Opinion
CIV-22-713-PRW
05-08-2023
JOE LURUE GARRETT, JR. Plaintiff, v. TURN-KEY HEALTH SERVICES, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Having reviewed the sufficiency of the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
I. Background Information
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 17, 2022. Doc. No. 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff explained that he was previously held in the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) as a pretrial detainee. He purported to assert claims under the Eighth Amendment based on allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement, including but not limited to blood and feces on walls, a staff shortage that created dangerous living conditions, a lack of proper medical attention, and failure to do site checks. Doc. No. 1 at 6-8; Doc. No. 1-1 at 1-2. Plaintiff named “Greg Williams, Oklahoma County Jail Trust” and “Oklahoma County Seat” as Defendants. Doc. No. 1 at 4, 6, 7.
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Amend, in which he indicated his intention to assert an additional claim under the Eighth Amendment based on a lack of adequate medical care. Doc. No. 10-1. Plaintiff explained that his hand was injured in an altercation with a fellow inmate and that he believed it was broken. Id. He further explained that someone in the medical department performed an x-ray of his hand and then sent him back to his pod with no further treatment. Id. Plaintiff stated that his hand remained painful and extremely swollen. Id. He spoke with the “pill line nurse” who told him there was nothing they could do but advised him to submit a medical request. Plaintiff stated that he submitted four such requests and did not receive a response. Id. He named Turn Key Health Services as the only Defendant for this claim. Id.
On March 21, 2023, the Court granted his request to amend, explaining that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), Plaintiff had the right to amend his Complaint one time without leave of Court. Doc. No. 15. The Court also discussed certain deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint and proposed amended claims. Id. After explaining these deficiencies, the Court provided Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint.
On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 16. He purported to assert claims under the Fourteenth Amendment based again on allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement and a lack of proper medical attention. Id. at 9-12. Construing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint broadly, Plaintiff named the following as Defendants: Greg Williams, the former OCDC Jail Administrator; the Oklahoma County Jail Trust; the Oklahoma Board of County Commissioners; and Turn-Key Services, Inc. Id. at 2, 3, 5, 6. The Court again issued an Order explaining certain deficiencies within Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and providing an opportunity to submit a Second Amended Complaint. Doc. No. 17.
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 28, 2023. Doc. No. 18. Therein, Plaintiff purports to assert claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and names the following as Defendants: Turn-Key Health Services, Board of County Commissioners for the County of Oklahoma, Oklahoma County Trust Authority, Sergeant Bean, CO Little Thunder, CO Wilson, Lieutenant Washington, Sergeant Haines, and Nurse for Turn-Key Health Services. Id. at 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10-12.
II. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). After conducting an initial review, the court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it presenting claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In conducting this review, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory[.]” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
III. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Because an amended complaint supersedes the previous complaint, see Thundathil v. Sessions, 709 Fed.Appx. 880, 884 (10th Cir. 2017), Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint must be sufficient, standing alone, to support his asserted claims. See Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “an amended complaint super[s]edes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect” (quotations omitted)). In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical attention upon a broken right hand. Doc. No. 18 at 7-8. Specifically, Plaintiff states:
Inadequate medical attention after I got an x-ray upon my right hand was proving to be broke. By prison doctor in their response to prisoner need or by prison guards in intentionlly [sic] denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with treatment.Id. at 8.
As previously explained to Plaintiff, the United States Supreme Court has held that an inmate advancing an Eighth Amendment claim based on inadequate provision of medical care must establish “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs[.]” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard based on lack of medical care has two components: “an objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently serious; and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991). With respect to the subjective component, a prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless that official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The analysis of Plaintiff's rights as a pre-trial detainee for conditions of confinement claims under the Fourteenth Amendment is generally the same as that of an inmate under the Eighth Amendment. See Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (“In determining whether appellant's [Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement] rights were violated, [] we apply an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases brought pursuant to § 1983.”), abrogated in part on other grounds, Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir.2020).
Plaintiff's allegations are not sufficient to satisfy the subjective component of such a deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff does not identify with any clarity the individual or individuals who performed an x-ray but did not provide further treatment, nor to whom he has requested medical treatment and was then ignored.
Moreover, “[p]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a [§] 1983 claim.” Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff's factual allegations supporting his claim do not refer to any actions by or omissions of an individual defendant. Although he names individual Defendants, Plaintiff's allegations are collectively vague, at best. Even liberally construed, Plaintiff's Complaint does not “identify specific actions taken by particular defendants[.]” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
In Pahls, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that a plaintiff's “undifferentiated contention that ‘defendants' infringed his rights” is insufficient to state a § 1983 claim because “a plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.” Id. “Because § 1983 . . . [actions] are vehicles for imposing personal liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants. ‘[I]t is particularly important' that plaintiffs ‘make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, . . . as distinguished from collective allegations.'” Id. at 1225 (quoting Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011)). Without specific allegations regarding an identified individual defendant that knew of and disregarded risks to Plaintiff's health and/or safety, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In Plaintiff's second claim, he asserts that gang affiliated inmates were placed into a pod with inmates who were not gang affiliated, leading to an August 13, 2022 altercation in which Plaintiff's hand was broken. Doc. No. 18 at 9. These allegations implicate a failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similar to Plaintiff's inadequate medical care claim above, a failure to protect claim is comprised of two elements. First, an inmate “must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, the inmate must establish that the prison official has a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that he or she is deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety. Id. (quotation omitted). The prison official's state of mind is measured by a subjective, rather than an objective, standard. Id. at 837. That is, the official must “both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
Plaintiff does not include any allegations indicating that an individual defendant knew or should have known that they were placing a gang affiliated inmate into a pod with non-affiliated inmates, nor that doing so placed Plaintiff at a substantial risk of harm. Also, like Plaintiff's previous claim, he does not identify an action on the part of a Defendant that resulted in this alleged constitutional violation, thereby failing to establish personal participation on the part of a Defendant in this matter. Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1225-26; Bennett, 545 F.2d at 1262-63. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations do not sufficiently set forth a failure to protect claim and the same should be dismissed.
IV. Oklahoma County Trust Authority
As noted, Plaintiff has named the Oklahoma County Trust Authority (“Trust Authority”) as a Defendant in this matter. Under Oklahoma law, a public trust such as the Trust Authority is a distinct legal entity, and its activities and obligations are determined by the written instrument under which it was created. Okla. Stat. tit. 60, § 176 et seq. This Court has previously recognized that the Trust Authority is the ultimate operator of the OCDC. Hickey v. Okla. Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CIV-20-1291-R, 2022 WL 845319, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 29, 2022). However, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations that demonstrate the Trust Authority was responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, and therefore the Court should dismiss his action.
Section 1983 does not authorize respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Consequently, Plaintiff must allege a factual basis for the Trust Authority's liability to state a claim pursuant to § 1983. Id. To do so, Plaintiff must plausibly plead that “the unconstitutional actions of an employee were representative of an official policy or custom of the municipal institution, or were carried out by an official with final policy making authority with respect to the challenged action.” Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001)).
There are five ways to establish an official policy or custom sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on a municipal jail trust: (1) actions of the municipal legislative body; (2) policies of the board pursuant to authority delegated by the legislative body; (3) actions by those with final decision-making authority; (4) policies of inadequate training or supervision; and (5) custom. Smith v. Rogers Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. 05-CV-0138-CVE-SAJ, 2005 WL 3298981, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2005). Here, the Second Amended Complaint does not identify any act or omission by the Trustees acting on behalf of the Trust Authority, or any policy or practice of the Trust Authority itself, that was the “moving force” behind Plaintiff's alleged unconstitutional treatment. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Trust Authority and his claims should be dismissed.
V. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Oklahoma
Plaintiff's claims, as alleged, also fail against Defendant Board of County Commissioners. Because the doctrine of respondeat superior or vicarious liability does not apply in § 1983 cases, Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013), Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that a county policy caused the alleged constitutional violation. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011). Official policy includes “the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Id. at 61. Plaintiff does not allege facts in the Second Amended Complaint that plausibly demonstrate that a county policy was responsible for the alleged constitutional violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Board of County Commissioners for the County of Oklahoma should also be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Plaintiff's action be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, based upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by May 30th , 2023, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not addressed herein is deemed denied.