under which they operate would indicate that they had ‘exceeded their powers,’ a basis for vacating any offending part of the award, under General Statutes 52-418(a)(4)." (Internal citations omitted.) Chrysler Corporation v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 591, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989).
II. THE ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS
The arbitrator in this case issued his decision in favor of the defendant/consumer, awarding a refund and exchange of the subject vehicle, based upon his findings that:
the consumer had reported a defect described as a " malfunctioning of the GPS navigation system" ;
the consumer had " presented substantial evidence that the defect existed, was not successfully repaired, and continued to exist" ;
the defect " was subject to a reasonable number of repair attempts during the first 24,000 miles" ;
the defect " could cause a seriously dangerous accident to occur [and therefore] met the requirements of the statute for a safety-related defect." because of the defect, the consumer " was clearly not able to use the Vehicle as he had intended," and the defect " impacts the Consumer’s normal, everyday use of the Vehicle" and results in " a substantial loss of use and safety."
III. ANALYSIS
The plaintiff challenges the arbitrator’s decision on two grounds. First, it contends that the arbitrator incorrectly applied the Lemon Law in determining that the subject vehicle met the statutory requirement of an existing defect which had not been repaired after a reasonable number of repair attempts. Second, it argues that the arbitrator’s conclusion that the alleged defect substantially impairs the use, safety or value of the subject vehicle is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court will examine these arguments each on turn.
A. The Arbitrator’s Determination That a Reasonable Number of Repair Attempts Had Been Made
The Lemon Law permits a consumer to recover only where a manufacturer is unable to repair the vehicle " after a reasonable number of attempts." Gen. Stat. § 42-179(d). The plaintiff argues that there is no substantial evidence in the record that the defendant satisfied the statutory requirement that the manufacturer be provided a reasonable number of attempts to repair the alleged defect. The plaintiff bases this argument in large part upon its reading of General Statutes § § 42-179(e) and (f) as defining " precisely what constitutes a reasonable number of attempts." In the view of the plaintiff, to satisfy the " requirement" of a reasonable number of repair attempts, the consumer must provide evidence of at least four repair attempts within a period of the earlier of two (2) years or 24,000 miles.
The court disagrees. The statute does not precisely define or delineate the term " reasonable" as it applies to the number of repair attempts. Under the statute, it is " presumed" that four repairs attempts in the first two years or 24,000 miles of ownership constitutes a " reasonable" number of repair attempts. " It is to be noted that both § § 14-179(e) and (f) are couched as a presumption. This court does not read either section as foreclosing a plaintiff from proving that some other number of attempts are reasonable under the circumstances. Rather, the specifications of the statute merely provide a formulation that, when met, can eliminate contests over reasonableness of a consumer’s attempts to obtain satisfaction through repairs." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. Avidan, 1991 WL 126041, at *2 (Conn.Super.Ct. June 25, 1991).
Construing the statute as a whole to effect its remedial purpose, the court concludes that § 42-179(e) sets forth certain criteria where a reasonable number of repair attempts will be presumed, but the only minimum " requirement" is the logical condition that the manufacturer must be allowed at least one repair attempt. If the consumer has made one repair attempt and less than four (or two, if it is a safety-related defect), then it is up to the arbitrator to decide if the number of attempts was " reasonable." The only " requirement" as to repair attempts under § 42-179 is that there be a reasonable number of repair attempts under the circumstances.
The court acknowledges that the arbitrator erroneously stated in his decision that the plaintiff had satisfied the statutory presumption for eligibility, when in fact there had only been three repair attempts within the first 24,000 miles. But that does not end the analysis. As explained above, there was at least one repair attempt made- but less than four- within 24,000 miles and under those circumstances, the question of whether a reasonable number of repair attempts has been made is left to the arbitrator. The arbitrator was well within his authority to find that the vehicle was eligible for Lemon Law relief even if the statutory presumption had not been met.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the arbitrator’s finding that reasonable repair attempts were made under all the circumstances. The arbitrator noted that the defendant did not have the opportunity to use the navigation system for several months after taking ownership of the vehicle. His earliest experience with the GPS malfunction appears to have occurred in Miami, Florida in early 2016. The defendant testified that he attempted to bring the vehicle in for repair to a Florida GM dealer at that time, but was unable to secure a service appointment before his return to Connecticut in March 2016. As a result the first GPS system repair attempt occurred at 11,591 miles. Over the next thirteen months, there were four more repair attempts, with three of them occurring over a three-week period in April of 2017. Mr. Cantalini, the Service Advisor for Gallagher Buick GMC, testified that during the three service visits that occurred in the three-week period in April 2017 (just as the vehicle was passing 24,000 total miles), Gallagher Buick GMC service personnel conducted multiple extended test drives of the vehicle totaling more than 200 miles.
" Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." Lawrence v. Dep’t of Energy & Envtl. Prot., supra, 178 Conn.App. at 637. The record demonstrates that the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to secure a repair in Florida after becoming aware of the defect and persisted with three subsequent repair attempts over a period of thirteen months and 12,400 miles, and two subsequent repair attempts only a matter of weeks after passing 24,000 total miles On the basis of such evidence, the arbitrator could rationally conclude that under the circumstances, the number of repair attempts was " reasonable" within the meaning of the Lemon Law statute.
B. The Arbitrator’s Finding that the Defect Substantially Impairs the Use, Safety or Value of the Subject Vehicle
The plaintiff contends that there is no evidence in the record to support the arbitrator’s finding that the GPS navigation system malfunction substantially impairs the use, safety or value of the defendant’s vehicle. The plaintiff’s arguments that the " overwhelming evidence" that it presented at the arbitration hearing showing no impairment of use was found " not persuasive" or was not addressed, or was " discounted" by the arbitrator, are unavailing. This court must defer to the arbitrator’s right to believe or disbelieve, credit or reject, any items of evidence presented at the hearing. General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, supra, 247 Conn. at 282.
" Under the Lemon Law, the standard for determining whether a defect substantially impairs the use, safety or value of a motor vehicle is both subjective, focusing on the consumer’s desire, needs and circumstances, and objective, focusing on whether these desires, needs and circumstances are reasonable." GM v. Rotundo, 2000 WL 1918058, Dec. 14, 2000 (Schuman, J.) at *1, citing Dohmann, supra, 247 Conn. at 291.
The evidence relating to the navigation system’s operation demonstrated a propensity for suddenly and unexpectedly placing the driver and the occupants of the vehicle in danger by freezing up, giving the wrong location, issuing commands in a garbled voice or speaking " gibberish," or commanding the driver to make turns onto roads that did not exist, or incorrectly navigating the vehicle to unsafe or inconvenient locations. From an objective standpoint, any one of these malfunctions, even in a vehicle traveling at moderate speed, could lead to an accident and therefore substantially impairs the " safety" of the vehicle.
From a subjective standpoint, there was substantial evidence in the record to establish that the defendant purchased the vehicle with the GPS navigation system for the purpose of safely and efficiently navigating in unfamiliar surroundings, such as in Miami, Florida, Washington, D.C, or on a cross-country trip. These subjective desires of the defendant in this case seem eminently reasonable, indeed, they are obviously the reason why any purchaser of a motor vehicle would desire a GPS navigation system. If the GPS navigation system does not function as intended, the driver cannot- without taking redundant measures- navigate safely and efficiently in unfamiliar surroundings, and therefore his use of the vehicle is impaired.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff argues that the arbitrator had no basis to conclude that defendant’s " use" of his vehicle was " impaired" because, in effect, the mechanical function of the vehicle was not affected and the driver eventually " got where he was going." In this vein, at the argument of this matter, plaintiff’s counsel dismissed the GPS navigation system as a mere " convenience feature." This argument hardly merits consideration. The arbitrator’s finding was that that a consumer was " impaired" in the use of his vehicle, not completely prevented from using his vehicle. By any objective or subjective measure, the evidence demonstrated that the erratic and unreliable performance of the factory-installed GPS system substantially impaired the " use" of the subject vehicle- so much so that the defendant testified that he chose not to use it for the primary purpose for which had been purchased (i.e., traveling about the country).
This court, in reviewing the record of proceedings before the arbitrator, concludes that the arbitrator’s finding that the GPS navigation system malfunction substantially impairs the use, safety or value of the subject vehicle is supported by substantial evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
As stated herein, this court finds that the factual findings of the arbitrator are supported by substantial evidence in the underlying record and that the arbitrator correctly applied the law in finding that the vehicle was eligible for recovery under the Lemon Law and that the defect substantially impaired the use, safety or value of the vehicle. Therefore, the defendant’s application to confirm the arbitration award is granted, and the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award is denied.