Opinion
Civil No. 05-1001 (GAG).
May 29, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. The matter is before the court on Defendants (motion for reconsideration. In this motion, Defendants ask the court to reconsider its previous dismissal of Defendants (counterclaim. After carefully reexamining the pertinent law, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants (motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 91).
I. Standard of Review
II. Legal Analysis A. Abuse of Process Claim
5960Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc.993 F.2d 281284Villanueva-Mendez v. Vazquez360 F.Supp.2d 320322See Rivera Surillo Co. v. Falconer Glass. Indus. Inc.37 F.3d 2529F.D.I.C. Ins. Co. v. World University, Inc. 978 F.2d 10 16 Cherena v. Coors Brewing Co. 20 F.Supp2d 282286National Metal Finishing Com. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc.899 F.2d 119123
Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conduct in filing and prosecuting this complaint constitutes a continuing tort, which tolled the statute of limitations. The court need not decide this issue because it finds that Defendants (counterclaim for abuse of process is a compulsory counterclaim.
Under Puerto Rico law, ([a] cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues when the complaint which was allegedly filed without probable cause and with malice is dismissed." Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 913 F.Supp 655, 659 (D.P.R. 1995) (citingGuzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1994)). Arguing that an abuse of process claim is similar to a claim for malicious prosecution, Defendants contend that the statute of limitations on their abuse of process claim has not began to run because the court has not dismissed the present complaint. The court disagrees. A claim for abuse of process differs from a malicious prosecution claim in one important respect. To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege that a civil action ended in plaintiff's favor. See Fonseca v. Oyola, 77 D.P.R. 525, 528 (1954). However, such requirement is absent from an abuse of process claim. See Gonzalez Rucci v. U.S. I.N.S., 405 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that the two basic elements of an abuse of process claim under Puerto Rico law are a bad motive and use of the legal process for improper, collateral objective). Therefore, the court cannot conclude that the limitations period on Defendants (abuse of process claim has not begun to run.
To avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's filing of this complaint tolled the limitations period of their counterclaim because an abuse of process claim is a compulsory counterclaim. The court did not reach this argument in its prior opinion because Defendants (opposition to Plaintiff's motion to dismiss raised the compulsory counterclaim argument in the context of their malicious prosecution claim, which the court dismissed on other grounds. ([T]he institution of plaintiff's suit tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations governing a compulsory counterclaim. (6 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1419 at 109 (1977). A counterclaim is compulsory if the claim (arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim . . . ( Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a). The Supreme Court has stated that the transaction or occurrence standard is to be read broadly. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n. 1 (1974).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's claim arises out Defendants (alleged tortious interference with Plaintiff's business expectancy. Defendants (counterclaim arises out of the filing and prosecution of this complaint, which Defendants maintain is an abuse of process meant to force the Defendants to settle a suit in state court. Because the merits of Plaintiff's tortious interference claim are necessarily significant to assess Plaintiff's possible ulterior motive, the court finds that Defendants (counterclaim arises out of the subject matter of Plaintiff's complaint. Thus, the court holds that Defendants (counterclaim for abuse of process is a compulsory counterclaim, whose statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of Plaintiff's complaint. See Carteret Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's dismissal of defendants (claims, including an abuse of process claim, because they were not asserted as compulsory counterclaims); Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 827 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an abuse of process claim is a compulsory counterclaim in the very action which allegedly is abusive); Podhorn v. Paragon Group, 795 F.2d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1961) (same). In light of the above, the court holds that Defendants (counterclaim for abuse of process is not time-barred.
Even if Defendants (abuse of process claim is timely, it must state a claim upon which relief could be granted in order to survive dismissal. To state an abuse of process claim under Puerto Rico law, a plaintiff must allege bad motive and use of the legal process for improper, collateral objective. Gonzalez Rucci, 405 F.3d at 49. Filing of a lawsuit is a (regular (use of process and a showing of bad motive in connection with regular process is insufficient to show an act of abuse. Simon v. Navon, 71 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1995). (Occasionally, however, courts will recognize a claim for abuse of process based on the initiation of a case where the action is filed for the sole purpose of forcing action in a collateral matter." Boschette v. Buck, 916 F.Supp. 91, 97 (D.P.R. 1996).
Here, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff abused the legal process by filing and prosecuting this complaint. To support this allegation, Defendants pleaded the following. On August 22, 1997, Defendants filed a breach of contract suit against Plaintiff before the Commonwealth Court of First Instance, San Juan Section (the (CFI(). As part of those proceedings, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Defendants (attorney claiming that the Professional Services Contract between Defendants and their attorney is illegal and unethical. The CFI denied Plaintiff's motion to disqualify and entered partial summary judgment in Defendants (favor. On June 28, 2004, Plaintiff threatened to sue Defendants if they did not settle the Puerto Rico lawsuit. As soon as Defendants rejected Plaintiff's last settlement proposal, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 2, 2004. In this action, Plaintiff alleges, as it unsuccessfully did before the CFI, that the Professional Services Contract between Defendants and their attorney is illegal and unethical. On September 22, 2005, the Puerto Rico Appellate Court affirmed the CFI and held that the Professional Services Contract is not illegal, unethical or improper. Accepting all facts affirmatively alleged by Defendants as true, the court finds that Defendants sufficiently pleaded bad motive and no conceivable proper purpose when they alleged that Plaintiff threatened to sue Defendants if they did not settle the Puerto Rico lawsuit and that Plaintiff based this complaint on the Professional Services Contract which the Puerto Rico Appellate Court has upheld as valid. In light of the above, the court holds that it committed error when it dismissed Defendants (abuse of process claim.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The court dismissed Defendants (malicious prosecution claim because Defendants cannot allege that a civil action ended in their favor. On their motion for reconsideration, Defendants ask the court to dispense with this element of a malicious prosecution claim for reasons of judicial efficiency. The court declines this invitation. Defendants have not cited to any case, nor has this court's own search found one, where a court has allowed a party to assert a malicious prosecution claim before a civil action ended in his favor. On the contrary, this court's own precedent suggests that this court would not follow Defendants (suggestion. See Boschette, 916 F.Supp. at 100 (noting that if (defendant Buck's counterclaim is one of malicious prosecution based on a prior civil case, it is equally without merit since no prior civil case has been adjudicated in his favor").
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants (motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 91) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The court, however, notes that Defendants (malicious prosecution claim is dismissed without prejudice, as the same is not ripe because no judgment in this case has been entered.
SO ORDERED.