Opinion
2012-08-22
Laura GEARY, appellant, v. CHURCH OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, respondent.
Edelman Krasin & Jaye, PLLC (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Michael H. Zhu], of counsel), for appellant. Murphy & Higgins LLP, New Rochelle, N.Y. (Dan Schiavetta, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
Edelman Krasin & Jaye, PLLC (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & De Cicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaac and Michael H. Zhu], of counsel), for appellant. Murphy & Higgins LLP, New Rochelle, N.Y. (Dan Schiavetta, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, ARIEL E. BELEN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), entered April 25, 2011, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and against her on the issue of liability, and upon the denial of her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the defendant and against her, dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell on a defect in the sidewalk abutting premises owned by the defendant. Following a jury trial on the issue of liability, the jury found that the defendant was not negligent, and judgment was entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint.
For a reviewing court to determine that a jury's verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, it must conclude that there is “simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict “on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” ( Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145;see Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 664 N.Y.S.2d 252, 686 N.E.2d 1346;Guclu v. 900 Eighth Ave. Condominium, LLC, 81 A.D.3d 592, 592, 916 N.Y.S.2d 147). In addition, a jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 746, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163;Chavanne v. BZL Cleaning Solution, Inc., 84 A.D.3d 852, 853, 923 N.Y.S.2d 175;Piazza v. Corporate Bldrs. Group, Inc., 73 A.D.3d 1006, 1006–1007, 900 N.Y.S.2d 673). Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors ( see Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d at 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145;Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 133, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184). “ ‘It is for the jury to make determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses, and great deference in this regard is accorded to the jury, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses' ” ( Jean–Louis v. City of New York, 86 A.D.3d 628, 629, 928 N.Y.S.2d 310, quoting Exarhouleas v. Green 317 Madison, LLC, 46 A.D.3d 854, 855, 847 N.Y.S.2d 866;see Salony v. Mastellone, 72 A.D.3d 1060, 1061, 901 N.Y.S.2d 87).
Applying these principles here, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, and a fair interpretation of the evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant was not negligent ( see Loughren v. County of Ulster, 75 A.D.3d 976, 977, 906 N.Y.S.2d 384;Muniz v. New York City Tr. Auth., 30 A.D.3d 388, 389–390, 816 N.Y.S.2d 561).
We agree with the plaintiff that the Supreme Court erred in precluding her from introducing into evidence certain photographs ( see People v. Patterson, 93 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 688 N.Y.S.2d 101, 710 N.E.2d 665;People v. Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343, 347, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913, 308 N.E.2d 435). However, this error was harmless, as there is no indication that the evidence would have had a substantial influence on the result of the trial ( seeCPLR 2002; Parlante v. Cavallero, 73 A.D.3d 1001, 1003, 900 N.Y.S.2d 749;Milone v. Milone, 266 A.D.2d 363, 698 N.Y.S.2d 173).