Opinion
A-13308
07-28-2021
JASON GEISLER, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Jane Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Clyde Ed Sniff en Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court Trial Court No. 3PA-14-02564 CI, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Jonathan A. Woodman, Judge.
Jane Martinez, Law Office of Jane B. Martinez, LLC, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Clyde "Ed" Sniff en Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOLLENBERG, JUDGE.
In 2004, following a jury trial, Jason Geisler was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery for his role in taking money and a car from three people at gunpoint. At the trial, one of Geisler's co-defendants, Shannon Stenhoff, testified against Geisler as part of a plea agreement with the State. Stenhoff testified that Geisler had participated in the robberies.
AS 11.41.500(a)(1).
For a more detailed description of Geisler's trial, see our decision in Geisler's direct appeal: Geisler v. State, 2005 WL 3883159, at *2-3, *7-8 (Alaska App. Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished).
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Geisler's convictions, but we remanded for resentencing. Geisler was resentenced in November 2006; he did not file an appeal from his resentencing.
Id. at *4-12.
In October 2014, Geisler filed an application for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had newly discovered evidence. He provided the court with a typed, notarized statement by Stenhoff and a handwritten letter purportedly from Stenhoff. In both statements, Stenhoff recanted his trial testimony.
AS 12.72.010(4). Neither party has addressed the timeliness of the application under AS 12.72.020(b)(2), and we have no need to do so, given our resolution of this appeal.
The State and Geisler then deposed Stenhoff. At the deposition, Stenhoff reaffirmed his trial testimony. He stated that he was in custody when he made his recantations, and that he did so after he and his family were threatened. Stenhoff explained that he was not currently in custody, nor was he in custody during the trial.
The superior court held a hearing on Geisler's post-conviction relief application, in which Stenhoff s deposition was admitted into evidence. No additional evidence was presented at the hearing.
In a written order, the superior court denied Geisler's application. The court analyzed the evidence before it in light of the test for a new trial announced by the Alaska Supreme Court in Salinas v. State. Under Salinas:
Salinas v. State, 373 P.2d 512, 514 (Alaska 1962).
A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence has to meet the following requirements: (1) It must appear from the motion that the evidence relied on is, in fact, newly discovered, i.e., discovered after the trial; (2) the motion must allege facts from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) must be material to the issues involved; and (5) must be such as, on a new trial, would probably produce an acquittal.
Id. (quoting Pitts v. United States, 263 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1959)). We have held that the Salinas test applies to newly-discovered evidence claims raised in an application for post-conviction relief. Lewis v. State, 901 P.2d448, 450 (Alaska App. 1995). We have also said that a more stringent standard applies to new-evidence claims raised in an untimely application, noting that the exception to the statute of limitations set out in AS 12.72.020(b)(2) requires that the applicant prove his innocence, rather than that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal. See State v. Finney, 2001 WL 1448756, at *4 (Alaska App. Nov. 14, 2001) (unpublished). But see Simpson v. State, 2008 WL 4757150, at *2 (Alaska App. Oct. 29, 2008) (unpublished) (addressing, but not resolving, the meaning of the "innocence" standard set out in AS 12.72.020(b)(2)). Because the superior court determined that Geisler did not meet the less stringent of these standards, we have no need to determine which standard should apply.
The superior court found that Stenhoff s statements in his deposition were more reliable than the recanting statements he made while incarcerated, that a jury probably would not acquit based on Stenhoff s recanting statements, and that, given Stenhoff s reaffirmation of his trial testimony in his deposition, Stenhoff s recanting statements were merely impeaching.
Our decision in Ahvakana v. State is directly on point. After Ahvakana was convicted, his co-defendant made statements recanting his trial testimony against Ahvakana. At a hearing on Ahvakana's motion for new trial based on these statements, the co-defendant reaffirmed his trial testimony, and the trial court denied the motion for a new trial. We affirmed, explaining:
Ahvakana v. State, 768 P.2d 631 (Alaska App. 1989).
Id. at 632.
Id.
Generally, when a witness recants inculpatory testimony, but reaffirms his or her inculpatory testimony at a hearing on a motion for a new trial or by affidavit, courts do not hesitate to deny a new trial, especially when the witness has been influenced to recant by friends or family of the accused.
Id. at 633; see also Simmons v. State, 1991 WL 11650692, at *6-7 (Alaska App. Mar. 20, 1991) (unpublished) (relying on Ahvakana in affirming denial of a new trial when a witness against the defendant recanted his trial testimony to the defense attorney, but reaffirmed his trial testimony at a hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial).
This case is materially indistinguishable from Ahvakana. Here, the court found that Stenhoff made his recanting statements while under duress, and that these statements did "not have the same indicia of reliability as Mr. Stenhoff s sworn statements during trial and the deposition." We generally defer to a trial court's credibility determinations, as it is the function of the trial court, not this Court, to weigh witness credibility.
Knutson v. Knutson, 973 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Alaska 1999); see also Alexie v. State, 402 P.3d 416, 418 (Alaska App. 2017) (recognizing that, in a post-conviction relief proceeding, "[w]hen material facts are contested, the trial court must hear the evidence and determine which assertions of fact are more credible").
The superior court further found that the jury was unlikely to acquit Geisler based on Stenhoff s recanting statements, when compared to his live testimony and deposition. The court found that there was substantial circumstantial evidence that supported Stenhoff s testimony that Geisler had participated in the robberies: Geisler matched the description of one of the suspects that the robbery victims had given to the police; Geisler's car matched the victims' description of a car used by one of the suspects; and, when the police attempted to pull Geisler over the day after the robberies, he fled on foot following a high-speed car chase, before ultimately surrendering. Geisler does not challenge the court's findings regarding this evidence. The court found this other inculpatory evidence "credible" and concluded that, in light of the totality of the evidence that would be presented at a new trial, Stenhoff s recantations did not undermine the State's case in such a significant way as to likely produce an acquittal.
See James v. State, 84 P.3d 404, 406-07 (Alaska 2004) (holding that when a defendant requests a new trial based upon an alleged recantation, the trial court must assess not only the credibility of the recantation testimony but also the likely impact of that new evidence in light of the totality of the evidence to be presented at a new trial); see also Mooney v. State, 167 P.3d 81, 90-91 (Alaska App. 2007) (discussing James, 84 P.3d at 407).
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Geisler's post-conviction request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
See Hensel v. State, 604 P.2d 222, 235 & n.55 (Alaska 1979) (applying the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the denial of a post-conviction request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.